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Grußwort
an die Teilnehmer des zehnten Colloquiums
vom 14.-16. Mai 1976 in Chicago.
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Denkende grüßen einander, indem sie sich gegenseitig
Fragen
stellen.
Die Frage, mi t der ich Sie grüße, ist die einzige, die ich bis zu
dieser Stunde immer fragender zu fragen versuche. Man kennt
sie u n ter dem Titel ››die Seinsfrage<<.
Sie kann für uns zunächst nur auf dem Wege einer Erörterung der abendländisch-europäischen Metaphysik gefragt werden, und zwar im Hinblick auf die in dieser vom Anfang her
waltenden Seinsvergessenheit.
Im metaphysischen Fragen nach dem Sein des Seienden verbirgt sich das Sein selbst hinsichtlich seiner Eigentümlichkeit
und Ortschaft.
Dieses Sichverbergen des Seins ist in den einzelnen Epochen
verschieden (vgl. Holzwege. Der Spruch des Anaximander,
S. 296 ff.).
_
Die Seinsvergessenheit ist im Zeitalter der
technologisch geprägten Weltzivilisation für das Fragen der Seinsfrage in einer
besonderen Weise bedrängend.
Aus der Vielfalt der hier nötigen Fragen sei die folgende ge1
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nannt

Ist die neuzeitliche Naturwissenschaft - wie man meint - die
Grundlage der modernen Technologie oder ist sie ihrerseits
schon die Grundform des technologischen
Denkens, der bestimmende Vorgriff und der ständige Eingriff des
technologischen
Vorstellens in die ausführende und einrichtende Machenschaft
der modernen Technik?
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Deren beschleunigt sich steigernde ››Efficienz« treibt die Seirıs~
Vergessenheit ins äußerste und läßt so die Seinsfrage als belanglos und überflüssig erscheinen.
Sie werden diese Frage nach dem Verhältnis der neuzeitlichen Naturwissenschaften zur modernen Technik in den wenigen Tagen des Colloquiums nicht beantworten, vermutlich
nicht einmal zureichend stellen können.
Aber es wäre schon genug und förderlich, wenn jeder der
Teilnehmer dieser Frage auf seine Weise eine Beachtung
schenkte und sie als Anregung für seinen Arbeitsbereich aufnährne.
So könnte die Seinsfrage bedrängender und erfahrbar werden
als das, was sie in Wahrheit ist:

Das Vermächtnis aus dem Anfang der Geschichte des Seins, das
in ihm und für ihn notwendig noch ungedacht geblieben ist die 'Alñßatoı als solche - in ihrer Eigentümlichkeít zu denken
und dadurch die Möglichkeit eines gewandelten Weltaufent-

halts des Menschen

Freiburg i.Br.

am 11.April 1976
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vorzubereiten.
Martin Heidegger
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POTENTIALITY, POWER AND SWAY:
FROM ARISTOTELIAN TO MODERN TO HEIDEGGERIAN PHYSICS?
RICHARD POL T
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Is technology merely applied science, or is modern science itself inherently technological? We know
that Heidegger would claim the latter. Our most important task, however, is not to rehearse
Heidegger°s claims as challenging and worthwhile as it is to interpret his many writings on this
~
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ofccurse,

on his thoughts as food for our own. I have not come far in thinking through the question of science
and technology, but here I will try to articulate the few steps that I have taken, focusing on the theme
of potentiality and power. It will be obvious that I am constantly indebted to Heidegger, and I will
refer to him at several points, but my main goal is to initiate an independent line of thought.
1. THE PROBLEM OF COMPARISON
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If we are to address the question of modern science and technology, the first step, it seems, is to
understand what is characteristic of modem Western science. This can be done only by way of
contrast to other modes of “science,” that is, ways of knowing - for only if there are other, at least
partially legitimate, ways of knowing is there any such thing as “modern Western science,” as
distinguished from science as such. We might compare Western science to Chinese science, for
instance. It may make more sense, however, to proceed as Heidegger does, by contrasting modern
and ancient Western science. After all, modern Western science defines itself in opposition to its
own predecessor. But there are many such predecessors - many modes of Westem speculation and
knowing. I must be more precise, then: when I speak of ancient science, I mean Aristotle's project
of understanding the principles and causes of beings - a project that attempted to preserve and
surpass the best of earlier Greek thinking, and that in turn seıved as a decisive influence in the
Middle Ages.
Now, what does it mean to “c0mpare” modem and Aıistotelian science? Can we simply point out
a series of different features and discuss their respective advantages? If so, what language, what
concepts, can we use asa neutral medium in which to represent those differences? One might reply
that the neutral medium is the natural medium - the concepts and words that come naturally to
anyone who is experiencing nature without prejudice. But phenomenology has taught us just how
difficult - perhaps impossible it is to be "natural" and “unprejudiced” in our description of
phenomena. As Heidegger puts it, “the °natural” is always hist0rical”~ in other words, what we take
for granted is just the residue of a historical process in which sense is constituted and configured'
If we accept this view, then what is left of our project of comparing two modes of science? Maybe
we should give up the notion of a neutral language and use two languages - one ancient, one modern.
~
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Then we can simply let the contrast between the two show itself. In this case, however, do we also
give up all right to judgment? Are we then reduced to making the innocuous observation that two
approaches are “different,” without hope of showing that one discourse, or language game, or
episteme, is truer than the other? Indeed, one of Heidegger's remarks on the topic seems to suggest
that because ancient and modem science are completely incommensurable, all judgment would be

"I

inappropriate:
[We cannot] say that the Galilean doctrine of freely falling bodies is true and that Aristot|e's teaching, that light
for the Greek understanding of the essence of body
and place and of
the relation
` '
'
between the two rests upon a difterent interpretätion o
kind of seeing and questioning of natural events. No one would presume to maintain that Shakespeare`s poetry
is more advanced than that of Aeschylus. It is still more im-possible to say that the modern understanding of
whatever is, is more correct than that of the Greeksf
hgflies striveupward, is false;

'

Do we, then, have to give up the very question of the truth of a way of doing science?
But Heidegger did not claim exactly that. He forbade us to say that the modem understanding is
more “con'ect" (richtig) than the Aristotelian understandingf Since truth, for Heidegger, is not
correctness but unconcealment, we might still be able to ask whether one or the other mode of
science goes deeper in its unconcealing of beings. We will not be able to make this judgment by
counting up the number of successful predictions made by each mode of science, or by establishing
that one approach ispractically more advantageous than the other; however, we may come to see that
the way of unconcealing that is typical of an approach is relatively rich or impoverished.
The crucial question, of course, is what "rich" and "poor" would mean here. Let me venture a
proposal. By a “rich” way of unconcealing, I mean a way that brings a qualitative plurality of
phenomena to light, that remains open to genuinely new experiences, and that makes it possible to
discern connections between human beings and other beings without reducing all beings to the saıne
level.' A "poor" way of unconcealing forces all experience into a single mold, leveling the
phenomena and making them display themselves only according to its strictures. In particular, this
way of unconcealing might tend to conceal the distinctively human features of our being,
highlighting instead certain features that we share with all beings -the ontological lowest common
denominators, such as presence at hand. This approach would lead to a reductive and crude selfunderstanding - or, for those who suspected its inadequacy, it could create a sense of a violent and
inexplicable rupture between humanity and the rest of the universe.
Even a superficial acquaintance with Heidegger's writings on science and technology makes it
clear that he sees modern science as a “poor" way of unconcealing in the sense I just explained.
Modern science, in his judgment, powerfully reveals an abundance of correct facts, but at the price
of reductiveness.
If it is fair to try to form such a judgment - a judgment about the relative richness or povcrty of
a way of unconcealing - then we do not have to give up the question of truth when we realize that
“the *natural* is always historical." Instead, we have to find a way of thinking historically about truth
as historical. Comparisons between two modes of science, two scientific discourses, might then be
g
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possible - not fi'om the secure standpoint of some neutral, ahistorical language, but with the tentative
touch of bilinguals (or polyglots) who try to venture as far as they can with the help of the languages
into which they have been initiated, always trying to push themselves and their words to their limitsf
If the project of comparing two modes of science seems provisionally legitimate, then we are
faced with a series of questions:
(l) What is the crucial difference between Aristotelian and modem science?
(2) Despite the undeniable
superior in
_ is Aristotelian science
. . productivity
_ , ofmodem science,
„
rieher?

(3) Does Aristotelian science in tum have its weaknesses - aside from its inability to generate
the theoretical and technological payoffs that are distinctive of modern science? In other
words, is there a nonmodem way of criticizing Aristotle?
(4) If we iind that both Aristotelian and modern science prove to be limited or poor in certain
respects, then can this judgment point us toward a new way of knowing - a postmodern
science, if you will?
I cannot fully answer these questions now. My proposal is, instead, that we can make some
inroads into them by focusing on the Aristotelian concept of potentiality and the modem conception
of power, and assessing the difference between them with Heidegger's help.
2. ARISTOTLE ON POTENTIALITY
Near the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics (I, 5) Aristotle lists some popular candidates for the
good: the life of pleasure, the life of moneymaking, the life of study, and the political life. To the
modern reader it may well seem that he has left out an important candidate: the life of power. The
closest relative to such a life in Aristotle”s list is the life of politics - but he tells us that its goal is
either honor or, of all things, virtue. Why is power not even worth mentioning as a possible ultimate

goal?
The answer, I think, is that Aristotle would dismiss the power~seeking life for much the same
reason that he dismisses the moneymaking life. Money is essentially a means to an end - it is
extremely useful, but it is good only if it is used. It proves its value only in its own disappearance,
only in the event in which it is replaced by some further good.6 Similarly, power is the capacity to
do something, and it is only an indispensable means to this end, not the end itself. In fact, the
possession of money is only a special case of power. Power need not use itself up in its use, as
money normally does (my power to teach is not destroyed by my act of teaching). But power always
has its being only asa way to some further goal. To anyone who said, “Power is the good,” Aristotle
would reply, “The power to do what?” And he would point out that this “what,” whatever it might
be, would necessarily be a higher good than the power to do it.
In the Politics, too, Aristotle avoids granting power a paramount status. He distinguishes among
various types of rule - such as the rule of master over slave, of husband over wife, and of a political
leader over fellow citizens ~ insisting that each is different in kind and has its own distinctive end
(Pol. I, l-2). To those who view the goal of politics as domination, he replies that they are confusing
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political rule with rule over slaves (Pol. VII, 2). Even in the case of rule over slaves, the goal of this
rule is not “sheer power,” as wemight call it, but the furthering of the master's praxis of living well
(Pol. I, 4, l254a7). The point is that power is always the power to achieve some particular end, and
there is no such thing as power per se, or power for its own sake regardless of its further purpose.
As insightful as these thoughts might be in regards to human action, they are rooted in an
interpretation of being that far exceeds ethics and politics. Given Aristotle's understanding of being,
the very notions of “power in itself” and “power for its own sake” are ontologically incoherent. We
need only r e c a
h v s i c s .
Aristotle
does
not
have
a finished system, I suggest that if there is a master concept in
Although
his thought it is actuality - energeia or entelecheía. (Heidegger calls entelecheia “the fundamental
word of [Aristotle`s] thinking.”)7 The concept is so primordial that it cannot be defined (Met. Ø, 6),
but in rough terms, it indicates being-at-work - the perfomance of the function (ergon) that is the
distinctive end (telos) of a certain kind of thing and is thus crucial to the thing°s fonn or essence.
(This is, at least, the central meaning - for there may be as many meanings of actuality as there are
meanings of being [Met. A, 7, 1017bl-3].) In more Heideggerian tenns, entelecheia is “standing~inthe-work in the sense of presencing into the appearance”: in actuality (if we may keep the traditional
translation), the entity comes forth, emerges as what it is.“
Actuality's helpmate is dynamis, potentiality - or as Heidegger suggests we should call it,
appropriatenessf' Aristotle insists that potentiality has being ~ it is not nothing (Mer. (9, 3) but also
that it is subordinate to actuality. Actuality is prior to potentiality in three ways. Every potential
being (say, a chicken egg) is generated by an actual being of the same kind (in this case, a mature
chicken); the potential being is intelligible only in tenns of the actual being; and the potential being
possesses the form less than the actual being does (Met. (9, 8). To sum al] this up in a way that
Heidegger would prefer, we can say that those beings that are apt to come forth yet have not fully
'°
emerged into presence are less complete in their presencing than those that have fully emerged. The
principle seems círcular, almost tautological - but perhaps this is the case with all first principles,
and we should not conñıse being círcular with being inconsequenti al. The implications of the priority
of the actual over the potential pervade Aristotle's thought ~ fi'om ethics to physics, from biology
to theology. If, for instance, there is no place in Aristotelian ethics and politics for power as an end
in itself, this isbecause dynamis -the potential, or if you prefer, appropriateness for a certain work
- is subordinate to energeia -the performance of this work.
Let's continue to explore the principle of the priority of actuality over potentiality by tuming to
Aristotle's Physics. Here he considers the realm of the beings that are intıinsically subject to motion,
where “motion" (kinesis) is undeıstood broadly, encompassing not only local motion (change of
place) but also change of quality, quantity and form. Aristotle's most general definition of motion
is, notoriously, that it is the actuality ofthe potential insofar as it is potential (Phys. III, 1). I take this
to mean, for example, that before I walk from Central Park to Times Square, I have the potential to
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do so, but the potential is not being actualized. After I have walked to Times Square, the potential
is not being actualized either - for I am actually there already. The motion, then, is precisely the
process during which my potential to walk from Central Park to Times Square is being actualized
as potential: it is unfolding itself, displaying itself in its capability. In Heideggerian language, to
move is to come to presence.“
Coming to presence, however, always remains subordinate to full presence. To put it in a formula,
“becoming is for the sake of being” (De Partibus Animalium, I, 1, 640a19). In particular, motion is
subordinate to the active actuality thaFArisñtle in some contexts calls praxis. Winesis, or motion,
tends intrinsically toward its own termination - for just as money is fulfilled in being spent, motion
is fulfilled when it is consummated and consumed in actuality (for example, when I reach Times
Square). Apraxis, however, is ongoing even when it is fully actualized. According to Aristotle, such
activities include seeing and thinking (Met. G), 6, 1048b3()-35). The act of seeing is fulfilled at every
moment in which it goes on; it does not tend toward its own tennination, and thus is not a motion.
In short, seeing and thinking are ends in themselves - and for Aristotle, this is not a “value
judgment” but an ontological truth.“
The question of praxis takes us full circle to Aristotle's ethics and politics: any behavior that must
be understood as kinesis rather than praxis - for example, the production of useful things and the
rechne that guides it - is inferior to praxis, is “slavísh” (Pol. III, 4, l277a36). It should thus be
assigned to slaves - whose purpose, as you recall, is to further the praxis of the masters.
A few other consequences of the priority of actuality over potentiality are worth mentioning. For
one, the principle makes evolution impossible: if a chicken egg is always produced by a chicken,
then the species chicken is eternal. It is inconceivable that there should be a process by which new
fonns of beings might develop. Furthennore, in theology the principle implies that the perfect being
is the most actual being, and thus has no potential at all. Aristotle°s god is not omnipotent, but
omnimpotent (Met. A, 7, l072b5-16). Rather than potency, the god is sheer actuality, the pure
performance of the highest praxis thinking.
But what does all this have to do with the character of Aristotle”s science, with the richness of his
mode of knowing as a way of unconcealing? We are not ready to make any judgments on
Aristotelian science before we contrast it with modem science. But if the highest actuality of the
omnimpotent being has tumed out to be thinking, then surely the question of power is not irrelevant
to the question of science.
In keeping with Heidegger's insight that all knowing presupposes a sense of being, I have not laid
out Aristotle`s “epistemology” and then shown how it applies to the question of the potential.
Instead, I propose that Aristotle°s views on knowledge are determined by his understanding of
actuality and potentiality. Briefiy: for Aristotle, knowing is fulfilled or actualized when, provoked
by our perceptions of present beings, we grasp them in their very way ofpresencing - in their being.
(In more traditional terminology, human experience moves toward intellection, toward the
“inductive” grasping of essence.)]3 Intellection (nous) grasps being, and does so without motion,
~
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of
without any residue of potential - which is why it is the divine activity. In nous, the presencing
“demonstrate” (make evident)
present beings becomes fully present to us.“ Then we can proceed to
various pattems and characteristics of beings. This is the heart of Aristotelian “science,” or episteme
own potential to know by
(Post. An. I, 2-3; Nic. Eth. VI, 3). The goal of episreme is to actualize our

grasping beings in their actuality.
3. POWER IN MODERN PHYSICS

we did those of Aristotle, we
are
can approach the modern scientific understanding of power by reflecting on a few concepts that
-I am not qualified to discuss
ubiquitous in modem physics. (This is “classical” modern physics
relativity and quantum mechanics, although they do not simply discard these concepts.)
a
First, “energy.” The transfonnation of the sense of this word is so complete that it must be sign
of a transformation in the understanding of being - for while Aristotle used the word energeia to
mean actuality, in modemity “energy” means potentiality. More precisely, it means “potentiality”
in a distinctively modem sense that no longer coincides with dynamís and no longer points toward

energeíafs

For modern physics, “energy” means the power to do “work,” where “work” too has a nonAristotelian meaning: to do work is to change the velocity or direction of a body. Energy can be
either “kinetic,” in which case it takes the form of motion, or “potential,” in which case it takes the
form of a certain state of a system that is ready to do work (for example, a charged battery).

In short, modern physics measures phenomena and conceives of forces in terms of bodies
or the
changing positions. Power is understood as the power to alter the rate of a change of position
direction of such a change - but without reference to any particular direction. In other words, power
is not power for a specific type of “work,” but transcends the specificity of all particular motions.
For instance, electric power can be used to propel any sort of vehicle in any direction, to power any
sort of device, to do any sort of job - and none of these uses is “unnatural.”'°
This is a sort of liberation, and it is tempting to say that modemity liberates potentiality from
of
and to the lack of
actuality. But here we have to pay close attention to the problem comparison
a neutral language in which to discuss these issues. It is not that modemity simply reverses
Aristotle°s priority of the actual over the potential -this would make no sense - but that an entirely
new language, a new web of concepts, replaces the old.
We can see this if we consider how strange, how unspeakable, the modern concepts are from the
Aristotelian point of view. For Aristotle, a “potential energeia” would be an ontological
contradiction. Even “kinetic energeía” is paradoxical, since kinesis is not full actuality, but only the
actuality of the potential as such. Kinesis is on the way to full presence, to praxis. But the modern
but eliminates the
concept of motion not only restricts motion to change of place (local motion),
telos, the praxis toward which motion is pointing. There are no intrinsic goals, there is no absolute
center. In Newton°s forınulation, masses tend to continue moving in a straight line but toward

ı
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nothing in particular." The notion of praxis drops out of physics. Seeing and thinking Aristotle's
favorite examples of praxis - now have to be conceived in terms of change of place, as complex
systems of local motion. (This approach cannot do justice to the phenornena in question - at least,
if we follow the modem philosophers who distinguish consciousness from matter because they find
it inconceivable to reduce perceiving and thinking to local motion. They assume, however, that
nature is intelligible in terıns of local motion - which is precisely the assumption that makes these
thinkers modem instead of Aristotelian.)
Instead of merely inverting Aristotle, then, modern physics establishes a new language that
prescinds from both Arist0tle°s “actuality” and his “potentiality.” What does this new language
achieve? First, there is no doubt that it brings clarity, unity and mathematical precision to our
descriptions of spatial motion. But aside from this type of fruitfulness, the modem approach
generates a new pair of concepts - energy and work - whereby power is freed from function. No
longer are potentiality and movement mere anticipations of full presence. To be present means
nothing other than to move (rest is only a special case of motion), and movement is itself power for it is kinetic energy. This power is literally in-finite: it is not bound to any particular “end,” but
is simply the capacity to resist or redirect other movements. To resist which movements, to redirect
them toward what? It does not matter.
Just as Aristotle's principle of the priority of actuality had a certain aura of circularity, modern
physics operates in accordance with a principle that seems no less self-evident: energy (the power
to affect a motion) makes possible all work (the establishment of any particular motion or system
of motions). But the liberation of power that is expressed in this tautology has implications just as
far-reaching as those of Aristotle's principle. In biology, a theory of evolution becomes not just a
18
possibility but a demand (Descartes already calls for it). It is no accident that “existentialism” -the
liberation of human freedom from a preestablished human essence - makes its appearance already
in Renaissance humanism.'9 Freedom - not “goodness” as the actualization of a form - now becomes
the ground and goal of distinctively modern ethics and politics. Banished from nature, goodness
takes refuge in the subject, where it will take the form of freely posited “values.” God,
metaphysically conceived as the "perfect" (that is, fully actual) being, has already been sentenced
to death in early modernity, and Nietzsche°s “will to power” lies just around the corner.2° Power in
itself, power for the sake of power, now becomes thinkable.
Is the modern conception of power linked to the modem way of knowing, the modern mode of
science? As we know, Heidegger characterizes modem science as essentially “mathematical," where
this means not just that this science uses numbers but that it projects the character of its objects in
advance.“ This mode of knowing is not unrelated to the Aristotelian comprehension of forms
through intellection. However, for Aristotle nous is essentially receptive of form” For the moderns,
the mind constructs fonn (as Kant argued so emphatically).23 This means that the modem mind or
subject is conceived as preceding form, as the ground of form. But then the subject”s freedom to
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construct form, its power, is prior to actuality as fomi. And this subject, when it constructs the fomt
of objects, constructs it precisely in such a way that the power of objects is construed as prior to their
actuality. Just as we saw with Aristotle, there is a peculiar symmetıy between modernity's way of

knowing and modemity's understanding of what it knows. It may be that an age's unspoken
interpretation of being is the basis for both that age's knowledge of beings and its knowledge of
knowledge itself, even though it may sometimes seem that one of these two sorts of knowledge
precedes the other.
4. THE POVERTY OF MODERN SCIENCE
How can we begin to assess whether the Aristotelian and modern conceptions of potentiality and
power are "rich" or “poor”- that is, whether their ways of unconcealing beings are fertile or

reductive?

¬

_¬ ¬

First, Aristotle seems to have an immediate advantage because of the intnnsic pluralism of his
concept of actuality. For Aristotle, nature consists of natures - distinct ways in which beings
actualize their specific forms or functions. Although we can investigate “being qua being,” the
investigation of a distinct region of beings - living things, for example - will always require a fresh
appreciation of the unique characteristics of this region (cf De Anima I, l, ll-19). The specific
natures cannot be derived from the universal.
In contrast, modem science displays a leveling tendency. Even though in practice psychologists,
biologists and chemists use concepts that are unique to their disciplines, there is a widespread
conviction that these concepts ought, in principle, to be reducible to the concepts of the fundamental
modem science - physics." There is a tendency to focus on factors that lend themselves to study by
our physics (what Aristotelians call the material and efficient causes) at the expense of the distinctive
ways in which phenomena are actualized (the so~called formal and final causes).” For instance, we
have all read articles that claim that some cognitive ability is “really” the fiınctioning of a particular
part of the brain - as if discovering the material basis for the ability were all we needed in order to
understand the essence of this ability.“
Why does modern science have this reductive tendency? The answer may seem easy, even
obvious, to readers of Heidegger. Modern knowledge takes a “mathematical” approach to beings:
rather than receiving their multiplicity of forms, it stamps them with a single form of its own,
representing them as uni-form. For the same reason, modem science is intrinsically “technological”:
things become nothing but objects that are representable by the subject, objects that are susceptible
to conceptual molding. This is the case well before the triumph of mechanical manipulation,
“technology” in the usual sense.
To me this answer seems a little too easy. We should at least pause to consider the paradox that
the reductive tendency of modem science coincides with a conception of power that seems, on the
face of it, liberating and open-ended. Power is no longer the potential to actualize a preestablished
form - instead, it has an open future, an infinite realm of flexible possibilities. Nature is no longer
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a universe that can include Dasein a radically non-Aristotelian universe, but because understanding
is a matter of possibilities rather than actualities, we must reconceive our way of understanding this
universe. We need a non~Aristotelian and non-modem way of knowing, a new “seience.”
6. TOWARD A POSTMODERN PHYSICS?

Without losing sight of Heidegger”s question regarding the ground of the truth of being, it seems that
we are also called to develop an interpretation of being itself the being of all beings -that avoids
the pitfalls of both the Aristotelian and the modem modes of science. Of course, a new
simply drop into our laps, and it cannofbe dreamed up in an
armchair. If Heidegger's later writings are right, it is a rare gift that we must await with pious
patience. Still, it seems perrnissible to list a few desiderata - a few features we would hope to find
in a richer understanding of being, particularly as regards potentiality or power. Have our overviews
of Aristotle and modernity suggested any such features? And does Heidegger himself offer us some
clues?
If we retrace Heidegger's path in search of ideas on potentiality or power, we find that it travels
a wide variety of terrain. As I have argued, Being and Tíme”s analysis of Dasein seems to transcend
both the Aristotelian and the modern standpoints. Nevertheless, it relies heavily on a traditional word
“possibility” anti does not indicate how its new approach to possibility might have implications
for how we understand beings other than Dasein. Over the next decade or so, questions of power and
potentiality mingle with other difficult issues as Heidegger undergoes some dramatic
transformations. Tn, characterize these developrnents briefly: around 1930 Heidegger stresses
Dasein's freedom more than ever; in the mid-thirties (Introduction to Metaphysics and the early
Nietzsche lectures) he tries to develop nontraditional approaches to power; in the sections of the
Beiträge devoted to the “fissure” (Zerklufıung) of being, he flirts with alternatives to the traditional
doctrine of modalities (possibility, actuality and necessitl/); finally, in the late thirties, he turns
against Nietzsche and against the very concept ofpower. According to Besinnung (193 8-39), being
lies in a realm beyond both power and powerlessness (GA 66, pp. 83, 187-8). The notion of
Gelassenheit, developed in the 19405, tries to inhabit this realm.
Although there are reasons for all these steps, by the end of this development Heidegger has few
resources to offer us for understanding what we normally call power - both human power and the
powers that are displayed in nature asa whole. I~Ieidegger's interests no longer lie in this area; he no
longer is seeking to interpret the being of beings. So if we still want to understand “power” as part
of the being of beings, as part of “nature,” we will need to take a path other than his. As we do so,
however, we may at least borrow linguistic inspiration from Introduction ro Meraphysics, where
Heidegger Wrestles most intensely with questions of power and nature. Here he uses the word das
Walzen, which can be translated as “sway.”35 If there is ever to be a “Heideggerian physics,” or a
viable postmodem approach to interpreting beings as a whole, it will need some such word as
part
of its altemative to both the language of Aristotelianism and the language of modernity.
e
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potentiality?
First, there are facts that are more conveniently and elegantly described in modern concepts, facts
that we all think of when we consider the advantages of modern science. Our astronomical
observations invite a conception of space not as geocentric, not as heliocentric, but as acentric essentially without an up and down, without preestablished places for things. By eliminating the
natural resting point toward which local motion tends, this view of space shakes Aristotelian notions
about movement and actuality.3° And then there are fossils - the evidence for evolution, which is a
completely anti-Aristotelian concept.
But facts and observations alone do not make a revolution. We could have continued to fıddle
with the Ptolemaic system to accommodate our new astronomical observations, and today's
“creation science” reminds us that evolution is not the only conceivable interpretation of the facts,
either. Furthermore, my goal is not to list the advantages of modernity over Aristotle while forgetting
modernity's own poverty - it s reductiveness. What I want to do is respect the richness of Aristotle's
conception of nature while catching sight of its weaknesses. The task is delicate, and it brings us
back to the problem of language. Do we have the words and concepts with which to criticize
Aristotle without simply rehearsing the founding moves of modemity?
Here I gladly avail myself of Heidegger°s help. Being and Tíme embraces the strenuous project
of finding the words to describe experience in a way that steers clear of both modem and ancient
prejudices. The entity at stake in this description is, of course, ourselves. Leaving aside the question
of whether Being and Tíme is ultimately a dead end, we can recall some of its fundamental claims
about Dasein. D_asein°s way of being is “existence,” where this signifıes that its own being “is an
issue” for it: we have a relation to our own being such that we can either win it authentically or fail
to win it.“ What enables Dasein to have such a relation to its own being is the dimension of the
future, or Dasein°s coming to itself “in its own1nostSeı'nkönnen” (SZ 325). This Seinkönnen, usually
translated as °“potentiality-for-being,” is a potentiality that is not subordinate to actuality. We are
fulfilled or “actualized” - we come forth as the beings we are - only if our “potentiality” - our “canbe,” our ability to be - is preserved.32 To take this possibility as bound to some particular mode of
fulfillment would be to misconstnıe our very essence.33 Thus, the assigning of an objective relos to
life is “the misunderstanding of human existence in general.”34
In a broad sense, this statement makes Heidegger a modern thinker. By raising possibility above
actuality, he rejects the Aristotelian priority of energeia. But he also avoids the reductiveness of the
modem notion of power or energy. To have possibilities is not just to be ready to affect the motion
of bodies, but to be enabled to understand to be ready to deal with beings of all sorts, including
ourselves, in such a way that they are revealed in the plurality of their various modes of being.
If Heidegger's characterization of Dasein is appropriate, then there is at least one entity ourselves - for whom the priority of actuality over potentiality is invalid. And of course, this is not
just one little exception to the rule - i t means that the rule is fundamentally inadequate. Not only is
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7. “On the Essence and Concept of <pı.'›o'tg in Aristotle's Physics B, 1,“ tr. Thomas Sheehan, in Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 216. Heidegger comments in 1936 that Book O of the Metaphysics, which deals
with energeía and dynamis, is “the most worthy of question of all the books in the entire Aristotelian corpus”: Nietzsche, vol.
1, The Will to Power as Art, tr. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979), 65.
8. “On the Essence and Concept of cpı3oıç,” 218. Heidegger would strongly object to keeping the traditional translation, for he
proclaims that with the Latin translation of eıtergeia as actus “the Greek world was toppled” (t'bid.). I will consider his reasons
for this histrionic claim below (section 4), but it seems convenient to me to use the traditional translation, with the caveat that
we may need to reinterpret the meaning of the word along Heideggerian lines.
9. Ibid. Again, Heidegger objects to the traditional translation, for reasons that l explore in section 4 below. Heidegger's most
extensive reading of Aristotle on dynamis isthe 1931 lecture course Aristotle 's Metaphysics E) 1'-3.' On the Essence and Actuaiity
ofForce, tr. Walter Brogan and Peter Wamek (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995). This is a sympathetic interpretation
that only hints at the limitations of Aristotle's thought (e.g. 155, 172-3). Heidegger points out (60) that dynamis could be
renderectby ten aifferenfüerman words witlfilifferentshades of meaning.
10. “Energeia fulfills the essence of intrinsically stable presencing more essentially than dynamis does": “On the Essence and
Concept of <pÜo'tç,” 219. Heidegger writes that in Aristotle's claim that energeia is prior to dynamis, “Aristotle's thinking and
part' passu Greek thinking, reaches its peak“ (ibid., 218). But for Heidegger, the usual translation of this thought in t em s of
“actuality" and “potentiality” is a disaster. Once again, 1 believe the traditional translations in themselves are not so dangerous
as long as we remember that they are merely placeholders for rneanings that must emerge from a careful and extensive reading
of Aristotle. In this paper I can do no more than suggest the results of such a reading.
ll “We must
leam to see how for the Greeks movement as a mode of being has the character of emergin g into presencing“:
ibid., 191.
12 ln “On the Essence and Concept of q›ı3o1g,” Heidegger blurs the distinction between kinesis and praxis by insisting that
entelecheia is “the highest state of movedness” (217). This interpretation is at best misleading, and I can only suppose that
Heidegger is trying to give the Aristotclian understanding of being a reading that is literally as “dynamic” as possible, for the
sake of bringing it closer to his own conceptions. To counter I-leidegger's reading, we need only point out that he refers to “the
movement of seeing” (ibid.), whereas Aristotle”s point is precisely that seeing is not a kinesis or movement. It is odd that
.Heidegger does not even mention the word praxis, which Aristotle uses to characterize seeing. We could also note that the
Aristotelian god, who is complete energeia and is performing the praxis of thinking, is utterly free of kiııesis the god is
precisely the unmoved movcr (Met. A, 7, l072b5-10).
13 For Heidegger's interpretation of induction as leading toward being, see “On the Essence and Concept of q›6cnç,” 187.
I4 Because nous is both a grasping of actuality and an actuality itself, Aristotle can conclude that the divine activity (the activity
that is most fully) is a self-presencing, a presencing of and to itself (noesis noeseos: Met. A, 9, 10741535).
15 The Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “energy," documents a range of meanings for the word, ranging from the more or less
classical sense “exercise of power” (the word is used thus by Bacon before 1626) to “power not necessarily manifested in action”
(earliest citation 1677). Senses between these two extremcs include “power actively and effıciently displayed or exerted” (1665)
and “vigour or intensity of action” (Coleridge, 1809-1810). The OED attributes the physicists` sense of "energy" as what is now
called kinetic energy to Thomas Young (1807) and the sense of“energy” as potential energy to William J. M. Rankine (1 B53).
16 When Descartes writes that his
philosophy opens the possibility of using the forces of nature for all the ends for which they are
"appropriate" (Discourse on Method, AT 62), the word "appropriate" can no longer have any natura] meaning. The question of
appropriatencss is now left to the subject, not to the object- or, at most, Descartes may mean that some forces have more power
than others and can thus be applied to more demandin g tasks.
17 For Heidegger's comments on the Newtonian concept of force in contrast to Aristotelian physics, see What is a Thing? 85~7.
18 Descartes, Discourse on Method, AT 45. One could argue, however, that the origination of newforms is still unintelligible, as
it was for Aristotle. After all, the classical concept of form no longer has any role in modem natural science (the biological
concept of “species" is a remnant that has to be reconceived). As effectively as we can describe different species of living things
and reconstruct their evolution, we are puzzled if we are asked to identify the ontological differences among humans, ñsh,
amoebas and amino acids. The "higher" beings are more complex, but in essence, from the modem point of view, all these
systems are just configurations of local motions. As Nietzsche puts it, what is living isjust a special case of what is dead (The
Gay Science, §l09).
19 See Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, On the Dignlty ofMan, tr. Charles Glenn Wallis, in On the Dignity ofMan, On Being and
the One, and Hepraplus (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).
20 As Heidegger puts it, Nietzschean will to power is as much dynamis as it is energeia (Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. l, 64). Of course,
this means that will to power is neither dynamis nor eitergeia, for in Aristotelian terms it makes no sense to identify the two.
21 What is a Thing? 92.
22 DeAnima 111,4. Nous also has a productive aspect, bu t- so it seems - its activity consists in "producing" the
reception of the
fomıs by the passive nous, where production means an enabling, much as light enables colors to shine forth (De Anima Ill, 5).
This producing is not a making, but an allowing-to-come~to-presence.
23 David R. Lachtemıan makes a good case in The Ethics ofGeometry: A Genealogy 0fM0dernity (New York: Routledge, 1989)
that for the ancients, even geomctrical “constructions” were more a matter of discovery than a matter of human making.
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Nietzsche observes in Twilight ofthe Idols that for traditional metaphysics, “the higher is not
permitted to grow out of the lower, is not permitted to have grown at a1l.”3° The highest must have
its own, inviolate sphere of being, where it reigns as causa sui. Reductive modem conceptions also
prevent the higher fiom growing out of the lower, in a different way: the “higher” things are merely
rearrangements of the “lower,” with no qualitative difference from them. The ñrst desideratum for
our concept of "sway" is that it allow for the evolution of new forms in such a way that these forms
can be understood as higher than that from which they have emerged. The lower must be understood
as coming forth with a sway that enables it not only to
to generale new beings with new capacities - including ourselves. Sway is not only sway over this
or that, but also an indetenninate sway that opens new possibilities.
Second desideratum: weneed to understand how beings can allow for mathematization (in both
the numen`ca1 and the broader Heideggerian sense) without being exhausted by this mathematization.
The reductive gaze of modemity is both possible and fruitful - but how? Aristotle offered such an
interpretation of mathematics (see Metaphysics M and N): mathematics abstracts from movement
and telos in order to focus on the quantitative. But if we abandon the Anstotelian conceptions of
motion arıd actuality, the details of his explanation will no longer work for us. What our postmodem
notion of "sway" would need to do, then, is to clarify how, as beings burgeon forth in an excess of
possibilities, they at the same time leave themselves open to the mathematical and to “technology.“
This brings meto the third of my three wishes. Heidegger suggests that we can learn to use things
in such a way that we work with nature and respect its potential, rather than forcin g things to yield
their energy.“ How can the sway of things work both with and in our own sway? If we allow for the
excess - for the overflowing possibilities that emerge from each thing - as well as respecting the
distinctive sway that pertains to each thing's nature, will we iind a way to dwell with things without
exploiting them? We must hope that an interpretation of the sway of beings would help us answer
this question.
Xavier University
NOTES
l. What is a Thing? tr. W.B. Barton, Jr. and Vera Deutsch (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1967), 39.
2. "The Age of the World Picture" (193 8), in The Question Concerııiııg Technology and Other Essays, tr. William Lovitt (New
York: Harper & Row, I977), ll7.
3. The opening of the passage l just quoted does forbid us to say that Galileo`s doctrine is "true" (wahr). But this clearly means
“true" in the sense of “correct," since Heidegger contrasts ıt with "false" (falsch). The issue here concems ways ofdescribing
natural phenomena, rather than the accuracy of particular descriptions. These ways of describing cannot be termed con'ecı or
incorrecr - although, as I am about to argue, they can be said to unconceal beings either richly or poorly.
4. The pluralism and openness of this way of unconcealing might recommend designating it as “weak" in a non-pejorative sense.

à la Gianni Vattimo.
5. The Gadamerian notion ot' a “fusion of horizons" would be appropriate here, although l would prefer to speak of opening
pathways between two regions ot' discourse that can never be completely “fused" because they are incommensurable.
6. A developed ontology of economy would have to qualify this statement byconsidering the phenomenon of interest. Money that
is lent is "used" without being used up - in fact, it is increased. This sort of legerdemain traditionally makes moneylenders
suspect not only morally but metaphysically - they create something from nothing.
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According to a recent manifesto of this conviction, Edward O. WiEson's Consilience: The Unity ofKnowledge (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1998), all the phenomena studied by the humanities ought to be explainable in terms of human evolution, which in
tum is explainable in tem1s of physics. For Wilson's confessed “ontological reductionism,” see p. 9.
As Heidegger says, natural processes are reduced to measurements of local motion: What is a Thing? 71.
“What we`re seeing here [the lateral prefrontal cortex] seems to be a global Workspace for organizing and coordinating
information and carrying it back to other parts of the brain as needed,' Dr. Duncan said
It is the relative performance ofthis
cerebral workspace, he said, that intelligence tests appear to measure": Natalie Angier, “Study Finds Region of Brain May Be
Key Problem So1ver,” The New York Times, July 21, 2000. For Aristotle's claim that both formal and material investigations are
necessary when Studying living things, see De Partibus Animaiium I, 1, 640b5-6412118; De Anima Il, 1. Of course, in making
this claim Aristotle is combating the reductive tendeneies of many of his predecessors. Reductionism is not just a modem vice.
“On the Essence and Concept oftpüoıg," 218.
On energeia andíynamis as modes of presencing, see ilítí., 2¬l9†lncıdentally, only a few years earlier, in 1935-36, Heidegger
was translating dynamis as "force" ( "Krafl, " in quotation marks) and “capacity“ (Vermögen): Die Frage nach dem Ding
(Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1962), 66; What is a Thing? 85. Heidegger himself, then, was not fully “de-Romanized“ until at least the
late thirties (a process, I would argue, not unrelated to his denazification).
“On the Essence and Concept of fpüotçf' 204.
For Heidegger on Aristotelian place vs. Newtonian space, see What is a Thing? 83-6.
Sein und Zeit, 7th ed. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1953)(henceforth SZ), 42.
I am, that is, I can": History ofthe Concept ofTime, trans. Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), 298.
Dasein`s possibilities are bounded by the possibility of the impossíbility of existing - death (SZ 250). But death is not a
fulfillmentz when this possibility is actualized, Dasein does not exist at all (SZ 261). For this reason 1 cannot agree with Thomas
Sheehaıfs Aristotelian interpretation of Heidegger, according to which Dasein”s being is kinesis and death is Dasein”s “final
cause”: Thomas Sheehan, “Heideggen Maıtin,” inRoutiedge Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, ed. Edward Craig (London and New
York: Routledge, 1998), vol. 4, 315.
The Meıaphysical Foundations ofLogic, trans. Michael Heim (Bloornington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 185.
On the word, Walten, see the translators” introduction to Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysicn, trans. Gregory Fried and
Richard Polt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), xiii. For a list of the 18 words related to Walten that Heidegger uses
in this lecture course, see ibid., German-English Glossary, 244.
Nietzsche, Twilight ofthe Idols, trans. Richard Polt (Indianapolis: I-lackett, 1997), 19.
See Heidegger`s discussion of the windmill in “The Question Conceming Techno1ogy,” in Basic Writiııgs, 2nd ed., ed. David
Farrell Krell (San Francisco: I-laı1›erSanFrancisco, 1993), 320.
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“HEIDEGGER”S CHILDREN AND CARNAP”S CHILDREN”: REPORT ON TRISH
GLAZEBROOK'S HEIDEGGER 'S PHILOSOPHYOF SCIENCE

PATRI CKA. HEELAN
The primary theme of Dr. Trish Glazebrook's book, Heidegger 's Philosophy ofScience, is that
Heidegger was always throughout his life deeply and persistently involved in a philosophical way
with the nature of modem, i.e., post-Galilean, theoretical/experimental, science, and that throughout
his life there was continuity and development in his thinking about the essence of modem science.
She shows this by noting the many references to modern science in every period ot`his writings and
by bringing out the temporal development in his reflections. Moreover, she studies Heidegger°s
claim that modern science is foundational for contemporary culture's grasp of the `real” and the
“true.` Modem science for Heidegger is constitutive of the “real' and the 'true“ of contemporary
Westem culture. This says something important about Heidegger's philosophy: that he had thought
seriously and continuously about the essence of modern science and that he saw it as definitive of
modem culture.
But does this constitute a philosophy of science? Or is it rather a philosophy of contemporary
culture? This brings me to the secondary purpose of the book which is indeed concerned with the
philosophy of science. The author continually tries to show the relevance of Heidegger°s thought
to the range of new, critical, seminal non-classical problems that now for some time have challenged
the “received view” of the philosophy of science working in the framework of logical empiricism.
Among these are, Kuhn's account of paradigm change and Hacking*s account of the primacy of
laboratory experiments and technology over theory, and the continuing debate about the nature of
quantum physics.
Glazebrook develops the primary theme by tracking three themes about science through the
collected works of Heidegger:
l. the culture of modernity as the “Age of the World Picture' in which the representation of the 'real' is
constituted by modern science;
2. modern science as “the mathematical projectiorı of nature” in which, as Carnap and the Marburg School
affirmed, experimental obseıvations are interpreted as mathematically theory laden events;
3. modem science as essentially “entangled with technology” in the constitution of objective frameworks of
“standing reserves' or *Ge-stell] a term which has been translated as “mere value-neutral resources for human
action.“

1
i

l

I

While affinning these themes as marking modem culture and modern science, Heidegger argues
that their characteristic marks fail to establish modern sciencels or modern culture's relation to
alethaic truth and are inauthentic to Da-sein°s being-in-the-world. Responding to his own critique,
however, Heidegger holds out the possibility of a “saving grace' in the awakening of an authentic
culture to replace the culture of scientific modemity. This “saving grace° is disclosed only to Dasein's being~in-the-world, i.e., in the Lifeworld. This is the practical lifeworld after the removal of
15
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all theoretical elements objectified as 'real' Aletheíc truth and the demand for
authenticity in the
Lifeworld is (in my terms) local, historical, freely chosen, contextual, emergent, cultural, and is the
subjective embodiment of mind in the everyday pre-theoretical life-world.
I disagree then with Glazebrook's thesis that Heidegger had a useful philosophy of science that
could be used as a platfonn from which to address the new, seminal, non-classical problems that
from the entirely different platform of the 'received' view of science were perceived to be
challenging this view of science. Turning attention to modern science, the lifeworld phenomena of
science occur in the laboratory to local groups of scientists. That is where they appeanandıo whom
they appear. If the aletheic truth of science then is to be found in the Lifeworld, its phenoınena
cannot be just theory laden mathematical events, but must be penetrated by local, social, historical,
and “natural” cosmological agencies that constitute new presences in the world (Do we see echoes
of what Newton sought in alchemy'?). Heidegger never went so far as to call such
presences
°perceptual° - though he might have done so by relating perception to the Lifeworld, had he not
regarded perception with the same general suspicion that tainted all the furniture of the world in this
Age of the World Picture. These scientific presences then need to be reviewed from the point of
view of Da-sein°s local historical practical existence, but what such a study would show is not found
in Heidegger°s wıitings. The cause of such presences is the scientiñc technology of the laboratory,
i.e., the measurement process: what then is their 'saving grace”? An answer to this question from
the platform of Heidegger's philosophy is not found either in Heidegger°s

writings.
A Heideggerian platform for the philosophy of science goes beyond
Heidegger°s own work and
is a pre-requisite to any discussion of the core problems that affect the Carrıapian
platform for the
of
science.
To
become
philosophy
an altemative platform for the philosophy of science Heidegger's
and
positive
negative critique of the natural sciences would have to be cashed out. Moreover, the
crisis in the philosophy of science is currently made more severe by the fact that at the
grass roots
level of research involving evolution, emergent development, history, anthropology, technology,
culture, neurological brain science, and especially medicine, local data are undecidable without the
inteıvention of subj ectíve judgement or convention. We find in retrospect such undecidable local
phenomena also in anomalies associated with the old classical sciences. Some of these anomalies
refer to dynamic processes in Nature that change not just the states of a given
thing but things
themselves as these jump across categorial boundaries in emergent processes of an
evolutionary
kind. Similar anomalies aıise when things are changed contingently but
irreversibly as in quantum
theory, or non-linearly (following small destabilizing changes) as in the “butterfly effect” What the
scientific “mathematically real' overlooks or excludes from the authentic Da-sein's scientific real
is whatever is particular, social, historical, and practical in Aristotle's sense of rechne.
Moving over
now from the side of data to the side of pure theoiy, there are a suite of new non-classical
problems
arising from the foundations of mathematics and logic, for example, there are always truths
belonging to any mathematical model that cannot be found by computational means. By a
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mathematical model I mean, more precisely, any algorithmic information theory, i.e., any deductive
theory based on clear logical definitions, first principles, and rules of deduction. The nature of pure
theory is such that some of its truths are not computable, not derivable from the model itself. Neither
of these limitations of mathematical/experimental science are adequately developed by Heidegger
so that it is premature to call it a herıneneutic alternative to the “received” philosophy of science.
At most Heidegger's thoughts about science are an element of, or better, a propaedeutic to a
genuine, i.e., true and authentic, philosophy of science, and you could, perhaps, interpret the title
of Glazebrook`s book in these terms. In this sense, Heidegger pointed out how to proceed. He
sketched out a new platform for doing the philosophy of science within the context of the Lifeworld
or Da-sein's being-in-the-world. But for all his lifelong meditation on modern science that
Glazebrook has presented and analysed with great diligence and in wonderful detail for which we
are deeply grateful, Heidegger lacked the kind of practical engagement with science that might have
happily brought him the insights he would have needed to present us with an alternative philosophy
of science.
However, for the past thiıty years or more there has been work done by scholars in Germany,
France, and the US on what one might call the “developed core” of that philosophy, with
applications to Space, Time, and even, surprisingly, to Big Bang cosmology as in the work of Luc
Brisson and Walter Meyerstein. Names occur such as: B. Ströker, O. Becker, H. Weyl, K-O Apel,
Istvan Fehér, György Markus, and the hundred or more members of the International Society for
Hermeneutics and Science. In the US, for example, Joe Kockelmans, Ted Kisiel, Don Ihde, Robert
Crease, and I, have been working for more than thirty years on a Heideggarian henneneutics of
natural science. Little or nothing of this is reflected in Glazebrook's book. Why is this so? One
might say that it was a scholarly oversight, but, to be fair to the author, responsibility lies beyond
her. lt lies with the profession, with the self understanding of continental philosophers. Soon after
the founding of SPEP, continental philosophy and analytic philosophy definitively chose to partition
the field of philosophy. They chose a parting of the ways (to use the title of Michael Friedman”s
new book on Heidegger and Carnap). SPEP and continental philosophy chose to be l-Ieidegger's
children specializing in the exuberance of the humanities and arts and were definitely not interested
in the boring natural sciences. Analytic philosophy, however, chose to be Carnap's children
specializing in the natural sciences, distrustful of cultural diversity founded, as they thought, on
human prejudices, and promoting a single moralistic international culture on the model of the
normative sciences.
This brings me to the secondary aim of Glazebrook's book. lt shows an unawareness of the gulf
that separates the two philosophical communities today. She tries with good will to bring
Heidegger's children and Carnap's children together to enter into dialogue about problems that, she
thought, should be relevant to both groups. Unfortunately, since continental and analytic
philosophies live in different cultural and linguistic worlds, and work from radically different
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platfonns, the pre-requisites for a fruitfiıl dialogue require more than goodwill, they include being
able to share with some understanding and sympathy the two incommensurable platforms of Camap
and Heidegger. It could be said of Camap with truth that on the longest day he ever lived Camap
could never be called a Da-sein`s philosopher. And I think that Bill Richardson had an important
point to make when he said, “On the longest day he ever lived Heidegger could never be called a
philosopher of science."
Speaking from a I-Ieideggerian philosophical platform of Dasein°s b
e
i
e u ü c a I philosophy of science be cashed out in positive terms? By “hermeneutical' I mean the sense of Heidegger's existential hermeneutical spiral, rather than the philologícal
textual or deconstructive hermeneutical circle. In other words, I ask, what would be the minimum
core ofthe aletheic truth of mathematical/expeıimental science within the existential henneneutical
spiral of scientiñc research? It should at least comprise an answer to the following questions:
1. How is modern science philosophícally or methodologically grounded in the local
historical pre-theoretical Lifeworld?
2. How do theories mediate computatíonally between pre- and post-theoretical observations?
3. How many diverse authentic roles can scientific technologies play in the Lıfeworlds of diverse
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communities?

The trajectory of a scientific inquiry is not a closed loop, beginning and ending in the same Lifeworld; it is an existential henneneutical spiral that involves Lifeworld change. Each advance in a
scientific inquiry, each tum of the hemıeneutic spiral, changes the pre-theoretical Lifeworld in which
the problem is initially located and embodied, into a changed post-theoretical Lifeworld, in which
the answer is (to use the words of Ludwik Fleck) *generated and developed' by the positing of a
theory-designed process (technological or institutional) linking subject and object by an 'entanglement' that changing both at the same time. This “entangling' process uses either a technology (a
*readable' technology) such asa measuring process, or an institution such as a legal process.
In this new post-theoretical lifeworld, new local scientific presences are revealed by local
measurement processes and standardized 'readable technologies°. (cf. Andy Clark's Being There:
Putıing, Brain, Body and World Together Again [MIT Press, 1997]) These presences are revealed
not as theoretical entities since they are universal and abstract, but as data products of measurement
processes done with theory-designed technologies and judged acceptable according to the standards
of the research program. For the reasons given, data are not theory-laden; they are praxis-laden and
their value depends not on argumentative or theoretical grounds but on their success, either, say,
within the culture ofresearch in contributing to the goals ofthe research community, or, say, within
some non-scientific culture in contributing to a different, hopefully more desirable, quality oflıfle
for that community. But there is, of course, no guarantee that these local presences will be more
berıign than before they were invented. The management of the changes made possible by the new
presences is in the hands ofthose who control the new technologies or institutions and how they use
them is subject to how the manageıs come to see their public responsibilities. Following the road
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that Heidegger pointed out, we should follow up with the philosophie question: How does theory
computationally mediate between the pre- and post-theoretical Lifeworlds?
Scientific technologies, say, in medical research, can serve merely as indetenninate resources or
Ge-stell or they can be specifically functional. As specifically functional, some are invasive of the
integrity of beings as in the killing by staining of living cells. Or some are non-invasive of the
integıity of beings as in imaging processes, such as sonograms or MRI. Or some can be Lifeworld~
changing, quality-of~life-changing because of the way (what I have called) 'readable technologies'
transform both human subjects and their environment, such as prostheses. All of these cases can be
studied in the field of scientific medicine. Ludwil?F1eck in his book, The Genesis andfievelopment
ofa Scientific Fact, gives a wonderful account of the changing Lifeworlds of the research physician
as serological tests gradually change the background and language under which the patient's
symptoms are seen until there is revealed slowly the presence of a new entity that had not hitherto
been recognized as an entity. In his research it was the disease entity to which the name “syphilis'
applied. This process of discovery has the structure of a Heideggerian existential hermeneutical
spiral. It is not in medical research alone that measurements play complex hermeneutical roles.
They do so also in natural science, with special attention to the very large and the very small, to
cosmology and quantum physics.
To illustrate what a Heideggerian herrneneutic of natural science can do, let me append some
parts of a paper I recently wrote for a volume on phenomenology and medicine. Its title is
“Lifeworld and Scientific Inference.”

HERMENEUTICS OF THEORY AND PRAXIS
Considering the role of theory in the “received view' of science, it is important to understand how
in this view theory serves to °explain, a phenomenon and how an 'explanation' is used to solve a
scientific problem by “computation” or °calculation.° It does so, say, by predicting the occurrence
or non-occurrence of a phenomenon. A theory then “explains” by providing an ideal computational
model that purports to represent the causes, conditions, and circumstances relevant to the occurrence
(or non-occurrence) of the phenomenon. The model (as an objective ideal reconstnıction) replaces
the Lifeworld phenomenon for scientific purposes, and these purposes are achieved by using the
model computationally to predict real Lifeworld outcomes. The fact that the beliefs surrounding the
“received view' work successfully for prediction and control in broad ranges of scientific
phenomena, does not, however, imply that scientific theory works for the reasons set forth in the
'received view.` It could be successful for other reasons. However, since the reasons given by the
“received view” deeply distort our understanding of ourselves and our Lifeworld by
misunderstanding the role of theory in shaping how we think about phenomena, it is well to probe
what is really implied by the meaning of theory in science or ordinary life.
I follow Heidegger (1996, pp. 69-70). He begins with a worker engaged in a building project,
using a hammer, and the hammer unexpectedly breaks. Let us suppose that a replacement can°t be
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found and that he has to have one made. His problem: what are the specifications of a hammer (of
the kind he needs to finish the job)? The answer to this question will be a theory (about hammers)
that explains a hammer's ability to do the hammer's job. What is a harnmer's job? It is the
'meaning' of a hammer. In this case it is a cultural praxis-laden meaning within the context, let us
say, of the building trade. Note that without a specification of context, the question is relatively
indeterminate. In the context of the “received view,' however, the hammer is a physical entity
specified by a theory that lays out the physical specifications under
the cultural nıeanıkıg-ejCa~hanmrer7 buTw7iefher or not it is so assigned this fiınction is a separate
and contingent matter. This second meaning is a theory-laden meaning. The two meanings are not
independent for the theory-laden meaning makes sense only if a local contingent existential
condition is fulfilled, namely that the hammer-referent ispraxis-laden in the conventional sense.
If this condition is fulfilled, the hammer is a public cultural reality, constituted by a socio-cultural
meaning. But what if the existential condition is not fulfilled? *It* would not be a hammer, it would
not be theory-laden, and would have nomore title to being listed in the hammer category among any
categorial listing of the furniture of the Lifeworld than any old boot that could be used to drive in
a nail. 'It' would become (in Heideggefs words) 'a mere resource' (' Vorhanden ' or 'Bestand') for
hammering or other indeterminate functions, orjust “nothing in particular' (1996, pp. 42-43; 1977a).
Despite the fact then that (hammer-) theory 'explains' (hammering-) praxis, the language of
theory and the language of praxis belong to different though locally and contingently coordinated
perspectives. Coordination does not imply, however, isomorphism between the two perspectives,'
for someone working on a carpentry project could, perhaps, be served on this occasion by an old
boot or something other than a hammer. Since theory and praxis are merely coordinated but not
isomorphic, they can be taken asaxes for a kind ofcultural phase space within which there are zones
of unceıtainty between explanatory theory and Lifeworld praxis, suggesting a Heisenbergian
indetenninacy principle in the theory-praxis phase space.
Reflecting on the fact that individual things in our experience are never without a possible human
purpose, everything in our experience, including scientific entities, bears some resemblance to a
hammer, or other tool or equipment. There are then (at least) two perspectives on everything in the
Lifeworld: (1) a praxis-laden cultural perspective that is constitutive of the Lifeworld, and (2) a
theory-laden perspective - possibly multiply theory-laden - that explains this cultural perspective
but does not constitute it. Being, as we said above, is not represented by theory, but by the
Lıfeworld. And the Lifeworld is a humanly meaningful contingent process that is subject historically
both to possible development and possible decline.
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WHEN 'THEORETICAL ENTITIES' ARE ALSO CULTURAL ENTITIES OF THE LIFEWORLD
The “theoretical entities' that enter into scientific theories of the human body, e.g., carbon or sodium
atoms, water molecules, genes, proteins and their properties, energy, momentum, wave length, spin,
and much more, belong in the first place to the imaginative or fıctive world of scientific models.
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Some in addition, however, belong to public fora of the Lifeworld. Which? The criterion
of
belonging to the Lifeworld is the possibility of realizing the theoretical entity as a Lifeworld
phenomenonz This is achieved in the first instance by standard processes of measurement, because

when a variable is measured it shows itself as present under the aspect measured. It is then a
phenomenon in the Lifeworld and one shaped by the practices associated with the standard
measurement setup. In addition to the public Lifeworld fortun of basic
laboratory research, there are
other public fora in which the theoretical entity has a presence with the status of a cultural
phenomenon. These feature, for example, technology, clinical medicine, pharmaceuticals, finance,
politics, religion, art, media. Äl l offlıese fora - like that of the basic laboratory _ are local fora in
which a scientific entity, always in some technological context, can
play the role of a dedicated
cultural resource (for the life of clinical medicine, pharmaceuticals, finance, politics,
religion, art,
media) and by this means can become part of the local furniture of the Lifeworld. However, there
is a difference between measurements (a) that are invasive and
destroy the local interfaces with the
living organism (e. g., by fixating and dying a cell), and (b) those that do not (e.g., certain imaging
techniques, such as, MRI). It is clear that the products of the former are no longer living parts of the
body and so are mere resources with multiple uses like any tool or equipment. Only the products
of the Iatter are living phenomena since they retain their role as
functioning parts of a living
organism and, under the Lifeworld criteria stated above, may not actually have (or have the use of)
all the phenoınenological properties accessible
only under invasive conditions (a). This suggests a
Heisenbergian phenomenological indeterminacy principle between measurable proñles of type (a)
and measurable profiles of type (b).
In all such local public fora, the scientific entity and its data are
meaningfully bivalent and
emulate the relationship between theory and praxis in the study of a hammer. If removed from
actual or dedicated association with all such local fora the
putative “data' are no longer data at all
since they no longer have the capacity to make manifest in the Lifeworld the
functioning presence
of anything specific.3 Having no detenninate Lifeworld
should
be treated possibly
meaning, they
as indeterminate resources - or, perhaps, just as noise.
By way of illustration from the classical sciences, consider that when new theory~based
technologies are added to the Lifeworld, as happened in Italy in the quartrocento with the invention
of perspectival projection and the camera obscura, terms of a new
kind, scientific and theoretical,
came to be introduced into everyday language with new practical measurement-based cultural
meanings, particularly, in this case, for space and time. The techniques of mathematical perspective,
for instance, revolutionized the Lifeworld of Italy and later of
Europe, through art, architecture,
urban planning, navigation, Warfare, and much more. The geometry-filled
productions of craft skills
in opties, astronomy, map making, painting, music,
Weapons” design, and other arts and skills
prepared the way for the elevation of artistic craft skills to scientific theory skills, where the
product
of the new art came to be regarded not as works of art, but as works of
geometıical reason or science
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(Crombie, 1994, pp. 499-680). Among other things the works of geometrical reason changed the
public urban space of Europe from a quilt of diverse local spaces and times into a single universal
space and uniform cosmic time based on measurement with rigid rulers and mechanical clocks
synchronized with the stars. For those who looked for a unified cosmology, the way was prepared
for Galileo and the Copemican revolution (see Heelan, 1983a/ 1988, chap. ll). It was Galileo who
helped convert works of thoughtful art - his dcfl experiments, such as, timing balls
an ınclıned lane - ınto a world of scie
,frrrrove on which we now look back with
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It follows fiom what has been said that the fumiture of the Lifeworld is not fixed with respect to
categorial kinds. Along with 'natural' physical phenomena, such as 'trees,' it comprises invented
'cultural' phenomena. Among them are those created by institutions, such as the Wassermann Test
by medical research laboratories. Some are categorized resources but not functionally assigned
'
(Bestand or 'Vorhände Q,such as, chemicals, reagents, and appliances in central storage available
for a variety of uses (l977a; 1996, pp. 42-43). Others are functionally assigned (“Zuhände '), such
asthose actually used in surgery (1996, p. 69). Only the latter enjoy a meaning in the Lifeworld that
is actually specified for detinite tasks and, consequently, are part of the fumiture of the Lifeworld.
METAPHOR AND THE JANUS-LIKE FACE OF SCIENTIFIC ENTITIES

Fleck, in his history of the scientific theory of syphilis, recognized the fact that in establishing the
meaning of the new scientific term, 'syphilis,' some special usage had to be negotiated between
scientific terms normed by the 'thought collective' of the research community and everyday tenns
normed by the *thought collective' of everyday life. To quote Duden:
asa practising bactcriologist, [Fleck] knew that his eyes were caught, not only in the norm imposed by the
collective of the laboratory, but equally by the thought style characteristic of his everyday family life. It is this
double anchorage - in the laboratory and at the table - that makes the scientist a conduit through which
scientific facts become confiısed with cultural interpretations. As a result, scientific facts have a Janus-like
face. (1993, pp.69)

What would result if the Janus-like face of a scientific fact were to go unnoticed or were to be
flouted or ignored by convention in public fora of communication? This happens all too frequently,
partly as a consequence of the widespread acceptance of the “received view' and partly because of
the limitations on public discourse caused by the difficult subject matter. The result is distortions
in communication. Two systematic errors become possible. Each, in its most innocent fomi, leads
to the more or less conscious use of a figure of speech, something like a metaphor. (1) The postscientific praxis-laden perspective of the laboratory Lifeworld zone is simply re-described
metaphorically in terms of the theoretical scientific meanings (see Halliday and Martin, 1993;
Bazermann, 1988, pp. 201-299). Under such conditions, theoretical descriptions replace practical
descriptions. But if the metaphorical character of the predication is not recognized, it is easy to take
the replacement to be exclusive and ontological, and to think that the Lifeworld conditioning of
phenomena no longer exists, and that only the theoretical scientific world exists. For example,
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perceptual space is assumed to be modeled by Euclidean geometry, colors by electromagnetic
wavelengths, sounds by pitch and loudness, and syphilis by a positive Wassermann Test, when all
such predications are no more than metaphors apart from the collaboration of the human senses,
language,_and cultural environment. Perceptual space, color, sound, and syphilis exist only the
product of interpretation through which they in their Lifeworld involvement become intelligible as
phenomena of human experience. Modem scientific medicine then has been often charged with a
weakness for reducing patients to a bundle of anatomical parts and physiological processes, each
having its scientific model at the level of chemistry, molecular biology, or physiology, and with little
regardTor the human life in which they are engaged and that uses such systems to cope, well or ill,
satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily with the challenges of the patient°s Lifeworld. All would agree that,
ultimately, scientific medical models should not replace the Lifeworld of the patient and should be
at the service of the patient°s quality of life as lived in and tested by his or her Lifeworld.
(2) The theory-laden perspective of the scientific zone is simply re-described metaphorically in
terms of pre-scientific (“naive' or “folk') Lifeworld meanings. In other words, since the scientific
tenns are not well understood in many public fora, they are simply filled with the old familiar prescientific Lifeworld meanings that the “received view' wants to replace, possibly with a more or less
conscious sense that this involves a metaphorical constıuction. From this awareness comes a
warning, generally heeded by historians of science and medicine, that needs, however, to be heeded
also by ethicists, media pundits, and public policy makers who, confusing the context of science with
that of Lifeworld ontology, so easily and offhandedly fill scientific terms with prescientific
Lifeworld meanings in their public discourse. For example, in such discourse, scientific terms such
as “cells,' 'organs,' and 'bacteria' are treated as (“naive° or “folk') 'things' like machine replaceable
parts violating their natures as integral parts of a living organism, for unlike machine parts these
organic terms are constituted by the continuous flow of chemical exchanges across their interfaces
with surrounding tissues.
What follows from the non-recognition of these (at their innocent best) metaphorical transitions
is, for instance, confusion in the public debate about such contentious practices as abortion, cloning,
disease prevention, Al(a1titicial intelligence), and much more, where scientific model terms, such
as, 'fetus,' °genotype,' “bacteriaf and 'neural networks,' are filled in public discourse with meanings
taken from related practical everyday (°naive' or 'folk”) contexts, making them falsely
synonymous
with the everyday uses of the related everyday terms. In this case, the everyday terms would be
“child,' “adult,' “cause of disease,' and “intelligencej etc., respectively. This usage may be good
politics, but it is itself a form of cultural disease.
Despite the problems created by possible metaphorical usages due to the complementarity of
explanatory scientific theory and preventive medical practices, scientific theories have been a very
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positive force in shaping the contemporary Lifeworld. There is no need to press this point. The
bacterial theory of infection led to a host of new cultural practices dealing with food
handling,

24

í

-¬...¬_»

PATRICK A. HEELAN

personal hygiene, sewage and water systems, the urban enviromnent, and the treatment ofbacteri al
diseases. But these practices, of course, have to be carefully designed and prudently implemented.
However, as scientific theories grow and change, a train of new and oflen contentious practical
problems are emerging: for instance, genetic theory has led to noisy debates as to whether or under
what conditions genetically modified (GM) foods should be admitted to the food chain. New cultural
'
, 'c ın tum lead
practices found to be effective also lead in their tum to new scientif
to better medical practices, whi
e er scientific theories, and so on. Though often
u ıc ora and sometimes even by the medical profession as stripping the mystery from
Nature and as exposing what is constitutive ofwhat 'really is,' scientific theory is in fact no more
than a tool for, or a way of coping with some living function of the human body constituted as
meaningful by a lifestyle in the patient's Lifeworld. Because of the zone of uncertainty between
theory making and cultural practices, and another between pre-scientific and post-scientific
Lifeworld tenns, there is an inescapable tension is the public mind that can - and oñen does» result
in changes, possibly also in confusion, conceming conditions for meaning-fulñllment and
conceming policy nomıs. Noting such changes, one captures something about the historicity and
contingency ofhemieneutic truth.
A critical example from medicine illustrates how the multivalence of scientific descriptions can
create new moral perplexities in the Lifeworld. Barbara Duden (1993), historian of the woman`s
body in clinical medicine, questions the scientific tenn 'fetus' that belongs to contexts of scientific
imaging and biology, and asks whether it is being abused in public fora of discussion when
substituted for the term 'child' that is used in the Lifeworld context of pregnancy and matemity. Has
the separateness ofcontexts between model-scientific, pre-scientific Lifeworld-processes, and postscientitic Lifeworld-processes been illegitimately suppressed in our medical culture, in the media,
and in public policy discourse? The temıs `fetus` and *child* are, of course, correlative (each in its
own context reveals something about what the other temi refers to) but they are not isomorphic and
interchangeable. A 'fetus' is a term whose primary owner is the medical profession. A living fetus
is recognized by sonographical and other imaging techniques apart from the mother's context in the
everyday life-world. Even while inseparable from the living tissue of the mother, the fetus is
generally described asa 'thingf as ifilike a pre-scientific machine part, it had an existence separate
from the mother. Duden notes with some concem that ethical rules and legislation in Westem
countries concerning pregnancies are presently being written in temis of the *fetus* where that term
slurs the difference between the fetus as part of the scientific model, the fetus as an organic part of
the post-scientific Lifeworld, and the child as an element in the mother's (usually) pre-scientific
pregnant life. Duden is unhappy with this and asks: should the difference between the two cultural
perspectives be recognized and anaccommodation found that defers to the special cultural role of
the mother in decision-making about the child?
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In the assessment of scientific theory and practice, medical science and clinical practice, the critique
Ofthe “received View' of science made via the phenomenological orientation of Husserl, Heidegger,
and Merleau-Ponty towards the Lifeworld and Heidegger's hermeneutics (or interpretation) of
experience has made it possible to assign different roles to theory and practice: technological design
for the purposes of enviromnental control to theory, and ontological understanding for the purpose
of human culture to practice. Scientific theories then have a “Janus-like face,' one side looks in the
direction of computational and technological control which is not constitutive of scientific
knowledge but is merely a resource or tool for multiple practices, the other looks in the direction of
human culture which is ultimately constitutive of ontological scientific knowledge.
This bivalence underscores the prevalence of metaphor in scientific discourse and, in particular,
in medical science whether inside and outside the scientific community under conditions where
modem culture and the 'received view” tend to mask the presence of metaphor in such discourse. It
was shown, however, that under the broader analysis of phenomenology, metaphor is as fundamental
for true scientific discourse as literality is for the “received view' (see Bazermann, 1988; Fiumara,
1995; Heelan, 1998; Hesse and Arbib, 1986; and Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). Since the theoretical
is mathematical and the practical is empirical, it makes no sense to predicate mathematical models
literally of the Lifeworld; at best, the two must come together consciously in some unambiguous but
metaphorical way guided by professional experts in the spirit of (what Aristotle called) “phronesis'
(prudent action), aware that they are seeking no more than a consensus about a set of relevant soluble

Lifeworld issues.
1
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NOTES

1. By isomorphtsm is meant a one-to-one translatability of any statement in one language into a unique statement in the other
language. The two context-dependent languages refer to the same things but from different, often interacting and mutually
interfering, perspectives. 1have argued that these languages are related among themselves within a lattice structure which includes
a least upper bound (lub) and a greatest lower bound (glb) as well as complements. This thesis is presented in Heelan
(l983a/1988), chaps. 10and 13.
2. For a fuller account ol' what constitutes a 'phenomenon' in Husserlean phenomenology, see Heelan (l983a/1988; 1991b).
3. There is the altemative strategy of re-evaluating the interpretive context of the experiment to pursue another goal. For a detailed
study of data, see Heelan (1989), also (1983a/ 1988).
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A SUPRATHEORETICAL HERMENEUTICAL PREPROTOSCIENTIFIC PERUSAL
OF TRISH GLAZEBROOK°S HEIDE GGER 'S PHILOSOPHYOF SCIENCE
(FORDHAM UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2000)

THEODORE KISIEL
In its ambition to provide “a systematic, sustained account of the development of 1-Ieidegger's
treatment of science" (4t),' this book by Trish Glazebrook (TG) is reminiscent of an earlier book
by Joseph Kockelmans entitled Heidegger and Science, which I had occasion to review shortly afier
it appeared? Kockelmans came to write his book by way of his long-standing interest in developing
a phenomenological ontology of science c
o
m
p
not
of
the
natural
sciences
but
also
of
the
human
sciences
sciences,
only
(Geisteswissenschaften)
in Dilthey's distinction, which the neo-Kantian Windelband tellingly (and quasi-ontologically)
distinguished into the nomothetic and the idiographic sciences, and which Kockelmans in his book
extends to a detailed analysis of the intemediate domain of the behavioral and empirical social
sciences. But Kockelmans's book assumes a diffuse quality, as I observed in my review of it, not
because of the breadth of the applications in the philosophy of science which it musters, but because
it now and then only mentions in passing, and thus tantalizes us with, a central question that should
have been made the unifying guiding thread of his book, namely, why the theme “Heidegger and
Science” is not a tangential issue for this self-acclaimed “thinker of Being,” but strikes at the very
nerve of his lifelong thought. For at least one oddity of that lifelong thought of our thinker of Being
is the frequency and intensity with which he addresses himself to the phenomenon of “science"
without ever really intending to do “philosophy of science” (except for a final student “trial lecture”
on July 27, 1915, on the concept of time in the historical and the natural sciences). Thus, at first
glance, hia various meditations-on-the-sense (Be-sinnungen) of science appear to be mere “spinoffs"
of his more overtly ontological intentions. And yet these apparent byproducts were fundamental and
penetrating enough to anticipate insights into the historicity of science which will recur decades later
(beginning in the radical sixties) in the revolutionary “new philosophy of science" of Polanyi,
Toulmin, Kuhn, Hanson, Feyerabend, etc.
TG in her book does not make the mistake of omitting this unifying guiding thread that is the
source of Heidegger's meditations on the sciences, however contortedly and backhandedly she
inteıj ects, and then displaces, this central thesis in order tb accommodate a second aim of her book,
not only of “demonstrating the signiflcance of science to Heidegger”s thought and the contribution
of that thought to philosophy of science" (5) but also of “locating his thinking in the analytic
discourse" (4), of showing “that issues crucial to Heidegger's analysis are central in the analytic
tradition of philosophy of science” (5), in short, of “bridging" (3) Hcidegger's work to, of putting
it “into dialogue with” (253), the analytic tradition of philosophy of science, which is mainly an
Anglo-American tradition currently dominated by figures like T. S. Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, Ian
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Hacking, Karl Popper and lmre Lakatos, to name only a few who loom large in TG's account. Since
the mathematical natural sciences are paradigmatic for analytie philosophy of science, TG is
especially taken by Heidegger's thesis that “science is the mathematical projection cfnalure” (1),
which she finds in incipient form already in the 1915 trial lecture on “The Concept of Time in
Historical Science." This thesis then recurs ever more insistently and so persists in several
permutatíons through 6 decades of thought in Heideggefs later accounts of scientific theory,
scientific representation, and scientific experimentation to the point of the essential convergence of
modem science with technology, all of which constitute central topics of current analytic philosophy
of science. Recoiling back into Heidegger proper, TG finally makes the hyperbolic claim, further
“hyped” by its repetition on the book jacket, that these central topics in close proximity to
I~Ieidegger's other noteworthy contributions to philosophy like “his overcoming of metaphysics, his
rereading of the ancients, [...] his vision and revision of language, truth and thinking--have at their
core an inquiry into science that drove his thinking for síxty years. I am not arguing for a new
reading of a few texts, or for adjustments and refinements of existing readings of Heidegger. Rather,
I am bringing to light a new basis on which to interpret his work as a whole. [...] Heidegger may be
right that “Every thinker thinks only one thought,' but ...[there are]... multiple possibilities for
envisioning such a thought. I read Heideggefis [one] thought as a philosophy of science” (13). _
Whoa! The re-newed re-viewed question of be-ing is the question of science?
PHENOMENOLOGY AS PRETHEORETICAL PROTOSCIENCE
To regain our footing on what has now become a slippery slope into the Americanization of
Heidegger's thought, let us return to the very ñrst and more continental of the two central theses that
TG identifies as pivotal in Heidegger”s repeated struggles with the essence of science, namely, the
thesis that philosophy itself is a science. Heidegger remains close to the theme of science because
he first took up Husserl's program of establishing “philosophy as a strict science” by getting back
“to the matters themselves” or “to what matters itself” (i.e. be-ing). If Heidegger is to be called a
philosopher of science at all, it can only be of the “protoscience” or “primal science”
(Urwissenschafi) of philosophy itself, and this only during his overtly phenomenological decade of
1919-29. Science for Heidegger is first the logos_of phenomeno-logy, which for him is ıpso facto
the logos of onto-logy, the “science of being,” whose phenomenological core and fulcrum is to be
a fundamental ontology whose single matter of concern is variously called “factic life(-experience),"
the “historical 1,” the “situation-I,“ and finally “Da-sein“ (my/our unique “being here”). Heidegger°s
phenomenological decade is framed on the hither side by his course of KNS 1919 on “The Idea of
Philosophy and the Problem of Worldviews” in which he ñrst laid down the ideal of
phenomenological philosophy as a supratheoretical prima] science of an original experience which
cannot be objectified, which as a pretheoretical science (Is this phrase not a “square circle”?) is like
none of the particular positive sciences and therefore problematizes the theoretical, epistemological,
and objective nature of these sciences by tracing their eidetic genesis from their initially
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pretheoretical and non-objectifiable matters. On the yonder side of the decade is the lecture course
of WS 1928-29, “Intro-duction to Philosophy," in which the very radicality of the matter of
philosophy as the “historical happening of transcendence” dictates the abandomnent of the ideal of
a strict, original, and primal science, misleading in part because it makes us think of panicular
positive sciences like mathematical physícs and theology, which radically contradict the essence of
philosophy. In WS 1928-29, afier a decade of vacillation over this strange pretheoretical primal
science so unlike any other science, Heidegger definitively abandons the project of developing
philosophy into a strict science. “What science on its part is, resides in philosophy in an original
sense. Plílosophy is indeed¬líhe o
r
i
reason it is not science, not even the original science" (GA27: 18).3 He observes that it is not a
science not out of lack but rather out of excess, since it springs from the ever superabundant and
ebullient “historical happening of Dasein°s transcendence" itself, the fundamentally dynamic but
chiaroscuro "evidence" of life. Superlatively a science from its abiding intimate friendship (filiva,
GA 27: 22) with this comprehensive evidence, "scientific phi1osophy,” much like the formula “round
circle,” becomes a misleading and even dangerous redundancy, deceiving us into pursuing the wrong
tasks in both philosophy and philosophy of science. Philosophy should be regarded in its fınite
tentative (and so inventive) character as ever “under way" in its transcending movement, as ever
philosophizing in response to its ever unique situation with its ever unique, fundamentally
chiaroscuro evidence. Philosophizíng becomes explicit transcending by letting transcendence
happen, repeatedly enacting the transition from the preconceptual understanding-of-being to a
precursory conceiving of being. In this way, it repeatedly actualizes the ontological difference
between be-ing and beings without objectifying be-ing itself (as in SS 1927, upon the “horizon of
time”).4 Philosophy in this frenetic transcending neverthcless continues to function as the
foundation (now however as a fundamenzum concussum) that makes sciences and their regional
ontologies possible, and moreover in its epochal time and history also accounts for the periodic
revolutions in their fundamental concepts (GA27: 16-19, 2l9ffi).
Without making use of this recently published lecture course pivotal to the question of a scientific
philosophy, TG in her own partial way explores some of these shifiing relationships between
philosophy and science (notably in her Chapter 1, to which the present section is put forward as a
supplement), which devolves into the later contrast between meditative thinking and calculative
“thinking" and the statement of provocation that “science itself does not think." Scientists themselves, however, on occasion do think more or less basically, she belatedly notes (239), particularly
in the moments of crisis in the fundamental conceptuality of their disciplines. . . when they, in being
forced to deliberate on the fundamental sense (Besinnung) of their concepts and so of their science,
in fact become philosophers! The early I~leidegger`s litany of scientific revolutions in progress in his
time is also worthy of note, since TG (15, 87f, 109, 217) and others have been captivated by the
genninal Kuhnian insights embodied in this litany. Significantly, this recognition of the
pervasiveness of scientific revolutions in the “hermeneutic situation” of his time first emerges in the
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wake of a confi'ontation of DiIthey°s philosophy of science and is repeated throughout the
period of
the drafting of Sein und Zeit? Heidegger therefore does not restrict himself to the crisis of revision
of the fundamental concepts in the mathematical natural sciences (TG's main
interest) in the wake
of Einstein°s theory of relativity and the strife between formalism and intuitionism that had
precipitated a crisis of the foundations of mathernatics. He also points to the struggles of vitalism
against mechanism over the fundamental concept of life in biology and the attempt made by Dílthey
himself to revive the lived sense of the actuality of history and tradition that are basic to the
historical human sciences, the transformation of the discipline of
history of literature into a history
of problems (Unger), and the search in the science of theology “for a more original
interpretation of
the human being's be-ing toward God” (SZ 10). All of this
groundlaying work that re-views and
re~vises the fundamental concepts of sciences in crisis calls for a “productíve
logic” of concept
formation that “leaps ahead into a particular realm of being in order to first disclose the constitution
of this being and to make such structures available to the positive sciences as
transparent frameworks
that orient their inquiry” (SZ 10). But these different frameworks of
regional ontologies that guide
the different inquiries of the ontic sciences ~ Kuhn will call them
paradigms - require a master
framework Heidegger calls it his fundamental ontology, that of a hermeneutics of Dasein, of the
unique being that already understands (and so spontaneously interprets) be-ing - to serve as a
"guideline” for the overall “ontological task of constructing a non~deductive genealogy of the
different possible ways of being” (SZ 11) into which the various sciences inquire. For
Heideggefs
major conccrn is in fact the ongoing crisis of philosophy itself as a science, as “a revolution in the
very way in which philosophical questions are to be posed and formulated”° as a result of the
confluence of Husserl's phenomenology with Dilthey`s hermeneutics of historical
(factic) life, along
with other philosophies of life (Bergson, Nietzsche) and existence
in
(Jaspers) postwar Gennany in
the Weimar twentíes.
The neo-Kantian fomrs of scientific philosophy then in vogue were notorious for
beginning, in
the spirit of the Enlightemnent, with the accepted fact
then
afsciencaand
analyzing science as an
already finished product. The most notorious fruit of this would be the logical positivist image of
science as a nomothetic system of laws and logical structure of theoretical
proofs that map and order
its sense data. The Husserl of the Logica! investigations likewise defırıes science
statically as “the
of
a
interconnection
totality
grounded
of true sentences” (SZ l l , 357). But later, by way of the
genetic phenomenological reduction, science is no longer accepted as a given fact but is made into
a problem that is to be resolved by tracing the eidetic genesis of the theoretical fi'om its
pretheoretical
protopractical roots (SZ 357), a problem that the early Heidegger made central to his hermeneutics
of facticity. All of the sciences are to be viewed, not after the fact as a ñxed structure
of finalized
results, but before the fact as an ongoing research process in a concrete “problem situation” which
is to be interpreted and resolved against the historical
background of inherited presuppositions that
direction
and
sense
to
all
impart
the aspects of the science. In the same radically historical vein, the
teacher Heidegger advices his beginning students on opening
day of WS 1923-24 to approach their
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chosen science, be it physics, historiography, or theology, not as a finished theoretical stmcture
attempting to correspond to reality, but more “phronetically,” as a historically unique practical
situation in which they ñnd themselves caught up and already under way, where each of them is
.
.
.
. .
_.
.
__
called upon to become „native „.man ongoing scien ce znvia by making its presuppositıons their very
.
.
.
_,
own and by developing a passion for the questions that it generates, thereby resolutely"
. .
. . that their. chosen . . . .is
. .
7
disciplıne
approprıating the relevant opportunities
transmıtting to them
Heidegger thus antedates
by decades the sense of scien ce in process and revolution and scien ce as
`
'
- eıican philosophical historians of science like Kuhn,
hermeneu c
Toulmin, and Shapere would later acclimate us. In the language of curreiñ p
such a heimeneutic approach already at the initial interrogative level of choosing the vital problems
at the cutting edge of one's science in its current “problem situation” would put the priority on the
“context of discovery” over the “context of verification" that logical positivism made paradigmatic
in its understanding of science. Making discovery the paradigmatic problem itself at once recalls the
shift in the primacy of “truth” from propositional correspondence to a more historically precedented
fallibilistic uncovering so dominant in Heidegger's thought. Science-in-genesis of discoveries is
hermeneutical precísely insofar as it necessarily understands, interprets and painstakingly resolves
its problem situations against the background and in terms of the presuppositional contexts of
meaning that give rise to them and at once provide the resources for their resolution. Although it is
not amenable to the analytic rationality of formal logic, scientific discovery is not ipso facto
irrational, as the positivists would have it, accountable only in reductively psychologistic terms like
intuition, inspiration, the “flash of genius" the “Eureka!” experience, the workings of the
unconscious, and even the “serendipity” of “chance,” as the evolutionary epistemologists are wont
to put it. Scientific discovery is a rational practice that develops in accord with a situational logic
of interrogative demand arising from its particular “heimeneutic situation" and soliciting an
appropriate human response to that situational demand. This demand-response logic of the
hermeneutic situation is govemed by a contextual rationality (“'l`he context decides”) and a practical
rationality, a hermeneutic rationality that calls for the explication of the appropriate sense lying
fallow and latent in the situational context of discovery.“
TG on occasion alludes to the “hermeneutic essence of science” (li) in Heidegger`s account,
which already caught the attention of early commentators on “Heidegger and Science” (she mentions
Caputo and Heelan), and at first promises to “expose” it (2), only to woefully misconstrue it later
(96-100, 210) in such a tlioroughgoirig fashion that it is beyond correction by even the most careful
(and in the end tedious) unraveling of its jungle of confusions. The misconstrual occurs in her
unfortunately sparse and highly selective gloss of § 69b of SZ on “The Temporal Sense of the
Modiñcation of Circumspective Concem into the Theoretical Discovery of Objectively Present
Things Within the World” (SZ 356-364), in which Heidegger first clearly makes the above-discussed
distinction between the logical conception of science fixated on the ex-post-facto analysis of its
nomo-thetic and hypo-thetic results, asopposed to the “existential” (i.e., hermeneutical) conception
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of science concerned with its more genetic moments of becoming a science by cultivating the
“theoretical attitude” out of (and therefore still within, Heidegger stresses in SZ 358) the practical
natural attitude. I-ler fatal misstep occurs in misreading and misdirecting Heidegger's intent in
postponing the task of a “completely adequate existential interpretation of science until the meaning
of be-ing and the 'connection' between be-ing and truth have been clarified in tenns of the
temporality of existence. The following deliberations [on the existential conceptíon of science and
the ontologícal genesis of the theoretical attitude] are a propaedeutic to understanding this central
problematic [of joining be-ing and truth in a temporal continuity, i.e., on the horizon of
Temporality]. Within this central problematic, moreover, the idea of phenomenology, as opposed
to its preliminary conceptíon already indicated in our Introduction (in § 7C), «El also first be
developed." (SZ 357, my underlining). It may be recalled that Heidegger in § 7t; distinguishes a
"formal" definition of phenomenology based on its etymology of “letting what shows itself be seen,"
which doubly accentuates the truth of intuition central to Husserl's phenomenology, and a
“deformalized phenomenological” (SZ 35) sense of phenomenology whose task is to
hemıerıeutically expose, “wrest” (36) out of concealment, “that which first and foremost does not
show itself... but at the same time belongs to what first and foremost does show itself so essentially
that it in fact constitutes its sense and ground” (35). lt is this hermeneutic sense of be-ing and of its
conclative phenomenology that the Third Division of SZ (the entiıety of § 69 is projecting its several
tasks) is to elaborate in the full glory of its ekstatic-horizonal temporality (this Division was never
published). In a footnote shortly after spelling out this task of "developing" the idea of
phenomenology as a science of concealing-unconcealing be-ing, in fact as an aside on the
thematízing process that objectifies and “makes present” the mathematízed objects of natural science
(363), Heidegger observes that Husserl, in fulfilling a long Westem tradition of a metaphysics of
constant presence, takes its central epistemological thesis that all knowledge aims at “intuition” to
have the temporal meaning that all knowing is a making present, and then suggests that not every
science, in particular “philosophical know1edge,” has the intuitive aspirations of making present. The
exception he has in mind is clearly a hermeneutic ontology along phenomenological lines, concemecl
with the truth of unconcealment, its concealments and absences, in order to “let them be” in and
through the explication of their tacit ways of constitution. At at least one point along the way,
Heidegger observes, contrary to Westem tradition, that the most basic form of all knowing is not
intuition but rather expository interpretation (Auslegung: GA 20, 359/2(i0)° of what is already
understood simply through living, and be-ing.
TG's misconstrual of § 69b appears to stem from her imperfect grasp of the above distinction
between two phenomenologies, one oriented toward the “self-evident etemal” truths of intuition and
the other toward the more comprehensively temporal and chiaroscuro truths of unconcealment. Her
neglect of hermeneutic phenomenology extends to the point of complete omission of the term
"hermeneutic" from an otherwise amazingly thorough Index bringing up the rear of this work. (For
the anal record: “hermencutic, 1-2, 28, 96-100, 102-3, 122-23, 133, 185, 253" for topics like
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henneneutic violence, hermeneutic circle, henneneutic project and, most significantly, but largely
leit undeveloped, the hermeneutic essence of science.) She goes astray when she understands § 69b
to be about “developing,” in close conjunction with a discussion of natural science, the preliminary
conception of phenomenology “for the first time” (TG 97, 210), without noting that Heidegger
contrasts his preliminary conception of phenomenology, which he had already developed in § 7C,
from the more hermeneutical “idea of phenomenology” left undeveloped in § 7C, which he is now
in a position to develop in its full temporality, once the ekstatic-horizonal structure of the full
been worked out (§ 69c). Despite the fact that
phenomenology is for Heidegger a method for philosophy, she continues, “it is inhis discussiorrof
the theoretical attitude that he himself sees his conception of phenomenology being developed. [.. .]
Phenomenology is to be developed in the context of natural science [understood as “the
mathematical projection of nature itself": SZ 3621, not in the context of philosophy as a science [...],
because he holds that the sciences are phenomenological. [...] Heidegger chooses natural science as
the place to develop a phenomenology of °lettíng beings be' [...] evidently natural science is the
home of such a phenomenology. [...] Yet that Heidegger in 1927 understands his account of science
to be the place where his conception of phenomenology will be developed for the first time is a clear
indication that the question of science is central rather than peripheral to his thinking" (97).
The intent of these misconstruals is now clear. It is one more justiñcation, and perhaps the
decisive one, of the hyperbolic claim gracing the book's backjacket: namely, that it is the “question
of science” as such which is in fact central to Heideggefs thinking throughout his career of thought
rather than the question of a scientific philosophy, which he in 1928-29 brackets as a “round circle”
and soon equates with metaphysics and onto-theo-logy, both of which are to be overcome by way
of meditative thinking, which science by itself camiot do. In this context, I would suggest that
another question in fact dominates the entirety of Heidegger's Denkweg, captured very nicely in the
title of Bill Richardson's book as arnended by Heidegger`s letter prefacing the book: not "From" but
“Through Phenomenology to Thought," suggesting that phenomenology is never really left behind.
Accordingly, the question that dominates the entirety of I~Ieidegger`s career of thought is the
“question of phenomenology as a possibility," first, of philosophy as strict science, and later, of
philosophy's transformation into the “poverty of thought” faced with an ineffable matter which in
its very withdrawal (Entzug) draws us to thought, “calls us to think.“ TG fails to note the lin gering
phenomenological vestiges in the various traits (Züge) of the thinking that outstrips science, ñrst of
all in its persistent pursuit of sense, in its meditation-on-the-meaning (Be-Sinnung) of the historical
situation in which each of us as individuals and as communities (of Germans or North Americans,
of scientific researchers or philosophical freelancers, etc.) happens to find ourselves here and now,
in the epoch of globalization. Vestiges of the free vaıiation of eidetic reduction toward Husserl°s
Weserısschau are surely to be felt in the Ventures of thought to establish the dynamic historical
identity of such individuals, communities, and human endeavors, not in terms of generic universals
but by way of temporally distributed (1`eweı`lı`ge) universals ultimately to be de-fined according to
the individuating historical context, “je nach dem,” in order to detennine, e.g., how modem science
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in the age of globalization or the German state in the Third Reich “perdures and prevails, rules and
administers itself, comes to be and passes away - in short, how it °essences'” (TG 212, citing the
essay on technology). By way of such historical variations, one arrives at an aspect of science that
science by itself cannot reach, its hard-core “uncircumventable, that which cannot be gotten around“
(217, 238), the Sache of each respective science and how it is to be approached, nature for
mathematical physics, the psyche for descriptive psychology, etc. Instead of a re-duction, eidetic
or transcendental, Heidegger now speaks of a “leap” of thinking, respectively to “essential thinking"
or to “originary thinking” (219, 230). In fact, Natorp°s word-play on the rıma
the “
°
o
ñ
g
n
"evidence already in KNS 1919, when Heidegger first
defines phenomenology as a “pretheoretical primal science of original experience,” which already
puts its status as a science in question. In its reductive regress back to the matter of be-ing itself, in
its unendingly circular deepening of the historically unique, hermeneutically “intentional”
reIationshı`p of the understanding-of-being, in its exposition of limits at which something begins to
be what it is in its possibilities, where it accordingly “essences,” fundamental thinking still bears the
traces of the phenomenological approach from which it receives its initial staıt. While discarding the
inappropriate concem for science and research in favor of a more fundamental logos, fundamental
thinking retains not only many of the means acquired from its phenomenological discipline, but
especially the common end of the pursuit-of-meaning (Be-Sinnuııg). The movement “through
phenomenology to thought” dominates 1-Ieidegger's path from start to finish.

'

I-IERMENEUTICS OF THE POLITICS OF SCIENCE IN TI-IE GERMAN UNIVERSIT Y .
One aspect of the “hermeneutic nature of science" that is amply treated, in a chapter devoted to
“Science in the Institution" (119~l62), is “the fact that science is a communal project not free from
a basis in history” (123). “Science happens in a community of researchers” where it becomes
institutionalized, and institutionalized science is “a politically and historically situated hermeneutic
project” (122) which in modemity finds its home in the university. “The destiny of beings in
modemity is to be the objects of scientific research in the context of the university, and the destiny
of Dasein as krıower is research" (133). But the incidental adjective “hermeneutic” is by and largt
left undeveloped in the chapter, so that there is no real indication in what sense the institution of
science is in fact “apolitically and historically situated hemıeneutic project." This section therefore
presents a second supplement on the concept of science to till this particular void.
Situating the sciences in the context of the university naturally places them in a community of
interpretation, so that one can in the same context appeal to the intellectual function of the university
as the site for preserving and transmitting a tradition across generations. But Heidegger as university
rector not only invoked the tradition of thought transmitted from the Greeks to the Gennans as
a”nation of poets and thinkers.” In the first wave of enthusiasm for the political revolution of 1933,
he also modeled the university añer the worker-state projected by the National Socialist German
Workers Party, projecting it asa kind of Platonic Idea, but modifying its ideality to accommodate

"i

~l

»-

A PREPROTOSCIENTIFIC PERUSAL or GLAzEBROoı<'s HEIDEGGER 'SPHILOSOPHY of Scıısß/cs

ıl

'F

4
»s

J
*1

r
_"

r

l
~›

_l

i

l

l
l

~

-t-*

L

"1
›
l
l

35

a uniquely German folk ethos, its traditional “work ethic.” The new German university student, as
a future leader of the nation, is to engage in work service and military service as well as in the main
service of the tmiversity, the service of knowledge and science, which as the “work of the brain”
does not differ in kind from, and so is no higher than, the two levels of the “work of the hand and
fist.” All work is intellectual or “spiritual,” a knowledge-laden deed and action that incorporates a
crafi know-how and an ordered understanding of its place in the world. But work in particular
involves a "capacity of resoluteness and perseverance in carrying out the undertaken task to its
i
t
" (GA 16: 239);'° to which we might also add the
prized German trait of Gründlichkeit, thoroughness, and even a related word then current in
national-Socialist jargon, “hardness.” What is “science” in this context?
“Science is but the more rigorous and thus more responsible form of that knowledge which the
entire German people must seek and demand for its own historical Dasein as a [worker]state,
provided that this people still wills to secure its continuance and its greatness and to preserve these
in the future. The knowledge of genuine science is in essence in no way different from the
knowledge of farmers, foresters, miners or gravediggers, and handworkers. [...] For knowledge
means: to know our way around_the world in which we are placed as individuals and in community.
Knowledge means: in decisiveness and initiative to be equal to the task to which each of us is
consigned, be it the task of plowing the field, felling the tree, digging the grave, interrogating nature
in its laws, or expositing history in the power of its destiny.
Knowledge means: to be master of the situation in which we are placed.“ (GA 16: 2340
One can therefore agree with TG that Heidegger “treats the university as the institutionalized
expression of the human desire to know” (132). But in his speeches as rector beginning with “The
Self-Assertion of the German University,” which are primarily intended for domestic consumption
in a time of domestic national crisis and its revolutionary resolution, this desire to know assumes a
uniquely German accent, more specifically, the folk accents of Gemıan idealism concretized through
I-Ieidegger's protopractical and multivalent sense of Dasein as care. The will to know, leam,
question, discover on the level of the university takes on the form of Ent-schlossenheít, resolute
opemıess, at first actively strenuous in its volitional rigor in responding to the demands exacted by
a time of national crisis and, on its other face, receptive in its openness in order to let the
“hermeneutie situation” of post-Weimar Germany be. This resolute openness is the very spirit of the
German university in its willful self-assertion, where its will to science is the will to question the
various sciences in “their boundless and aimless dispersal into particular ñelds and niches” in order
to expose them once again to the full comprehensiveness of overvvhelming “world-shaping powers
of the human-historical Dasein” of a people “in the midst ofthe uncertaínty ofbeings as a whole,”
i.e. in the interwoven contexts of nature, history, language, and the state that appears to be most
suited to it, as well as the law, custom, economy, technology that it is to develop. Such a will to
science “will create for our people its world of most intimate and extreme danger, which is its truly
spiritual world." This spiritual world of the people exposed by the German university is not a
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superstructure of high culture or a depository of useful information and values; rather, “it is the
power that most deeply preserves the peopIe's earth-and-blood-bound energies and, as such, it is the
power that most deeply moves and most profoundly shakes the Dasein of a people.”“ It is this
power of indigenous spirit that guarantees each particular people its possibility of greatness, for it
to choose in resoluteness or to allow to decline.
Heidegger from his university podiurn continues to pose this fateful choice as late as SS 1935 to
the German people, challenging it to recover its autochthonous spirit and so reclaim the spiritual
world indigenous to it. Germany, this nation of poets and thinkers caught in the land-locked vice-like
grip of Central Europe, now lies in the great pincers between the metaphysical twins of America and
Russia, both of which are caught up in “the same hopcless frenzy of unchained teclmology” (EM
28).” It is thus metaphysically threatened on the Westem front by the international “spirit of
capitalism” (Max Weber's phrase) and on the Eastern front by the international “specter of
communism” (Communist Manífesto) then “haunting” Europe and the entire planet. Gemany, the
most metaphysical of peoples, is by the same fact best equipped spiritually to reverse the drift of the
disempowerment of the spirit through scientism, positivism, materialism, utilitarianism, and other
identifiable versions of nihilism incurred by the industrial revolution, and so to arrest "the decline
of the West." For the “inner truth and greatness” of the indigenous German movement called
National Socialisrn resides in its promised autochthonous resolution, through its völkischen
worker-state, of “the cncounter between global technology and modem man” (EM 152).
lt would take Hitler's announcement of the “Four Year Plan” in September 1936 and the impact
that this “total mobilization” of the German military-industrial complex, tacitly in preparation for
a total war in four years, would have on the universities before we find the first true evidence of
Wholesale, albeit (as usual) discreet, resistance to state policy and planning on the part of Heidegger.
This resistance is sustained by a full-scale meditation (Besinnung) on the essence of modern science
(thus of the increasingly specialized and fiagmented “research university”) as technological, that is,
on the institution of scientific research as a “business” activity, in which method takes precedence
over the domain of objects that is itself being projected by the particular scientific
specialty. It is
within such a meditation that the essence of modern metaphysics is first seen to culminate in the
essence of modem technology.“
The courses from SS 1937 on display increasing concern over the technical organization of the
sciences toward useful results for the “benefit of the people anti nation" (362/103),” and over the
“superpower” of technology and the total technical mobílization of the entire planet (451/186). This
takes place against the background of Germany°s Four Year Plan impacting on the university,
whereby even the human sciences are being made into pedagogical tools to inculcate a political
worldview, and the “technology of vast libraries and archives” are placed at the disposal of news
media and information services, or used primarily to avoid unnecessary duplication of costly lab
experiments (268/1 61). “Today the major branches of industry and our military Chiefs of Staff have
a great deal more “savvy' over 'scientific' exigencies than do the “universities';
they also have at

A PREPROTOSCIENTIFIC PERUSAL OF GLAZEBROOICS HEIDEGGER 'SPHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

ii
0-1
l

,a

i

,

~¬~
i

.wp

ll
l

i

_]

i

i

i

l

l

ı

`l

.-i
l

37

their disposal the larger share of ways and means, the better resources, because they are in deed
closer to the °actual'” (268/16).
Constemation over the Four Year Plan, especially among the younger faculty at Freiburg, led to
a series of “working meetings" among them, independent of the party sanctioned discussions of the
matter, beginning in the Fall of 1936. Heidegger took over such a working session meant especially
for instructors in the natural sciences, mathematics, and medicine in WS 1937-38, launching it on
November 26, 1937, with a keynote lecture on “The Threat to Science.”'5 Long before the external
threat of the Four Year Plan, there has been an intemal threat to science that comes from itself in its
modern development, in its giving of primacy to method over its matter, which has led to the
progressive technization and specialization of the sciences to the detriment of their relation to their
respective domains of being. The resulting threat of groundlessness is only amplified by the “unusual
emergency of our people" (8), which confırms the political need for ñırther technical organization.
Industry now takes over science, after the American way of scientific pursuit and in competition with
it. Scientiñc organization “is becoming a world process, such that in the future, it is no longer the
countries with the richest natural resources, but the countries and peoples with the greatest and most
impressive inventionsthat will seize world leadeıship” (9). As industry takes over science, science
in its fulfilled form of abundantly equipped facilities no longer finds any deep and inner roots within
the university. Yet it is not just industry that takes science away from the university, but also the
absence of the long overdue “self~assertion of the German university." For Heidegger, there is a
deeper sense to the self-assertion of the German university, over against its coordination into the ever
expanding military-industrial complex of the Third Reich, than a mere clash of the basic institutions
of the army, industry, the university, and the state. Self-assertion of the German university does not
mean clinging to a past academic tradition, nor, to begin with, the political organization of the
university, but rather “the will to put itself into question and thereby, and only thereby, to win back
its proper task for itself, and in a higher form: thus to be the site in which science itself on the
strength ofan original knowledge ofitselfi secures and continually renews and augments itself. This
knowledge of itself can only grow out of the communal meditation on the meaning of the different
albeit interrelated domains of science and groups, out of the will to an historically spiritual ground“
(10). Without such a self-assertion, the escalating threat to science at the university is further
intensifıed by the necessity of political education and of the creation of a new generation of Leaders
in the party. The recent announcement of plans for a new kind of supreme technical school, “with
the will of the Führer behind it” (l 1), does not necessarily make the university supertluous, but it
will certainly dilute its initiative. With the multipication of new departments in the tuıiversity like
military science, racial science, ethnology, Germanic prehistory, and space research (i.e. the
geopolitical problem of Lebensraum), and the establishment of new chairs in them, “the great will
toward a meditation on what is essential will become more and more impossible” (1 1). But
ultimately, the essential threat to science comes not from political measures against it nor from the
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for it, but solely fiom itself, its inability and unwillingness ıo renew and

transform itse{ffi'om within.
Heidegger's notes for and from these “working meetings” turn again and again on the political
constellations that relate science to the National Socialist "worldview" (and not to the “movement,”
as in 1935!). One choice example: “There is not even a transformative will for this new organization
[of science as a spiritual power]. The farcical 550th jubilee celebration at Heidelberg University:
forced and inflated without ground and background. And the Führer? Stays away! Instead, on August
16 [1936] he closes the Olympic games in Berlin; on the same day, he organizes the preparations for
the Tokyo games! [...] The Olympic games
greats fi'om all lands are courted for their approval- one is more among one's own kind! 'University
people' of the old style also know too much" (22). One of his greatest mistakes in the rectorate: “that
I did not know that the ministry cannot be approached with creative projects and large goals“ (24).
Now that the “coarse and nonsensical and naive outburst of a “new völkischen science' has totally
gone awry,” the pendulum has swung the other way. In demanding undisturbed quiet for
supratemporal science, one finds a new common ground for compromise: From the side of science,
one concedes that there is nosuch thing as pure theory, that there is room for a worldview. From the
side of the völkischen representatives, one concedes that one must concentrate work on the “matters
themselves," but also that the demand for a worldview is indispensable. Both sides are now saying
the same thing, but the compromise thereby diffuses all the forces of questioning that would bring
us to “the moment of true inception and a real change" (24). What to do in this stalemate? Running
away solves nothing. Best to remain and exploit the possibility of meeting like-minded individuals
while willing one's own individuality. “This not to prepare the university now hopeless - but to
preserve the tradition, to provide role-models, to inspire new demands in one or another individual
~
somewhere, sometime, for someone. This is neither 'escape' nor 'resignation' but the necessity
that comes from the essential philosophical task of the second inception” (241). In this situation, “we
must put on the mask of the °positivists' and be confused with them." We thereby enter into the
“circle of the lanqavnonte"“ [secret ones]. But these Lanthanontes can only be those who know that
and why they must be secretive. Not the game of the misunderstood or of those passed by or of the
'long-sul`fen`ng'. Resignation? No. Blindly agreeing to everything? No. Accommodation? No. Solely
to build for the future." (25) The university is at the end and so is science, “but this is precisely
because philosophy has its second essential inception before itself That what we have called science
is running its course and technologizing itseljf perhaps for a whole century, proves nothing to the
contraryl” (26). In view of its uselessness, phi1osophy's positions and chairs are being reduced or
cancelled. “But with the abolition of philosophy, the Germans--and this with the intention of gaining
their völkischen being! - are committing suicide in world history" (27).
With this 'total' entry into the industrial arms race in preparation for war, National Socialism,
purportedly in search of geopolitical “living space' and scarce natural resources, has unequivocally
placed itself on the same plane as capitalism and communism. The “movement" in search of its
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uniquely German roots has become, like them, a technological worldview. At this point, Heidegger
gives up his fading hope in a difference in the decisions made by narrow-minded party functionaıies
and by Hitler himself, the statesman whose originative deeds create a new state and a higher order.
After he develops a more refined sense of the essence of technology as completed metaphysics,
Heidegger will characterize Hitler as the supreme technician of a System as much being imposed
upon him asmanipulated by him, by way of a shrewd calculative thinking totally devoid of any
vestige of the meditative thinking required of the statesmanfó In his first approximation of the
metaphysical essence of technology in “The Age of the World Picture,” which revisits the pincers
passage of SS 1935 three years later in order to characterize 'the situation as a “struggle of
worldviews” (“Die Zeit des Weltbildes,” pp. 87/134i), Heidegger identifies the “national socialist
philosophies... the laborious fabıications of such contradictory products,” (92/ 140) asamong them
(but as usual, discreetly, in an appendix that was not readi). He singles out the phenomenon of the
“gigantic” (das Riesige: also the “titanic, colossal, mammoth... monstrous!”) that appears in various
guises and disguises in the course of the teclmological conquest of the “world as picture” refening
not just to the oversize machines like particle accelerators merely to “smash” the miniscule atom,
but also to the gigantic numbers of atomic physics as well as astrophysics, the amiihilatíon of
mammoth distances by the airplane and radio, etc. - and observes that this manifold phenomenon
of gíganticism cannot be explained by the catchword “Americanísm” and its presumed worship of
bigness (8'/5'135). For “Americanism itself is something European” (l03/ 153), and the modern
worldviews that come from Europe develop their own gigantic displays
“when the tallies of
millions at mass meetings are a triumph”! (EM 28) Giganticisrn is but one of the results of the
“global” thrust of modern technology, already manifesting its totalízing consequences in the early
20th century in global phenomena like the world war and the worldwide economic depression.
~

A

GE-STELL

That giganticism is not just American but in the end “something European” will return with a
vengeange for Heidegger as the forties progress and he first develops his sense of the essence of
modern science and technology as Ge-Stell, the syn-thetic com-positing of man and nature alike into
the technological grid. One of the first examples that he gives of the forced and challenging extremes
to Which technological exploitation is carried, along with the extraction and processing of uranium
ore for the fabrication of atomic bombs and the conversion of agriculture into a motorized food

industry, is the “fabrication of corpses in gas chambers and annihilation camps" (GA 79: 26)” How
to comprehend in an existential way the “megadeaths” involved in such systematic killings?
“Hundreds of thousands die im masses. Do they die? They are done in, annihilated, “wasted,” killed.
Do they die? They become component parts of a stockpile com-posed [and decomposedl] from the
fabrication of corpses. Do they die? They are surreptitiously liquidated in annihilation camps. And
even without camps millions are now reduced to famine in China and end by starving to death”
~
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(GA 79: 56). So much for the folkish worker-state that, like the truth of the New Testament, “shall
make you free” (Arbeit macht frei).
Perhaps due to his early long-standing association of “Arnericanism” with mammoth feats of
technology like the Hoover dam, the old Heidegger, undeterred by the later Russian achievement of
Sputnik, developed a penchant between 1966 to 1976 of repeatedly posing the question of the

technological Ge-Stell, mercifully without using this difficult-to-translate artificial Teutonism, to a
series of American conferences that he was told would be devoted to his “thínking.” The formulation
chosen as the anniversaıy question of this year's meeting of the Heidegger Conference of North
America is perhaps the clearest and most direct expression of this “question of
ls modern natural science the foundation of modern technology - as is cornmonly assumed - or is it
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itself already the basic fonn of technological thinking, the determining preconception and continual
incursion of technological representation repeatediy being geared into the operative and adaptive
machinations of modern technique? The latter's ever escalating *efficiency* impels the oblivion of
be-ing to extrernes and so makes the question of be-ing appear trivial and superfluous (GA I6: 747f.).

TGregards Ge-Stell as the culminating projection of science within a series of three proj ections
that histoıically constitute the very essence of science. The first is the onzological projecıion which
predetennines the basic concepts of the particular region of beings that serve to guide the
investigations of the particular regional science, understood to be situated within the more
comprehensive context of a unified field of be-ing that is left to the "science" of philosophy to
investigate. The second is the mathematical projection of nature that constitutes modem science,
making mathematical physics into a paradigtn for all the positive sciences. It is therefore the first of
the reductive projections in its extension of Galilean-Newtonian mechanics, mathematized by the
CGS system of calculation, not just to quantum mechanics but to all the “positive” sciences. Both
“mechanics” and “calculus” already suggest that the mathematical projection is but a “transitional
phase” (5) destined to ripen into the technological projectían that is currently “globalizing” science
as well as humanity.
The Ge-Stell (the syn-thetic, the com-posite) can also be espied in ñligree in the grand
metaphysical systems of modern philosophy that aspire to a mathesís universalis and take being to
be absolute position (Leibniz, Kant). Even the passage through absolute negation in the grand
dialectical systems of late modernity only temporarily postpones the ine-. itable impression of a
giganticism and an ultimate standoff of absolute object standing over against absolute subject, who
has in advance “set up the object before” itself, re-presented (vorgestellt) it. The standing object
is the hypo-thesized component of the nomo-thetic com-posite of science, while the stock item
standing in reserve (Bestand) is the ever uniform and disposable (be-stellbare) component of the
technological com«posite. Its syn-thetic stock of “natural" resources extends even to the uniform
units of reserve “manpower.” It is easy enough to espy the shifting pattems of such syn~thetic
com-posites in the year 2001, at the axis of the millemtium, of which a few have already been
mentioned: the military-industrial complex, corporate globalization, the totally mobilized “war
machine” at once coordinating Atlantic and Pacific fronts, the Missile Defense System, “Huston
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Control,” satellite tracking systems, the air traffic control network, the globally coordinated weather
forecasting model, the regionally interconnected electric power grid cascading into blackout, the
donor “organ bank” system, the internetted WorldWideWeb, the Human Genome Project, etc. etc.
It is sometimes difficult to look beyond the global com-posite and ñnd the right words to formulate
the “question of be-ing" inherent in this millennial “hemtenetıtic situation." “For there still looms
like a specter over all this uproar the question: what for? - where to? - what then?” (EM 29).
University ofNorthern Illinois
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(Frankfurt: Klostennann, 1979). Translated and corrected by Theodore Kisíel as History ofthe Concept ofTı`me: Prolegomena
(Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1985). For more on this revolutionary contrast, see Theodore Kisiel, “From lntuition to
Understanding: On Heidegger's Transposition of Husserlian Phenomenology," Etudes P/ıénoménologiques 22 (1995): 31-50.
GA 16 = Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebeıısweges (1910-1976), edited by Hermann Heidegger (Frankfurt: Klostennann,
2000). Citcd here are speeches given by Rektor Heidegger in January 1934 to the citizens of Freiburg, “from gown to town." as
it were, where Heidegger tended tostress that there is only one class in the new Germany, the worker class.
Martin Heidegger, Die Selbstbehauptung der deutisclten Universität, edited by Hermann Heidegger (Frankfurt: Klostermann,
1983), pp. 13-14. “The Self-Assertion of the University,” translated by Lisa Harries in G. Neske & E. Kettering (eds), Martin
Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers (New York: Paragon, 1990), pp. 5-13. esp. p. 9.
EM= Einfihmngin die Metaphysik (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1953). New English translation by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt,
Introduction to Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale UP, 2000).
This is a quick summary of “The Age of the World Picture," the talk first delivered in Freiburg on June 9, 1938, which constitutes
Heidegger's public philosophical response to the Four Year Plan and which some regard as his first unequivocal critique of
National Socialism. Martin Heidegger, “Die Zeit des Weltbildes," Holzwege (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1951), pp. 69-104; English
translation by William Lovitı, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (San Francisco: Harper Colophon, 1977),
pp. 115-154.
The following collation of scattered "technical" passages in SS 1937 is drawn from Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche 1(Pfullingen:
Neske, 1961); English translation by David Farrell Krell, Nietzsche, Volume II: The Eternal Recurreııce ofthe Same (San
Francisco: HarpetCollins, 1991). Remarks on the technologizing of science and scholarship continue into WS 1937-38 in the
course entitled Basic Questions of Philosophy: cf. GA 45: Sf/5 f, 53-55/49l`, 110-1 13196-99, 141-143/1231“, 179/154.
Martin Heidegger, “Die Bedrohung der Wissenschaft: Arbeitskreis von Dozenten der naturwissenschaftlichen und medizinischen
Fakultät (November 1937)-(Auszilge)," D. Papenfuss and 0. Pöggeler (eds), Zur philosophischen Aktualität Heideggers, Vol.
lxPhilosoplıíe und Politik (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1991), pp. 5-27. Page references here are first to the delivered talk itself (pp.
5-1 1) and then to an accompanying set of loose “notes on the working circle" that was held privatissime since Fall 1936, which
the editor (Hartmut Tietjen) has entitled “Philosopl1ie, Wissenschaft und Weltanschauung" (pp. 14-27). A middle section entitled
“Besinnung auf die Wissenschaft" (pp. 11-14) is not cited in the above.
Martin Heidegger, “Überwindung der Metaphysík," Vorträge und Auj.`sätze,(Pfullingen: Neske, 1954), pp. 71-99, esp. pp. 94 and
96. English translation by Joan Stambaugh in Martin Heidegger, The End ofPlıilosophy (New York: Harper & Row, 1973),
pp
84-1 10, esp. pp. 105 and 107; reproduced in the Wolin edition, The Heidegger Controversy, "Overcoming Metaphysics
(1936-1946)," pp. 67-90, esp. pp. 85 and 87; references are to no. XXVI of this collection of notes, a note that was written no
earlier than late 1942. Heídegger's last reference to Hitler as bonafide statesman, tinged with a mild critique, occurs in the
Schelling course of SS 1936: “It is in fact evident that the two men who have initiated countcrmovements in Europe for the
political formation of their nation as well as their people, that both Mussolini and Hitler are essentially detemiined by Nietzsche,
again in different ways, and this without the authentic metaphysical domain of Nielzschean thought having an immediate impact
in the process” (GA 42: 400.
GA 79 = Bremer [1949] and Freiburger [ 1'95 7] Vorträge, edited by Petra Jaeger (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1994).
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Stalkers on the trail of the elusive Heidegger usually encounter markers of essences in a hierarchical
setting. Pitted against what Heidegger understands as the swift and tenible onslaught of the demonic
evil' unraveling the order of rank, Heideggefs thought seems nestled within the highest order of
rank. For the researching stalker the order of questioning thought must remain elusive.2 Successful
claims were made on Heidegger's body, but as yet there are no substantiated claims on the realm of
essential thinking. Research in phenomenology thus continues on the Holzwege marked out by
Heidegger. Research in phenomenology is of course also a marker left by Heidegger as he tumed,
leaving other markers, in pursuit of the region of questioning thought. One of these markers is called
the way of Gelassenheit, marking I-Ieidegger's later approach to thinking the world encountered in
the modem scientific age. There is, in other words, an ensemble of markers begimiing with the 1925
Marburg lectures, which, if followed in the manner of research, trace a series of multiple and
sometimes perilous paths to the Gelassenheit marker of the period 1944- 1955.
From 1925 to 1929, Heideggefs formulations of a hermeneutical phenomenology moved in the
dimension of an encountering understood as the basis for derivative modes such as knowing and
explanation. I-lermeneutical phenomenology is the phenomenal exhibition and interpretation of the
structure of encountering beings in the ontic-existentiell self-evidence of a world becoming
“transparent in a Dasein by way of the positive vision of the phenomenon of in-being." The meaning
of the proposition “An entity always is only for a conscíousness” means, accordingly, that “a world
is encountered" and the entity “thus directs us to interpret the structure of encounter, the activity of
encounteringf”
Yet, encountering an entity is a tricky affair, especially when the entity is that master trickster
Heidegger calls the Dasein. Like all forms of observation, research in phenomenology is subject to
the unceıtainty principle. The more exactly you pin down a philosopher, the least certain you can
be about the momentum of her thought. Unlike the kill that makes biographical research a substitute
for following the tracings, captures do not really end the game. Red Peter in Kafka's tale “A Report
to an Academy" tells us that afier his capture by the Hagenbeck firm, he had no choice but to become
something other than an ape.“ I have no doubt that if Heidegger were here to hear my measure-taking
of his thought on science and technology, he would howl in the manner of the Red Peter's apes when
they first heard of the notion of human freedom as self-controlled movement. The effects of the
legacy of classical physics are often cruel, but they also provide some lighter moments.
For us trackers who don't think we're always on the same paths, much less in the same woods,
being in the world does not necessañly follow from the proposition that a world of beings must be
encountered prior to any attempt at knowing and explanation. Heidegger's equivocation between
43
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being-in-a-world and being-in-the-world, and thus the entire problematic of the worldhood of the
World, persists beyond, so to speak, Being and Time. This equivocation is at work in his 1938
characterization of modem natural science. I-Iowever, there is a subsequent shift with the later
Gelassenheit marker, a shift that departs from the worldhood of the world to the possibility ofa new
rootedness. It is in the context of this shift and the two 1944 markers die Gegner and Gelassenheit
- that I would like to discuss certain
crossings of I-Ieidegger's thought and recent developments in
quantum mechanics, with emphasis upon non-local reality.
According to Heidegger”s 1938 characterization, natural science has lost its roots. For Heidegger
this means that natural science has become “ınodern.” Forschung [research] is the fundamental
characteristic of this alienated science. The alienation of natural science thus lies in the very essence
of research - a projecting of both a fixed ground plan of natural events and a rigorous manner “in
which the knowing procedure must bind itself and adhere to the sphere opened up.”5 Logically, then,
we an*ive at the second essential characteristic of research: the methodology of experimentation. In
1938 Heidegger makes no distinction between classical Newtonian mechanics and quantum
mechanics. He characterizes both as the laying down of a law, with reference to their ground plan
of the object-sphere, as a basis for controlling the observations of motions and thus for controlling
them in advance by calculation.“ In essence, then, modern natural science takes over and assumes
the role of Being in the determination of beings without, however, ever raising the question of Being.
Mathematical physics is a metaphysical variant of Seinservgessenheít.
The time of the world as picture is the Cartesian space-time of objective representations, of beings
represented to us with certainty within a universal space-time grid. Within this proj ection, the world
becomes the sum total of representations of beings as objects. Our modem world is the world drawn
by alienated, human-centered science. The Being of beings is replaced by the picture-view of modem
natural science and its mimetic doublings in the realms of the arts and life sciences. Grounded in
human subjectivity, modem natural science is driven by will, meaning that it is also a domineering
project ofmastery. Heidegger tells us this project is possible because the doctrine of revealed truths
no longer binds us to a hierarchical Scheme of beings, to “a specific rank of the order of what has
been created-a rank appointed from the beginning»and thus caused, to correspond to the cause of
creation (analogia entı's).”7 It is remarkable that Heidegger does not interpret the argumentum ex
verbo regulation of medieval knowledge as following upon a projection or a world-view. Why does
Heidegger not regard church doctrine as a carefully prepared proj ection of a region for the
appearance of beings? Because, says Heidegger, a Greek, medieval, and Catholic world view are
equally absurd (although Plato did determine the beingness of what-is as eidos and thus laid down
the presupposition for the world becoming a picture).
But Heidegger is not very convincing on this point, especially since a stronger case for the linkage
of knowledge and technology-as-domination can be made for the medieval church view and its
enforcement than for modern natural science after Newton.E I say “after Newton” because modern
w

NON-LOCAL REAL1rvıN HE1DEGGER's CHARACTERIZATION OF MODERN NATURAL SCIENCE

45

natural science in its classical Cartesian-Newtonian form is largely medieval in its ideological
character. Descartes believed that God created the world in accordance with mathematical ideas. The
truths of classical physics were “viewed” by Descartes as revealed truths. A one-to-one
correspondence between every element of physical theory and physical reality was possible,
according to Descartes, only because the mathematical language of the former mirrors the perfect
mind of the creator. The price Descartes was willing to pay for this one~to-one correspondence was
the ontological separation of the subjective world of lived experience from the real world of physical
reality. The observed results of scientific experiments could not be trusted, therefore, since they
involved human perception. The way to the Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm is the hard road of
mastering the passions, the body, and nature by the mathematical soul. The failures of Scholastic
Physics are thus essentially theological: analogical reasoning is inferior to mathematical reasoning.
In Hennami Weyl`s words:
When the authoritative world-view of the Church came to grief in the Middle Ages and waves of skepticism
threatened to wash away everything stable, man's belief in the truth clung to geometry as to a rock. At that time
it could be set down as the highest ideal of all science that it can be pursued more geometricag

World-views are never neatly separated by clear demarcations marking their begimiings and ends.
The authoritative world-view of the Church came to grief but it did not disappear with the rise of
mathematical reasoning as the highest ideal of science. The truths uncovered in accordance with
mathematical ideas were still held by Descartes to be “revealed truths.” Nacleau and Kafatos call this
seventeenth-century metaphysical view the “hidden ontology of classical epistemology.”m This view
was held by Copemicus, Kepler, Galileo, Newton, and Einstein. It is a mistake to construe this view
as following upon a scientific commitment to experimentation since none of the major ti gures of this
complex of overlapping traditions held their beliefs on the basis of controlled observations. For
Copemicus the Sun was the center of the universe simply because it was a better symbol of God than
the earth, a symbol that God himself would prefer. Kepler°s extension of Copemicus - t h e laws of
planetary motion were experimental only in a derivative sense. The elliptical orbit of planets was
simply a consequence of a model of the universe which Kepler regarded as more mathematically
hannonious than Copemicus' model. Despite the absence of experimental confinnation, Galileo
remained committed to his mathematical law or constant describing the acceleration of bodies in free
fall. Like Einstein after him, Galileo held to the article of faith stating that all movement must be
subject to the law of number corresponding to the eteınal and iınmutable tnıths in the mind of God.“
The law of number and physical reality are a sacred union for classical physics. And it is precisely
this article of faith that relegated scientific experimentation to a subservient role.
In 1954 Heidegger referred to the recent works of Werner Heisenberg dealing with the the
problem of causality in quantum theory. According to Heidegger, Heisenberg treats this problem as
a “purely mathematical problem of the measurement of time.”” In its baldness this is a curious
statement against the backdrop of what Niels Bohr and Heisenberg were proposing for a radically
new conception of nature since the late l92Os. The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory
V
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radically depaıted from classical physics by proposing that the basis of scientific theoretical structure
is not microscopic space-time realities but the concrete sense realities of everyday life. It is true th-at
Heisenberg, along with Max Bom and Pascual Jordan, developed the theory of matrices in the belief
that science can only deal with quantities measurable in experiments, but this new mathematical
theory was prompted by the realization that the classical assumption of “real” atoms and molecules
in the sense of exactly definable and determinable was untenable given the experimental
findings
that physical quantities can be known only through acts of observation. Heisenberg's indetenninacy
principle and matrices broke with the classical logic premised on Aristotle”s law of excluded middle.
By the l930s physicists were divided into the two camps: realism (Planck, Schrödinger, DeBroglie,
and Einstein) and the Copenhagen Interpretation and its new logical framework of complementarity
(Bohr, Heisenberg, Dirac, Pauli, Jordan, and Born).
Given this complex situation, it is even more curious that Heidegger goes onto state that “since
the beginning of the modern period in the seventeenth century, the word 'real' has meant the same
thing as *certain”.ö'3 Heidegger seems to understand all of modem science in the mode of classical
physics, and seems to imply that quantum theory is nothing but a development and extension of
classical physics. The August, 1954 lecture “Wissenschaft und Besinnung” provides Heidegger's
answer to the question he later posed in 1976 and which today,
twenty-five years later, we are
meeting to once again address. Regarding I~Ieidegger°s 1954-55 answer to the question, it is crucial
to note that Heideggefs reading of quantum theory follows lines laid down by the realist
camp.
Thus, Max Planck is quoted: “The actual is whatever can be measured”'4 for the purpose of
supporting Heidegger°s reading of modern science as “the theory of the real." What Heidegger
thereby displaces is the pivotal quantum interpretation question; namely, what does a quantum
being's proxy wave (y) tell us about the actual situation of an unmeasured quantum being? This
question arises precisely because both quantum theory and experimental results indicate that all
measurement “profoundly reshapes the very fabric of reality.”15
Unlike his 1938 lecture “Die Zeit des Weltbíldes,” “Wissenschaft und
Besinnung” does distinguish
classical from nuclear physics, noting that the latter can neither be traced back nor reduced to the
fonner. Nevertheless, Heidegger insists that what does not change for the new
physics is the fact that
nature has in advance to set itself in place for the entrapping
securing that science, as theory,
accomplishes. However, the way in which in the most recent phase of atomic physics even the object
vanishes also, and the way in which, above all, the subject-object relation as pure relation thus takes
precedence over the object and the subject, to become secured as standing-reserve [Besrand], cannot
be more precisely discussecl in this place.“
What follows instead of a precise discussion is Heidegger's answer to the question we are
'7
addressing today. It is an answer that comes in brackets, perhaps marking its provisional character.
Rather than disappearing, the subject-object-relation now attains its most extreme dominance as
predetennined from out of Gestell, one in which both subject and object “are sucked up” as Bestand.
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However, the subject-object polarity of classical epistemology and its goal of bıinging the object
to stand in constancy are rooted in the assumption of a god-like perspective from which physical
reality can be known as it is in itself. If, on the other hand, there is always an interaction between
beings under observation and measuring instruments, including the human eye, Bohr°s quantum of
action precludes any possibility of a one-to-one correspondence between elements of theory and
what is observed. What, then, is the meaning of subject and object sucked up as inventory? Does the
predetermination of this event preclude an overcoming of the subject-object relation within a
transformation of modem science? If so, the essence of technology understood as Gestell determines
the development of science such that modern natural science can be nothing other than the
fundamental structure of technological thinking. But if this is indeed Heidegger°s position in 195455, why would he suggest, shortly before his death, that we address the relation of modern science
to modern technology? Perhaps the question has something to do with the equivocation between
being-in~a~world and being»in-the~world, an equivocation taking the form of a separation of truth
from Dasein°s self-understanding in Heidegger”s post 1939 thought.“
Our conceptual experience of the world is shaped by centuries of overlapping and conflictual
world-views. If, however, as proposed by classical physics, the sum of the parts in physical reality
compose the whole of what-is, Heideggefis thesis of a pre-conceptual understanding of Being would
amount to nothing more than a thesis of a pre-scientific understanding of reality that could, in
principle, become conceptual with the completion of science as a complete theoıy of reality. This
would also imply that the comection of instrumental referential totalities and derivative theoretical
entities in Sein und Zeit was itself pre- and proto-teclmologicalfg Modem science as a complete
theory of reality would thus complete the project of hermeneutical or existential phenomenology,
making modern science the last phase of active nihilism from a post-Kehre perspective. This would
also mean that the western metaphysical roots of fundamental ontology are determinate and fateful
in the process of scientific-technological globalization. Another beginning is possible only as a
retrieve since there is only one World progressively exhausted by the domination of technological
calculation. In this sense, Heidegger°s Kehre is necessitated by the veıy logic underlying the
unfolding of fundamental ontology both in-itself and in the western world after the publication of
Sein und Zeit. But what Heidegger took as a coalescence of events and Geschichte during the
turmulent 30s and 40s, was actually a dead-in or trap set by what was already prefigured in
Heideggefs thought as the essence of science-technology. Regarding the specific conflation of this
essence with the evil forces of America and the Soviet Union, we need not discuss here.2°
In 1955, however, Heidegger is speaking of a “completely new relation of man to the world and
his place in it.”2' This new relation emerges, on the one hand, as the forces of technology create
conditions outstripping our capacity for decision and, on the other, as probable global destruction
does not happen. What is uncanny pertains to what is hidden in the improbability of the nonoccurrence of the probable beyond our calculative abilities. Furthennore, what Heidegger sets forth
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in this more or less popular address, was already prepared in l944~45 with the shift away from the
problematics of the world, representation, horizon, and willing to the notion of die Gegner. Things
appearing in die Gegnet are nolonger objects in relation to egos. The improbability of the probable
not happening thus moves us from the transcendental horizon of the world arıd the referential totality
ofinstruments to another side of die Gegnet, to the side of “that-which-regions.”" Following the lead
of the English translation and its absolute use of the adjective for the purposes of avoiding a noun
or reification of the regioning, the side of die Gegner tumed toward our representing is not exclusive
of the side other than that of willing and representing. A world is thus a totality only within the
horizon of that world, and then only because that world is a world of representation. In other words,
the shift in Heidegger's thinking fi'om the transcendental hoıizon of the world to die Gegner implies,
whether explieitly stated or not, the recognition of a plurality of worlds, one of which has certainly
conquered, dominated, and most often destroyed the worlds of others. What is improbable concems,
therefore, this European world and the fact that it has neither yet destroyed all the others nor itself.
Decisively, so to speak, Heidegger also makes clear that Gelassenheit does not necessarily require
as the historical or logical prerequisite of first being bound by the European transcendental horizon
of the world.“ Nevertheless, he still maintains “The program of mathematics and the experiment are
grounded in the relation of man as ego to the thing as object.”2" If classical physical science is part
and parcel of the European transcendental horizon of the world, the experimental findings of
quantum mechanics indicate a break away from the unfolding of the historiographical character of
the subject-object-relation. Indeed, Heidegger tells us: “The historical rests in that-which-regions,
and in what occurs as that-which-regions."” It is possible, then, to dwell in more than one world as
the occurrence of that-which-regions calls from one world to another. From the standpoint of the
classical Cartesian-Newtoniarı world, the experimental results of quantum mechanics evince a
puzzling world of wave-particle duality, null measurements, particle spin, and non-local effects. This
world can neither be shared nor understood by ínhabitants of the Cartesian-Newtonian world as long
as they remain bound to their “revealed truths" ideology. Heidegger seems to understand this when
he notes in “Wissenschaft und Besinnung” that nuclear physics can neither be traced back not
reduced to classical physics. On the other hand, his claim conceming the exacerbation of the subjectobject-relation to that of Bestand in the domain of the new physics evinces a lack of acquaintance
with the new, strange world of quanta.
A quantum entity (I-Ierbert's “quon") is never fully open to view because “its visible compatible
attributes represent only part of its fiıll range of possibilities.”2° We never see a quantum wave since,
unlike ordinary waves, it carries no energy. The square of a quantum wave's amplitude at location
x represents not energy but rather the probability that a particle will be observed if a detector is
placed at location x. What we see are thus aggregates of quantum particles. We can, however, infer
the presence of probability waves from the pattem of particle events. Quantum possibilities can be
calculated but only in the manner of invisíble waves. They do not add in the ma mie r of classical
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things. One of the strange things about quons is that if their waves meet out of phase (interference),
physical possibilities disappear without ever having appeared. This is perhaps why Einstein called
the quantum wave a Gespensterfeld. The French prefer the more elegant densit, de pr,sence. The
strange duality of particle and wave, locality and continuous spread, makes it impossible to
categorically separate the obsen/er and observing apparatus from the results of physical experiments,
which “implies that we can no longer °see' the preexistent truths of physical reality through the
lenses of physical theory in the classical sense.”27 The observing subject becomes part of the result,
but not as an ideological constructor of what must appear as the result of experimentation.
If complete certainty is desired, the wave function allows a precise prediction of where a particle
will appear specifically in space as long as no observation is made. If, on the other hand,
experimental verification of this prediction is attempted, quantum theory gives only the probability
of finding the particle at its predicted location. Quantum theory is thus complete in the classical
sense only as a wave mechanics that is completely deterministic in the absence of observation. But
wave mechanics cannot be the whole story since waves also have particle attributes, some of which
are weird from a classical perspective.
We, at least those of us over 60, were taught that objects don”t have intrinsic properties called
colors. We were also taught that light is caused by moving electrons. But I suspect that most of us
were not taught that electrons follow neither any classical law nor even any kind of classical law.
If they did, black bodies, for example, would always, when heated, glow bright blue at all
temperatures. But they don't do that. Even though Max Planck was a very conservative sort of
thinker, I don't think he would have approved of suppressing his discovery of the quantum of action
in favor of science teachers' preference for Newton' s laws. Particles, contra Newton and even contra
Planck`s desires when he first took up the black-body puzzle, can't have any energy they please.
How Planck did what he did in connection with the results obtained are instructive in terms of
I-Ieidegger's distinction between challenging things to emerge and allowing them to emerge. Planck
began with the assumption that particles cannot vibrate any way they please. Thus he mathematically
restricted their energies to certain multiples of their vibration frequencies or colors (E=nhf where E
is the particle's energy, n is any integer, f is the frequency of the particle°s vibration, and h is a
constant to be chosen by Planck). In Nick I-Ierbert's words:
Planck's assumption was not justified by any physical reasoning but was merely a trick to ınake
the math easier to handle. Later in his calculations Planck plamied to remove this restriction by
letting the constant h go to zero. This would make the value of the “energy coin” so small that the
particle could once again have effectively any energy it pleased.
Planck discovered that he got the same blue glow as everybody else when h went to zero.
However, much to his surprise, if he set h to one particular value, his calculation matched the
experiment exactly (and vindicated the experience of ironworkers everywhere). Hot iron glows red,
Planck showed, only if those particles exist whose energy is built from “coins” of a particular
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denomination. Physicists politely ignored Planck's work because although it gave the right answer,
it did not play fair. This fiınny restriction on energy was totally alien to classical physics. Newton's
laws permitted particles to have any energy they pleased”
Planck's quantum of action follows nature's insistence that no energy transítions will occur
except as specífic whole chucks of energy. As something more than zero, Planck's constant spelled
the end for the ideological dream of mathematical theory as both allowing precise predictions of
physical reality and for the isomoıphism of theory and reality.
Challenging the earth, we get iron ore. Intensifying our challenge by employing the tried and true
torture of heating the ore, we get its red glow. Challenging it to the utmost by submitting it to
universal (Newtonian) laws, we get something totally unexpected. Not the blue glow veri fying our
mastery, but instead nature's insistence on discreteness and indetenninacy when we attempt to
measure its different yet combined voices. When and where the differences are great enough,
measurement does not match the unity of nature's conjugations. What is remarkable about
I-leisenberg`s Uncertainty Principle is that it applies only to the measurement of conjugate attributes,
i. e., to attributes that are unlike one another. Thus the Uncertainty Principle preserves what for
classical theory and logic is the contradictory coexistence of unmeasured wave and measured particle
duality. Quantum attributes always come in pairs which are as unlike as possible. This paired
unlikeness limits how accurately we can know both of them. We can know both together but not
with much exactness. We can know one or the other with precision but always at the cost of not
knowing much about the other: “The Heisenberg relations guarantee that any experiment will contain
a blind spot just big enough to hide the solution to the wave/particle riddle."”
Nature, including the human, answers toıture in a way difficult if not impossible for the torturer
to understand. Jean Am,ry tells us that no one ever recovers from torture: “Whoever was tortured,
stays tortured.”3° If all things are connected in the way quantum theory indicates, we can also say
that "whatever was tortured, stays tortured.” Do the sado-masochist practices of European culture
have limits? And one, should address this question only after first reading Sade`s Juliette together
with the long-suppressed histories of westem expansion (aka genocide). Science, on the other hand,
may yet become one of the few decent developments of the European civilizing process. But when
the scientist does not hear and read what nature says and writes, science remains in the ideological
mode of western expansionism as it shouts and overwrites the event-horizon of knowledge. Being
human is neither a self~referentíal and closed system nor a being-in-the-world. There is no
ontological bridge between theory and reality. I-Ieidegger`s world as picture does indeed refer to the
age of total ideology, the age of murder and torture. But this age began well before the modern
period. I-leidegger`s anti-modemism misses the markers on the way to the modern we have yet to
become. We will return to this. But first the matter of non-locality and the end of classical physical
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In 1964 John Bell of the Centre for European Nuclear Research decided to tackle the argument
between Einstein and Bohr by devising the mathematical relationships between two particles like
those in the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen thought expetimentf' and then by showing that certain kinds
of measurement could settle the issue of whether quantum theory was complete (Bohr) or incomplete
(Einstein). Einstein, after finally accepting the Uncertainty Principle as a fact of nature, remained
convinced that every element of physical theory must have a counterpart in physical reality. To
establish this, the EPR thought experiment suggests it is possible to circumvent the quantum measurement problem by using experimental information about one particle to deduce complementary
properties such as position and momentum of another particle that originated with the first from the
same quantum state. Since these two paired particles (in this case, photons) move apart from one
another at the speed of light, the measurements made on one particle after a sufficient time has
passed cannot effect the other particle since no signal can travel faster than the speed of light. Despite the limitation of the quantum measurement problem, EPR argues that if we measure the position of one of these particles, such a measurement will not effect the other since they are space-separated. This accords with the principle of local causes: energy transfers between space-like separated
regions cannot occur at superluminal speeds. EPR then argues that since we can calculate the momentum of the particle that was not measured and since we already know the position of the particle
that was measured, wecan deduce both the momentmn and position of the particle that was not measured. Thus' we can circumvent the rules of measurement-observation in quantum physics. In other
words, Bohr's thesis that particles have no dynamic attributes before they are measured must be
wrong and thus quantum theory is an incomplete theory. The EPR thought experiment was thus designed with the assumption of the principle of local causes for the purpose of confirming the realist
position which holds that physical reality is independent of the observer and acts of measurement.
What came to be called Bell's Interconnectedness Theorem was based on his discovery of a
loophole in von Neumann's proof that the world cannot be made of ordinary objects possessing
dynamic attributes of their own. The problem was that David Bohm and Louis de Broglie and other
neo-realists had built ordinary object models of quantum reality in apparent violation of von
Neumann's proof. What Bell discovered was that these realist models all contained objects whose
attributes are context-sensitive, changing their attributes in response to their environment. What Bell
did was to devise a proof for the invalidity of all models of reality having the
property of locality.
This proof brings the Newtonian world of science to an end. Newton has a premonition of this end
when he said:
That one body may act upon another at a distance through a vacuum without the mediation of anything
else . . . is to me so great an absurdity, that 1 believe no man, who has in philosophical matters a
competent faculty for thinking, can ever fall into.“

A

l
\

_í

ll

Indeed! Umnediated action-at-a-distance is a scandal for the ideological project of mastery
tluough the process of challenging (Herausfordern), ordering (Bestellen), and ultimate reduction to
inventory (Bestand).
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Instantaneous connections across infinite distances between all particles that have ever been in
contact with one another non-local eßkcts do not provide for the possibility ofthe ultimate perfection
of classical epistemology and its correlative principle of certainty. Quite the contrary. We cannot
command the non-local nature of reality to appear or submit to some kind of exquisite examination
ordeal. We do not '“disturb”' or “create” phenomena by acts of measurement or observation. Such
metaphors derive from the realist assumption that the world is describable independent of
observation and measurement” If, on the other hand, experiments indicate a non-local universe,
then any description of physical reality must accord with these findings if they are to avoid the
pitfalls and dangers of ideology (world aspicture or the world).
In 1972 John Clauser and Stuart Freedman performed the experiment that veri ñed the statistical
predictiöns upon which Bell based his theorem.“ However, the Clauser-Freedman experiment did
not establish that the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics resulted from superluminal
communications. In 1975 Jack Sarfatti proposed a theory, based on Planck`s quantum of action, of
superluminal transfer of negentropy (order) in which there is no transport of energy." Then, in 1982,
Alain Aspect led a team that performed the crucial experiment confirming that superluminal
communication was a fact of nature.“
If we follow the leads provided by the experiments indicating non-locality, the time of science
asideology will come to an end in the dissipation of the separation subject and object and of science
from Besinnung. We will accept the event-hoıizon of knowledge and the spacetime of scientific
refleetion. Wewill thus begin to bring to an end the period ofthe European as brutum bestiale. Total
ideology, the tinal configuration of metaphysics,” and science-reflection within the event-horizon
of knowledge are completely incompatible. I-leidegger's understanding of modern natural science
remained within the perspective of positivism, seeing physical reality as fully disclosed in
mathematical descriptions. Positivism itself is “premised on classical epistemology: “there must be
a one-to-one correspondence between every element in a physical theory and every aspect of the
physical reality described by that theory.”” There can be little doubt that classical natural science
developed within the framework of European asceticism and its fanatical attempt to overcome the
pleasures ofthe earthly body. The globalization of this sado-masochistic obsession with the onward
marching Christian soldíers of the Crusades, the slave traders of the ancient and medieval worlds,
and the ordained slaughters of the native populations of the New World is now so well established
that even the loyal, albeit transplanted, subjects of the cleansed New World, now jogging under the
consumer imprint, can only enjoy the booty of centuries of murder, rape, torture, and theft in no
other way than through the masochistic techniques of the old asceticism” Consuming others and
their achievements requires self-consumption. This is the subject-object relation as pure relation and
the ultimate reduction of suject and object to inventory. With the near total sacriñce of the “wild
man” to civilization, the vale of tears of the contemptus mundi finds its ultimate expression in the
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pithy but exculpatory “shit happens." The forgetting of Being is also the selective forgetting of
.
.
specific beings.
What Nadeau and Kafatos have dubbed the “hidden ontology of classical epistemo1ogy,” namcly
that “the truths of classical physics asDescartes viewed them were quite líterally 'revealed' truths,”“°
is clearly a fundamental structure of what Heidegger understands as technological thinking. What
I have attempted to show, however, is that the new physics, which developed out of the old by
breaking with it on the basis of experimental findings, can no longer picture or represent what exists
between measurements-observations. The only (scientiñcally) detemtinable relation between events
is a matter of probability. There can be no certainty of representation in the domain of the new
physics. The experimental findings of the new physics indicate that “our” classical world of
"subjects" and "objects" is a highly coded ideological construction, cultivated over centuries, and
highly resistance to the event-horizon of scientific-experimental knowledge. And it is precisely in
this tension between ideological totalization and the limits established by the new science that
Heidegger's cautions about any reiñcation of Sein~Seyn-Ereignis-Gegner must be “observed."
The thing is not “in” neamess, “in” proximity, as if neamess were a container. Neamess is at work
in bringing near, as the thinging of the thing.“
Loyola University, New Orleans

NOTES
1.

2.
3.
4.

5.

.

_
.
.

10.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheím (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1959),
p. 46; Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1958), s. 35.
lbid., p. 83; s. 63.
Manin Heidegger, History ofthe Concept ofTime, trans. Theodore Kisiel (B|oomington: lndiana University Press, 1985), pp.
216-217; Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeirbegrıfi!, Gesamtausgabe, 20 (Franfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1979), s. 296-298.
Franz Kafka, “Ein Bericht für eine Akademie," Gesammelte Werke, 1, hg. v. Hans-Gerd Koch (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer,
1994), s. 238-239; Frank Kafka: The Complete Stories, ed. Nahum N. Glatzer (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), p. 253.
Although placing Heidegger in the company of Katka`s laughing apes does a certain violence to Heidegger's notion of the
Dasein, this "positioning" does accord with 1-leidegger`s "own" moves away from specific attempts at "self-controlled"
movements in the l930s. lrony is unavoidable here.
Manin Heidegger, “The Age ofthe World Picture", in The Question Conceming Technology, trans. William Lovitt (New York:
Harper & Row, 1977), p. 118; “Die Zeit des We1tbildes,"` in Holzwege (Frankfurt am Main: Klostemiann, 1963), s. 71.
Ibid., p. 121; s. 74.
Ibid., p. 130; s. 83.
Nietzsche made a case for this in his Genealogie der Moral, especially in the third essay, sections 19-22.
Hermann Weyl, “On Time. Space, and Matter," in Phenomenology and the Natura! Sciences, eds. Joseph J. Kockelmans and
Theodore J. Kisiel (Evanston: Northwestem University Press, 1970), pp. 93-94.
Robert Nadeau and Menas Kafatos, The Non-Local Universe: The New Physics and Matters ofthe Mind (Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 8. This text is a reworking of their 1990 collaboration The Coıiscious Universe: Parts aud
Wholes in Physical Reality, which hasjust been reissued in a revised second edition (New York: Springer-Verlag, 2000). I will
be referring to these texts as NLU and CU.
NLU, pp. 152-155.
Martin Heidegger, “Science and Retlectionf' in The Question Concerning Technology, p. 161; "Wissenschaft und Besinnung,"
in Vorträge und Aufsätze, Teil 1(Tübingen: Neske, 1967), s. 43.
Ibid., p. 162; s. 43.
lbid., p. 169; s. 50.
Nick Herbert, Quantum Reality: Beyond the New Physics (New York: Anchor Books, 1985), p. 114.
`

J. R. WATSON

gi

--r
.

§

-

-1-

“Science and Reflection," pp. 172-173; s. 53.
For a sympathetic discussion of Heidegger's position in this regard, see William J. Richardson, "Heidegger's Critique of
Science," The New Scholasticism, Vol. XLl1, No. 4 (Autumn, 1968): 519-520.
See John Sallis, “The Origins of Heidegger's Thought," Research in Phenomenology, 7 (1977): S3-S5.
This point has been made in a slightly different manner by Karsten Harries, “Fundamental Ontology and the Search For Man`s
Place," inHeidegger and Modern Philosophy, ed. Michael Murray (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978). This
is also the reason why Joseph J. Kockelmans can claim the many worlds projected by the various sciences all derive “from the
world immediately lived by the community of man" - Heidegger on the Essential Difference and Necessary Relationship
Between Philosophy and Science," in Phenomenology and the Natura! Sciences, ed. Joseph J . Koekelmans and Theodore J.
Kisiel (Evanston: Northwesrem University Press, 1970), p. 165.
See my "Heidegger's Essentials: Appropriations and Expropriations," in Martin Heidegger and the Holocaust, eds. Alan
Rosenberg and Alan Milchman (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996), and Reiner Schi1rmann's concise essay “Riveıed to a
Monstrous Site," in Ihe Heidegger Case, eds. Tom Rockmore and joseph Margolis (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1992)
Martin Heidegger, “Memorial Address." in Discourse On Thinlring, trans. John M.Anderson and E. Hans Freund (New York:
Harper & Row, 1969), p. 50.
Martin Heidegger, "Conversation OnA Country Path," in Discourse on Thinking, pp. 72-73; Gesamtausgabe, 13, s. 55.
lbid., p. 73; s. 55.
lbid., p. 79; s. 61.
Ibld., p. 79; s. 62.
Herbert, Quantum Reality, p. 181. l am adopting the use o1`Herbert's name for a quantum entity - "quon."
NLU› PP. 41-42.
Quantum Reality, p. 35.
lbid., p. 69.
Jean Amery, At The Mind 's Limits, trans. Sidney Rosenfeld and Stella P. Rosenfeld (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1980), p. 34.
Alben Einstein, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen, "CanQuantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered
Complete?," Physical Review. 47 (1935): 77711“. John S. Bell's fonnulation ot' his theorem appeared as "On the EinsteinPodolsky-Rosen Paradox," Physics, 1(1964): 195111.
As quoted in Herbert, Quantum Reality, p. 213.
See The Non-Local Universe: The New Physics and Matters ofthe Mind, pp. 92-93.
Stuan Freedman and John Clauser, "Experimental Test of Local Hidden Variable Theories," Physical Review Letters, 28 (1972):
938ff.
For a discussion ofSarfatti 's theory, see Gary Zukav, The Dancing WuLi Masters: An Overview ofthe New Physics (New York:
William Motrow, 1979), pp. 310-313.
Alain Aspect, Jean Dalibard, Gerard Roger, “Experimental Test ot' Bell's lnoqualiıies Using Time-varying Analyzers,“ Physical
Review Letters, 49 (1982): 1881 ff.
Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol. 4, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982), pp. 148-149; Nietzsche
ll (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), s. 201-202.
Nl..U› PP. 10-11.
See David E.Stannard, American Holocaust: The Conquest oftlıe New World (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1992), especially Chapter lll: Sex, Race, and Holy War, and Ward Churchill, A Little Matter ofGenocide: Holocaust and Denial
in the Americas 1492 to the Present (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1997). For a refutation of these “distortions of history,"
see any of the edifying mctaphysical works ofWilliam Bennett.
NLU, p. 8.
Martin Heidegger, "The'l`hing," in Poetry, Language. Thought, trans. Alben Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971),
p.178; Vom'„ge und Aufs„tze, Teil ll, s. 50.

1
r

1

r

\

l

ı

,.4`

_

í

1
1
1

_

_

í

;

-

ı

1

l

THEORY AT THE THEATER:

ı

HEIDEGGER, HEISENBERG, AND COPENHA GEN
'

7
.

i-l
oi

"

i

Ü

'l

i

r

i

1

I
i

1

11
ı
J

_J .

,l

-i

GARYSHAPIRO

-In memory ofLeonardo Shapiro

(1946-97), a man

ofthe theater -

Bohr and Heisenberg think in a thoroughly philosophical way, and therefore oniy create new ways
of posing questions, and, above all, hold out in the questionable.
Martin Heidegger, What is rr Thing? I
-~

In Heidegger's work there are a surprising number of references, direct and indirect, to discoveries
in quantum theory, relativity, and other developments in twentieth century physics.2 Heidegger met
with Heisenberg around the time of the lectures from which I have just quoted, and he often cites
him by name. At the very beginning of Time and Being, for example, he compares the work and
attention necessary for a serious engagement with the thought of that lecture and text to that which
is demanded by Paul Klee's paintings, by a poem of TrakI°s, or by a formula of I-Ieisenberg°s.
Everyone would acknowledge, he says, that these are all difficult and demanding works that require
careful and repeated viewing, reading, and thinking. Yet people expect philosophy to be more
immediately accessible and edifying. The “thinking that is called philosophy,” he suggests, requires
at least as much concentration as we would give to Klee, Trakl, and Heisenberg. I take it that these
are not arbitrary examples, but that they embody exemplary artistic and scientific forms of
questioning with which Heidegger would like, to associate his own thinking. Heis attempting to
initiate his listeners (and readers) into the path of thinking undertaken in the lecture. This must be
heard not simply “as a series of propositions”; rather we should “follow the movement of showing.”3
All four of these artists, scientists, and thinkers break new ground in relation to the traditions from
which they emerge. The very conj unction of art and science, at the opening of this lecture in which
Heidegger reflects back on his entire path so far, and which opens up new questions, is significant.
It suggests that these are forms of thoughtful questioning that can be seen both in mutual relation and
in their connection with Heideggefs own thinking. If we take his advice to treat no aspect of the
presentation of thought as insignificant, then we must give some attention to his juxtaposing
Heisenberg”s formulas with the work of two artists for whom he had the deepest respect. When we
are invited to' “think Being without beings” we might think of Heisenberg's physics in its conceiving
of matter and energy without Newtonian substance and Cartesian determinacy, Klee's dissociation
of the image fi'om representation, and Trakl°s freeing of poetic saying fi'om grammar. Given this hint
about the thought that takes place in art and science, I am reminded that Heidegger, when he speaks
of the modern hegemony of science and technology holds out the possibility of art as a saving power.
And a recent visit to the theater draws me to think of a work of art that itself engages with the
questions of modem science and technology in its attempt to make sense of the theoretical, political,
personal, and so necessarily philosophical encounter of two giants of twentieth century science, Niels
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Bohr and Werner Heisenberg. I refer to Michael Frayn's play Copenhagen which has been
performed in London and New York in the last two years. My hope is that we might allow this play
and Heidegger's thought to question one another in ways that would render more perspicuous the
question posed for our conference.
Otto Pöggeler rcmarks in passing that it was rather unusual for Heidegger to attend the theater.
This might seem odd, at first, given his deep concem with Sophocles, and with Hölderlin, who was
constantly working with the dramatic poetry of the Greeks, and who returned again and again to his
Empedocles. This absence of the theatrical contrasts rather strongly with the careers of Sartre and
Camus, who put philosophy on the stage. Could itbe that the modern theater is not a genuine place
but merely a location, a position in urban space? Just as the modern urban
building (and I avoid
of
the
for
stands
alone without reference to its surroundings, so the
speaking
postmodem
now)
theater is no longer a sacred space in the polis. The Greek temple lets the earth be an earth and the
world a world. The theater too is situated in a place around which the life of the
city unfolds; it is
not merely located at a point in a neutral grid. Even if the Greeks eventually came to
say that tragedy
had nothing to do with Dionysus, his shadow hovered over the theater in the tragic
age. In The Birth
T
Nietzsche
thinks
of
the
theater
as
a
of ragedy
living site for actors, chorus, and spectators that is
both situated in the city and which summons up the sense of being on the earth and under the
heavens:
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The fonn of the Greek theater recalls a lonely valley in the mountains: the architecture of the scene
(Scene) appears like
a luminous cloud fonnation that the Bacehants
swarming over the mountains behold from a height- like the splendid frame
(Umrahmung) in which the image of Dionysus isrevealed to them.“

Yet despite Heidegger's intense concem with the situation of the temple, he shows no similar
concem with the theater. Even his discussions of Sophocles tend to focus on individual
lyrical
passages, like his reading of the choral ode from Antigene in Introduction to Metaphysics. One might
begin to wonder whether there is an avoidance of the dramatic and performative mode in Heidegger;
even his encounters with the Platonic dialogues rarely, if ever, focus on what we tend to think of as
the dramatic dimension, replete as it is with irony and performative force. I reserve for some other
occasion an inquiry into why Heidegger, in his dealings with both Greeks and modems, tends to
privilege the lyrical and the oracular, rather than the dramatic, as both Hegel and Nietzsche did. Let
me just suggest, for now, that if Heidegger (like Paul Valery and Walter
Benjamin) was concerned
with the ubiquity and the homelessness of the contemporary work of art - two sides of the same
thing then the staging of a play like Copenhagen could be seen not only as an instance of that
strange condition, but as a way of addressing it and thematizing it. The celebrated van Gogh painting
of the shoes depicts them in a an almost featureless space, on a
ground that seems to fall away; and
this can be seen as a redoubling of its own situation as a mobile easel painting, and so as
telling us
about
the
situation
of
art
in
the
something
world. Copenhagen, in reducing the set to a minimum,
and (as we'll see) placing the audience both on and off the stage, is not only a
play about the
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uncertainties of space (and time) but a work that addresses those uncertainties in the veıy form of
its presentation.
Copenhagen addresses some of the rnost uncanny questions of modern science and technology;
its effect is to render these enteıprises and the places that they hold in our lives deeplyfmgwiJírdı`g.
Not the least of its surprises is its ability to pack the theater with audiences who will follow
discussions of quantum theory with 'rapt attention. If its questions are not precisely those that
Heidegger asks, they are certainly not foreign to them. Heideggefs thought about the meeting of art
and technology is constantly shadowed by the lines from Hölderlin°s (untheatrical) Patmos
But where danger threatens
That which saves from it also grows.
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And this saving power, we are told, might be found (at least) in art, in a poetic revealing. So a
work of poetic art, a theatrical one in this case, could just possibly have some relevance to
Heidegger's questions concerning science and technology.
Copenhagen is, in the first instance, the dramatic replay and questioning of a questionable event.
In late 1941, the German physicist Wemer Heisenberg paid a visit to his friend and colleague Niels
Bohr, in Nazi-occupied Denmark. These were the two scientists who contributed the most to
formulating the principles of modern quantum mechanics, and to what became known as the
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory. Heisenberg is, of course, identified with the discovery
of the uncertainty principle. Heisenberg was already involved in work that led to the German atom
bomb project. Later, Bohr, who was half-Jewish, escaped from Denmark on the very eve of the
scheduled deportation of Danish Jews, found his way to the United States, and played a significant
role in the Manhattan Project. The result was the bombs that were dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. This was the last meeting of Bohr and Heisenberg until after the war. Ever since, it has
been a historical and political questionlwhat happened at that encounter, and what Heisenberg's
purpose was in initiating it. Copenhagen is set in a limbo-like space in which the characters, now
dead, argue and repeatedly re-enact the events of that event. As Heisenberg says in the opening
SCCHCI

Now we're all dead and gone, yes, and there are only two things the world remembers about me. One is the uncertainty
principle, and the other is my mysterious visit to Niels Bohr in Copenhagen in 1941.Everyone understands uneeıtainty.
Or thinks he does. No one understands my trip to Copenhagen. Time and time again l”ve explained it. To Bohr himself,
and to Margarethe [Bohr`s wife]. To interrogators and intelligence offieers, to journalists and historians. The more I've
explained, the deeper the uncertainty has become (4).5

Afier the war, Heisenberg claimed that he had sought to persuade Bohr to join with him in efforts
to derail the work directed toward the development of atomic Weapons on both sides, or at least to
slow it down so that there would be no viable contribution to the war. Bohr was suspicious and
wondered whether Heisenberg was really serving the Nazi war effortfl. Later, Heisenberg cited the
slowness of work on the German side as evidence to demonstrate that he had been successful in his
efforts. Some observers attributed the sluggish progress of the German work to Heisenberg's
supposed failure to understand some of the crucial principles and facts required to construct reactors
and bombs, or even to his neglecting to perfonn some of the necessary calculations. His reply, in the
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play, is that since the calculations he was accepting from others implied that it would almost
ceıtainly be impossible to prepare a bomb soon_, he was happy to take them as established. In the
theater these questions are lefi hanging.
A few years ago, before the massive documentation that has come to light about Heidegger's
involvement with the actual practices and prejudices of the Nazis, as well as his continuing respect
for the “inner truth" of the movement, we might have been inclined to draw many parallels between
Heidegger and Heisenberg. Both were acknowledged leaders in their ñelds and claimed that they
were working for the defense of Gennan Wissenschafl, not for the despicable policies of the Nazis.
Both contested in the most striking way a certain metaphysics of presence - call it Cartesian or
Newtonian -that had held sway for centuries. Both were under suspicion and interrogated after the
war by the Allied authorities. I will retum to some of these themes, but I note now that these
similaritics also have their limits, most notably with respect to the kinds of account they eventually
gave of their service to the regime and its goals. Heisenberg condenmed the Nazis and claimed that
he had made an anguished choice not to desert his country, even when it was clearly following an
evil and self-destructive path. He offered repeated accounts of his role. Whether these were selfserving distortions or not, they at least showed that he accepted the responsibility to give an account.
Heidegger's public comments in the Spiegel interview were clearly evasive and self-serving; they
attempted to disguise his continuing support of the Nazis and his anti-Semitism. Since Frayn's play
helps to render Heisenberg`s story plausible, even if it stops short of endorsing it, some critics have
seen it as a morally questionable apologia for a physicist who served the Nazi war effort and who
would have done more if had been able to.
While we might continue to explore these issues with regard to Heidegger, let us retum to the
play. In the theater, especially in the modem theater without a chorus, one significant theatrical mode
permits and sometimes requires the characters to explain and justify themselves. The theater
becomes a kind of tribunal or courtroom. Copenhagen resurrects its characters to conduct the
equivalent of such an inquiıy before a tribunal of the ñıture. The action, if one can call debates about
complementaıity action, is presented on a remarkably bare curved stage with just a few elementary
pieces of furniture. There are only three characters: Heisenberg and Niels and Margarethe Bohr.
(You°ll recall that Sartre's No Exit, also set in limbo afier death, has three characters.) At the back
of the stage, in an are, are two raised tiers of seats for about twenty-five members of the audience.
The presence of the observers on the stage reinforces our awareness that observation is part of the
action. This is to concretize and enlarge a theme from the physics which is under discussion. In the
course of the play we hear, for example, that to determine the position of an electron it must be
observed, but to observe it, it must be illuminated by a photon; yet that action of observation will
disturb the electron in its pathiand so make it impossible to detennine the position it would have had
if unobserved. This is illustrated in the play by Heisenberg miming the path of such an electron,
circling the stage in a wide orbit, where he is intercepted by Bohr, playing the photon. At the same
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time, we in the conventional seats of the theater are reminded that our presence is not absolutely
passive or receptive, because we see spectators like ourselves on the stage. This recalls Nietzsche”s
analysis of the situation of the Greek theatrical audience, which would simultaneously look down
on the actors on the scene while, in their identification with the chorus in the Orchestra, they Would
be looking up at those same actors. The theater thus embodied a form ofperspectivism that was soon
to be eclipsed by “the one great Cyclops eye of Socrates.”6 The doubling of perspective and the
theatrical equivalent of the uncertainty principle tell us that there is no “immaculate perception,” to
borrow a tenn from Zarathustra. O11 the night that I saw Copenhagen in New York, during the
meeting of the American Philosophical Association, the distinguished epistemologist J aako Hintikka
was visible among the audience on the stage, no doubt thinking through these complex relations.
We are sometimes reminded that our word “theory” derives from a Greek word that names an
envoy, an obseıver; for example, a witness sent to see the Olympic games. A theater is a place for
observation. But observation is not iımocent or immaculate. In particular, we should not appeal to
an unreflective (an unobserved) concept of observation in order to bolster an unrefiective conception
of being as completely available to inspection, as absolutely present. A theater could be a site for
subjecting this conception of theory to experimental test, as we might think of a cloud chamber or
a cyclotron as a scientífic theater. Heidegger discusses the revolutions of twentieth century physics
in several contexts, finding in them a way, parallel to his own, of rendering questionable the
traditional thinking of being as presence. Quantum mechanics appeared in 1925-7, perhaps more
than coincidentally, at the same time as Being and Time: “same” on the calendar, but it is
temporality, among other things, which is at issue. In a paper of 1934, Heisenberg, having recently
been awarded the Nobel Prize, published an article on “Wandlungen der Grundlagen der exakten
Naturwissenschaft in junger Zeit.”7 In this paper addressed to a fairly broad audience, Heisenberg
argued that recent physics required a revision in the twentieth century Weltbild and that this would
necessitate a rethjnking of the Kantian fonns of intuition and categories. There is an iconoclasm in
this collapse of the Weltbild that Heidegger will pursue in his 1938 paper on this theme: it is no
longer possible to picture the fundamental structure of the physical world. In the lecture series of
1935-36, given under the title of Grundfragen der Metaphysik, and published in 1962 as Die Frage
nach dem Ding (What is a Thing?), Heidegger seems to respond to Heisenberg, building upon a
review of classical physics, and some references to recent discoveries, to introduce a prolonged
reconsíderation of the Kantian conception of the thing. Part of his provocation for putting the thing
into question is that the sciences are themselves raising questions about what they had formerly
taken for granted:
if, for example, we undertake the effort to think through the inner state of today's natural sciences, non-biological as well
as biological, ifwe also think through the relation of mechanics and technology to our Dasein, then it becomes clear that
knowledge and questioning have here reached limits which demonstrate that, in fact, an original reference to things is
missing, that it is only stimulated by the progress of discoveries and technical successess

Heidegger would seem to be suggesting something like the following. Through such discoveries
as the uncertainty principle science reaches certain limits. What Newtonian science had taken to be
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absolute entities, existing independently of all human knowledge, now tum out to be things that are
in some sense functions of our activities of measurement and observation. In On the Question of
Being Heidegger says that Heisenberg's uncertainty principle is not derivable from Kant's
“transcendental interpretation of om' cognitive knowledge of physical nature.”° But the implication
is that there is a significant affinity between Heisenberg and Kant. lndeed, Heisenberg was involved
in a series of discussions with physicists and philosophers about the relation between quantum
mechanics and Kantian philosophy; this occurred most intensively, it seems, in 1930-34. Heisenberg
reports that the major question discussed was whether the principle of causality, at least in Kant*s
formulation, would have to be sunendered ort radically revised in the light of quantum theory. In
his later narrative reconstruction of these discussions, he seems to agree with a view that he attributes
to the young Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker: “Science progresses not only because it helps to explain
newly discovered facts, but also because it teaches us over and over again what the word
'understanding' may mean.”'° This begins to sound like a call for a thinking in science that would
be analogous to the thinking to which Heidegger invites us. Aı1d part of the impetus for Heidegger's
extensive engagement with Kant in What is a Thing? appears to stem from the provocation of
quantum theory. From the most recent scientific formulation of the questionable status of the thing,
Heidegger is led back to the canonical philosophical attempt to put the thing into question. As the
quotation from What is a Thing? suggests, although he sees such theoretical developments as the
uncertainty principle as forcing us to acknowledge the limits of scientific knowledge, he also claims
that such “theory” is not a disinterested beholding, nor is it a letting things be. It is rather under the
domination of certain practices, those of the ongoing work of institutionalized science with its need
for new discoveries, and of the technological quest for new fonns of control and domination. Later,
in The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger willoffer the formulatiorı that modem science
and technology are in fact indistinguishable, that they are forms of enframing, Gestell, and that they
envision their objects - which are indeed all objects, all things- as Bestand, or standing reserve.
There too he makes explicit his suggestion that what had seemed to be a window opened up by the
physics of Bohr and Heisenberg was in fact a false opening in so far as the new theory tumed out
to be not an altemative to the scientific-technological project of grasping and controlling, but simply
its latest and most sophisticated expression.
Here we can cite the authority of Heisenberg himself. As Heidegger notes, Heisenberg sums up
the results of his inquiry by saying that the end of all these inquiries into the fundamental structure
of matter and energy is the realization that human beings find themselves and their own activity in
the place where they had been searching for what they took to be the physical, objective things:
ln this way the impression comes to prevail that everything the human encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct.
This illusion gives rise inturn to one final delusion: lt seems as though the human everywhere and always encounters only
himself. Heisenberg has with complete oorrectness pointed out that the real must present itself to the contemporary human
in this way.

At this point Heidegger accurately cites Heisenberg, “Das Naturbı`ld.” And to distinguish himself
as sharply as possible from this formulation he says in his own voice, and with the emphasis of
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italics “In truth, however, precisely nowhere does the human today any longer encounter himself
i.e., his essence.”" How might we encounter ourselves in our essence? Might the art of the theater
offer a way of showing how even the great scientist and the philosopher fail to encounter
themselves?
It is revealing that Heisenberg, in explaining himself seems to allude to the famous saying of
Protagoras, reading it in the conventional way as saying “the human is the measure of all things; of
those that are, that they are; and of those that are not, that they are not.”” Heidegger, aswe know,
has his own reading of this saying. Significantly, it occurs in “The Age of the World-Picture,” which
is concerned to show that the very idea of a picture of the world is a fomi of thinking that comes
about only with modernity. Heidegger argues at some length that Protagoras` thought must be
sharply distinguished from Descartes”s subj ectivism. On Heidegger's reading, Protagoras” sayings
are to be heard in terms of a Greek conception of the human:
The human does not, from out of some detached I-ness, set forth the measure to which everything that is, in its Sein, must
accommodate itself. The human who possesses the Greeks' fundamental relationship to that which is and to its
unconcealment is metron (measure [Mass]) in that he accepts restriction [Mässtgung] to the horizon of unconcealment that
is limited after the manner of the 1;and he consequently acknowledges the concealedness ofwhat isand the insusceptibility
of the latter's presencing or absencing to any decision, and to a like degree acknowledges the insusceptíbility to decision
of the visible aspect of that which endures as present [das Aussehen des Wesenden].”

In Copenhagen the complicity of modem physics, instrumentalism, and Protagorean subjectivism
is aıticulated in interchanges between Bohr and Heisenberg, and then subj ected to further
questioning by Heisenberg and Margarethe. As in his writings, here Heisenberg repeatedly insists
on the fact that their theories work, and that this is all that matters. Even if the Copenhagen
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Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, whose two central principles are complementarity and
uncertainty is a “political compromise” the point is that “It works, it works, it worksl” But Bohr
responds that “it's more important than that...We put man back at the center of the universe.“ Not
only does he cite Protagoras explicitly, but he does so in the course of a grand narrative in which
human beings are seen as periodically displaced from the center, only to retum there. We are
constantly reminded in this theater that every observer is observed, and that no observer can observe
himself. All the characters are aware, for example, that they are under political Surveillance and that
the house is ahnost ceıtainly wired. Each remarks of the others, at various points, that they can see
many things but they cannot see themselves. The man at the center of this world, like Foucault's man
is an “enslaved sovereign, observed spectaton”
Bolır concludes his anthropocentric discourse in which Copenhagen is the center of this centrisrn
by saying that it is here
in the mid-twenties we discover that there is no precisely detenninable objective universe. That the universe
exists only as a series of approximations. Only within the limits determined by our relationship with it. Only
through the understanding lodged inside the human head.
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At this point, Margarethe intervenes. She is the only feminine voice in this play, the
helpmeet
who has been driven to tears typing and retyping her husband”s scientific papers. She might seem
to be deflecting the high philosophical tone of this exchange between two macho intellects proud
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to have been at the center where man was put back into the center. Margarethe
occupies an eccentric
in
this
on
this
circular
position
circle,
stage; her questioning opens up new avenues:

Margarethe: So this man you've put back at the center of the universe - is it you or Heisenberg?
Bohr: Now, now, my love.
Margarethe: Yes, but it makes a difference.
Bohr: Either of us. Both of us. Yourself. All of us.
Margarethe: If it's Heisenberg at the center of the universe, then the bit of the universe he can°t
see is Heisenberg (73~74).
_
The consequence, as Margarethe goes on to point out, is that Heisenberg will never be able to
know why he went to Copenhagen in 1941. She has shifted the conversation, not
simply by personalizing things, as Niels suggests, but by pointing out the unthought which lurks in the proud assertion
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that the human has been placed back at the center of things. For that is
precisely a place that induces
a false sense that one is able to survey everything, although, like all other
positions, it involves its
own blind spot. Better perhaps to occupy one of those eccentric
positions in which the blind spot is
not so intensely masked. Bolır makes a similar observation in another context. In
response to one
more of Heisenberg's tıiumphalist assertions that the Copenhagen interpretation
“works,” despite
all paradoxes and contradictions, Bohr says:

1

l

...you've never been able to understand the suggestiveness of paradox and contradíction. That's
your problem. You live
and breathe paradox and contradiction, but you can no more see the
beauty of them than the fish can see the beauty of the
water (67-68).
.

l

Heinrich Petzet tells a story of a visit by Heidegger to the theater in Bremen;
Pöggeler cites this
story in confirmation of his remark that Heidegger seldom went to the theater. It was an accident,
an effect of indeterminacy, if you. The scheduled plans for the
evening had fallen through, but
Lorca's Dona Rosita was playing. In that play there is a scene in which the housemaid tells a
story
of an old professor holding a discussion on the theme “what is an idea?” She tells us that she
laughed, recognizing that he was an important man, even though she failed to understand what he
was saying. The professor is harassed by noisy students who force him to return to
the everyday
world. At that point Petzet reports he heard Heidegger whispering to himself
“Yes, that is me.”“
What did Heidegger recognize here? Was it simply the disparity between the
professor and his
students, or was it also the fact that the professor, who took himself to be at the center of things,
failed to see his real position? Did this rare visit to the theater confinn the blind
spot of theoria that
is a necessary aspect of the play of presence and absence? Arıd if
Heidegger were to see Frayn”s
Heisenberg might he say “Yes, that is me”?
University
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Thanks to Babette Babich for several very helpful provocations and
suggestions concerning this paper.
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WAS HEIDEGGER PRESCIENT CONCERNING TECHNOSCIENCE?

DON IHDE
TIME WARPS

I had remembered the movie, “Being There,” with Peter Sellars playing Jerszy Kosinki°s man of
authenticity, as deeply ironic and funny heideggerian spoof in which the main character, an
intellectually challenged gardener tlırown out of his insular life into a world of high politics, became
a sort of prophet-advisor to the President himself. The gardener would utter simple literalisms, “the
soil must be tended if there is to be a good harvest,” which were taken as metaphorically profound
by the political interlocutors. Here was heideggerian authenticity caught in the world of political
deception and intrigue. Thinking my adolescent son might like this, we got the video ut to our
surprise, all ofus found the movie slow, boring, and repetitive, not at all like the guffaw-producing
first time decades ago.
This same experience occurred again as I worked on a recent paper about spectroscopy I was
using the figures of Moses and Aaron to illustrate the 'image and logic' traditions in science
instrumentation. And, for my figure, I used Schoenberg's opera, “Moses und Aron.“ In the opera
the dialectic is between a totally iconoclastic Moses who believes God cannot and must not be
imaged, and Aaron who holds that unless imaged, God cannot be experienced at all. The opera reenacts the “Golden Calf' incident, but with a twist in that Aaron argues that Moses is a hypocrite
since he has used “images' all along - burning bushes, arıd even the “graven” letters on the tablets.
The time Warp occurred when I re-read Exodus where I found that God appears quite often,
anthropomorphically „and directly, with a feast, face-to-face conversations, hands, feet, and
backsides, a sort of postmodern multiperspectival set of epiphanies quite far from the purified,
cannot-see-God prescriptions of °textbook theology' of the later traditions.
The third Warp occurred in working on this paper. I returned to Heidegger, this time with a
particular interest in his philosophy of science in contrast to most of my earlier work on his
philosophy of technology (upon which I have rather extensively published). Heidegger returned
waıped, different now with respect to both science and technology - he had changed through time.
A phenomenological reason for these time warps relates to the ways in which figures change in
relation to their fields or contexts. In each case, significant temporal and historical changes have
occurred: movies are faster paced; biblical archeology has shown us a more archaic Hebrew culture
than before; and Heidegger now has to be repositionsed in relation to both the radical and
revolutionary changes within the sciences, many ofwhich have occurred only since the mid 20'*
century, and in relation to the new types ofscience - better, technoscience studies which have also
emerged since the mid 20"' century.
So, the re-reading of Heidegger 1 shallattempt here must re-context Heidegger with respect to
these very large historic changes, first with respect to philosophy of science and science itself, then
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with respect to the science-technology relation, or technoscience.
concerning technoscience?
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Was Heidegger prescient

HEIDEGGER ON SCIENCE

Trish Glazebrook opens her book on Heidegger's philosophy of science, by attacking Richardson's
earlier claim that, “On the longest day he ever lived, Heidegger could never be called a philosopher
of science." [HPS 1] She then valiantly attempts to take Heidegger°s discussions about science in
a direction towards a philosophy of science, clearly not succeeding in quite making him into a Quine,
for whom “philosophy of science is philosophy enough,” [NYT] but nevertheless she makes the
science theme much more central to Heidegger°s confrontation with modernity than most previous
commentators. My own reading will be more modest and more critical. I shall restrict myself to
what could be called Heidegger°s explícit wrítings about science (and technology) and shall refrain
from reading his views across Aristotle, the Greeks, etc., although 1 agree with both Glazebrook and
Ziınmerman, that the science question plays an important role in Heidegger's negative confrontation
with modemity.
Heidegger's explicit writings on what will emerge for me as technoscience, are grouped largely
in three different periods: First, there is the period around Being ana' Time (1927) which includes
the Basic Problems ofPhenomenology, and stretches to the Kant work of 1929; second, there is the
richer period in the mid-thirties with What is a Thı'ng?, the Beitrage, and the famous “World as
Picture” texts; and third, the period of the mid-fifties, after the War and de-Nazification with “The
Question Conceming Technology,” “Science and Reflection,” and related texts. All this is followed
by a gap in which the 'later Heidegger' has little to say on science, but then returns with his last
letter, to the Heidegger Conference, in which the science-technology question is re-raised.
The relative paucity of explicit texts is one problem for this theme; but Heidegger's writing habits
also pose a problem. His writings rarely engage and seldom cite contemporaries, rather, his explicit
interlocutors are what today we call “dead white males.” Heidegger is a deep reader of the
philosophical traditions: the Presocratics, Plato and Aristotle (not Democritus), Medieval onto
theology, and also deeply, the early Modems, Descartes and Kant, with sideglances to Galileo and
Newton; and then into the 19"' century with Nietzsche and Dilthey. But, he is a shallow and thin
reader of both the histones of science and technology. (Those of you who may have read my “The
Historical and Ontological Priority of Technology over Science” are familiar with my
disillusionment conceming Heidegger°s understanding of the history of technology.) Yes, he does
cite, although in briefest form, Planck, Heisenberg, and a few other contemporary scientists, but if
he was interested in philosophy of science, one does not find discussion with even his senior
colleague, Husserl, or his acquaintance, Carnap, on actual philosophy of science issues. This leaves
us with inferences and with having to trace something of an historical context, which I shall do, but
with reticence since it leaves too much to speculation for my taste. I shall take what follows in

66

DON IHDB

roughly chronological order, but skipping from then contemporary philosophy of science, science
itself, and Heidegger's relations to both.

11

11

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE IN HEIDEGGER”S TIME

I shall begin with only a superñcial look at the state of European philosophy of science in
Heideggefs time to set the context. There are three strands which bear examination: First, the
emergent philosophies of science at the beginning of the 20'“ century which forefronted
mathematization, in particular, mathematicalphysics. The figures here are Duhem, Poincare, and
above all, Mach. Second, there was the powerful contemporary movement of Logical Positivism
and Logica] Empiricism, centered in the Vienna Circle which organized in 1922. And, third, there
is Husserl. Husser1”s discussions about science are much more extensive than I~Ieidegger°s, but the
major work, the Crisis, does not actually get published until 1936, precisely in the middle of
Heidegger°s own thirties period of science discussions. And, finally, there is one more background
figure whose effects are still felt, more strongly in Europe than in North America, and that is Dilthey.
The definitive split between the “sciences° of explanation (physics here) and those of “understanding
(for Heidegger, mostly history) infects most of 201“ century philosophy of science until very recently.
I shall concisely situate Heidegger with respect to these groups and figures. But, anticipatorily, we
must equally be aware that what amounts to a revolution in the philosophy of science - here I refer
to the “new philosophies of science” associated with Kulm, Popper, Feyerabend, Lakatos et. al.,
simply do not get off the ground until after Heidegger has ceased to closely attend to science
questions. Put simply, Heidegger is too early to have digested the “new” philosophies of science.
Insofar as philosophies of science interpret science, there are quite different “pre-Kuhn' compared
to 'post-Kuhn' versions concerning what science is and does. However, there are some intriguing
prescient hints which I shall underline between Heidegger and Kuhn and kin.
The Mathematı`zers: With respect to philosophy of science prior to Heidegger's first forays, the
three figures of greatest prominence were Jules Poincare (1854-1912), Pierre Duhem (1861-1912)
and, particularly for Gennany and the subsequent development of Logical Positivism, Ernst Mach
(1838-1916). I shall not do more than mention the important consensus which might be noted
concerning this early 20"“ century development: (a) First, all held to the basics of early modem
epistemology which has the subject-in-a-box (body), viewing its sensations which can only infer to
an external world through representations. (b) This, in turn leads to the notion that science is a
theory instrument which can properly infer to an objective world. Science is physical theory and its
scientific exemplar is physícs. (c) Third, theory takes its shape through mathemaıization whether
this process is considered as a formalism (Duhem), or as instrumental (Mach and Poincare). Thus,
science is the process of mathematizing the world through theory, and is paradigmatically
exemplified in mathematical physics.
Because my program here is fairly global regarding 20'h century philosophy of science, I shall
simply take a shortcut and assert that what we see of Heidegger's early 'philosophy of science,°
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largely reflects and repeats this dominant view. “A look at.. .science, which is at the same time the
normative one in the modem age, namely, mathematical physics. ...[shows that] modem physics is
called mathematical because, in a remarkable sway, it makes use of a quite specific mathematics. . ..it
can proceed mathematically in this way only because, in a deeper sense, it is already itself
mathematical” (WP 72) And even later, “Science is the theory ofthe real. ” (SR 157) I shall later
trace this theory-physics-mathematization emphasis more specifically concerning some of the
problems which the “neW” or "Jewish" physics caused for Heidegger. But for the moment it is
sufficient to see that Heidegger very much belongs to the common consensus of early 201“ century
philosophy of science.
The Positı'vists: However, by the time Heidegger turns his attentions to science in his first two
periods (20's and late 30`s), two additional, relevant movements in the philosophy of science had
become important: on the one side there is the emergence of a more virulent philosophy of science
which followed Mach, Logical Positivism within the Vienna Circle (1922). This movement began
to dominate philosophy of science in the twenties and early thirties, although it was contested by the
phenomenological philosophy of science of Edmund Husserl to which Heidegger also found himself
drawn.
In the case of early 20“ century Positivism there is ample indirect evidence that Heidegger found
himself in deep opposition to it. Most concretely, there is the Carnap/Heidegger controversy well
documented by Michael Friedman in “0vercoming Metaphysics: Carnap and Heidegger,” which I
highly recommend to you. [OLE p. 45ff] Carnap first met Heidegger at an Arbeitsgemeinschaft in
Davos, Switzerland, 1929. Heidegger was opposed to Cassirer's neo-Kantian positions and since
this was post Being and Time (and later led to Kant and the Problem ofMetaphysics, 1929), it was
an important confiontation. Carnap was, in fact, deeply impressed and subsequently studied SZ, but
later began to attack the anti-logical and, as perceived by Camap, the anti-science stances implied
by Heidegger. He chose Heidegger°s meditations on nothingness for particular attack in his
“Metaphysical Pseudo-Sentences,” in Erkenntnis, 1932. There followed by both Heidegger and
Camap, a series of oppositions. Heidegger's position was one which made logic derivative:
“Nothingness is the source of negation, not vice versa...The idea of “logic' itself dissolves in a
voıtex of more original questioning. . ..Therefore no rigor of a science can attain the seriousness of
metaphysics. Philosophy can never be measured by the standard of the idea of science." [OLE p.
47] Camap, in return, “selects a few sentences from that metaphysical doctrine which at present
exerts the strongest influence in Gennany. ... a metaphysician here arrives himself 'at the statemetn
that his questions and answers are not consistent with logic and the scientific mode of thinking."
[OLE 46-47] Camap and Heidegger become known to occupy contrary positions on the relationship
between metaphysics and science. Friedman claims, “Camap and Heidegger are therefore at
opposite ends of the spectrum not only philosophically but also in culutral and political tenns”
[OLE 51] Carnap fled to America in 1935, with relief, “I was not only relieved to escape the stifling
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political and cultural atmosphere and the danger of war in Europe, but was also very gratified tc see
that in the United States there was considerable interest, especially among the younger philosophers,
in the scientiñc method of philosophy. ..” [OLE 49]
Carnap and Neurath were neo-Manıists; saw science as affiliated with democratic tendencies; and
were strong modemist proponents, for example, of the Bauhaus declarations. Heidegger reveals his
opposition to this modemism at the time. Condemning scientific philosophy (Positivism), “Here the
traditional logic is to be for the first time grounded with scientific rigor through mathematics and
the mathematical calculus in order to construct a 'logically correct” language in which the
propositions of metaphysics - which are all pseudo propositions are to become impossible in the
future." [OLE 53] And, echoing the opposition culturally and politically as well, “It is no accident
that this kind of 'philosophy' wishes to supply the foundations of modern physics, in which all
relations to nature are in fact destroyed. It is also no accident that this kind of °philsoophy' stands
in intemal and extemal comiection with Russian cormnunism. And it is no accident, moreover, that
this kind of thinking celebrates its triumph in America." [OLE 53] This said on the eve of Carnap's
emigration to America.
The Positivist/Metaphysics controversy between the Vienna Circle and Heidegger is a rich one
which I cannot further explore here. I will note that Friedman makes a very good case that in the
background lies a neo-Kantian controversy between the Marburg School (Cassirer et. al.) and the
Southwest School (Rickert and Windelband) which also echoes the logic/metaphysics relationship
seen between Camap and Heidegger. For our limited purposes here, it is more important merely to
see that Heidegger persistently makes logic - and science - derivative in an often negative sense
from metaphysics.
Heideggerian Twists: What has emerged at this point with respect to Heidegger°s implicit
philosophy of science is largely reflective of the main trends of the time. I summarize here those
themes which repeat the dominant views: (a) Physics, particularly mathemarı`calphys1`cs, remains
the paradigm science for Heidegger; (b) physics is viewed as a measuring and following Husserl
- a reductive
science; (c) it is theoretical in form, and it is experimental only in a secondary sense
because the theoretical cast calls for experiment to achieve exactness in measurement; (d) its
epistemology is 'objectivist` in that it must make its objects stand before it as represemfazions. This
is typical early modern epistemology with a subject/object distinction within a representationalist
framework. All of this remains within what might be taken as the early-to-mid 20:“ century
“standard view' of science. The generalview and Heidegger also accept the Dilthean distinctions
between Erklarung and Verstehen sciences.
Heidegger does place some twists upon this image of science - but, as I shall claim, the twists,
if anything, make his philosophy of science even more conservative than that of many of his peers.
The Heideggerian twists are to be found in his basically aprioristic view of science practice:
Science, Heidegger thinks, makes a projectíon upon nature and only works from within the limits
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of this projection. This projective view goes back to his earliest works on science in the twenties,
“Ascientific investigation constitutes itself in the objecrification ofwhat has somehow already been
unveiled. " [BP 320] “..Modern natural science constituted itself in the objectification of nature by
way of a mathematical projection of nature." [BP 321] And continues in the period of the thirties,
“[Science] is accomplished through the projection within some realm of what is - in nature for example - of a ñxed ground plan of natural events. The proj ection sketches out inadvance the manner
in which the knowing procedure must bind itself and adhere to the sphere opened up.” [wp 7 2]
This is part of what it means, for Heidegger, to be an explanatory science, “The basic character
of proceeding in eveıy explaining is to follow and lay out in advance individual series and sequences
of consecutive cause-effect relations.“ [B 102] This conception of science as aprioristic (and
reductive) projection, leads Heidegger to his negative evaluations, first, “Accordingly, 'science'
itself is not a knowing in the sense of grounding and preserving an essential truth. Science is a
derived mechanism of a knowing, i.e., it is the machinational opening of a sphere of accuracies
within an otheıwise hidden and for science in no way question-worthy - zone of truth” [B 101]
This same projective-aprioristic characteristic of science, Heidegger extends to its process of
mathemarizatíon. “Modem physics is called mathematical because, in a remarkable way, it makes
use of a quite specific mathematics. . .it can proceed mathematically in this way only because, in a
deeper sense, it is already itself mathematica1.”' [WP 72] But, and here we see the closed projection
retuming in its Heideggerian twist, “Te mathemata means for the Greeks that Which man knows in
advance in his obseıvaton of whatever there is and in this intercourse with things." [WP 72] In
short, this antique version of mathematics reinforces the aprioristic notion of a proj ection by which
Heidegger is characterizing science.
The same notion of apriori projection even belongs to Heidegger's sense of experiment. It is
because of the essence of the projection that modem science must be exact. “Mathematical research
into nature is not exact because it calculates with precision; rather it must calculate in this way
because its adherence to its object-sphere has the character of exactitude” [WP 73] And, again,
“Because modem “science' (physics) is rnathematical (not empiı-ical) therefore it is necessarily
”
experimental in the sense of a measuring experiment. [B 113]
And, ultimately, this aprioristic proj ection even accounts for the use of “technologies' or instruments. “What is experienced.. .is always already somehow soughr , by applying certain instruments.
The mere looking around and looking at becomes an observing that pursues What is encountered and
indeed under changing conditions of its encountering and coming forth. . magnifying glass,
microscope: sharpening the seeing and changing the conditions of observability." [B-1 l l]
Thus, from top to bottom, Heideggefs philosophy of science retains this projection, reduction,
and aprioristic pre-given way of seeing nature. And, precisely because science as science cannot
self-reflexively or from within discern that it is such a projection, Heidegger ends by claiming that
“science does not think."
~
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It will not come as a suıprise if I tell you that left in this state, there would not be
any wonder why
be
to
Heidegger might
be *anti-science] or, from the perspective of 21“ century
perceived
technoscience studies, be thought to have, simply, a very weird notíon ofscience. But whilel shall
not leave Heidegger in this deplorable state, it might be good to ask what could a
science, so
conceived of, do?

__J

Aprioristic, projective science, subsumed under an already “known' mathematization, and even
subsuming experiment and instrument under its measuring foregaze, could probably find out that
the orbits of the planets are elliptical rather than circular (Kepler). It probably could discover that
the analema traced along the meridian lines placed in cathedrals in the 17"“ and 18* centuries showed
both Ptolemy and Copernicus°s measurements were wrong [SinC]. It
probably could see the
development of laws of motion along Galileo's and Newton's lines, since part of the projection is
the reduction and abstraction of motion in which “Motion means
change of place. No motion or
direction of motion is superior to any other. Every place is equal to every other. No
point in time
has preference to any other." [WP. 73]
But - I contend - this aprioristic projection most
likely would have serious difficulties with the
unexpected, the unpredicted, the anomolous, and the radícally new - and above all, the
challenges
to precisely a projective apríorístic nation science
In
of
itself short, while early modern °normal'
science might work under a Heideggian rubric, 'revolutionary° science
might not do so well. Let
us shifi scenes, first to the physics of Heidegger's time, then to the emergence of the discontinuous
philosophies of science exemplified by Kuhn and his kin.
v

JEWISH PHYSICS, OR SCIENCE IN HEIDEGGER`S TIME
The leading science magazines, Science, Nature and the
Scientific American have all carried
millemıial series in the year, 2000. Clearly physics had to play a major role in this
retrospective.
There is now a hundred year history to the “new” physics, relativistic and
quantum. Let us look
at
this
and
relate
it
to
briefly
history
Heideggefs periods of science texts. [transparencies]. But,
in
there
is
an added twist to this emergence of the new physics because it
particularly Germany,
became known there as “Jewish physics.“ [This factor does not
play a role in the retrospectives, nor
in the famous play, “Copenhagen,” in which Bohr and
Heisenberg play the central roles. But in the
mid-century history precisely the “Jewish” identification of relativity and quantum physics did
matter. There was a very contested academic
struggle in Germany between the classical physicists
and the relativistic-quantum physicists which eventually led to
Heisenberg's attempt to save the new
within
physics
Germany by showing that it could lead to nuclear submarines and atomic bombs, both
of which he proposed for the Third Reich in a conference on
Kernphysik. It later led, through the
of
the
emigration
dominantly Jewish group of physicists [Einstein, Fenni, Szilard, Oppenheimer,
et. al.] to the United States and eventually the “Manhattan
Project.”] I cite this because both the
challenge of the new physics and its identification as “Jewish physics” was obviously known to
y
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Note how this played into Heidegger's insistence on his notion of projective physics:
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It is sheer nonsense to say that experimental research is Nordic-Germanic and that rational research on the other
hand comes from foreigners. We would have then aiready to make up our mind to count Newton and Leibniz
among the “Jews”. lt is precisely the projecting-open of nature in the mathematical sense that is the
presupposition for the necessity and possibility of “experiment” as measuring. [B1 13]

I read this in two ways: first, it shows that Heidegger was aware of the classical/new physics
controversy cast in its racist context; and second, he uses it to finnly maintain his continuist position
concerning the projective and' aprioristic views of science. Yet, the new physics also posed a
challenge to Heidegger as we can see in his struggles with classical as compared to quantum physics.
I have selected here a progressive set of quotations showing how this struggle was reflected in
Heideggefs thought. Whereas in the works in the twenties concerning science focus more broadly
upon natural science, largely conceived of under the obj ectifying proj ection and its mathernatizing
dimensions, by the thirties physics per se begins to be mentioned more frequently. At first
Heidegger°s tendency is to play down any strong difference between classical and quantum physics,
or to subsume it under his initial notion of projection:
“Inasmuch as modem atomic physics still remains physics, what is essential - and only the
essential is aimed at here - will hold for it also." (WP 72) Or, there is incremental continuity,
“Within the complex of machinery that is necessary to physics in order to carry out the smashing of
the atom lies hidden the whole of physics up to now." [77]
But, even in the later work of the fıfties, continuity under the projection plays a role, “In the latest
works of Wemer Heisenberg, the problem of the causal is the purely mathematical problem of the
measuring of time." [SR 161] And, under the objectifying dimension of the projection, “Were
objectness to be surrendered, the essence of science would be denied. This is the meaning of the
assertion that modern atomic physics by no means invalidates the classical physics of Galileo and
Newton but only narrows its realm of validity” [SR 169 ] But, while this continuity thesis
dominates, doubts build by the mid-fifties, “The objectness of material nature shows in modern
atomic physics fundamental characteristics completely different from those that it shows in classical
physics.'” [SR 172]. Only by rising to a higher level of abstraction now can the continuity be
maintained, “And yet modern nuclear and field physics also still remains physics .i.e., science, i.e.,
theory, which entraps objects belonging to the real in their objectness. . .” [SR 172] This eventually
soaks in enough for Heidegger to begin to recognize that just as there are epochs of Being, there are
epochs of physics, “This rough indication of a distinction between epochs within modem physics
makes plain where the change from the one to the other takes place." [SR 172]. But I now, once
again, break off my story concerning Heidegger vis~à-vis the science of his time, and return again
to the scene in philosophy of science.
¬
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NEW PHILOSOPHIES OF SCIENCE
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At precisely the time period when Heidegger was beginning to discem the radicality of the new
physics - and as we shall see below, the time in which “Technology” (which I deliberately
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capitalize) occurs, i.e., the fifiies, a new breed of philosophers of science began to emerge in the
Euro-American context. I refer, of course, to what I call “Kuhn and Kin.” These philosophers
might be called philosophers of discontinuity. They are also frequently identified as the antipositivists of the posítivist-antipositivist controversy.
Their power in overturning the dominance of both the mathematizers noted above, and the
positivist movement, was belatedly evidenced by an interesting controversy covered by Nature
magazine, begiıming in 1987. (transparencies). This opinion piece, co-authored by two physicists
fi'om the Royal College, London [in science even opinion pieces are co-authoredl], blamed the four
philosophers in the 'mug shots' for weakening the faith in science and thus leading to the budget
cutting suffered under the Thatcher regime. What they were pointing to were the results of a new
consensus which had emerged fi'om 'new' philosophy of science. This included (a) an intepretation
of the history of science which was no longer linear and accumulatíve; rather it was discontinuous
and often ruptured, or characterized by 'revolutions' which, in effect destroyed and replaced
previous paradigms. (b) The new philosophies of science began to recognize that, in addition to
objectification, there were also processes of de-objectıfcation. Perfectly established scientific objects
- phlogiston, aether, Democritean and Boschean atoms, epicycles, and hundreds of other 'objects'
simply no longer existed; they had been replaced entirely by new objects - but equally, by the
scientific standards of the time, those objects had once existed! (c) The notion of unified science,
the ideal of positivism, disappeared and sciences in the plural replaced the hoped for reduction to
physics with other autonomies. This also implied the displacement of physics as unqualified
paradigm science. [Fuller review] (d) And while mathematics and quantilication remained
important, different styles ofmathematics, included geometríes which were as drastically different
from classical mathematics as quantum physics was from classical physics appeared. (e) And,
finally, new looks at the roles of experiment and instrumentation occurred such that disconfinnations
of expected results played a stronger and stronger role in the concept of science.
In listing this shifi within philosophy of science, one can easily see how the dominant
Heideggerian notions of aprioristic projections must be called into question. For insofar as Heidegger's implicit philosophy of science repeated and echoed 'classical' philosophy of science, it, too
must come under challenge. Here, however, is the opportunity to see another dimension of Heidegger's thinking about science, and here, for the first time, lies the opportunity to begin to test some
notions of prescience. So, my tactic will now change for the moment, to one which reads backward
to Heidegger to discem his possible relations to the new or revolutionaıy philosophies of science.
Heidegger 's prescient moments: What I amgoing to outline now are some other dimensions of
Heideggefs implicit philosophy of science which, while nestled within the overall trajectoıy of
aprioristic projection, point to other possibilíties. I shall call the first of these, the pre-invention of
framework relativity. Dreyfus and others have sometimes pointed out that Kuhn was a
'heideggerian.° This parallelism of texts is indicative:
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When we use the word “science” today, it means something essentially different from the doctrina and sceimia of the
Middle Ages, and also from the Greek episteme. Greek science was never exact because in keeping with its essence, it
could not be exact and did not need to be exact. Hence it makes no sense whatever to suppose that modern science is more
exact than that of antiquity. Neither can we say that the Galilean doctrine of freely falling bodies is true or that Aristotle's
teaching that light bodies strive upward is false; for the Greek understanding of the essence of body and place and the
relation between the two rests upon a different interpretation of beings and hence conditions a correspondingly different
kind of seeing and questianing ofnatural events. [WP 71]

And, then, Kulm:
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Since remote antiquity most people have seen one or anohter heavy body swinging back and forth on a string or a chain
until it finally comes to rest. To the Aristoteleans, who believed that a heavy body is moved by its own nature from a
higher position to a stte of natural rest at a lower one, the swínging body was simply falling with difficulty. .. Galileo, on
the other hand, looking at the swinging body, saw a pendulum, a body that almost succeeded in repeating the same motion
over and over again ad infinitum....l am acutely aware... of the difficulties created by saying that when Aristotle and
Galileo looked at swinging stones, the first saw constrained fall, the second a pendulum....when paradigms change, the
world changes with the. . .paradigm changes. . .cause scientists to see the world oftheir research engagement differently.
[SSR 119-121]

This parallelism shows what I am calling framework relativity at work in both Kuhn and
Heidegger. It entails the features of I-Ieideggerian epoches and Kuhnian paradigms such as: (a) a
thing or object is what it is in relation to its context or field; (b) if fields or contexts change, so does
the object; (c) but this means that if there is a replacement of one paradigm or epoch by another, the
thing or object either may be said to disappear or to be 'covered over." The difference between
disappeaming and being covered over is a difference between Kuhn and Heidegger - for Kulm one
can say that phlogiston, aether, etc. are displaced and disappear as objects; for Heidegger one would
have to say that they are covered over or remain vestigially beneath or below their replacements.
One view is *radical* in that it implies things which come into existence and then pass out of
existence; the other 'conservative° in that the older things remain under the newer things.
But, framework relativity must be seen to be differently motivated in the Kuhn/Heidegger cases.
I-leidegger's motivation lies in his “history of Being' (or, history of metaphysics) cluest which has
one Big epoch, the history of metaphysics since the Greeks to its culmination in Nietzsche, but
within this are progressive smaller 'coverings' in the Roman, then Middle Ages, then Modernity each of which covers more of the originating moment. Kulm°s motivation is to inject histories into
science and what he calls “revolutionary science' is when one paradigm replaces another. For
purposes here, my point has to be restricted to noting the deep functional parallelism of framework
relativities between Heidegger and the pre-eminent new philosophy of Kuhn. But I do want to
remark that until late, and at a crucíal moment Heidegger himself did not seem to see the implication
of framework relativity for science itself.
The second prescient moment I shall associate with Heidegger”s fairly early recognition that
science as it develops must be understood as a socially developed program: science is a research
program. “The essence of what we today call science is research” [wp 72] Here, Kulm but also
Popper, Lakotos and later, Latour - is anticipated. And, although just as with framework relativity,
Heidegger”s rationale for interpreting science as research is to more deeply embed it in his notion
of a reductive projection or his conservative program, “In what does the essence of research consist?
...[it is a] projection [whjch[ sketches out in advance the manner in which the knowing procedure
~
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adhere to the sphere opened up. This binding adherence is the rigor of
research,” [WP 72] the result is to begin to see something of the social structure of the scientific
enterprise.
Science as research means that science becomes institutionalized, “[a research program is]
ongoing activity. But this is to be understood ñrst of all [as the] phenomenon that a science
today...attains to the respect due a science only when it has become capable of being
institutionalizedf' [WP 76] Ultimately, science as research implies a diffeerent kind of vocation,or
more strongly, a different kind of human. And just as Heidegger does with stone, compared to steel
bridges, water wheel dams compared to hydroelectric ones, he ends up making a nostalgic
comparison between pre-research and research roles:
must bind itself and

__.

-l

*l
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The Scholar disappears. He is succeeded by the research man who is engaged inresearch projects. These, rather than the
cultivating of eruditíon, lend to his work its atmosphere of incisiveness. The research man no longer needs a library at
home. Moreover, he is constantly on the move. He negotiates at meetings and colleets information at congresses. He
eontracts for commissions with publishers. The latter now detemıine along with him which books must be written. [WP
77-8]

This description matches that which is made much later by Latour in Science in Action, the role of
the PI [principal investigator] which is well recognized in contemporary Big Science. Popper,
Kulm, Lakotos, and later, Latour, all extend this notion of science as a social institution engaged in
research. For even though Heideggefs understanding of science-as-research is limited by his notion
of projection, and cast in his usual negative tones conceming modemity, there is enough descriptive
insight here to call his mid-career views prescient. There is much more to be said here, but I leave
this as a prescient vignette only before now moving to the largest of Heideggefs prescient moments
-the move to Technology.

l

HEIDEGGER`S TECHNOLOGICAL TURN

My tactics have been to place I-Ieideggefs thinking about science - and now technology ~ either in
his own historical context, or as above, in association with a more contemporary situtation. I shall
do the same here. I have noted that early 20"“ century philosophy of science concentrated upon the
theoretical and mathematizational moments of science, particularly as focused in physics as premier
science; by the twenties positivist philosophy of science amplified these tendencies to the extreme
under the banner of 'unified science', the two series, papers on the scientific world view (19281937), and the unitied science series (1938-1962 - which included Kuhn's Structure). marked a kind
of end to this style of philosophy of science. The *new* philosophy of science then dominated the
early sixties through the seventies, but by the late seventies and early eighties there were new
challengers to science interpretation, not only from within philosophy of science, but even more
powerfully from a range of social sciences -the “strong program” (Bloor, Bames, etc.), laboratory
studies (Woolgar, Latour, Knorr Cetina, Pickering), actor network theory (Callon, Latour) and social
histories (Shapin and Schaffer), etc. These movements threatened to displace philosophy of science,
not only as the primary interpreter of science, but as a flawed interpretation of science. Heidegger,
of course, was not and for the most part could not have been aware of these developments since he
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died in 1976. And, while it is these movements which can be said to have “invented' the
terminology conceming science as technoscience, I cannot do more than mention them in passing.
However, I do want to also note that within the history and philosophy of science, now informed
by philosophy of technology, there has emerged an informal consensus regarding the role of
science's technologies (and instruments) inwhatl have called the *school* of instrurmental
realisrs,
among whom I would include Ian Hacking, Robert Ackermann, Peter Galison and myself. I shall
return to this development at the end. What I am
implying is that we are now in an epoch in which
the 'new' or anti-positivist philosophy of science itself is being displaced. We are two full moves
beyond I~Ieidegger's context.
That said, I now return for the last foray into Heideggefs
prescient moments, his turn io
Technology. [I will here resist a temptation to “cut and paste' since, as you saw, I have a rather
large
publication list on precisely this topic. Here I wish only to focus upon the “time Warp' under which
Inow see Heidegger] His most prescient insight,
regarding what today is called technoscience, has
been with regard to technology in science. This appears with significance first with
Being and Time
(1927). The analysis of equipment, the ready-to-hand/present-at-hand distinction, and the
understanding of a praxical °know1edge' in which tools °withdraw' and yet remain “assigned° to
complex contexts, remains in my mind as one of the pioneer analyses of technologies in use. This
phenomenology of the ready-to~hand in contrast to the presumably decontextualized obj ectification
of entities in the present-at-hand has produced reams of
commentary and explication. [It is my own
belief thatthis period of technology
analysis remains the most significant positive contribution of
towards
technoscience.
Heidegger
It isthe most detailed and the most insightful, for as we shall see,
the later work never seems to have again been so
concrete.] But, in this context, I have been
his
examining
thinking about science, and now I shall turn to his considerations about how
technology relates to science.
Heidegger remained cognizant of an-intimate role for technology within and alongside science.
But, if Being and Time gives us an analysis of technology in use, it is not yet applied to science
per
se. Even in his meditations of the thirties, he only
associates
with
science. In
loosely
technologies
“The Age of the World Picture,” science and
are
technology
separate phenomena: “One of the
essential phenomena of the modern age is its science. A
phenomenon of no less importance is
machine technology” [wp 70] But, he also claims that science itself is
“machinicf “Science is a
derived mechanism of a knowing, i.e., it is the machinational
opening of a sphere of accuracies
within an otherwise hidden. . .zone of truth." [B. 101] Which
carry a trajectory, “The natural sciences
become machine science." [B 108] And, in this period, because science is
projective, machinic
knowing, it must use machines or instruments. “What is experienced. . .is
always already somehow
sought, by applying certain instruments.. .magnifying glass, microscope [such as we have
already
noted]” [B. l l l ]. These mentions, without analysis, pepper many of his texts: the
“complex of
machineıy that is necessary to physics in order to carry out the smashing of the atom,”
[wp. 77]
“Compare the Wilson cloud chamber, the Geiger counter, the free balloon flights to confirm and
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identify mesons.” [SR 173] But, in each of these cases, the use of instruments or technologies
remains subsumed under and within the notion of scientiñc, now 'machinicf projection.
I am now almost ready to make the penultimate move for this paper, the examination of the
epochal tum to technology in “The Question concerning Technology." There remains only the
single, enticing hint that Heidegger's belated recognition that quantum physics ultimatel y could not
be subsumed by orremain within the direct trajectory of classical physics. In his fifiies period, the
period in which the tum to technology occurs, Heidegger recognizes, “The objectness of material
nature shows in modem atomic physicsfimdamental characeristics completely dwbrent from those
that it shows in classical physics. The latter, classical phsics, can indeed be incorporated within the
former, atomic physics, but not vice versa. Nuclear physics does not permit itself to be traced back
to classical physics and reduced to it." [RS 172 ] We are close here to a 'paradigm shit`t.' And,
now, perhaps for the first time, there is an opening to the possibility of a non-early modem
epistemology: “The way in which in the most recent phase of atomic physics even the object
vanishes also, and the way in which...the subject ~ object relation as pure relation thus takes
precedence over the object and the subject, to become secured as standing-reserve, cannot be more
precisely discussed in this place." [SR 173] Now the zum zotechnology.
[Instructions to myself: avoid
Inverting science and technology, or 'inventing technoscíence
'scissors and paste,' honor the time warp which sees both science and technology in Heidegger in
a different way.. ..Because I have written so extensively on this theme, I shall here focus only upon
what is *new* through the time warp phenomenon.]
Even though “The Question Conceming Technology" is the most thorough and complex work
on the science-technology relation, I shall work it through quickly and primarily with an eye to they
way the essay transfonns Heideggefs earlier notions about science: First, the inversion» Heidegger
argues that the *standard view' that modem technology arises from and is an application of early
modem science is wrong; it is, rather, the inverse: “Chronologically speaking, modem physical
science begins the in the seventeenth century. In contrast, machine-power technology develops only
in the second half of the eighteenth century. But modem technology, which for chronological
reckoning is the later, is, from the point of view of the essence of holding sway within it, the
historically earlier." [QT 23] From this claim, which inverts the standard view, there are, in tum,
two strong implications. The first is more concrete in that Heidegger sees that physics and its
instruments might also be understood inversely:
lt is said that modem technology is something incomparably different from all early technologies because it is based on
modem physics as anexact science. Meanwhile wehave come to understand more fully that the reverse holds true as well:
Modem physics, as experimental, is dependent upon technical apparatus and upon progress in building technological
apparatus. [QT l4]
For 1954 this was a prescient insight, particularly for philosophy of science, although not quite

so dramatically for the history of science and technology, which by that time had begun to realize
that even such theories as theımodynamics, because they arose from puzzles from the steam engine,
led to the saying that “science owes more to the steam engine than the steam engine does to science."
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The second implication, however, is more abstract - it is only by turning Technology
[capitalized]into a °metaphysics' that it becomes possible for Heidegger to claim that science itself
is subsumed into Technology. “Technology is therefore no mere means. Technology is a way of
revealing.” [QT 12] Technology is a mode of revealing. Technology comes to presence in the reahn
where revealing and unconcealment take place, where alethia, truth, happens. “ [QT 13] But this
end of metaphysics metaphysics is simultaneously the transcendentializing of Technology and its
characterization as “Enframing,° “Standing Rese1ve,' and the reduction of the whole of Nature under
its °challenge.” Technology as hidden within modemity, is again contrasted with the °Greek:°
“And yet the revealing that holds sway throughout modem technology does not unfold into a
bringing-forth in the sense of poiesís. The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging
which puts nature to the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can beextracted and stored
as such." [QT 14]
From this streams the cascade of contrasts between Heidegger°s romantic and nostalgic premodem preferences and the negatively cast consequences of modernity, rechnoscience. Under the
"
former, the “Question includes: the old windmill, the old Wooden bridge, the “Rhine°, and old
handwork technology; and under the latter, a hyclroelectric plant, jets, radar, agriculture as
mechanized food industry, miníng - both uranium and coal, and power stations.
The revealing of Technology which challenges the earth itself “sees' the earth as standing reserve,
for miníng, for mineral deposits, for yielding ore, nitrogen for agriculture, uranium for nuclear uses
-~ all
this is Technological *revealing* and it now sucks up and includes modern science itself under
its sway:
e
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Because the essence of modem technology lies in Enframing, modern technology must employ exact physical science.
Through its so doing, the deceptive illusion arises that modem technology is applied physical science. This illusion can
maintain itself only so long as neither the essential origin of modem science nor indeed the essence of modem technology
is adequately found out through questioning. [QT 23]

The more intimate relations between science and its technologies, the inversion which sees
science as more than merely technologically embodied are prescient - but also deeply flawed.
Heidegger's thin understanding of the history of technology shows through even in this essay:
miníng, and whatever mode of revealing it belongs to, goes back to prehistoric times; by Roman
times the lead levels had risen ahnost to modem heights; and while the old windmill may not take
the wind for granted as power source, the old saw mill which dams the stream does. But, there is
a worse result fi'om elevating Technology into a metaphysics as well it dooms Heideggefs
analyses of technology to being the same for every technology. Taking nature, the earth, as
enframed standing reserve leads - one can say logically - to his later claims in the interviews that
the Holocaust and modern agticulture are equivalent (both treat their resources as standing reserve).
In short, the elevation to technology with the capital *T* emasculates I-Ieidegger's philosophy of
technology from making any nuanced conclusions about particular technologies (without capitals)
because everything stands under the revealing power of enframed standing reserve.
~
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If such a move is philosophically disastrous, a second move which while belonging closely to
this late insight, but which was not fully followed out, shows more promise. Heidegger begins to
get a glimpse - but a glimpse only -that late modern science may, in fact, be different from early
modern science. I have previously noted this in his belated recognition that quantum physics totally
re-situates the early modern subject-object distinction. In the “Question ” he finally realizes that
“[Standing reserve]. ..designates nothing less than the way in which everything presences that is
wrought upon by the challenging revealing. Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-resewe no
longer stands over against us as object." [QT 17] This “dissolution” into pure relationality [noted
above] implies something approaching a “systems' approach to technology.
an airliner that
stands on a rtınway is surely an object.. .. We can represent the machine so. But then it conceals
itself as to what and how it is. Revealed, it stands on the taxi strip only as standing-reserve,
inasmuch as it is ordered to ensure the possibility of transportation. For this it must be in its whole
structure and in every one of its constituent parts, on call for duty... ready for takeoff” [QT 17]
Much later Bruno Latour was to say, “airplanes do not fly, Air France flies.” [
] But the
implication, undeveloped, is that late modem science may harbor a very non-modem epistemology,
no longer bound to the Cartesian subject-object, and representationalist context. Rephrasing,
“physics, in all its retreating fiom the representation tumed only toward objects. ._ will never be able
to renounce ...that nature reports itself in some way or other that is identifiable through
calculation.. .and remains orderable asa system of information.” [QT 23.] This, however, hints at
something very different from early modem physics and early modem epistemology. Heidegger
never followed through on this insight.
I shall now leave Heidegger, ambiguously caught in his late recognition that within science itself,
an epoche had emerged which no longer was commensurate with the early modern science which
Heidegger deeply contested. And, although there were moments of prescience which I have
identified -i n relation to late 20"' and early 215' century thinking about science, he still is left in the
main as now as much “history” as were his contemporaıies: Carnap, Feigl, Reichenbach, and others.
Crippled by a paucity of Systematic thinking about science, a shallowness of awareness of the
histories of both science and technology, Heidegger now takes his own place as “history.”
«

epilogue: lowercasing technologies

I want to conclude with a postscript conceming technoscience, arıd a tale, told with a “heideggerian'
twist, but written with both a multicultural and lower case voice. First, the postscript: Whether we
use the date, 1954-5, when Heidegger ceased most explicit writing about science and technology,
or 1976, the year of his death, it should be anachronistically obvious that
apart from the early 20'“
revolution
in
century
physics, Heidegger simply missed most scientific revolutions of the past fifty
The
plus years.
largest such revolution is obviously in biology: DNA, RNA, the human genome,
cloning, stem cell research has in many areas replaced even physics as the premier frontier for
contemporary science. Moreover, the whole of cosmology and astronomy has been revolutionized,
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basically since 1950. Prior to that time, astronomy was optical and light wave astronomy; but today
takes its signals from the heavens from gamma to radio waves. Black holes, the background
radiation, dark body radiation, inflation, and the like are mid 20'“ centuıy phenomena made possible
by instrumentation not known to Heidegger. Even the earth itself, once solid and immobile, the
center of the pre-modem universe, now is understood to crack, move, have plates in which the very
continents have moved over time and mountains which rise and fall in plate tectonics and continental
drift. I could go on, but the mid 201“ century to 21“ century movements in the sciences are at least
as deep and disjunctive towards early modern science as early modem science was to the late Middle
Ages. Heidegger was simply too early to see and reflect upon this historical phenomenon.
But, the more important ending for this occasion, is to be able to tell a different tale about the
relations between science and technology and the emergence of technoscience. It is fair to say that
very few philosophers of science today, and virtually no science studies principals would deny the
importance of science's teclmologies. Shapin and Schaffer's momumental Leviathan and the Air
Pump demonstrated the deep interrelation of technologies to the very making of scientific knowledge
itself. But my tale will return to the themes of Heidegger's Question and in shortest form retell it
in lower case and contemporaıy form:
Technology, with its capital, as Western metaphysics, actually has a very different history than
the one claimed and told by Heidegger. It was from Islam that Aristotle himself re-entered Europe,
along with new sciences of map making and astronomical measurements entailing astrolabes and
amarillaríes. And, it was fiom China that gunpowder and the c a mi o n entered Europe. By the
fourteenth century, the cannon began to destroy castles [trans], reaching the peak of one a month in
Normandy during the Hundred Years War. Here was a “modern” technology more than three
centuries before early modern physics. But, as one can see, early cannons simply did not need a
geometrical science such as ballistics. However, as defenders began to use firepower as well [trans],
canrıoneers had to move their field pieces farther away from the castles. Here, technology in the
lower case, needed ballistics: cannon balls - with distance - fell to the
ground. Elevating the barrel
increased distance, but how better than trial and error, could one tell how much to raise the barrel?
The geometrical science both historically and chronologically followed technology. As Manuel de
Landa notes, “ “The theory of exterior ballistics...was worked out by the fathers of modem
dynamics, Tartaglia and Galileo. Perhaps it would not be too much to assert that the foundations of
modem physics were a by-product of solving the fundamental ballistic problem. '“Tartaglia was led
to his criticism of Aristotelean dynamics by experiments on the relation between the
angle of fire
and the range of a projectile. But to Galileo is due the fundamental discovery that the
trajectoıy of
a projectile. ..must be parabolic.” [deLanda, p. 40]
Here, the early modern story is repeated, Aristotle is replaced by Galileo, the restrained fall
replaced by the pendulum, but in the context of technologies lower cased. By 1494, only two years
añer the Moors - who had brought Aristotle to Europe - and the Jews - who with the
mapmaking
Moors brought their mathematics to the enframing of the world-globe for the
Voyages of discovery
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in the School of Henry the Navigator, which helped allow an
early treatment of humans as standing
reserve in the figures of the slaves brought back by Columbus in 1492, were
expelled from Spain
thus ending two earlier centuries of multicultural “sciencef This
which
combínes a pragmatist
story
strand of science-technology history, thus not requiring the
subject-object, representationalist
epistemology which actually arose later and which today is decaying, with a phenomenological one
in the sense of a set of lifeworld practices, but a lifeworlcl in the midst of a
myriad of technologies,
a Galileo with a telescope instead of Husserl's merely
mathematizing Galileo. This pragmatoto
mind
phenomenological tale,
leaves in shambles the purified Heideggerian tale. The
my
tale
is
much
like
Heideggerian
the elevated theology textbook revisions which make of the
homey,
anthropomorphic biblical God, into his later Schoenbergian non-perceivable and iconoclastic God,
unapproachable, but nevertheless totally demanding.
And, with this messier, but more
contemporary tale, I end my show.
SUNY at Srony Brook
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Some of the dominant interpretations among American readers of Heidegger's writings in the period
surrounding the publication of Sein und Zeirl bear a heavy debt to Pragmatism. The readings put
forth about a decade ago by Hubert Dreyfus and Mark Okrentz are the most detailed and best known.
In recent years, however, such readings have come under a partial attack. The main objection to
such readings has been their claim to be a total interpretation of SZ. Certain analyses of the book,
such as those of death, anxiety, and authenticity, fairly obviously do not ñt neatly into Pragmatism.
There are other analyses, such as that of intratemporality (Innerzeitigkeit), about which it is less clear
whether they fit into the Pragmatistic interpretation.3 One aspect of the Pragmatistic interpretation,
however, has largely avoided criticism. This is the claim that it was the considered opinion of the
early Heidegger that Dasein's encounters of present-at-hand (vorhanden) entities i.e., its intentional
relations to objects or states of affairs, taken apart from their practical significance - is founded in
Dasein°s understanding of readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit) - i.e., its ability to deal practically with
equipment. William Blattner has joined Dreyfus, Okrent, Joseph Rouse, and others in endorsing
what he calls the thesis of the “primacy of practice.”"
In this paper, I argue against attributing even this much Pragınatism to the early Heidegger. In
so doing, I will offer a new interpretation of Heidegger's claim throughout this period that Dasein's
understanding of presence-at-hand is founded in its transcendence toward the world i.e., its Beingin-the-world. First, I point out that Heidegger sketches out two (if not threes) distinct and roughly
chronologically successive versions of this claim between 1921 and 1929. Only the first version,
which is prominent in writings through the First Division of SZ (completed by April 1, 1926),
maintains the thesis of the primacy of practice. I argue, however, that there are compelling reasons
- both textual and phenomenological - not to treat this first version as Heidegger°s considered view.
In so doing, I address two possible interpretations of this first version. One, which is strongly
suggested by Heidegger's texts during this period, maintains that the primacy of practice is onric.
The other, which Dreyfus suggests, maintains that the primacy of practice is rather ontological. I
argue that both interpretations of the first version fatally distort both theory and practice.
I conclude by briefly explicating the second version of the claim, which appears prominently in
Division Two of SZ (completed by November 1, 1926) and throughout 1927-1929, but which has
received virtually no explicit attention in the literature. On this view, Heidegger no longer insists
that theoıy is founded in practice, but rather that both are founded in Dasein°s “ecstatic” temporality.
The picture that I hope will emerge is that Heidegger's analyses of temporality in Division Two of
SZ led him to reconsider both his view of presence-at-hand and its relation to readiness-to-hand.
81
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Whathe came to see was that both modes of encountering intraworldy entities share a_temporal
certain
sense, one which presupposes Dasein's ecstatic temporality. Since this view avoíds
difficulties inherent in the view of the primacy of practice, charity requires us to take this second
version to be Heidegger°s considered view.
THE THESIS OF THE “PRIMACY OF PRACTICE”
entities in Being-in-theHeidegger"s first account of the foundation of encounters of present-at-hand
world can be found in his lecture-courses at least as early as 1921/22 (GA 61: 148f, 177), and
20: 298-301; GA 21:
occupies aprominent place from 1924/25 through 1925/26 (GA 19: 126f; GA
`
1926.“
153-161, 207) and in portions of the First Division of SZthat were completed by April 1,
In 1925, Heidegger claims to have been professing it at that point forseven years, i.e., since 1918
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(GA 20: 303).
This first version claims that presence-at-hand is founded in readiness-to-hand (cf. GA 20: 265 f,
268; SZ 71t). We can understand this is as follows. It is possible for us to encounter intraworldly
entities at all only because they fit into our practical projects ~ and ultimately because they allow us

to pursue some possibility of ourselves: a for-the-sake-of-whom. The meaningfulness of
intraworldly entities is accordingly precisely their serviceability, or usefulness, in these practical
from
projects. Present-at-hand entities as such, however, are intraworldly entities regarded apart
the ways in which they can fit into ourpractical projects. In I-Iusserl”s terms, they are entities only
insofar as they are “bodily” (leibhafiig) given to a practically detached perception (cf. GA 20: 264and
268). Heidegger thus describes the present-at-hand as “the incomprehensible pure and simple,
it is the incomprehensible because it is the de-worlded world” (GA 20: 298; cf. 266). In the
perception of a present-at-hand entity,
the world isno longer accessible in its full worldliness, in its full meaningfulness, as it is encountered by concem. In the
of the term 'deficient`
pure perception of a thing, the world shows itself instead in a deficient meaıiiiıgfulııess. My use
in
is
cleficient:
it lacks something
as
it
is
encountered
perception
follows that ofthe old term deficiens. Meaningfulness
the
world
as
a
manifold
of things,
world.
ln
at
which it authentically has and would have to have as a
merely just looking
its originariness is demolished. (GA 20: 300f; cf. SZ 65, 112)

This account of presence-at-hand as “deficient” concern is repeated in SZ:
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In withholding from all producing, handling, etc., concem places itself in the only. mode of Being-in [the world]
that now remains: just lingering at [something]. Explicitly looking at what is thus encountered is possible on
the basis of this manner of being toward the world and as a mode of this manner of being, which allows entities
encounterecl within the world to be encountered just still in their pure look (eiöog). (SZ 6 1)

On this first account, then, encounters of present-at-hand entities essentially involve a “coveringup or dirnming” (GA 20: 266) of their practical usefulness, which in turn results from their being
cut off from the meaningfulness that, as such, constitutes environmentality. The “as” gets restricted
[zuriickgedrängt] to the uniform level of the only present-at-hand. It sinks down to the structure of the
of pure
determining only-allowing-to-be-seen of the present-at-hand. Only thus does it gain the possibility
regarding pointing-out. (SZ 158)
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Encounteıing a present-at-hand entity thus requires a “leveling of the originary °as° of
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circumspective interpretation into the as of present-at-hand determination” (SZ 158). Heidegger
elaborates in his 1925/26 lecture-course, claiming that the apophantic as, involved in interpretive
encounters of present-at-hand entities,
however, always presupposes the originary structure of the as, namely the more basic understanding of what gets leveled
in and by the assertion. Asscrting determination is thus never a primary díscovering; asserting determination never
determines a primary and originary relation to entities; and thus it, this logos, can never be used as the guiding thread for
the question of what entities are. (GA 21: 159)

An encounter of a present-at-hand entity is thus “a derivative [abkünftigen] mode of interpretation”
(SZ 157). It “derives” from an encounter with a ready-to-hand entity because it just is the latter, only
devoid of its originary, practical meaningfulness.
This first account immediately faces a prima facie difficulty: if intraworldly entities are
encountered entirely in terms of their practical meaningfulness, and if present-at-hand entities as
such are not encountered in terms of their practical meaningfulness, then how can intraworldly
entities be encountered at all in this mode? In Heideggefs terms, what are the “exisienrialontological modifications” through which the encounter of a present-at-hand entity “arises out of
circumspective interpretation?” (SZ 157) How does one “sight” “a present-at-hand entity in the
ready-to-hand” (SZ 157)?
I-Ieidegger's account of the “change-over” from readiness-to-hand to presence-at-hand is based
in a description of kinds of breakdown in practical dealings with the ready-to-hand. For Heidegger
in 1924/25, the essential feature that distinguishes the present-at-hand from the ready-to-hand is
wonder (Verwunderungfitıo!á"eiv). This wonder, in tum, has its genesis in “something's not being
right” in one°s practical dealings with the ready-to-hand:
Something makes an observer wonder, is “wonderful”, insofar as the observer doesn`t succeed at the encountered
affairs with the understanding at its disposal. She bumps herself against what shows itself to her. (GA 19: 126)

state of

Heidegger calls this encounter of a glitch in the otherwise smooth dealings with equipment an
ómopíotz a situation out of which one does not know one”s way (GA 19: l26f).
On this first account, then, the present-at-hand appears as what offers resistance to Dasein°s
practical projects.7 In 1925, Heidegger notes that his theory is similar to Max Scheler's, and that
both he and Scheler borrowed it from Wilhelm Dilthey.8 In Division I of SZ, he endorses the
Dilthey/Scheler theory of presence-at-hand as resistance, as far as it goes: “The analytic exposition
of the phenomenon of resistance is what is positive in the treatise just mentioned, and the best concrete proof of the idea of a 'descriptive and analytic° psychology” (SZ 209). In fact, Heideggefs
only criticism of the theory is that its talk of “life”, “will”, “drives”, etc. “requires ontological determination” (SZ 209), and that “[e]xperiencing resistance, i. e., discovering resisring entities through
'
striving, is possible ontologically only on the basis ofthe disclosedness ofworld“ (SZ 210; cf. GA
20: 302-305). In Section 16 of SZ, Heidegger fills in the Dilthey/Scheler account of the genesis of
theory out of practice with three progressively intense stages of breakdown: conspicuousness of
unusable equipment, the obtrusiveness of missing equipment, and the obstimicy of something that
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stands in the way of completing one°s practical task altogether. He hints that in the third stage
entities show themselves in the mode of pure presence-at-hand (SZ 73f; cf. GA 20: 266-268).
DIFFICULTIES WITH THE “PRIMACY OF PRACTICE” THESIS

iii

not
Despite its initial plausibility, I think that this account of the practical genesis of presence-at-hand will
suffice. For interpreted as a general .theory of relation of presence-at-hand to readiness-to-hand, this first
account faces two difficulties. First, surely not all encounters of present-at-hand entities in fact begin as
encounters of ready-to-hand entities that prompted a total breakdown. That is, there are surely moments in
scientific research and everyday life in which someone simply looks at something with which she was not
previously dealing practically. Thus breakdown is not ontically necessary for explaining how a particular
entity gets encountered as present~at-hand. Second, even a total breakdown need not necessitate that we
leave the practical framework altogether. While admittedly total breakdowns are highly unpieasant
experiences, there would appear to be nothing in them that compels us simply to look at the “obstinate” entity
solely with an eye to its appearance. It is still possible for someone to continue encountering the entity in
essentially ready-to-hand terms: as unready-to~hand. As Heidegger himself notes, unreadiness-to-hand (SZ
73-75) is a deficient mode of readiness-to-hand. It is, however, not yet the positive mode of presence-athand. Thus breakdown is not ontically sufficient for explaining the emergence of presence-at-hand.9
In championing I-Ieidegger's first account of presence-at-hand, Dreyfus has attempted to clarify
Heidegger's .claim about the way in which presence-at-hand is founded in readiness-to-hand.1° For Dreyfus,
this foundation is not ontic - as Heidegger seems to claim in the texts from this period - but ontological.“
That is, Dasein's understanding of presence-at-hand - its ability to encounter entities as present-at-hand In Dreyfus' terms, the practical
oses its understanding ofreadiness -toihand
1=›resupp

-

everyday world... cannot and need not be made intetligible in terms of anything else; rather, it can account for the
possibility and place of theory... The description of world as revealed by Dasein's being-in-the-world and of the ways of
being revealed by Dasein°s coping Heidegger callsfiundamental ontology. It isthe only kind of foundationalism he defends.
(1991, pp. 1221)
Dreyfus” particular interpretation of this claim turns crucially onhis interpretation of readiness-to-hand
On the one hand, he defines the ready-to-hand as the familiar, i.e., what we are able
and

presence-at-hand.
to make sense of, or cope with. By “making sense” of something, or “coping” with it, Dreyfus presumably
means interpreting it in an appropriate manner, i.e., one that allows it to be seen as what it is. On the other
hand, encountering the present-at-hand for Dreyfus essentially involves experiencing strangeness. Someone
at a given time encounters something as strange, in turn, just in case she encounters it as entirely unfannliar,
i.e., as above and beyond her present capacities to make sense of it, or cope with it.
Dreyfus' ontological interpretation of the relation between presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand avoids
the difficulties of the ontic interpretation we just examined. For it treats breakdowns in practice not as
necessary conditions for such a discovery, but rather just as examples of ways in which practices lead to the
discovery of present-at-hand entities. Scientific practices, such as observation and experimentation, are other
ways of encountering things as strange. Now it is admittedly a bit unclear why this interpretation of the
relation between readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand treats the latter as founded in the former. Perhapâ
this is the case because strangeness depends defínitionally and phenomenologícally upon familiarity, and
thus, for Dreyfus, upon readiness-to-hand. Presence-at-hand is defined as beyond the faıniliarity of the
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ready-to-hand. For this reason, Dreyfus insists that science proceed by “decontextualization” (1991, p. 256;
cf. 84), “desituation” (2000, p. 316, 318), or “recontextualization (within the proto-theoretical space in which
dealings with the strange would take place)” (1999a, p. 70).
I think that Dreyfus' interpretation of the relation between readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand fails
to do adequate justice to either. On the one hand, it is not the case that, as Dreyfus appears to hold, the
ready-to-hand is identical with the familiar. Although Heidegger does indeed use the term “familiarity"
(Vertrautheit) in his analysis of Being-at-ready-to-hand entities, it is not the em'ı'tı'es with which Dasein is
familiar, but its world” A Dasein's world is the totality of cross-referential practical meanings disclosed
to it, i.e., the totality of ways in which it could make use of ready-to-hand equipment (SZ 86). Because a
world is thus specified in terms of an individual's practical capacities, it is naturally entirely familiar to that
individual: it is the scope ofwhat she can do with equipment. Readiness-to-hand, by contrast, is a way of
encountering intraworldy entities with regard to their possible usefulness or uselessness ultimately, for
realizing some possibility of oneself, for the sake of whom one strives to act practically (SZ 86).
Uselessness, or unreadiness-to-hand, is just a deficient mode of readiness-to-hand: the way in which a readyto-hand entity shows up as íncapable of being employed to realize the guiding for-the-sake-of-whom. The
conspicuousness, obtrusíveness, and obstinacy we mentioned above are ways of just such deficient
existentiell modes ofreadiness-to-hand (SZ 355f, 357f; GA 24: 432f, 439-443). Since such ready-to-hand
entities are encountered as outside our familiarity (GA 24: 432), and thus as strange, Dreyfus° definition of
readiness-to-hand as familiarity is mistaken.
Dreyfus' account of presence-at-hand in terms of strangeness is similarly insufficient. Heidegger makes
it clear thatthe essence of presence-at-hand is apophansis. This is a way of encountering en-tities in a
mamer characterized by a commitment to the goal of allowing them to show themselves from themselves
asthey are in themselves. The caveat “as they are in themselves", I think, means that one goal of apophansis
is to make correct interpretations of the entities in question. The “from themselves", I think, implies that
apophansis has the further goal of employing concepts in these interpretations that are appropriate to the
entities in question, i.e., which illuminate them not just one-sidedly, but in their fullness. Dreyfus is surely
right to say that encountering entities as present-at-hand may often involve encountering them as unfamiliar.
In particular, it may well require that we recognize that our current practices and concepts are inadequate
to the task of apophansis. Where Dreyfus goes wrong, however, is in insisting that strangeness is the goal,
or, in his terms, a “structural element“, of present-at-hand encounters. His definition of presence-at-hand
thus puts the cart (strangeness) before the horse (the goal of interpreting entities using appropriate concepts).
~

J

We can sum up the difficulties we have seen with Dreyfus' position as follows. He appears to conceive
of strangeness as both sufficient and necessary for encountering something as present-at-hand. We have
seen, however, that strangeness is not sufficient for, or unique to, presence-at-hand, since ready-to-hand
entities can also show up as strange. Furthermore, we have seen that strangeness is not a necessary feature
of the present-at-hand, but merely a frequent consequence of the attempt to encounter entities as they are in
themselves. Now if, as Dreyfus appears to do, one defines the ready-to-hand as the familiar, and the presentat-hand as the strange, then one moves in a very tight circle. It is not a circle, however, that fits Heideggefs
texts.

PRESENCEAT-HAND AND READINESS-TO-HAND
AS F OUNDED TNDASEIN'S ECSTATIC TEMPORALITY
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Thus far, we have examined two plausible interpretations of the claim that presence-at-hand is not founded
in readiness-to-hand: the “ontic” version, most immediately suggested by the text of SZ; and the
works. In the remainder
“onto1ogical” one developed by Dreyfus. I have argued that neither interpretation
of this paper, I argue that Heidegger fortunately abandons the first version ofthe claim that presence-at-hand
is founded in Dasein's transcendent Being-in-the-world, in favor of a second version, which avoids the
difficulties that we have seen plague the first. This second version differs from the first version in no longer
a mode founded in
insisting that presence-at-hand is a deficient mode of encountering intraworldly entities,
readiness-t0_-hand.“ Instead, this second version maintains only that both are ontologically founded in
Dasein°s ecstatic temporality.
This second version can be found in a marginal note to the passage quoted above from SZ 61, in which
because the former just is the latter,
Heidegger claims that presence~at-hand is founded in readiness-to-hand
only minus the regard for the practical meanings of equipment:
.

3

'
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from looking-away-from [e. g., breakdcwns in
Looking-toward [i.e., observing the present-at-hand] does not' yet emerge
and
has
this
former
has
its
own
looking~away as a necessary consequence.
the
-the
origin
dealings-with
ready-to~hand]
Observing [the present-at-hand] has its own origirıariness. The view upon ciöoç [i.e., the way the present-at-hand appears]
requires something different. (SZ 441)
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Naturall Y, we do not know for sure just when Heidegger changed his mind. I think, however, that there is
evidence that he had his doubts already by the time he wrote the Second Division of SZ. It is instructive to
to the
compare his discussion of the relation of the apophantic “as” of present-at-hand interpretation
the
corresponding
hermeneutic "as" of ready-to-hand interpretation in Division One (SZ l57f) with
follows
the transition
discussion in Division Two. In the example he uses to illustrate the point, Heidegger
from regarding a hammer as an item of ready-to-hand equipment to observing it as a present-at-hand object
with properties. But although he speaks of a modification here, this latter discussion is entirely devoid of
“cut off” from
Heidegger°s earlier talk of presence-at-hand being “derivative”, “restricted”, “leveled off",
readiness-tomeaningfulness, etc. Indeed, he writes that the "modification", or “change” (Umschlag) from
hand to presence-at-hand cannot be accounted for “by our distancing ourselves from handling, but also not
by our merely looking away from the tool-character of this entity; but rather by our looking ar the
encountered ready-to-hand entity “anew°: as present-at-hand." (SZ 361)
Thus although he speaks of an ontological modification in the way we relate to the hammer, Heidegger
does not imply here, as he did earlier in SZ, that presence-at-hand is founded in readiness-to-hand. His
these two ways of
phenomenological description of the modification illustrates the differences between
being, and could just as well proceed in the opposite direction: from presence-at-hand to readiness-to-hand.
I am aware of no instance in Heidegger°s writings after around April 1, 1926, in which he asserts that
he
presence-at-hand is fotmded in readiness-to-hand. Indeed, there is considerable textual evidence that
abandoned this claim. For example, in Division II Heidegger rejects the DiltheyfScheler account of
he still
presence-at-hand (i.e., reality) as resistance to practical striving, which, as we saw in Section 3,
maintained in Division I. Instead of characterizing such resistant entities as present-at-hand, he now
describes them as “remain[ing] ready-to-hand precisely in their unsuitability” (SZ 356; emphasis altered).
He also explicitly modifies his terminology in accord with his shifting views. He writes, for example: '\`
with the things of the 'I' -¬
“Being at present-at-hand entities in the broader sense, e.g., circumspective dealings
narrower and broader environs, is founded in Being-in-the-world" (GA 24: 239). Here Heidegger clearly „E
he. termed both
employs the term “present-at-hand” “in the broadest sense” (GA 24: 95) to include what in SZ
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the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand.
Now it is true that in this later period (after April 1, 1926) one can frequently find
the following:

statements

similar to

Relating to entities is at first and most closely [zuerst und zunächst] not knowing, and not at all in the sense of scientific
investigation of entities. .. Everyday dealings with intraworldly entities are the primary manner and for many often the
only manner of discovering the world. (GA 25: 2])
¬

~

= i

But he also makes it clear that dealings with the ready-to-hand are primary only in the sense of being the
most common and everyday way in which intraworldly entities show up “by and large” (zunächst und
zumeist; e.g., GA 29/30: 262). In 1929, Heidegger makes it clear that he does not hold that the originary
phenomenon is Dasein`s “dealings with things of use". Instead, it is “transcendence as Being-in-the-world
in the sense of a 'basic constitution of Dasein” (GA 9: 155 n55; cf. GA 29/30: 262i). “The only... intention
of the analysis of the environment” in SZ was not at least on his slightly later interpretation of it - to argue
that Dasein`s most ontologically originary relation to intraworldly entities is that of practical involvement.
Rather, it was “to lead up to [the phenomenon of the world], and to prepare for the transcendental problem
of the world” (GA 9: 155 n55).15
Heidegger makes this view of the purpose of the analysis of dealings with the ready-to-hand crystal clear
in the following passages from his 1927 lecture-course:
~
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What is sought is the condition ofthe possibility ofthe understanding ofbeing that undersiands entities in tlte sense of
readiness-to-hand andpresence-at-hand. These entities are encountered in our everyday dealings with them. As existing
relations of Dasein to entities, these dealings with the entities most closely encountered are founded in the basic constitution
of Dasein, Being-in-the-world. Accordingly, the entities with which we deal are encountered as intraworldly entities. Since
Dasein is Being-in-the-world and the basic constitution of Dasein lies in temporality, our dealings with intraworldly eıırities
are based in a particular teınporality ofBeing-in-tlıe-world. (GA 24: 413)
And, a few pages later:
Only when we have grasped the more originary temporalizing will we be able to get an overview of the way in which the
understanding ofbeing of entities - here of the tool-character and the readiness-to-hand of the ready-to-hand equipment, or
of the thingliness of present-at-hand things and the presence-at-hand of the present-at-hand - ismade possible and transparent
by time. (GA 24: 4161)
p

One striking feature of these passages is the fact that Heidegger no longer claims that presence-at-hand
is founded in readiness-to-hand. Indeed, he writes in precisely this context: “In this regard, it is not essential
whether the ready-to-hand is in the nearest nearness or not, whether it is nearer than the merely present-ab
hand.. .” (GA 24: 414). By 1927, then, Heidegger treats both presence-at~hand and readiness-to-hand as on
the same ontological level, with both being founded in the ecstatic temporality of transcending Being-in-theworld (cf. GA 24: 429, 379).
_
Space constraints prevent me from offering anything but the most rudimentary sketch of the foundation
of presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand in Dasein's ecstatic temporality. We can begin by noting that in
Heidegger's detailed discussions of the temporality of encounters of intraworldly entities, no distinction is
made between presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand. Both modes of encounter have the temporal sense
of retaining (Behalten) the past, attending to (Gegenwärtigen) the present, and protending (Gewärtigen) the
future. Accordingly, the temporality of both is “now-time": the past as no-longer-now, the present as now,
and the future as not~yet-now. Since now-time is a unidirectional and continuous transition from one now
to the next (GA 24: 351-356), what is retained at a given time must always be dístinct from what is protended
at that time (GA 24: 3501). This is surely the case for Husserl”s account of internal time consciousness which is a phenomenological description of the temporality of the encounter with a very specific kind of

I;
,

›

.›!

tl
EDGAR C. BOEDEKER, JR.

88
.2

I

I,

li
1
t

1

4!

4-1

I

-

ı

lil

I

1
1

1

I

1
I

I

1

1.

1

1

,.1!

,i

l
ı

if; 1
1;
l

.

51

4`.

1.1

=ı
35
.1

Ii.

1%
ı

|

x1.

.1

' .ll1

rf |1
1

r

1| 1

1

|

1

5

present-at-hand object: an immanent sense-datum, such as a tone (cf. GA 26: 263i). In the case of the
temporal intention of a physical object, the aspects of the objects now retained (as now-no-longer perceived)
must be distinct from those now protended (as now-not-yet perceived). Similarly, Heidegger emphasizes
that in the herrneneutíc interpretation of a ready-to-hand entity, one attends to the entity (say, a hammer, GA
24: 416) by simultaneously (1) retainiııg the with-which (say, the nail and boards; SZ 353) and (2)
protending “the for-what, i.e., that at-what of usefulness” (say, hammering the boards together) (SZ 353; cf.
GA 24: 4l5t) or the “in-order-to” (SZ 355). The retained with-which is thus distinct fiom - although
intimately related to the protended for-what, at-what, and in-order-to. In this way, what Dasein retains,
attends to, and protends occurs in now-time (cf. GA24: 347f, 366-369; SZ 406i).
A further parallel between the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand lies in the fact that encotmters of
both kinds of entities are characterized by the movement fiom “empty” intention to fulfillment. Ready-tohand equipment is encountered in terms of its role in carrying out, or “fiılfilling”, practical projects. The
fulñllment of an intention of a present-at-hand entity, o'n the other hand, is the ideal limit of perceiving the
object fi'om every perspective. This movement toward fulfillment involved in both sorts of encounters, in
turn, is made possible by a synthesis of what is retained, attended to, and protended. Protention, or “foresight”, sets out “emptily” in advance a temporal sequence of steps that would count as fiılfilling the intention,
whether practical or perceptual. And retention of what has already been attended to makes it possible to
fulñll these anticipated steps.
.
In encounters ofboth the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand, protention, or fore-sight, always employs
meanings of one kind or another". whether the with-which, at-which, and in-order-to involved in a practical
project; or the concepts involved in perception. 'I`he disclosure, or “fore-having", of such meanings involved
"itself points back into a still more origínary temporality” (GA 24: 416), i.e., to Dasein's ecstatic temporality
(GA 24: 428; SZ408-420). Ecstatic temporality is distinguished from now-time by three features. The first
is its circular structure. '°

Whereas in now-time what is now retained must be distinct fi'om what is now protended, in ecstatic
temporality what one comes back to “pastly" is nothing but what one comes toward futurally (SZ 3251", 328330; GA24: 406i). Tlıe second distinguishing feature of ecstatic temporality is that what one relates to are
not intraworldly entities at all, but rather possibilities of oneself - in particular, possible ways of
encounteríng entities. Third, the temporal ecstasies are directedtoward a "horizon" (SZ 365; GA 24: 435438) that is not capable of being experienced as actualized in any now. The horizons of now-time, however
- the “earlier”, the "today", and the “1ater” (SZ 407, 421; GA 24: 340-369) - are essentially related to the
possibility of experiencing in some now, be it past, present, or fiıture.
Although the temporality of Dasein's being-itself, with its projection of everyday for-the-sakes-of-whom
upon the horizon of death - the horizon of Dasein's being-itself - is surely the most striking example of
ecstatic temporality, it is important to note that Dasein's relation to both the horizon of practical meanings
- i.e., the world - and the conceptual horizon is equally "ecstatic". Heidegger characterizes Dasein's relation
to a horizon of disclosed meanings as transcendence. Since the disclosure of meanings makes it possible
for it to encounter intraworldly entities, “[t]ransencence - the above-and-beyond of Dasein - makes it
possible for it to relate to entities - both to the present-at-hand, to others, and to itself - as entities” (GA 24:
426). Furthermore: "If transcendence makes possible the understanding of Being, but transcendence is
grounded in the ecstatic-horizonal constitution of temporality, then the latter is the condition of the
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possibility of the understanding of Being” (GA 24: 429). Dasein”s understanding of both presence-at-hand
and readiness-to-hand is founded in its ecstatic temporality because both inodes of encountering intraworldly
entities presuppose the “ecstatic” disclosure of a horizon of meanings.
In conclusion, I think we can understand the shift in Heidegger”s position in something like the following
manner. As early as 1919, he had seen the phenoırıenological inadequacies of the modem assumption that
relations to present-at-hand objects are the most basic of all “intentiona1” phenomena. By 192 U22,
Heidegger first tried standing this traditional assumption on its head, holding the position of the primacy of
the practical over the theoretical. This is the aspect that he explicitly endorses of what he calls “Pragmatism”
(cf. GA 61: 135). During this period, it became gradually clearer to Heidegger that the truly originaıy
phenomenon was Dasein°s temporality."
He nevertheless continued to maintain the thesis of the priority of the practical. One reason for this, I
think, is that he did not explicitly examine the temporality of either practice or theory until Division II of SZ
itself. Now in his earlier discussion he followed Aristotle in noting that theoretical contemplation is
“difficult to uncover” (GA 19: 95), since “pressing ahead to what really is” (GA 19: 96) goes against
Dasein's natural tendency to remain with what is familiar and superficial. Nevertheless, although there may
be a long and difficult way toward the present-at-hand, encounters of present-at-hand entities themselves are
nevertheless devoid of a temporal structure. Heidegger thus describes the purely theoretical contemplation
of the present-at-hand, oocpía, as follows:
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énımñ!n [i.e., deductive reasoning] is excluded here, since it cannot disclose the åpxuí [i.e., the grounds upon which
?êrrıcrr'r1!ı1 is based], but rather presupposes them. Constantly maintaining itself at what always is achieves pure vociv [i.e.,
simple contemplation of the àpr;(aí], which Aristotle also compares with cıicrßnoig [i.e., simple sense-perception of physical
objects]. (GA 19: 171)
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In this passage, which is typical of the period before Division II of SZ, Heidegger follows Aristotle (and
Plato) in taking encounters of the present-at-hand to consist merely in contemplatíng such etemal structures
as space and numbers (GA 19: 31-34). Temporality, it seems, was reserved for Dasein°s encounters with
the ready-to-hand.
I think that the shift in Heidegger's thought about the relation of theory to practice begins only in Division
II of SZ because it is there that he first conducts an explicit analysis of the temporality of readiness-to-hand
and presence-at-hand (SZ 352~3 64). These analyses did not show that encounters of present-at-hand entities
were virtually devoid of temporality, as his earlieraccount of presence-at-hand as “deficient” would have
suggested. Instead, they revealed that such encounters in fact have a complex temporal structure - similar
to the structure that Husserl explicated in his phenomenology of internal time~consciousness.” And once
Heidegger worked out the details of the foundation of Dasein's understanding of readiness-to-hand in ecstatic
temporality, he saw that the analysis applied equally well to its understanding of presence-at-hand. In this
way, I think, Heidegger came to see the originariness of presence-at-hand.
Umyersity ofNorrhem Iowa
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Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit. 16"' edition (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1986), abbreviated hereafter as “SZ”, followed by the page
number. Heideggers works published in his Gesanıtausgabe (Frankfurt: Klostermann, l9'."5ff) will be cited as "GA",followed
by the volume number, a colon, and the page number. ln the case of multiple editions, I have used exclusively the most recent
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editions as of 1994.
Hubert Dreyfiıs, Being-in-tlıe- WorId: A Commentary onHeidegger 's 'Being and Time', Division I (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1991), esp. pp. 60-87; Mark Okrent, Heidegger 'sPragmatism (Ithaca: Comell UP, 1988), esp. pp. 135-155; see also Charles
Guignon, Heidegger and the Problem ofKnowledge (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), pp. 100-103, 150-168.
William Blattner, “Existential Temporality inBeing and Time (Why Heidegger is not a Pragmatist)", in Hubert L. Dreyfus and
Harrison Hall (eds.), Heidegger: A Critical Reader (New York: Blackwell, 1992). See also Marylou Sena, “The phenomenal
basis of entities and the manifestation of being accordgin to sections 15-17 of Being and Time: on the pragmatist
_
mísunderstanding", Heidegger Studies 11(1995), pp. l 1-31.
William Blattner, “The Primacy of Practice and Assertoric Truth-_Dewey and Heidegger", in Mark Wrathall and .1efl`Ma1pas
(eds_), Heidegger, Authenticity, and Modernity: Essays in Honor ofHubert L. Drefliıs, Volıune I (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
2000).
Heidegger may well be working with yet a third version of this claim during this period. According to this version, present-athand entities are enooımtered in practical dealings with ready-to-hand equipment as "the always-already-there" (GA 20: 263).
Unlike the products of ready-to-hand activity, the “present-at-hand" in this sense is not in need of being produced. lnstead, it
is the “nature", "maten'al", or "matter" (übt) out of which products are fashioned. Because in production one's attention is
directed primarily not toward the materials, but rather toward the work one is accomplishing, the “present-at-hand" on this
account comprises the "background" (GA 19: 29) of dealings with ready-to-hand equipment (GA 20: 268-270). This third
`
account has been chaınpıoned by Carleton B. Christensen , in “Heidegger's Representationalism”, I7ıe Review ofMerapliysics
51 (1997), p. 80. 1`heodore Kisiel also notes the difference, but does not appear to regard the earlier
description as a distinct
'
' '
'
account of presence-at-hand; see The Genesis ofHeıdeger .r Being and Tme (Berkeley.' University ofCa1ifomia Pre ss, 1993),
p. 508.
This third version of the claim, however, would appear to be unworkable. Simply put, this account fails to adequately
distinguish between presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand. In particular, present-at-hand entities are understood as entities
related to as not yet, but capable ofbecoming, ready-to-hand ~ in possible future dealings with them. This account omits two
crucial features of the way in which present-at-hand entities are etıcountered. First, it holds that present-at-hand entities as such
ane related to irnplicitly, or unthematically. This wrongly precludes the possibility that one can encounter entities in this mode
of being explieitly and thematically. Second, it fails to get to the essence of presence-at-hand: a mode of encountering entities
“in themselves" apart from any possible practical use (e. g., GA 25: 26).
to abandon this account inSZ. One need only compare the description in his 1925 lectureNot surprisingly, Heidegger came
'
course ol' the role of rrıaten'al s in production with the corresponding passages in SZ. (In particular, compare GA 20: 26If with
SZ 70; and GA269fwith SZ71.) Such a comparison makes itclear ` that that the characterization
in the earlier work of materials
`
as "[always already] present-at-hand" gets consıstently replaced in .SZwith the characterızatıon “[always alread y] rea dy-tohand".
SZ 61f, 72-76, 155-160. For the dating, see Kisiel, The Genesis ofHeidegger 's 'Being and Time ', pp. 481f.
GA 61: 148l`, 177; GA 20: 293f, 303; SZ 20911
GA 20: 293f, 303. ScheIet's lecture-course is Die Fonnen des Wissens und die Bildung. Dilthey's text is Beiträge zur Lösung
der Frage vom Ursprung unseres Glaubens an die Realität der Außenwelt und seinem Reclıı (l890); Gesammelte Schriften V,
1 (as cited in SZ 205 n2, 209 n2).
_
For this criticism, see Joseph Rouse, “Science and the theoretical “discovery' of the present-at-hand” in Don lhdc and Hugh
Silvennan (eds), Descrıptıons (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985), pp. 200-210,' and Knowledge and P ower(Ith aca : Comell UP,
1987), esp. pp. 741"; see also William Blattner, “Decontextualization, standardization, and Deweyan Science", Man and World
28 (1995), pp. 321-339.
Hubert L. Dreyfus, Being-in-the World: A Commentary on Heideggers 'Being and Time '. Division I (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1991), pp. 60-87; Hubert L. Dreyfus and Charles Spinosa, “Coping witlı 'l`hings-in-themselves: A Practice-Based
Phenomenological Argument for Realism”, Inquiry 42 (l999a), pp. 49-78; Charles Spinosa and Hubert L. Dreyfus, "Robust
Intelligibilityz Response to Our Critics”, Inquiry 42 (1999b), pp. 177-194; Hubert L. Dreyfus, “Rep1ies”, in Mark Wrathall and
Jeff Malpas (eds.), Heidegger, Coping, and Cognitive Science: Essays in Honor ofHubert L. Dreyfus, Volume 2 (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 2000).
This is Dreyfus' way ofputting it at (1991) p. 121.
Heidegger descrıbes Dasein as familiar with its world (S2 54, 76, 86; cf. GA 24: 428) and with the meaning-relations (SZ 87)
and meaningfulness (SZ 110, 123) that constitute its world.
Hubert I.. Dreyfus and Charles Spinosa (l999a), p. 70.
'I`he relation of presence-at-hand to readiness-to-hand is different from the equiorginariness that holds among the three existential
ı g (Bein g-at intraworldly entities , Being with-others, or Being-oneself) , the respective existential
perspectives of Dase'ın`s be`n
horizons of the “there“ (world, das Man, and death), or the three moments of Dasein's Being (projection, thrownness, and iIS
..
_ .
_
..
_
. _. _ .
ability to encounter entities). This kind of equıorıgmanness ısmore than Just the absence of presupposıtıon, but in voıves muıual
_
PresuPPosition - See mY"Individual and con1munity inearly Heidegger: Situating das Man, the Man-self, and self-oumershıp
in Dasein's ontological structure", Inquiry (forthcoming 2001).
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These two passages are eited in Joseph Fell, “The Familiar and the Strange", in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Harrison Hall (eds),
Heidegger: A Critical Reader (New York: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 661°. Fell's central contention that “ln the order of anxiety,
things are disclosed as purely present-at~hand” (p. 76) is clearly incompatible with the interpretation I have suggested here. ln
Division I of SZ, Heidegger claims that eneounters with the present-at-hand emerge out of breakdowns in dealings with the
ready-to-hand, a phenomenon that is not the same as anxiety.
Heidegger hints at the circular structure of Dasein°s temporality throughout this period; cf. SZ l52f, 3 141°;GA 24: 437, 33 lf,
336; GA 26: 268-270.
See Kisiel”s concise summary of the development of the concept of temporality at The Genesis ofHeidegger 's 'Bein g and Time ',
pp. 5 l Of.
See Rudolf Bernet, “Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Zeit bei Husserl und Heidegger", Heidegger Studies 3 (1987), pp. 87104.

ÜBERLEGUNGEN ZUM PHILOSOPHISCHEN DENKEN HEUTE
WISSENSCHAFT UND TECHNIK UND IHR ANDERES

UTE GUZZONI
Meine Überlegungen gliedern sich in vier Abschnitte. Als Motto stelle ich eine Bemerkung aus
Heideggers „Logos“-Aufsatz voran: „Gleichwohl verändert das Denken die Welt. Es verändert sie
in die jedesmal dunklere Brunnentiefe eines Rätsels, die als dunklere das Versprechen auf eine
höhere Helle ist.“ (Logos, V.u.A., 229)

._ı,
l

I. DIE GEGENFRAGE

l

Wenn, wie Heidegger schrieb, Denkende einander gríißen, indem sie sich gegenseitig Fragen stellen,
dann mag auf die „Frage nach dem Verhältnis der neuzeitlichen Naturwissenschaften zur modemen
Technik“, die er an uns gerichtet hat und die wir hier miteinander besprechen wollen, auch eine
Gegenfrage erlaubt sein: Läßt sich das Verhältnis dieser beiden Ausprägungen des neuzeitlichen
Geistes nicht nur dann angemessen erläutem, wenn sie - zumindest auch - von ihrem möglichen
Anderen her in den Blick gefaßt werden? Muß dieser Blick nicht schon von anderen Erfahmngen
und Einstellungen geleitet sein, - und dies nicht lediglich so, daß sie als zukünftig erahnt werden?
Können wir hier tatsächlich „zunächst nur auf dem Wege einer Erörterung der abendländischeuropäischen Metaphysik“ vorgehen, wie Heidegger schreibt?
Heidegger hat zumeist, wie auch in diesem Brief, seine ganze Betonung auf den
Vorbereitungscharakter des von ihm geforderten Bedenkens der Erscheinungen unserer Jetztzeit
gelegt, welche Vorbereitung gerade durch einen Rückgang in die Geschichte des Seins gewonnen
werden soll. Wir leben in der Epoche der Seinsvergessenheit, in der das Gestell herrscht und die
Verwindung der Metaphysik auf vermutlich lange Zeit noch aussteht. Dem Bereich, „aus dessen
Spielraum her das Ungedachte ein Denken beansprucht“, ist darum allererst der Weg zu bereiten.
Im Wesentlichen geschieht das, indem sich das selbst nicht mehr technologisch bestimmte, vielmehr
besinnliche Denken dem Wesen der Technik und seiner Herkunft aus dem abendländischen
Seinsgeschick zuwendet. Ich erinnere an die Aussage in dem Vortrag über „Gelassenheit“: „So gibt
es denn zwei Arten von Denken, die beide auf ihre Weise berechtigt und nötig sind: das rechnende
Denken und das besinnliche Nachdenken“, wobei mit dem ersteren das Denken des „heutigen
Menschen“ und d.h. das wissenschaftlich-technologisch ausgerichtete und bestimmte Denken
geıneint ist (Gel., 15). Mit der zweiten Art des Denkens hat Heidegger zumeist die Besiımung auf
„die ontologischen Grundzüge der technologisch-wissenschaftlichen Weltzivilisation“ im Auge

i

`r

l

l

l

l

l

gehabt.
Daneben gibt es allerdings auch genügend Stellen, wo er von einem grundsätzlich anderen, einem
dem dichterischen Wohnen zugehörigen Denken spricht und dieses gleichwohl nicht nur als ein erst
vorzubereitendes, wesenhaft noch ausstehendes versteht, sondern von der Gleichzeitigkeit der
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grundsätzlich verschiedenen Denkweisen ausgeht. Er hat diese Gleichzeitigkeit eines anderen, nichtteclmischen Denkens ja auch selbst praktiziert. Und, was vielleicht noch schwerer wiegt, er hat dabei
auch die Gleichzeitigkeit eines anderen Gedachren, der Welt, in der wir wohnen, vorausgesetzt.
Das besimıliche Denken geht somit gewissermaßen in zwei Richtungen und ändert dabei seine
Eigenart: Zum einen geht es dem Sinn nach, der in allem technisch Bestimmten wirkt und fragt
zurück in das in diesem und durch es Verstellte; es fragt die Seinsfrage, im Hinblick auf die
Seinsvergessenheit. Zum anderen aber richtet es sich, gleichsam mit einem arıderen Blick, in eine
andere Gegend, es schaut auf die Dinge in der Welt, auf die Brücke, über die wir gehen, den Krug,
aus dem wir gießen, das Haus, in dem wir wohnen; dabei fragt es nach Welt und Ding, nach Nähe
und Gelassenheit und ist „unterwegs zur Sprache“. Weder ist dieses so gerichtete Denken lediglich
ein prophetisches Künden, noch sind die Dinge und Gegenden, mit denen es sich befaßt, lediglich
visionär erschaute Gegenstände. Nur auf Grund der Gleichzeitigkeit von technischer Wirklichkeit
auf der einen Seite und bewohnter und durchwanderter Welt auf der anderen Seite ist das möglich,
was Heidegger „die Gelassenheit zu den Dingen“ nennt, nämlich die „Haltung des gleichzeitigen Ja
und Nein zur technischen Welt“. (Gel., 25)
Im Folgenden versuche ich der gerade angerissenen Thematik etwas näherzukommen und d.h.
meine Gegenfrage genauer zu artikulieren. Damit beschäftigen sich diese Überlegungen auf ihre
Weise mit dem Grundthema dieser Tagung, mit Heideggers Verständnis von Wissenschaft und
Technik; sie konzentrieren sich auf einen Aspekt dessen, was wir in gewissem Sinne deren
„Gegenbild“ nennen können. Zugleich soll damit eine Grundthese jenes Briefes ihre
Selbstverständlichkeit verlieren, die Voraussetzung nämlich, daß uns Heutigen in erster und
dringlichster Weise die „Erörtenıng der abend]ändisch-europäischen Metaphysik“ und damit das
Denken des „Vermächtnisses aus dem Anfang der Geschichte des Seins“ aufgegeben sei.
Il. DAS TECHNOLOGISCHE DENKEN

In der in Heideggers Brief formulierten Frage wird das wissenschaftliche Vorgehen als „der
bestimmende Vorgriff und der ständige Eingriff des technologischen Vorstellens“ thematisiert. Diese
Kennzeichnung betont den aktiven, fast gewaltsamen Charakter der Wissenschaft; da das
wissenschaflliche Denken eine grundlegende Erscheinungsform des technologischen Denkens und
einen ständigen Rückstoß injenes darstellt, ist es selbst grundsätzlich technisch und somit auch im
technischen Simie gewaltsam. An anderen Stellen wird es in ähnlichem Sinne als ein
herausfordemdes Stellen, als „Bewältigung“ (Die Zeit des Weltbildes, Holzwege 84), als Angreifen
und Herrschen bestimmt: „Nicht das Anwesende waltet, sondem der Angriff herrscht.“ (a.a.O. 100)
Die wissenschaftlichen Bestimmungen und Kategorien stellen ihrer Sache nach, indem sie sie „in
die Zugänglichkeit zerren“, sie verfolgen sie und lassen ihr keine Ruhe, indem sie sie zwingen, sich
in das jeweilig festgestellte Gegenstandsgebiet zu fügen.
Diese fast agressiven Bestimmungen könnten zunächst in einem gewissen Gegensatz zum eher
neutralen Berechnen und Messen stehen, mit denen Heidegger zumeist das wissenschaftliche
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Vorstellen kemızeichnet. Aber auch diese sind Weisen eines Stellens, das seinen Gegenstand in
absoluter Weise in eine ständige Gegenwart zwingt, womit es der Sache die Möglichkeit nimmt, sich
von ihr selbst her zu zeigen, sich auf ihre eigene Weise einem achtsamen Denken zuzusprechen.
Alles unvorhersehbare und zufallig-zufallende Geschehen, jede Eigensinnigkeit und
Unverwechselbarkeit eines jeweiligen Sachverhalts sollen so weit wie möglich ausgeschlossen bzw.,
sowie sie auftauchen, verstehbar und manipulierbar gemacht werden. Die Sicherheit einer
umfassenden Wißbarkeit und rationalen Erklärbarkeit von allem und jedem scheint zuweilen fast den
Rang einer existenziellen Notwendigkeit zu bekommen.
Zur Sicherstellung gehören auch die Bereitstellung und das Verfugbarmachen. Wie hinsichtlich
anderer die zeitgenössische Gegenwart erörternder Bestimmungen hat Heidegger auch hier in
erstaunlicher Weise spätere Entwicklungen antizipiert. Die Installierung und immer weiter
fortschreitende Vervollkommnung des Internet realisiert in einer fast schwindelerregenden Weise
die Verfügbarmachung von allem für alles. Indem zu welchem Thema auch immer sich jede
mögliche Information auf den Bildschirm holen läßt, soll virtuell das Wissen der gesamten
Menschheit verfügbar sein. (Ich sage „soll“, weil es hier ersichtlich auf das Verständnis von so etwas
wie Wissen ankommt. Wemi Heidegger z.B. davon spricht, daß es darum gehe, „das Dichterische
[zu] wissen“, so ist dieses Wissen wohl kaum ein solches, das auf dem Bildschirm dar- und
bereitzustellen wäre.)
Die schrankenlose Verfiígbannachung erfordert und impliziert eine vorgängige Nivellienıng alles
Vorliegenden. Heidegger spricht von Unterschiedlosigkeit und organisierter Gleichiöımigkeit. (u.a.
V.u.A., 96f., Holzwege, 103) Alles wird dem gleichen Maß unterstellt und damit berechenbar
gemacht, die Meßbarkeit ist zum Kriterium der Wirklichkeit des Wirklichen geworden. Die Rede
von den menschlichen „Machenschaften“ weist daraufhin, daß es dem zum vorstellenden Subjekt
gewordenen Menschen entscheidend darum geht, das ihm Begegnende dem ein eigenes Begegnen
kaum mehr zugelassen wird in den Griff zu bekommen und im Griff zu haben (V.u.A., 91), eben
um dessen sicher sein und darüber verfügen zu können. Dabei verlieren jene Machenschaften
zugleich immer mehr ihren selbstherrlichen Charakter, insofern die Beziehung des herrschaftlichen
Subjekts zum in seine Gegenständigkeit nivellierten Objekt in die „aus dem Gestell bestimmte
Beständigkeit des Bestandes“ übergeht und schon übergegangen ist, „in dem sowohl das Subjekt als
auch das Objekt als Beständige aufgesogen werden.“ (S.v.Gr., 61)
An den Bestimmungen, die ich hier aus der Vielzahl der Heideggerschen Kennzeichnungen
angefiihrt habe, wird u.a. deutlich, wie stark das wissenschaftliche Erkennen und Wissenwollen im
technologischen Denken verwurzelt ist. In beidem ist der gleiche Zugriffcharakter gegenüber dem
Seienden und die gleiche Nivellierung und Vereinheitlichung zu sehen. Das vielfältige Stellen, das
im Wesen der Technik begründet liegt, hat im wissenschaftlichen Denken eine ausgezeichnete
Ausprägung gefunden, so daß dessen Begreifen und die technische Zurichtung Hand in Hand gehen.
Dabei handelt es sich - und darauf kommt es Heidegger bei all seinen Überlegungen zum Wesen der
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Technik entscheidend an - nicht umein „Gemächte“ der Menschen, vielmehr entstammt es mit all
seinem scheinbar selbstgewissen und sich seiner selbst versichemden Vorstellen und Handeln einem
Geschick, das den geheimnisvollen Charakter eines Seinsentzuges hat. Das Wesen der Technik
verweist, mit Heideggers Worten gesagt, „in die Endphase des epochalen Seinsgeschickes im Sinne
der Bestimmung des Seins als der unbedingten Bestellbarkeit alles Seienden“ (Bd. 16, 743).
Das Problem der Menschen ist, daß sie gemeinhin diese Seins-Bestimmung, unter der sie stehen,
nicht sehen, daß sie sich eben da als Herren ihres Geschicks wähnen, wo sie in Wahrheit nur
Bestellbares eines Bestandes sind, der sie immer schon in sich einbezogen hat, innerhalb dessen sie
nur noch funktionieren und fungibel geworden sind. Insofem kommt es nach Heidegger darauf an,
eine Besinnung zu wecken auf das Verhältnis des heutigen, neuzeitlich bestimmten Menschen zum
Sein, zur Welt, zu seiner Stellung inmitten der Welt. In „Der Satz vom Grund“ heißt es in diesem
letzteren Sinne: „Sollen wir indes auf einen Weg der Besimiung gelangen, dann müssen wir allem
zuvor erst in eine Unterscheidung finden, die uns den Unterschied zwischen dem bloß rechnenden
Denken und dem besinnlichen Denken vor Augen hält.“ (199) Dieses besinnliche Denken richtet
sich auf die „Grundzüge der technologisch-wissenschaftlichen Weltzivilisation“, indem es sich mit
dem auseinandersetzt, was als metaphysisches Denken und metaphysische Realität die Geschichte
des abendländischen Menschen bis heute bestimmt hat. Es antwortet dem „Anspruch, der sowohl
das Seiende in der Planbarkeit und Berechenbarkeit erscheinen läßt, als auch den Menschen in das
Bestellen des also erscheinenden Seienden herausfordert“ (Grundsätze des Denkens, GA 79, 124),
und eröffnet so die Möglichkeit eines gewandelten Angesprochenwerdens.
Ill. BILDHAFTES DENKEN
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Was mich hier interessiert, ist jedoch, wie gesagt, eine noch andere Art der Besinnung: Es ist ein
besinnliches Denken, das in radikalerer Weise anders ist, anders nicht nur als das rechnende und
nachstellend-bestellende, sondern selbst noch als das sich auf jenes besinnende Denken. Implizit
macht auch Heidegger diesen Unterschied, wenn er z.B. einerseits sagt, daß „jeder durch eine
Wissenschaft hindurchgehende Mensch als denkendes Wesen auf verschiedenen Ebenen der
Besinnung sich zu bewegen und sie wachzuhalten“, also besinnlich zu denken vermag, daß aber
andererseits selbst die „höchste Stufe der Besinnung“ nur erst eine Vorbereitung für einen
kommenden Zuspruch sein könnte. (Wissenschaft und Besinnung, V.u.A., 70) Es scheint demnach,
daß der Aufitıf zur Besinnung zwar eine gegenüber dem rechnenden Vorstellen andere, jederzeit
mögliche Art des Denkens, eben das besinnliche Denken, im Blick hat und anmahnt, daß Heidegger
davon aber andererseits noch ein gewissermaßen „drittes“ Denken unterscheidet, das er ein
„einfaches Sagen“ nennt und von dem er an der gerade zitierten Stelle sagt, daß es heute noch
aussteht, weil der Zuspruch seines zu Sagenden selbst noch fehlt.
Wie anfangs angedeutet, bin ich davon überzeugt, daß, wie auch immer es mit dieser
Zukünftígkeit eines anderen Zuspruchs bestellt sein mag - ich will diese Frage hier offen lassen -,
jedenfalls auch heute schon und seit je die Möglichkeit zu einem gegenüber dem wissenschaftlich-
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technologischen Denken anderen Erfahren und Sprechen gegeben ist. Nicht nur, weil anders gar kein
kritischer, d.h. scheidender und unterscheidender Blick auf das technologische Vorstellen möglich
wäre, sondem vor allem, weil es, recht besehen, unsere eigene Erfahrung ist, daß wir uns als in der
Welt Wohnende und uns bei den Dingen Auflialtende wissen und verhalten können. Und ich denke,
daß auch Heidegger in vielfältigen Zusammenhängen zumindest unausdrücklich von dieser
Überzeugung ausgegangen ist, z.B. in dem Vortrag „Bauen Wohnen Denken“, wo er das Geviert der
Welt und den Aufenthalt der Sterblichen in ihm an einer durchaus hier und
jetzt eine Stätte
verstattenden Brücke aufzei gt und damit keineswegs lediglich ein Zuktmftsbild auszurnalen versucht.
Heidegger spricht hier - auch - von der tatsächlichen Heidelberger Brücke, wie er an anderer Stelle
von diesem bestimmten Krug handelt, der im Wirtshaus in Gebrauch ist, von diesem
spezifischen
Haus, in dem Freuden und Leiden beieinander wohnen. Doch auch seine Erörterungen des Denkens
selbst verweisen durchaus auf gegenwärtig Mögliches, wenn auch Vielleicht allererst Anzueignendes,
so wenn er Bestimmungen gibt wie (unter manchen anderen) diese: „Das Denken ist ein
Erhören,
das erblickt“ (S.V.Gr., 86), oder wenn er sagt, das Denken wäre „ein In~die-Nähe-kommen zum
Fernen“ (Gel, 45).
Welcher Art ist dieses unser anderes und anders mögliches Denken? Inwiefem ist es als ein
„einfaches Sagen“, als ein „herzhaftes“ und zugleich ein „gelassenes“ Denken zu bezeichnen, und
ich fitge hinzu: als ein wohnend-wanderndes, ein sinnliches sowie ein bildhaftes Denken? Ich
beschränke mich hier auf die letztere Kennzeichnung. Mit dem Bildhaften des Denkens soll dabei
nicht das Abbildhafte, sondern der Charakter des Sichtbar- und Erblickbarseins sowie
zugleich eine
Abkehr von der reinen Begrifflichkeit angesprochen werden.
Kant sagt einmal von der Poesie, daß sie "nichts anderes ist als eine
Einkleidung der Gedanken
in Bild", so daß er damı feststellen kann: "Unter allen Völkern haben also die Griechen erst
angefangen zu philosophiren. Denn sie haben zuerst versucht, nicht an dem Leitfaden der Bilder die
Vernunfterkenntnisse zu cultiviren, sondern in abstracto; statt daß die andern Völker sich die
Begriffe immer nur durch Bilder in concreto verständlich zu machen suchten." Und sogar
Heidegger
selbst notiert fast resignativ: "Das Sagen des Denkens ist im Unterschied zum Wort der
Dichtung
bildlos. Und wo ein Bild zu sein scheint, ist es weder das Gedichtete einer
Dichtung noch das
Anschauliche eines ,Sinnes“, sondern nur der Notanker der gewagten, aber nicht
geglückten
Bild1osigkeit." (Winke, GA 13, 33)
Andererseits sagt er aber auch, daß „das denkende Sagen nicht bildlos, sondern in seiner Weise
bildhafi“ sei. (Heraklit-Vorl., GA Bd.S5, 301 f.) Sein eigenes, ofl als „poetisierend“ mißverstandenes
Denken und Sprechen ist weitgehend bildhaft. Im übrigen scheint mir auch
Heideggers häufiger
Rückgang auf die „Weisheit der Sprache“ ein Rückgang zu Bildern zu sein. Die Begriffe der
gewohnten philosophischen Terminologie oder auch unseres alltäglichen Sprachgebrauchs werden
zuı1'íckgeführt auf die in ihnen zur Sprache kommenden Bilder, d.h. die konkreten
Weltzusaınmenhänge, die in ihnen sichtbar werden. Bei diesen etymologischen Rückgängen kommt
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etwas zum Tragen, was Heideggers späteres Denken auch sonst auszeichnet, daß es nämlich keine

Begriffsbestimmungen zu geben, sondem die Sachverhalte in ihrer der jeweiligen Fragesituation
entsprechenden konkreten Relevanz zum Sprechen zu bringen sucht, womit es jeweils in bildhafte,
konkrete Seinszusammenhänge hineinfiihrt.
Ein „besinnliches“ und „herzhafies“ Denken kann der Bildhafiigkeit nicht entraten. Das Bild ist
sowohl das von der Sache her dem Sehen und Fühlen und Denken Sich-Darbietende, sein Anblick,
wie zugleich das, was in diesem Sehen durch Sinnlichkeit, Verstehen und Einbildungskrañ entsteht,
die Ansicht; so ist es gewisserrrıaßen der Schnittpunkt bzw. die Schnittfläche von Sehen und
Gesehenem. Daß wir etwas sichtbar vor uns haben, muß nicht heißen, daß es leibhaftig anwesend
wäre. Das Bild kann z.B. auch dadurch hervorgerufen werden, daß wir etwas Bestimıntes hören, oder
auch riechen oder tasten. Erimıerungsbilder können sich unauflöslich mit bestimmten sinnlichen
Eindrücken verbunden haben. Was da hervor-gerufen wird, haben wir irgendwie anschaulich vor
uns, - als wäre es heute gewesen, sagt man dann ofi. Wir sehen etwas, auch wenn wir es erinnem
oder antizipieren, jetzt vor uns, - während das begrífllich Erfaßte als solches zeitlos ist.
Die entscheidende traditionelle Differenz des Bildes gegenüber dem Begriff besteht darin, daß
das Bild ein Einzelnes repräsentiert, der Begriff dagegen das zeitlos Allgemeine erfaßt. Zugleich
aber ist dieses Einzelne nie nur einzeln, nicht isoliert. Es handelt sich nur dann um ein verstehbares
Bild, ein Bild also, das tatsächlich etwas sehen und erblicken läßt, wenn es eingebettet ist in einen
ganzheitlichen Zusammenhang, wenn es die Bezüge in sich versammelt, die seine Welt ausmachen,
letztlich das „Gegeneinanderüber“ von Himmel und Erde, Sterblichen und Göttlichem.
Der Bereich, dem das Bild zugehört, ist der Raum der Sinnlichkeit, - wie eng oder weit wir diese
letztere auch immer fassen. Allerdings läßt sich dieser Raum der Sinnlichkeit nicht säuberlich
gegenüber einem Raum des Nichtsinnlichen unterscheiden, diese Unterscheidung, von der Heidegger
sagt, „daß auf ihr alle Metaphysik gründet“, ist jedenfalls nicht mehr in einem ausschließenden und
zudem hierarchisch bestimmten Gegensatz zu sehen. Heidegger hat die nicht nur sprachliche Nähe
der Worte „Sinne“ und „Sinn“ verschiedentlich in den Blick gerückt. So z.B., wenn er in Bezug auf
die Sprache sagt: „Laut und Schritt sind zwar Sinnliches, aber Simıliches, darin je und je ein Sinn
verlautet und erscheint. Das Wort durchmißt als der sinnliche Sinn die Weite des Spielraums
zwischen Erde und Himmel.“ (Hebel - der Hausfreund, 38)
Die Übergänglichkeit oder auch Durchlässigkeit zwischen Unsimılichem und Sinnlichem hat in
der Tat viel mit der Sprache, aber doch nicht nur mit ihr zu tun. Zwischen Unsichtbarem und
Sichtbarem verläufi keine eindeutige und scharf zu ziehende Grenze. Noch weniger besteht zwischen
beiden ein prinzipieller Unterschied der Bereiche, so daß eine Welt des Diesseítigen, Sichtbaren,
gegenüber einer Welt des Jenseitigen, Unsichtbaren zu unterscheiden wäre. Sichtbares und
Unsichtbares spielen vielmehr mamngfach ineinander und gehen ineinander über.
Nehmen wir als Beispiel die an sich unsichtbaren Gefiihle. Die Liebe, die Dankbarkeit, die
Resignation z.B. lassen sich oftmals dem sichtbaren Ausdruck entnehmen. Gleichwohl ist die Liebe
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selbst nichts Sichtbares, - womit gemeint ist, daß sie kein raum-zeitliches, körperliches Ding ist.
Aber sie ist selbst in dem, was sichtbar ist an ihr, sie tut sich kund und gibt sich in Gebärden und
Blicken, in der Intonation der Stimme, der Art des Sprechens und des Schweigens. Ich denke, es
wäre zu kurz gesehen, wenn wir hier lediglich davon sprechen wollten, daß sich die Liebe des
sinnlichen Ausdrucks als eines Mittels bedienen, sich in ein ihr an sich fremdes Medium
hineinbegeben Würde. Ein solches Verhältnis würde die Getrenntheit zweier Bereiche oder Sphären
voraussetzen, und die „an sich“ unsinnliche, unsichtbare Liebe würde in den anderen Bereich als ein
ihr Fremdes hineintreten, umsich vemehmbar zu machen. Gehören aber die tiefen Blicke und die
zärtlichen Gebärden nicht vielmehr der Liebe selbst zu? Ist sie nicht gerade in diesen sie selbst, nicht
mehr und nicht weniger als in der Zugeneigtheit der Gefühle sozusagen für sich genommen? Kann
es hier also überhaupt das Unsichtbare ohne das Sichtbare geben, und umgekehrt? Begegnet uns
nicht vielmehr das Unsichtbare auch und vielleicht vor allem im Sichtbaren? Ist nicht die
Sichtbarkeit ein Sichtbarwerden des Unsichtbaren selbst?
„Das Wesen des Bildes ist: etwas sehen zu lassen“, heißt es in „... dichterisch wohnet der Mensch
...“. (V.u.A., 200f.) Nach den „Bemerkungen zu Kunst Plastik Raum“ besteht aber gerade das
philosophische Denken in einem solchen Sehenlassen, „das das Wesenhafie der Dinge in den Blick
bringt“, „das Wesenhafie sichtbar“ macht (16). Als derart bildhaft sichtbannachendes ist das
denkerische Sagen an ihm selbst dichterisch oder dichterisch wohnend. Auch hier ist das Sichtbare
der Bilder nicht von ihrem Unsichtbaren zu trennen, das Sinnliche nicht vom Unsinnlíchen, das
Helle nicht vom Dunkel. „Das díchtende Sagen der Bilder versammelt Helle und Hall der
Himmelserscheinungen in Eines mit dem Dunkel und dem Schweigen des Fremden." (V.u.A., ib.)
Die Bildhafiigkeit des Sehenlassens und In-den-Blick-bringens ist nicht ohne das
Verborgenbleibende und Unsichtbare, ohne das Dunkel und das Geheimnis. So lesen wir in deıı
„Grundsätzen des Denkens": „Diese Dunkelheit ist vielleicht bei allem Denken jederzeit im Spiel.
Der Mensch kann sie nicht beseitigen. Er muß vielmehr lemen, das Dunkle als das Unumgängliche
anzuerkennen Das Dunkle behält das Lichte bei sich. Dieses gehört zu jenem.
Sterbliches
Denken muß in das Dunkel der Brunnentiefe sich hinablassen, um bei Tag den Stem zu sehen.“
(Grundsätze des Denkens, GA 79, 93)
IV. ZUR GLEICHZEITIGKBIT DES ANDEREN
„Ich glaube, man denkt viel gesünder, wenn die Gedanken aus umnittelbarer Berührung mit den
Dingen erwachsen“, schreibt van Gogh einmal an seinen Bruder. Adomo spricht von der Liebe zu
den Dingen, denen es gleichsam über das Haar zu streichen gelte, und von dem „langen und
gewaltlosen Blick auf den Gegenstand“. Die umnittelbare Berührung und das Über-das-Haan
streichen wahren jedoch auf geheimnisvolle Weise zugleich eine Distanz, die wir die Distanz des
Eigenseins des Anderen nennen kömien. Merkwürcligerweise vermögen wir die Dinge nur zu
berühren und wirklich gewaltlos zu erblicken, wenn wir ihnen zugleich nicht bemächti gend auf den
Leib rücken, wenn wir ihnen ihre eigene Dunkelheit, ihr Geheimnis, ihre Feme lassen.
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Ich denke, das geht in die selbe Richtung, die Heidegger meint, wenn er vom In-die-Nähekommen zum Fernen spricht, oder davon, daß die Lauterkeit des Dunklen gewahrt werden muß,
wenn das Sichtbare und Lichte aus seiner Dunkelheit und Unsichtbarkeit heraus anerkannt werden
soll. Es ist u.a. diese - der im Sichtbaren selbst liegenden Herkunft aus dem Unsichtbaren
entsprechende - Wahrung der Distanz, die das bildhafie Denken ums Ganze verschieden sein läßt
vom vorstellenden, rechnenden und messenden Denken. Distanz, Fremdsein, Andeısheit, Ferne das alles ist ausgeschlossen, wenn einerseits eine ständige Verfügbarkeit und Bestellbarkeít,
andererseits eine universale Berechenbarkeit und damit auch Vergleichbarkeit von allem mit allem
gewährleistet sein soll. Dem bildhafien Denken kommt wesenhaft eine Vieldeutigkeit und ein
Offenlassen zu, gerade weil es seine Sache nicht „in die Zugänglichkeit zerrt“, dem Sichtbaren
vielmehr die Freiheit läßt, sein Unsichtbares jeweils so oder anders oder gar nicht zu zeigen, es z.B.
im Unsichtbaren zu belassen, indem es sich in dem Bild geradezu versteckt. Das Rätselhaftbleiben
der Sache ist dann keine bedauerliche und zu ihrem Überschreiten herausfordernde Grenze des
Erkenntnisvermögens oder der technischen Reproduzierbarkeit, sondem es ist Zeugnis eines tieferen
und víelschichtigeren Geschehens zwischen dem Menschen und seiner Welt, das sich nicht linear
und gleichflârmig abrufen und modellieren läßt.
Der Charakter der Uniformität, Globalität und - mit Marcuse gesagt- Eindimensionalität, der
dem technologisch-wissenschafilichen Erfassen eigen ist, negiert in direkter Weise den qualitativen
Eigensínn des Begegnenden. Der Krug hört auf, Krug zu sein, wenn er wissenschaftlich als ein
Hohlraum gesetzt wird, „in dem sich Flüssigkeit ausbreitet“ (Das Ding, V.u.A., 168). Er wird
geradezu als Krug, wie Heidegger sagt, „vernichtet“. In diesem Negieren und diesem Vemichten
aber liegt, daß der Krug etwas anderes ist, daß der ausschenkende oder autbewahrende Umgang mit
ilun, weil er ist, jederzeit möglich ist, sobald wir uns auf ihn und sein Hier- und Jetztsein einlassen.
Unsere Tage mögen heute ofimals keine Muße mehr haben, die uns erlaubte, ihn wahrhañ in der
Hand zu Fühlen und das Ausschenken sinnlich-leiblich zu vollziehen. Aber daß wir zu eilig, zu
zerstreut, zu angespannt sind, heißt nicht, daß uns sein Geheirnnisvolles grundsätzlich verstellt wäre,
geschweige demi, daß es uns noch nie erreicht hätte. Wir wüßten nicht, wie ein Krug faßt, wir
veımöchten das Wort „Krug“ nicht sinnvoll zu sagen, wenn eine Welt, in der es zum Beispiel Krüge
gibt, uns Heurigen prirızipiell verschlossen wäre.
In Bezug auf die Welt, in der es Krüge, Brücken, Häuser, Tünne, Wälder gibt - um hier nur
solche Dinge zu nemıen, auf die Heidegger selbst in verwandten Zusammenhängen zu sprechen
kommt -, erscheint es mir nicht nachvollziehbar, inwiefern sie in eine unbestimmbare Zukunft
verlegt werden sollten. Warum besteht Heidegger - obgleich er doch zugleich, gleichsam
unbekümmert um die theoretisch betonte Ungleichzeitigkeit, mannigfache Erläuterungen über
Gelassenheit, über eine „Übung(,) gewissermaßen des Sehens im Denken“ (GA 16, 589), über das
Erblicken, das erhört, über das Sichtbarmachen des Wesenhafien gibt -immer wieder so eindringlich
darauf, daß das andere Denken eines Anderen nur vorbereitend sein, daß ein anderer Weltaufenthalt
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nur in der Zukunft wirklich werden könne? Ist es, weil er nur so an dem strikten

Entsprechungscharalaer des Denkens festhalten kann, an der Überzeugung also, daß dem heutigen
Menschen „eine höhere Möglichkeit des Daseins“ nur anderswoher, nämlich „aus der Gunst des
Seins“ (Bd.16, 743) geschenkt werden könne?
Es geht nicht darum, Heidegger eine Inkonsistenz, gar eine Widersprüchlichkeit seines Denkens
vorzuhalten. Vielmehr meine ich, daß sein Denken seine fruchtbare Spannung u.a. gerade daran hat,
daß es weit entfemt davon, eine Einheitlichkeit und in sich schlüssige Systematik aufzuweisen in einer solchen Weise durch die Landschaft der Welt geht, daß es von unterschiedlichen
Wegpunkten aus unterschiedliche Perspektiven sichtbar macht, unterschiedliche Maßstäbe anwendet,
unterschiedliche Dinge in den aufmerkenden Blick faßt. Wir sollten Heideggers Denken nicht als
ein unveränderliches, prophetisches Wort verstehen und behandeln. Wie alles Denken ist auch seines
als ein j eweiliger Vorschlag zum gemeinsamen Verstehen und Bereden zu nehmen. Halten wir uns
den Blick frei von falscher Ehrfurcht gegenüber dem Denker und gegenüber bestimmten seiner
Werke, so mag sich zeigen, daß Heidegger zu einer gewissen Zeit seines späteren Denkens einen
besonders ausgreifenden Schritt in eine erstaunlich neue Gegend getan hat, ohne im Folgenden die
Notwendigkeit zu sehen, eine systematische Verknüpfung der früheren Einsichten mit den später
gewonnenen vorzunehmen, so daß er beide nebeneinander bestehen ließ.
Vielleicht sind der seinsgeschichtliche Schritt zurück und das erblickende Weltdenken tatsächlich
zwei in einer geschichtlichen Schwellensituation wie der unseren nebeneinander mögliche und
notwendige Weisen der philosophierenden Auseinandersetzung mit dem, was ist; dann aber sollten
wir dieses Nebeneinander auch anerkennen. Es könnte allerdings auch sein, daß der Mut und die
Gelassenheit, uns Menschen tatsächlich ein Wohnen auf der Erde und unter dem Himmel zuzumuten
- miteinander und in einer Dimension der Sichtbarkeit des Unsichtbaren uns zu der Einsicht
-,
ñihren könnte, daß es sich in der Tat, wie Hölderlin sagt, „mit ihnen“, d.h. mit uns selbst „wendet“,
so daß wir das vorbereitende Erwarten einer geschicklichen „Gunst des Seins“
aufgeben könnten.
Freiburg Um'vers1'ta`t
-«
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As technology today comes to be ever more identical with reality in general, we face a condition of
“reality” which is patently indebted to the world-constitutive function of scientific knowledge (with
its emphasis on the species of natural - or “physical” - science, to the extent that this mode of
i.e. the
scientific thought has consequently all but absorbed its former antagonist, the “moral”,
human sciences). The self-dissolution or melting into one as it were, of these traditional antitheses
appears inescapably to mark the ultimate peak of modemity. What used to appear to be nature turns
out now to be a social construction of sirnulacra - or technologically generated “fictions.” Nature,
we are assured, does not exist. All-of this, we believe, could not have been foreseen during the first
half of the 20* century, when, during and subsequent to World War I, Heidegger and many others
encountered technology as a “planetary” problem. It is this coincidence of nature and technology
that surely constitutes the most revolutionary aspect of the world-change we are currently
undergoing. And yet, we are at the same time reminded of a passage in Plato, one which is precisely
adduced by Heidegger in the course of his own enquiring after technology: “Everything that is
responsible [aitia] for creating something out of nothing is a kind of poetry.” (Symp. 205b)] Faced
with such a coincidence between physis and poiesis, (which Heidegger will praise as “Greek”), we
might well sunnise that our most recent technological revolutions are but the perfection of Platonist
metaphysics: nature finally recognized as illusion, as simulacrum. To that extent, Heidegger's
question as a task of thinking the nexus between science qua “modem natural science” (reasongiving: logos) and technology does not involve us in the old cliché of Romanticism: of Immediacy
Lost and Regained. Much rather could one claim, perhaps with a touch of exaggeration, that
Heidegger remains ever indifferent to the past as such, a Pauline fiıturist or esehatologist throughout
- a
disposition that seems in paradoxical contrast to his insistent recourse to the Ancients, to “the
Greeks”. To explore this apparent paradox with respect to the “essence” of technology is the goal
V

ı

of what follows.

1.
1

I

I

lt is surely not difficult to concede that in the last 250 years of Western history (i.e., since the First
Industrial Revolution) there has been a crucial link between modern science and technology: since
the beginning of the world of machines, that is, the beginning of “modern technology.”2 But
Heidegger°s more specific point is that the priniple of sufficient reason, as embodied in Leibniz'
thought, is to be recognized as that which transpires today (having only today become visible in its
unfolding), constituting as it were the metaphysical ground of our still (and especially)

“metaphysically” informed present. Heidegger”s anti-historicist question thus intends to be an
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anamnesis of the present and its aetiology. It is precisely in the reason-giving principle that Leibniz
refers us back to Plato's Socrates and to his paradigm of the only life worth living: one that is

-perpetually examined and controlled by logon didonai (Apol. 23). Thus the relevant time lag would
actually intensy - and it will increase further. And yet the whole idea of a chronological sequence
might seem misconceived, for the very point of Heidegger's ananmesis is that technology is not at
all an independent entity to be set over against metaphysics or theory. Technology, such is the thesis,
is to be found qua "practice"precisely at the core, and as the core, of metaphysics itself. Hence, part
of Heidegger°s anamnesis will be to ascribe to the principle of sufficient reason-giving what he calls
an “incubation period” of no less than 2,300 years.3 What thus breaks out like a disease (or like the
brooding of an egg) has thus been prepared over the course of a very long era. “Older” than
technology, in any event, is the “essence” of teclmics, which holds sway not only in modern science,
but in European science as such Thus we may say that this essence as it reigns today to the extent
precisely that it is itself nothing technological - is what began to rise 2,300 years ago: that is, in
Heidegger's sense, metaphysics..
Is the principle of reason then to be qualified as a disease? Once again, we are reminded of
Socrates who famously professes, a moment before his death, to owe a rooster to the healing god
Asclepius. Is theniSocrates' ever-examined life of logon didonaz' that very disease? What has this
to do with Socrates' kind of open-ended questioning that might well be called the piety of his
thought? Is logon dídonaı' a condition, a factor, or the heart of the disease? Is the history of thinking
or metaphysics the history of nihilism? In such anamnesis, would there not be, once again, a
normative implication of nostalgia for a painless, pre-nihilistic state of “health'? But we should in
any case be careful with our metaphors - and With the Pavlovia.n reflexes they are liable to provoke.
A few things seem initially plausible - even before we begin to reflect on those 2,300 years:
l. What does it profit a physician nostalgically to wish away a “disease” that awaits diagnosis?
2. In Heidegger's incubation time the Pre-Socratics are conspicuously included: 2,300 years counted
backwards from Leibniz' 1700 AI). necessarily lead to 600 B.C.; hence not even the Seven Sages
would be able to escape the verdict. 3. The notion of “disease” itself is historically conditioned,
depending upon how an age or culture defines health. To Heideggefs mind, this at is perfectly clear,
bringing him closer to Ludwik Fleck than to Sigmund Freud: perhaps not a useless remark here, as
mention will presently be made of King Oedipus. On the other hand, it is Husserl who envisages the
genealogy of modemity as pathogenesis, cuhninating as we know in a "crisis" not of science alone
but of modern life (or “European humanity”) in generalf' What distinguishes Heidegger, then, is his
mode of recourse to antiquity. The Greek questioning experience and the essence of technology how then are they to be conceived to hang together? And how are We to understand the “plague”,
the disease that haunts Thebes at the beginning of Sophocles's most famous tragedy?
~

Heideggefs questioning is guided by an observation which he shares, incidentally, with a number
of other thinkers on metaphysics. The concept of philosophy - traditionally metaphysics is itself
~
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preconditioned, at least since Plato and Aristotle, by an idea of “knowing” (or scientia) which is in
tum shaped by a model of production, as typically embodied in Socrates” frequent references to
artisans while inquiring after rechne: thus production as “manufacture” (Handwerk is Heidegger`s
German term) and further, in Roman and Christian metamorphosis, as “creation" (with reference
here to a creator)5. The Greek term for this is poiesis. Its correlate is rechne as the knowledge which
is liable to become synonymous with all epísteme in Plato: cognition or knowing in general, i.e.,
the noetic relationship to entities as such.“ But as “knowing,” it is the very sphere constituted by
traditional rationalityt “reason” steınming from the Latin ratio or, in Greek, logos. In its sphere, then,
the traditional plurality of those knowing modes (the technai) comes to be subsumed under the one
heading of rechne. It further ensues, according to Heidegger, that above all it is in what seems to be
its very opposite, namely contemplation or theoria, that the model of knowing as fabrication
(poı'esı`s) achieves its sovereignty,
What thus emerges is the question specific to the later Heidegger, intertwined with the problems
of die Kehre, the “turning” in the nineteen-thirties, with reference to poetry, to the critical battle
around and against Nietzsche-' (very much including Jüngerian recrudescences, the Will to Power
having transformed itself, through the Gestalt of the worker, into the Will to Will).And arising in
the midst of all this is the idea of “planetary technology” where Heidegger reinforces and/or
abandons the philosophical project of restituting or restoring the sciences -that is, the university
-to a lost or obscured “essential ground,” and thereby first completing metaphysics. As this is also
the context of I-Iei_degger”s political disaster, it is clear that there is room for a number of serious
questions, which would center on the issue of Heideggefis insight conceming National Socialism
as opponent or embodiment of planetary technology, before and after 1938. This would be the
insight, philosophically speaking, regarding “metaphysics” which represents itself as the problem,
not the solution. And that is how technology comes to appear as the basic trait or structure of
metaphysícs itself. It is therefore a strikingly contemporary interest that inspires Heidegger to turn
to a renewed anarnnesis “of the Greeks” in order to lay bare the core of technology.
This of course involves the further issue of the form and fashion of our own Heidegger exegesis.
It is clear that were we pledged, consciously or not, to a research model of the philosophy of
technology (qua assembling expert knowledge and infonnation data concerning technology), a
Heidegger would have little to teach us: and least of all by distinguishing technology from its
“essence_”. Not only has he no ethics, even worse, he has no logic - and no physics either. Thus, and
in particular, our perspective would not be disturbed by self-critical afflictions and suspicions,
suggesting, e.g., that in so thinking we might simply re-iterate what Heidegger, it is to be hoped with
an eye to his own Machtrausch, calls “busy-ness” (Betrieb). In that case, we would not reflect upon
but merely exemplify the expert°s hysteron proteron of confusing the problem with the solution, just
as it happened to the problem-solving hero Oedipus Who had to mistake the Theban plague as an
outside “tl1ing” or research object to be investigated. Yet what remains most interesting therein may
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be the fact that Heidegger, while still endeavoring to teach “metaphysics” in 1935, describes this
very Oedipus, crushed between the assault of appearance and the advent of truth in his furious search
for identity, as the exemplary “Greek” Dasein: “we must see him as the embodiment of Greek beingthere, who most radically and wildly asserts its fundamental passion, the passion for disclosure of
being, i.e. the struggle for Being itself.”8 Here indeed the connection between the “Greek” and the
catastrophic procedure of Oedipus° expert questioning rechne seems immediately to point to the nonapparent “chal1enge” which Heidegger will attempt to think as the essence of technology.

2.
The crucial aspect of the Heideggerian inquiry will tum out to be that the state of the world and the
state of language are one and the same and this is precisely what is expressed by the problem of
logos. In principle, therefore, the question as to the essence of technology becomes ever more
identical with the problem of an originary creation or production, as a constitutively "Greek" poiesis
in contrast with, and obstructed by, the traditional metaphysical model of production. (The same
constellation likewise explains Heidegger°s ongoing preoccupation with the poets, further extending
well into the 1980s in the form shape of Hans-Georg Gadamer”s belated self-critical musings on
poetry.) The essence of technology according to Heidegger thus expresses a lack of, or a retreat from,
or a refusal of a world. In that sense, if the task of thinking be to conceive this refusal “as such” (in
terms of the knowing, techne, as essentíally related topoiesís), the state of the world then appears
by definition as “unpoetic.” Now the term Heidegger introduces for this world-state is, of course,
the notoriously provocative term: Ge-stell, usually rendered as “enfi'aming” or “setting-upon“, with
connotations of trapping or entrapping. It may accordingly be assumed that as the name for
technology's essence, Ge-stell must also be the fonnula for the question of how to distinguish
technology from this essence, to the extent that, as a definition of this essence, it is contrasted with
potests in the originary or Greek sense. In Heideggerian terms, then, there is implied a reciprocity
or coincidence of an experience of language and of Being, proximally corresponding to the Greek
versus the modem era (as explanans vs. explanandum). Less obvious and in the background, as it
were, there is also in Stellen a crucial reference to the ancient Greek thesis, the counterpart ofphysís,
and thus to the nature-culture dyad, famous since the sophists and Aristotle, and recalling, via the
“thetic” activity of rechne in bringing things to stand (i.e., to be), the distinction between the
"positive"and the “natural” in the Western tradition.9 To capture this proximity, which will presently
be recognized to imply the Ge-stell as the self-desisting Fourfold, it would seem tempting to render
Ge-stell by the term “Sistence.”1° More remarkably, however, Ge-stell would seem to possess a
polemic edge against Emst Jünger”s Gestalt of the worker," signalizing the same epochal signature
or state of affairs _ namely, the “total mobilization” or Will to Will- in a contrasting light.“
This should serve as rough characterization of I-Ieideggefs point of departure for his- inquiry
conceming technology. Here, one might still have the impression that much of this talk about
“world” and world~refusal looks frighteningly familiar: the good, poetic, ancients versus the bad,
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world-deprived, technological moderns, exactly as romantic cliché would paint its nostalgia for
Greece. It is all the more striking, however, if, as documented by one of Heidegger°s seminars held
at Le Thor as late as 1969, we should then find the thinker still emphasizing what he terms the
_ an assertion
“fundamentally un-poetic nature-of the interpretation of language by the Greeks”
that appears to border on the paradoxical (the Greeks being, of course, the poetic nation par
excellence) as long as We do not raise the question: what - or better: who - does Heidegger mean
by the Greeks? What does “poetic” mean here? (What does the Greek interpretation of language have
to do with the Greek experience of Being?) What would a more "poetic" interpretation look like?
All these aspects will turn out to have to do with Heidegger°s treatment of logos.
_

3,

i
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.
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A first step towards characterizing the paradox would seem to reside in the assumption that what is
meant is the Greeks° philosophy, qua philosophy, that carries and embodies this “un-poetic”
interpretation (whereupon Aristotle, for example, could only be seen as the one who rehabilitated
the poets banished by Plato): philosophy as such would be at stake _ to the extent that it adopted
in its entirety the epistemic model of production or manufacture as described earlier. Entities as
physis, composed of fonn and matter, reduced thereby to thesis (that is, to a product of work) and
negating the genuinely natural, physical character of standing and growing in itself. Aristotle, to be
sure, does distinguish between the two kinds of “mov'ement”, the natural and the cultural. But as the
ontological conception of the thing as ensemble of matter and form (or possibility and actualíty) is
retained, this continue to serve to reaffinn the demiurgic or poietic model of thinking and knowing.
(And it is against Aristotle's dichotomy of entities that Heidegger had evoked the unitary Platonic
thought of physis as itself the highest poiesisl)
Hence the paradox persists: Greek philosophy would thus be unpoetic precisely owing to its
manufacturing or poietic paradigm. At any rate, this “manufacturing of knowledge” is both
technological and ancient, i.e., “Greek”. The consequence becomes obvious in the problem of
language and its Greek interpretation, which is the problem of logos. As Heidegger explains in
1969, it is the reduction of aletheia to the field of legein (in the sense of speech, as verbum dlcendí)
which characterizes the Greek inception from its begimiing, ”always already, in advance”, i.e., ever
since Homer's epic language: this is What constitutes the “unpoetic” interpretation of language, in
view precisely ofthe fact that there is, according to Heideggefs conviction, no higher-ranking poetic
practice than that of the Greeks.l3 Thus it is indeed in the legein itself that the unpoetic comes to be
founded. At Le Thor, for once directly criticizing Aristotle's Poetícs, Heidegger still adds (or
perhaps has a participant add) a quotation of an apophthegm once uttered in conversation by
Stéphane Mallarmé: "poetry has entirely lost its course since the great Homeric aberration” A gloss
he leaves unexplained, advising the reader to meditate upon its implications. But it is clear that, at
this point in Heidegger's reasoning, logos itself, in order to be freed from its metaphysical reduction
to the apophantic and semantic, must be envisaged in terms of a more originary, “more Greek” and
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hence more “poetic” meaning of legein, and that the obvious locus of such an attempt must be the
exemplary thinking of logos, in Heraclitus.
Thus in the Western tradition, “reason” and “language” are brought to hang together in logos, and
that is why logos must be at the core of I-Ieidegger°s sustained reflection on the essence of
technology: that is: Ge-Stell or "Sistence”, as this essence, determined by its contrast with the
"world"that it refuses or of which it constitutes the self-desisting event. Its counterpart will then be
Heidegger's vision of that world in describing which he regresses, according to some comınentators,
into archaicizing mythology: the famous Geviert, the Fourfold, as the structure of the world formed
by the interdependent, linseparable, resonating tetrad of “regions”: divinities and mortals, sky and
earth. The essence of the entity or the thing, as obliterated and left unthought by Plato as well as
Aristotle (both spell-bound by the pattern of production) and thereby a priori annihilated by science,
is now conceived as that Which hosts or assembles the Fourfold, reminiscent of “thı'ng” in Old High
German, meaning “assemb1y” (as °cause' or “matter` of dispute, or “council”).
In such apparent mythologizing, the suspicion of escapism and irrationalism is naturally bound
to arise; and we seem to be back precisely to that romantic and nostalgic picture of a lost unity of
the world. Are we then dealing with a new philosophy of Ur-Gemt'itlı`chkez`t, as a sharp tongue commented regarding one of Heideggefs lectures? Yet it is also and interestingly tnıe that such a
perfectly sober mind as that of the Prussian statesman, designer of the very notion of the liberal arts
and theorist of language, Wilhelm von Humboldt, will find, a century earlier, surprisingly
Heideggerian terms for describing the “assembling” bent of the Greek mind: “when choosing an
object,” he writes, “they always take together [compare legei], as much as possible, the tenninal
points of all spiritual existence, heaven and earth, gods and humans, vaulting them in the idea of fate
[Geschick] as keystone.” One could surely sunnise a common, probably Platonic, source for this
coincidence between von Humboldt and Heidegger, which may in fact come somewhat
unexpectedly.l4 Hence in all of this there may be rather less irrational mysticism than much more
structural thinking. But how are
to go about expounding and clarifying the problem of the
refused “world” in what looks like a welter of paradox and contradictions, where Heidegger in
addiion attempts to think much more rigorously and radically than Humboldt, the enlightened
humaníst? Together, Enfiaming and the F ourfold signify the unity of language and world - the
“assembling” which is the more originary meaning of logos (to be dis-covered). The relevant and
problernatic aspect thereof (which is precisely that of production or poiesis as the_“un-poetic”) would
now seem to contain the problem of Enframing as the essence of technology, accessible by means
of elucidating “the Greeks”, that is, the Greek experience of language alone. More precisely still, the
“unpoetic” (derivative, semantic logos) is the specific character which distinguishes the “world”
(Fourfold) in its own, Self-obstructing essence, as Eníraming or Sistence. With this in mind, let us
return to Heidegger's essay, “The Question Conceming Technology" itself, the scene of which was
.
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a meeting of the Bavarian Academy of the Fine Arts in 1953, where Heidegger°s lecture followed
on the heels of an address by Wemer Heisenberg.

I

i

107

l

1

1

e

l

\

ı
I

1

<

A

4.
is
its
Crucial to Heidegger's Munich lecture
point of departure in the thesis described above,
according to which the essence of technology is nothing technological, which he proceeds to
explicate by examining the “instrumental,” that is, analysing the means/end relation defıning the
instrumental comportment - of hqmofaber, as Hannah Arendt would later call it - and by ranging
it within causality. In modem science, as we know, what is constitutive is thought to be the very
opposite: i.e., the presumptive elimination of all teleological elements. Heidegger, for his part,
claims that the whole sphere of causality remains obscure precisely in that the instrumental
(especially as regards technology's finality) is defined in modern terms by “efficient causality” alone
as the sole admissible model of causality. Heidegger first refers to the traditional system of four
causes (out of which structure modern thought subsequently isolates a single effective cause),
raising questions such as: Whence the four causes? And how do they belong together? But then,
taking a further step, he even declares that ancient thought is ignorant of efficient causality, given
that there is not even a Greek word for it (either in Aristotle or elsewhere).15
Greek production does not effect an object through subjectivity; as an example, Heidegger
demonstrates this Greek character by analysing making of a silver chalice, a sacrificial vessel, as it
turns out, by a silversmith. (This silversmith may also be read as a critical - if not self-critical - echo
to the famous hammer-using artisan of Being and Tı'me°s analytic of Dasein.) With regard to
Heidegger°s example, we may recall that naturally the silver (as hyle) and the “aspect” (eídos) of
“chaliceness” represent material and fonnal causes. There remains a third that above all is
“responsible” (aition) for the sacıificial vessel by circumscribing the chalice as belonging within the
reahn of consecration: the end, telos, or final cause, which completes the entity by assigning it the
bounds of its sphere - not its purpose. The silversmith, the fourth paıticipant in the responsibility
for the finished vessel, is what he is not as eflicient cause: “the Aristotelian doctrine,” says
Heidegger, “neither knows the cause that is named by this term nor uses a Greek Word that would
correspond to it." What the silversmith does is to deliberate [überlegen] and to gather [versammeln]
the three causes previously mentioned. Deliberation, Überlegen, says Heidegger, is in Greek legeín,
logos: It is due to this logos of the silversmith that and how those first three modes of aitíon come
into appearance and into play.
Three points may strike us in this account of the making of the chalice. First, the denial of an
efficient cause (even of a Greek equivalent tenrı), which would, if unconditionally accepted,
facilitate a sharp distinction between Greek - namely, in this case, Aristotelian - and modern.
However, the texts yield a different impression: for not only does Aristotle know of such a cause,
the name that he has for it is exactly “the efficient", understood as the poietic: to poı`etı`k0n.1°
Second, the artisan°s doing - poieín - is, so to speak, absorbed in the assembling, legein; thus it
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seems that, for Heidegger, Sheer “deliberation” brings about the accomplished vessel. In other words,
logos (the deliberation exhibiting the artisan°s techne) and poiesis become here identical in that logos
is stripped of its usual meaning “to say” or “to te1l,” in favor of assernbling or “laying”, which will
turn out to be the more originary sense of logos - and poiesis as Well - that Heidegger had sought.
(It could also be observed that logos and poiesís further coincide with physis, nature, with the help
of the quotation from Plato directed by Heidegger against the conventional distinction, going back
to the Sophists and Aristotle, between natural and cultural or “positive” beings.)
The correlate of this latter fusion of logosáooiesís is our main interest for the present consideration
of "world" (language and Being) in the later Heidegger: the example of the silversmith°s production
shows on closer inspection that the play of the four causes is in fact derived as steınıning from and
as being a concretization of the Fourfold. Conversely, the Fourfold constitutes an elaboration of the
doctrine of the four causes in the way Heidegger is known to rethink (in terms of the “unthought”)
loci of ancient tradition in a “more Greek” way. To put this in other terms: Heidegger's idea of the
Fourfold is not derived from Hölderlin, as, for example, Reiner Schürmann and others have
assumed,'7 but rather from Aristotle. As sky and earth stand for and deepen form and matter, silver
and chaliceness, as the telos of scrificial libation leads to the divinities, the region of the rnortals then
must be the speciñc site of the poietikon, the poetic: in their very act of “assembling,” by
deliberationz logos.“ So conceived, the fourfold structure becomes concinnous with the equally
Aristotelian key thought of the essay, namely the truth-character of technology as alerheuein, in
using which Heidegger reaches back to his reception of the Nicomachean Ethics thirty years earlier.
As the Fourfold constitutes the stıucture or harmony of the world precisely as refused and
silenced by Enfiaming or Sistence, í.e., by the essence of technology, it is what Heidegger's anam.ne~
sis of the Greek inception aims at. Thus in such a retrieval of “the Greeks” - that is: of Aristotle
the un-poetic nature of the essence of technology now accurately echoes the poietic structure of the
Aristotelian Fourfold. The poietic doing of the mortals in assembling “things,” their legeín, clearly
shows the parallel: just Enframing is nothing else than selildesisting Fourfold, so techno, by now
amounting to “Greek” knowing in its entirety (in light of Plato), is essentially ohliterated and
likewise manifested by the poietic-unpoetic mode of disclosing that is technology”s truth.
.

~

as

5.
There yet remains the riddle of the unpoetic interpretation of language Which we seem now in a
position to pose more adequately. The further tum to logos in Heidgger”s reflection not as signifying
“speech” but something more primordial, leads us one step further back (or ahead) to the prePlatonic Greeks. lt is especially in his essay “Logos ( Heraclitus, Fragment B 50)” that Heidegger
expounds the allegedly original meaning of legein and logos as presupposed in 'the silversmith
parable: “laying,” or laying-before as letting-lie: this very tum from speech to layíng constitutes the
locus where, according to Heidegger, there flashes up the “unthought” essence of language (and
“world” alike; that is, the “middle” of the Fourfold as Sage). Correspondingly, he comments on what
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isfor us to envision as the unthought in the Greek inception: “had this beginning not safeguarded
what has been, i.e., the gathering of what still endures, the Being of beings would not now govern
from out ofthe essence ofmodern technology. Through technology the entire globe is now embraced
and held fast in a kind of Being experienced in Western fashion and represented on the
epistemological models of European metaphysics and science.”19 Metaphysics and science are
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declared to be based upon the resulting conception of language as tool or organ (glossa, “tongue°)
and as “signifying voice,” phone semantíke (fiom semainein, to mean). By contrast, this flashing up
of the primordial unthought essence of language took place in Heraclitus's use of the word logos.
But this flash was extinguished abruptly so as to obliterate logos in the sense of primordial “laying”
And hence Heidegger°s point is that this “laying” is to be recognized as the originary experience of
language: “saying”, Sage, which must therefore be thoughtr as the middle of the Fourfold (Where
it also-appears as Fate-or Destining, Geschick, with an echo of moíra in Parmenides).
Of the vast field of questions here, I shall only be concerned to address that aspect of logos as it
relates to Aristotle in transcending him. With the extinction of the flash, logos is set on its way to
become ratio; it will proceed to become, in an ever-renewed application of the fonn-matter scheme,
the human faculty of autonomous reasoning or “logic” as opposed to (“positive”) revelatíon.
Meanwhile, it becomes proposition, then concept, ultimately it becomes the word, verbum. Thus
11Heidegger would seem to maintain that logos, to the very extent that it took on the meaning of
“speech, obscures the more original meaning of laying-out (lesende Lege: something like “col-lective
layout”). This would be precisely the genesis of the now familiar “unpoetic”,interpretation of
language, «while - With the advent of the “semantic voice” - the unity of World and language in
originary poiesis falls into oblivion and refusal. Henceforth, in Enframing or Sistence the world
speaks only in its concealment. It is important to note that it is this meaning of laying that Heidegger
has in mind when he renders logos by Sage, saying, as the contrary of speech further to be elaborated
as the “ringing of silence“. (Another aspect of theisaying-laying relation will be mentioned in a
moment.) Conversely, Sage is not by any means “myth” as some comrnentators have believed.2°
In order to measure the enduring presence of Aristotle in all this, while tıying at the same time
to elucidate the advent of the “semantic voice” as the incisive moment in the history of logos, it may
be useful briefly to recall Heraclitus's famous fragment 93 (DK) regarding the diction of Apolline
prophesying. It is familiar to all of us, e.g., in Marcovich's translation: “The Lord whose is the oracle
in Delphi neither speaks (legei) nor conceals, but gives a sign (semainez').” Heidegger quotes it
repeatedly, since the wording beautifully confinns his main point since Being and Tíme: apophantic
“disc1osing” (or, “de-claring”, with an allusion to Charles Kah_n”s rendering) as here the sense of
legein is made evident in opposition to cryptic “concealment.”21 But what about the opposition itself,
and what about the semainein? Even without intending an overall analysis in our present context,
two problems may yet be observed to cohere in this received interpretation (which dates as far back
as Plutarch;22 and, as we recall, Plutarch was himself a Delphic priest): the meaning of semaínein,
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on the one hand, together with the meaning of the “neither - nor” opposition on the other, both
seeming to center upon the problem of “signifying” (hinting) as the presumptive activity of the
oracle. It is to be understood that for commentators from Antiquity, Heraclitus is usually taken to
be referring to his own philosophie discourse (logosl), either metaphorically or by comparing it more
or less favorably with the oracle. Thus in the usual understanding of the Delphic way of giving a sign
(itself famously ambiguous) is implied something like a scale of transparency between the extremes
of total lucídity and total opacity, where logos, taken as revealing opposed to concealment, would
iind its place on the side of lucidity, so that the sign itself comes to stand in the middle: that is, in
a chiaroscuro midpoínt asa fragile measure between those two extremes.23 In other words, what we
find is Aristotle's conception of the mean (meson).
Now, if it were to be accepted that this idea of a moderated mean or middle, between the extremes
of concealing and revealing, constitutes but a retrojection of an Aristotelian schema onto the
fragment (hereby implying a kind of semantically ambiguous twilight as essential to Pythian
sayings), the question would still remain with regard to an earlier meaning ofsemainei. This is not
the place to attempt an alternate reading of the fragment according to which the “neither - nor”
would refer not to a scale of degrees or valeurs of light and darkness but to a qualitative antithesis,
in keeping with other occunences ofthe neither/nor in Heraclítus. It may be thought, however, that,
if anywhere, it is in this Heraclitean saying that something like the “Greek interpretation of
language” is to be found and examined as to its poetic or non-poetic character. The crucial point of
such a reading would be to emphasize that the lord of Delphi does not declare or “lay open” in the
mode of legein at all (not even halfway) - not implying as necessary that twilight ambiguity which
is a trait of only some of his sayings (for a counter-example here we may recall, in Aeschylus's
Oresteia, the exactly unambiguous Delphic command that Orestes kill his own mother).24 With
regard to the meaning of semaínein, “to indicate,” it could be argued that its meaning is closer to
“instruction” by imperative, giving orders, for instance, indicating where to go for a departing
colony.25 In addition, as semainein is a technical tenn of mantic and prophetic terminology, to say
that the lord of the oracle indicates, semaineí, would hardly seem for Heraclitus to be a surprising
claim but to amount much rather to a tautology. The otherwise inevitable lack of equilibrium
(semainei must balance anax) would point to the previous part of the sentence, i.e., once more to the
problematic neither/nor and to the “does not lay open” (oute legei). Thus we might be led to
improvise a rendering such as, “The ruler who possesses the oracle-chasm at Delphi neither lays
open nor conceals but gives orders.“ If, on principle, the oracle does not “tell” in the way of logos,
then surely this would encourage enquiring into the Greek interpretation of language beyond logos
(or, more precisly, beyond the Aıistotelian fixations of both logos and semainein) - all the more so
if we recall that the oracles were delivered in Verse: in hexameters, like Homer's (unless, with
Mallanné in mind, this were to be put inversely), that is, poetically.
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HEIDEGGERI LOGOS AND THE BSSENCE OF TECHNOLOGY
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It is 'from this pivotal point of the Greek interpretation of language (i.e.,- the experience of
Parmenides and Heraclitus
language and of Beingl) that the question of logos in Greek philosophy in
could be reopened. We might expect that it is precisely to the “question conceming technology,”
with its identity of Fourfold and Enfiaming, that such renewed analysis of the limits of logos would
return: and this would then seem to fonn a new chapter in the history of the oddly timeless influence
of Heraclitus on Hölderlin and Hegel, on Nietzsche and Heidegger. Heraclitus, in his vehement
opposi-tion to Homer: after having spoken of the “great Homeric aberration”, in a sequel not
mentioned by Heidegger, Mallarmé replies to the interlocutor°s question, “Before Homer, what?”:

ı
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i

“Oıpheus.”
6.
In that sense, there is shed more light on the decisive instant -when, according to Heidegger, the
flashlike appearance of logos as saying - i.e., as laying - in Heraclitus was immediately obliterated
and obscured so asto set metaphysics on its way: the instant when, through the shift from laying to
speech in logos, precisely the unpoetic interpretation of language arises, while primordíal rechne and
poiesis are seen retreating into the unthought, in favor of the incubation of modem technology. That
is, exactly when logos caıne to designate the experience of language to the very extent that it became
the occidental ratio or calculative reason. This instant is in Aristotle, or as we carı further narrow
it: in the very opening plırases of De ínterpretatione.“ What makes the interpretation of language
ultimately unpoetic would be the idea of symbols of mental experience as sensual articulation of
sentence meaning, in the “semantic voice” (phone semantike), where semainein first appears as we
know it, as signifying. By the same token, logos becomes well-ordered, calculative “telling” - it
becomes concept, proposition, and at the same time “reason,” the thinking faculty of the rational
animal, a shift that allegedly dates back to Parmenides (fr. 7,5 DK). At last, on the other hand, logos
then appears as- the Word, once again, after 600 years, in Heraclitus°s town of Ephesus on the coast
of Asia Minor, in the writings of the fourth Evangelist. All the While, the self-obstruction of the
"world" prepares itself, toward its manifestation as Ge-stell after 2,300 years.
All of this may then be duly regarded as an exposition of Heidegger's claim in the Heraclitus
essay as already cited: “Had this beginning not safeguarded what has been [das Gewesene] i.e., the
gathering of what still endures, the Being of beings would not now govem from out of the essence
of modern technology." Here, the essence of modern technology, the enframing mode of “sisting”
and entrapping entities, precisely in its unpoetic character (reduced to causcı eflíciens), is nothing
other than the world, the Fourfold, showing itself only in its concealment or refusal, sub specie
contraria, as Enframing. Or, citing Heidegger once again, it is this essence of modern technology,
through which “the entire globe is today transformed and destined into a being which is occidentally
conceived and is entrapped within the truth-fonn of European metaphysics and science” The insight
resulting from this ariamnesis is not only, first, that the essence of technology isindeed nothing
_
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technological but also, second, that it is visible only as seemingly remote in time. It therefore defies
any historicist perspective but is emphatically histoıic, geschichtlich, as Heidegger correctly claims.
It remains outside the jurisdiction of expert historiography and on pain of confusing the problem
with the solution. There is no other way of grasping that direct connection between the height of the
technological age and the beginning of metaphysics, i.e., the “Greeks,” than what Heidegger calls
“thinking.” And- this will all the more be true to the extent that in light of Heraclitus, as opposed to
Aristotle, the Greek experience of language would seem less manifest in Oedipus' struggle for selfdetermination than in the Wisdom of his adversary, Tiresias.
Meanwhile, there is still a eorollary to be appended. As we have seen, it is in the totality of
aspects concerning the Fourfold no less than the related problem of logos' primordial creativity
(transcending the “unpoe_tic” Platonic model ofcraftsmanship o_r manufacture) - i.e., in the name of
what Heidegger envisioned as originary techne~poı`esis - that Heidegger turns away from Leibniz
and towards Aristotle. He turns to Aristotle in order to depart from him towards the thought of a
more primordial, “more Greek” conception of the unity of the four causes in the Fourfold conceived
as the “Saying,” die Sage. Heidegger re-encounters that same Platonism as the inrıermost character
of modernity, if not the essence of technology itself: as anyone can see in today°s mediatic reality.
It is this constitutive Platonism that Heidegger found embodied, at quite another level, in
Heisenberg: symbolically speaking, at the point where Heisenberg himself took up the thought of
the four causes, along with other Aristotelian concepts, to articulatethe Zusammenhänge which he
had elaborated thirty years earlier??
On the other hand, an attempt at an even more pointed reflection on language and the “unpoetic,”
at a greater distance from Aristotle rather than extrapolating what is “more Greek” in rewriting him,
would continue the meditation on Greek “basic words", Grundworte, by acknowledging above all
that they appear, “more primordially,” in contexts of poetic composition: Which is the case precisely
of logos, aletheia, semaineinfs This would include, and be nourished by, a critical debate, e.g., with
the recent book on Pindar by Michael Theunissen, who, coming from a rather un-Heideggerian
orientation but nevertheless sharing the historic but non-historicist motivation of presenting a costbenefit analysis or critical theory to Westem rationality, turns to archaic Greek lyric poetry precisely
to step out of the tradition pre-given as the discipline of “philosophy” (susceptible of anaehronism),
in order to grasp, philosophically, the problematic of the experience of time, which would seem to
have much in common with the essence of technology.
7.
This would elucidate (such is my concluding observation) further surprising aspects of this
Heideggerian Aristotelianism: one of them to be found exactly in the place of the unpoetic
interpretation of language, i.e., of Being, where things begin to look somewhat like an everyday
evolutionist perspective. In the case of language, logos, and of art, poiesis, alike, the “Greeks,” says
Heidegger, dwell in their world without attaining to sufficient concomitant thinking on either.29
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This looks just a bit like conventional thinking about unreflective “primitives” in their histoirefioide
- regarded from modem European perspectives. What is perhaps more crucial is the fact that it also
looks like the Husserlian “na`1`ve” givenness or'“natural” attitude; and we may sunnise that this is still
an unexpected reflex of the first book of Aristotle°s Metaphysics. This concerns once again logos
in what Heidegger claims to be its primordial meaning as “collective laying-out,” lesende Lege, just
as such “lay/ing” as letting-lie represents a remarkable avatar of the Greek hypokeimerton, as that
which is let, or allowed to, present itself “before”: the Substance, that is, no less than the
the
metaphysical category par excellence since Aristotle. Could that be a coincidence? Conceming
second term, Lese (collection, of what lies before), it is hard to escape seeing that it simultaneously
refers to the ordinary sense of lesen, or legere, i.e., reading, in that Heidegger names correlatively,
in 1935, the written letters, grammata, as the paradigm for the Greek “experience” - not here of
We
language, but of Being.“ What could this supposed paradigm have to do with the “unpoetic”?
find therein a final hint at the unity of world and language as revealed by the recourse to the Greeks
in the thought of the Fourfold or saying as speaking in its veryconeealment as Enframing. That is,
the essence of technology takes on a surprising proximity to the problem of the connection between
writing and metaphysies. This would lead to further questions addressed to Heidegger and to the
›;'

Greeks as well.
Martin-Lutheß Universität, Halle- Wittenberg
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ELBVEN THEsEs oN HEIDEG-G1-za AND oN
(A WORKING PAPER)
_

TECHNOLOGY

THOMAS SHEEHAN

1. Heidegger 's Focal Topic Is Not Das Sein Des Seienden.
a. Being = is. The being of entities is the “is” of entities -in Heideggefs words, “das ist, alh. das
Sein,” or as William J. Richardson puts it, “the Is of what-is." This being or “is” is not
ontological but the onticness of the ontic, die Seiendheit des Seienden. lt is not Heidegger's focal

I
I

topic.
b. No being without "as.” This being or “is” shows up only in a ép!nveíu or Seinsverständnis, that
is, only in an act of taking-an-entity-as (etwas auf etwas entwerfen). We take an entity as this or
that, understand that it is such and so, and thereby know its being. The first name for being or
“is” is the "as" of taking-something-as.

1

ı

I

c. Die Sache abbeing. By positing the ontological difference between being and entities and then
opting for the side of being, one has not yet arıived at die Sache selbst. Metaphysics has always
known the ontological difference and enjoyed an understanding of being.
2. Heidegger 'sfocal topic is what makes possible such “is ” or being.

calls his topic das Sein selbst or das Sein als solches. In those titles the "selbst" and
Heidegger often
”
"als solches point. beyond “is” to what makes “is” possible.
such presence comes about: "Die
a. If being is the Anwesenheit of entities, Heidegger asks how
"
als
solche
kann
es
Anwesenheit
Frage, inwiefern
geben
(SD 77.17-18)
b. If being is the manifestness of entities, Heidegger's topic is the prior possibilizing of that
”
manifestness: “die vorgängige Ermöglichung der Oflenbarkeit von Seiendem (GA 9, 114.2627).
l

c. If being is the “is” of what-is, Heideggefs issue is that which allows for such is-ness: "Grund
una' Zulassung der Seiendheit ” (GA 68, 51.5)
d. And since being or “is” shows up only in a synthetic-differential act of taking-something-as (a
”
Seinsverständnis), Heidegger's topic is “die Bedingung der Möglichkeit des Seinsverständisses
(GA 24, 405.12-13).
Y

3. Heideggerians should abandon the word "being" as a marker for die Sache selbst
a. because Heideggefs focal topic is not “being” (“das Sein [ist] nicht mehr das eigens zu
”
”
Denkende, SD 44.6-7) but something entirely different (“ganz anderes, ibid. 22.5);
b. because even in the formal denornination. of die Sache as “being-as-such,” the distinction
between das Errnöglichte (= das Sein des Seienden) and das Ermöglichende (= das Sein selbst)
is often overlooked;
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c. because Heidegger scholarship virtually always hypostasizes das Sein into a quasi-metaphysical
“sometl1ing” that one can allegedly “pursue” and “relate to,” a “something” that performs such
extraordinary act as revealing and concealing itself, abandoning us, dispensing epochs of itself,
and so on.

ı

I
I

”
4. Being/ "is occurs only as the sense ofentities.

\

Heidegger, both early and late, holds that

ı

í

1

a. being or “is” is always the “is” ofan entity; shows up only as the sense of that entity; and
indicates that the entity “makes-sense-as” or “'is-open~and-available-as.” Das Sein = das Anwesen
= der Sinn
[sc., des Seienden].

1

b. being/"is"/sense cannot occur except in relation to human beings, and it occurs only in syntheticdifferential acts of áp!nvaíu, taking-something-as (lb above);

ı

c. what makes possible the “as” of any taking-something-as, and thus any occurrence of
being/”is”/sense, is possible relatedness to human interest.

I

d. Heidegger calls the whole of such possible relatedness the “open,” the “world,” or the “clearing”
(Da = Welt = Lichtung), which he understands as tóyo; (or equally nóts!og), the realm of the
tension between synthesis and distinction (eóvüeoıç/ôıatpaoıg).

ı

5. Being/"is “/sense occurs only in and with Da-sein, the open-that-we-are.

I

a. Heidegger, both early and late, holds that the human essence ineluctably and apriori
(i.e., qua geworfen) is the open. Da-sein = “being-the-open,” or “the open-that-we-are."

b. Insofar as the open or Da makes possible any entity's openness-as and thus all occurrences of
being or “is,” being-the-open means being die Sache selbst.
6. In one formulation die Sache selbst is human finítude, the lack that generates and is the open.

a. What generates (zeittgt) the open, and thus makes possible all takings-as and occurrences of
being, is the ñnitude or lack-in-full-self-presence that defines the human essence.

b. This lack is intrinsically though relatively “hidden” and “withd1'awn,” i.e., it “prefers to hide,”
ıcpı"mseüeı rpıteí. Heidegger sometimes call this lack the tfiüq.

7. In another formulation die Stiche selbst is the apriori openedness (Gewoıjfenheít, E reign etsein)
of the open-that-we-are, which makes possible all takings-as and occurrences of “is.”
a. In the earlier tenninology this apriori openedness is called the Geworfenheit of
the Da-that-we-are (Da-sein: GA 2, 74.25), which makes possible all Entwerfen

auf

b. In the later terminology it is called equally the Ereignetsein of the Lichtung-that-we are
(Lichtung-seı`n.' GA 69, 101.12), which makes possible all Geschicke des Seins.
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8. In yet another formulation die Suche selbst is Ereignis, the opening ofthe open.
1
\

Heidegger understands Ereignis as the apriori opening of the open rather than as “appropriation” or
“enowning.”

(See notes on thesis 8, below.)

ı

9. What Heidegger calls Seinsvergessenheit is the forgottenness not

being possible.

ofbeing but ofwhat makes

\

a. What makes being possible is the hidden lack or ıfiüq, our fmitude that generates and is the open.

b. That hidden lack is “redoubled" (doubly hidden) when one overlooks or forgets it.
i

c. But one can also understand and embrace that hidden finitude --as one°s own essenoe; as what
generates the clearing; and as the source of all takings-as and occurrences of being.
open also
des
Seins).
guarantees an in-principle infinity oftakings-as and givings-of-being (Geschicke

I0. The

intrinsicalbı hidden lack that is responsible for the

apriori openedness

ofthe

a. The in-principle infinity of such takings-as and givings-of-being is the positive gift of the

ıfitm/clearing/Ereignis.
b. That infinity need not entailıthe overlooking of the clearing (Seinsvergessenheit) nor stand in
inverse propoıtion to the understanding and embrace of one's essential lack (Entschlossenheit).
11. The in-principle infiníty oftakings-as and givings-of-being also makes possible unlimited global
technology.
a. One form of endless taking-as is endless using-for: the adapting and reshaping of entities into
means for achieving human ends, into commodities, and so on. Global technology is the positive
gift of Ereignis.

b. Such endless and universal using-for need not entail Seinsvergessenheit or stand in an inverse
relation to Entschlossenheit, Eigentlichkeit, die Einkehr in das Ereignis, or die
Uberwindung/Verwindung der Metaphysik.
c._

There are no philosophically interesting grounds within Heideggefs thought for límiting (much
less opposing) the endless, global spread of such technology.

d. Overlooking the clearing is not the cause, or a contributing cause, of the globalization of
technology.

e. There is no necessary connection between the self-assertion of the technologically efficient self
(sc., Jünger's °°Worker-dominating-the-world”) and Seinsvergessenheit. Aquinas could just as
easily have overlooked and forgotten the clearing during his mystical vision at Fossanova as
Stalin could have understood and embraced it while industrializing the Soviet Union.

ı
i
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SOME SUPPORTING NOTES

1

RE THESIS l

re Ja, Being = ”is. ” Heidegger: “das ist, d.h. das Sein": (GA 40, 97.12). Cf. also: “Was wir mit dem 'ist'
meinen, nennt das Hauptwoıt und der Name 'das Sein”' (GA 51, 45.3-4); “...das Sein nennen, indem wir
das 'ist' sagen” (ibid., 43.17-18); “Das 'ist'...[ist] eine Abwandlung und Wortform des “Zeitwortes° “sein°.
Dieses *Zeitwert* *sein* können wir durch Vorsetzung des Artikels zum Hauptwort erheben: “das Sein”
(ibid., 28.23-27); “...daß wir an die Stelle des “ist' ein Hauptwort schieben und den Namen “das Sein'
aussprechen” (ibid., 29.30-32).
Richardson: The citation from William J. Richardson is taken from his "Martin Heidegger,” in Babette E.
Babich, ed., From Phenomenoiogy to Thought, Errancy, and Desire (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995), 619.17.
Re being = Seiendheit: “Seiendheit - Jenes, was das Seiende als ein solches auszeichnet, eben das Sein": GA
9, 260.6-7.
re lb, “N0 being without 'as '”.' Once dehypostasized, "being" comes down to the implicit “as” of taking-as
and the articulated “is” of statements. Thus “being” is never the object of an immediate, intellectual intuition.
Heidegger does argue that human beings enjoy a categorial intuition of “is,” but that is not a blinding insight
into Being-As-Such. Rather, categorial intuition is our immediate presence to mediation, to the inevitability
of taking-as and making-sense-of (ımà-àyopeüsıv, “categorizing”). The categorial intuition does not deliver
an all-at-once vision of Big Being but is about our throvsmness into the “as,” our ineluctable discursivity.
That is why Heidegger prefers to call it the “hermeneutical intuition” (GA 56/57, 117.13).
re Ic, metaphysics knows the ontological difference (era). Cf. GA 15, 310, 12-15; GA 65, §25 8, 423.27424.23; GA 51, 43.2-3, 13-16. SD 40.9-10.
RB THESIS 2

r

ii
i

ı
l

l
l
1
I

~

re 2.' beyond "is

Cf GA 9, 228.8, lO-l 1, 24; SD 40.18-24. (Compare

and Ermöglichung: VA I, 67.12).

RE THESIS 3

1

ı

re 3.' "being si die Sache: To use Latin in place of Heidegger°s German, his issue is neither quidquid est
(“whatever is”: das Seiende); nor the quidditas of quidquid est (i.e., Seiendhe1`t); nor the esse (= Sein) that
is contracted in any given est (Thomas Aquinas had already covered that groı.ınd); nor the est (simpliciter)
of any quidquid est, since in Heidegger's phenomenological perspective est never appears alone but always
in conjunction with an Entwurf des Seins, an act of “taking-something-as."

RE THESIS 4
re 4a-c: Heidegger, early and late, holds that there is no “is” to things without a taking-as, no "being" that
exceeds the sense things have, and no sense that is independent of human being. Before homo sapiens
sapiens evolved, there was no "being" on earth: it did not lurk within things, waiting to be discovered; it was
not hiding in the wings, waiting for a Dasein to come along so that it could reveal itself. Likewise before
creation there was no “being” in God's heaven, because “being” for Heidegger does not mean mere “in
existence." The status of “out-there-ness” i.e., “existence” whether in this universe or in God°s heaven
is not what constitutes "being" for Heidegger. If anything, “in-here-ness” does, the condition of
Innerweltiichkeit, of “having sense."
Moreover, there is no such thing as "the" being of entities; there is only the current being of entities das jeweilige Sein des Seienden (GA 9, 263.33-34), which is simply the present "Sein" from among an
infinite number of “Sein 's " that an entity might have. The current being of an entity is what and how I
happen to take this thing "as at the present moment. The being of something comes about only when “man
entwirfi etwas auf etwas. The proper translation of entwerfen auf . . is not “to project something upon” (a
meaningless phrase in this context) but “to take something as," i.e., to make sense of it. Irı theoretical activity
we take X as something. In practical activity we take X as for something. In both cases, whether we take
~

~

ı
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«
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1

Socrates as an Athenian (the apophantic "as" of rt ıcıııà ıwög iuíycw) or take up this rock as suitable for
hammering (the hermeneutical “as” offi str; fi ıııßeív), the first name for “is” or "being" is the "as" of an act
of taking-as.
In Sein und Zeit Division I, chapters three and tive, Heidegger provides a phenomenologicalhermeneutical explanation of how “being” functions whenever we make ,sense of things, whether in the Sand-P framework of apophantic statements or in the tools-for-tasks framework of practical operations. In
both contexts, he argues, “being” is always a matter of the synthetic-differential relation between things and
human interests: it is about the sense that things have in the light of those interests. “Being” is certainly the
"presence" of things, but that presence is always the current sense that things have in relation to, and within
the world of, human concerns and interests.
.

.

1

í

1

.
1
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re 4d: Cf. GA 65, §193, 316.27, §73, 297.25; GA 9, 325.20-21, 326.15-16, 327.14-15, etc. Also “Der
Unterschied als Lichtung, als Ereignis": Zollikoner Seminare, 242.12-13; and “Die “Unterscheidung als
Charakter des Seins selbst; es west als unterscheidend, scheidend einigendes”: Heidegger, Schellings
Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809), 216.29.

RE THESIS 5

Heidegger understands the Da not as“the there” but as “the open." (Cf. GA 9,
184.11, 184.25, 185.29, 187.32, 188.21; Zollikoner Seminare, 9.8, 188.14-15.) As such, the Da is not only
the same as Welt and Lichtung but is also the equivalent of all the other terms that Heidegger used for die
Sache selbst. The Da is the ES of Es gibt Sein. It is also óütfiñaıu, Ereignis, Lichtung, and die Wahrheit des
Seins selbst (respeøtively: ócitñıäeıu: letter to Jean Beaufiet, »November 23, 1945, in Lettre sur lflhurnanisme,
2nd,edition, ed. and trans. Roger Munier [Parisz Aubier, 1964], 184.2; Ereignis: Zoliikoner Seminare,
242.12-13, 21-22; Lichutng: GA 65, §193, 316.27, §73, 297.25; and GA 9, 336.27; Wahrheit: “Wahrheit west
nur und immer schon als Da-sein": GA 65, §243, 392.20).
We should not translate Dasein as “being-there” or “being-the~there” or “there-being” but, rather, as
“always-being~open” or “already-having-been-opened,” or “apriori openedness” But those phrases are so
awkward, and as Richardson says, “a man must live with himself” (Heidegger, 579, n. 6). So I settle simply
for “being-the-open” or “openness.”
re 5a, “ineluctably and apriori (qua geworfen) In Heideggefs early language, we are always already
thrown-open (geworfen). We are not thrown “into” the open, as if the Da/Lichtung/Welt already existed
without us; we are not open “to” the open, as if it were something separate from us; we do not “transcend
to" the open as if we had to cross from here to there; and we do not "project" the open as if we brought it
about as our own personal achievement. Without us, there is no open at all; but with us, the open is always
apriori operative. In that regard some of Heideggefs terms can be misleading. “Being-in-the-world” actually
means “being-the-world” (die Lichtung-sein: GA 69, 101.12), and “thrawnness into the world” means beingthe-world afnecessity, i.e., apriori.
re 5a, “being-the-open

RE THESIS 6

Whether as Welt, Lichtung, Da, or Ereignis, Heidegger's focal issue is the open-that-we-are, which gives
all forms of being and all epochs in the history of being. But what exactly opens up the open? “Wie gibt es
die Lichtung? ” (SD, 80.25)
”
Heideggeı"s most formal answer is that what opens the open is "das Sichentziehende (WD,6.2). “That
which withdraws itself' (or less anthropomorphically, “the intrinsically withdrawn”) pulls us out into
ëmrumg, into openedness. As Heidegger puts it: “What withdraws from us draws us along with it by that very
withdrawal” (WD, 5.37). That sentence needs to be interpreted in terms of apriori-perfect aspect (GA 2, 114,
n.): that which is intrinscially withdrawn has always already drawn us out, i.e., opened us up. "Entzug ist
Ereignis” (WD, 5.27): the intrinsically-withdrawn has apriori opened the open.
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But what is it that has always already wíthdrawn, that remains intrinsieally absent and hidden, and that
thereby has drawn us out into openedness? One could fall back on the hypostasization-thesis and reify das
Sichentziehende into “Being Itself” in its absential mode (“The Lethe”) and then have It (whatever "It" is)
do the withdrawing, the opening-of-the-open, and the giving-of-being. But that would only be metaphysics
in its most banal and wılgar form, the destruction of everything Heidegger stood for.
Heidegger's answer is quite different. If (and one uses this notion only as ia limit-idea) metaphysical
closure, full self-presence, and perfect self-coincidence were the measure of complete being (rö ráisııov), then
the completeness of human openness is to be always “in-complete” (dnaıfiç). Ever unfinished and always onthe-way, we may think of ourselves as stretched out towards full self-presence, but we never arrive there.
Our lack-of-full-being is what makes us be human. It is “our fault”'(or at least our nature) that we are this
lack: Schuldigsein. We do not “possess” our lack-in-being so much as it possesses us (without ever being
extrinsic to us) and defines our essence. Our lack makes us be open and finite by ever remaining a lack,
privatively “absent” and “concealed.” We cannot encompass and incorporate it. It is intrinsicaily withdrawn
from our powers - "seh"-withdrawn,” if you will. Our lack~in~being “causes” and maintains our openedness.
Therefore, Ereignis is not Big Being or the “Lethe,” operating from some Beyond and heteronomously
“appropriating” us into a place other than ourselves. Rather, our finitude is the absence that opens the open:
Der Entzug ist des Da-seins (GA 65, 293.9). Our finitude makes all “as”-taking and “is”-saying possible by
requiring us to understand things not immediately and ontically, as God allegedly does, but indirectly and
ontologically (= iınperfectly), through their being (GA 3, 280.30-31). Our finitude, and it alone, is the
irıtrinsically hidden mystery, overlooked in fallemiess and embraced in resolve: das vergessenen Geheimnis
des Daseins (GA 9, 195.23). Our finitude is the “it” that “gives being” and that is responsible for the various
dispensations in die Geschichte des Seins. In the language of Zeit und Sein, our finitude is what erreicht die
Zeit (opens the clearing) and schickt das Sein (makes possible all taking-as and thus all giving-of-being).
re 6a, "lack in":
The measure and norm of is-ness - its ideal, perfect state - is ontic selfpresence: “[D]ie sich selbst gegenwärtige Gegenwart ist die Maßstab aller Seiendheit” (GA 65, 200.9-10).
(Moreover, this perfect self-coincidence is a traditional definition of the divine: vóncnç vmieamg [Metaphysics,
12, 9, 1074” 34-35], which constitutes further confinnation that Sein/"is" - whether in its infinite or finite
forms - cannot be Heidegger's focal topic.)
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RE THESIS 7

Beiträge shows that the later Heidegger was focused on the same central topic as the earlier: the apriori
openedness of the open-that-gives-being. In the early period this openedness of the open was terrned
Geworfenheit, whereas in the later period it is called Ereignetsein. Thus Beiträge equates geworfen with
ereignet (GA 65, 239.5 and 304.8) and with zugehörig der Er-eignung (252.24), and it reformulates die
Übernahme der Geworfenheit as die Über-nahme der Er-eigmmg, without changing the issue (GA 65, 322.7
and 327.7; cf. GA 2, 431.13). What Heidegger is expressing in both the earlier language of Gewoifenheit and
the later language of Ereignis is that being-open is the ineluctable condition of our essence, not an occasional
accomplishment of our wills. It is our “fate,” the way we always already are (GA 2, 431 .16-17). This is the
central issue of his thought, and it does not change between Heidegger I and Heidegger II. To-be-the-open
”
is to be apriori opened, and only as such can we take-things-as. Dasein is ”erschiießend erschiossenes (GA
27, 135.13), able to open up other things only because it itself is already opened up.
RE THESIS 8
and
later
works
make
it
clear
that
is not an “event” in any usual sense of the term (i.e.,
Ereignis
Beiträge
Vorkommnis und Geschehnis: SD 21.27) and that what Heidegger meant by Ereignis is not primarily
“appropriation” or “enowning.” In the forthcoming GA 71 (Das Ereignis, 1941-42) Heidegger shows that
the original etymcn of Ereignis is not eigen (“own,” parallel to the Latin proprium, from which derive
“appropriation" and “enowning”) but rather eräugeniereugen, “biinging something out into view." Heidegger
got much of this from Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm (see footnote 1, below). More importantly, however, in
GA 71 (section “Das Ereignis,” sub-section “Er-eigen - Er-eignen,” ms. 100a), Heidegger annotated the
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Grimm etymologies, thereby providing his own understanding of Ereignis. (In what follows I have added
the hyphens for the sake of clarity.)

i

1. Etymology of er-eignen
l. The original form of sich er-eignen was sich er-eigen
underlies
the Old High German irGerman
the
modem
a.
The
Old
High
ouga, "eye" (cf.
Auge),
1
the
Middle
German
“to
before
the
and
eyes."
High
er-öugen,
place
ougen
b. As the diphthongs äu and eu gradually devolved into ei, er-äugen and er-eugen became er-

f

1

!

eıgen.

1
p

c. The Grimm brothers translate this er-eigen with the Latin infınitives monstrare and
osiendere (obs + tendere: to stretch something out in front of) -- that is, “to show something,
to bring it forth into view."
d. Thus in the reflexive, sich ereigen, “to occur” = sich erweisen, sich erzeigen (ostendi,
monstrari), “to come forth, to show itself as it is.”
2. As er-äugen and er-eugen devolved into er-eigen, eigen came to be associated.with
a. the entirely unrelated adj ective eigen, (“own,” as in the Latin proprium);
b. and subsequently with the inñnitives eignen (obsolete: “to fit with, belong to”)
and an-eignen/zu-eignen (“to appropriate something to oneseli”).
3. Finally, by the beginning of the 1600s
a. not only did the root-meaning “own” begin to creep into verbs like er-eigen, er-äugen, and
er-engen,
b. but also the additional letter “n” (of eignen, etc.) came over into er-eigen, er-äugen, and ereugen, transforming them into
i. er-äugnen and er-eugnen, which have since died out,
ii. and er-eignen, which has survived.'

=

.

t

2. HEIDEGGER'S ANNOTATIONS TO THE ETYMOLOGY

In GA 7l Heidegger accepts the Grimms° etymology, including the fact that eigen/proprium is not the
original etymon:
“Er-eignen (dasselbe [wie Er-eigenj) eu in ei -und dazu Verwirrung mit dem unverwandten
'eigen ', proprium,
a'.h. mit 'an-eignenfl 'zu~eignen.
Heidegger likewise accepts that the primary meaning of sich ereignen is “to come into view, to appear, to
be brought forth and revealed":
"Er-eigen: er-eugen - er-äugen - ostendere, monstrare,
in die Augen, Blick, Anblick

drew upon, see Jacob Grimm and Wilhelm Grimm, Deutsches Wörterbuch (Leipzig: Hirzel,
1854-l960[!]), sixteen volumes; vol. III (E-Porsche), 1862:“Eräugnerı, Ereugnen, Ereig'nen," “Eräugnis,” “Eräugnung," “Eräugung“
at 699; “Ereigen” at 784-5; and “Ereig'nung“ at 785. See also Wolfgang Brokmeier, “Heidegger und die Suche nach dem Eigenen -Heidegger und wir --,” in Ingeborg Schüssler et al., eds., Heidegger: Semaine de Chexbres, 1988 (Lausanne: Genos [Cahiers de
Philosophie], 1992), 61-95, here, 89f., notes 3-5. Also François Fédier, “Traduire les Beiträge zur Philosophie (Von: Ereignis),”
Heidegger Studies, 9 (1993), 15-34, esp. 32-33. In his published work Heidegger refers in passing to this etymology in Identität und
Dijjferenz (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), 24.21 -25.1, a passage that is omitted from the English translation by Joan Stambaugh, Identity
and Dijjference ( New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1969), 36.14.
1 For the etymology that Heidegger
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fallen - erscheinen
sich oflenbaren, zu-tragen,
“
be-geben.

Most significantly, he glosses all this with a verb that does not appear in the Grimms° etymology. ln
places lichten, “to disencuinber and free up, to open
apposition to Grimms' erweisen and erzeigen Heidegger
”
erweisen
in
up or clear”: "lichten
erzeigen. Thus, the reflexive, sich erweisen and sich erzeigen (“to
show up or appear as whatone is”) mean the same as sich lichten, “to be- opened up and cleared.” Sich
ereignen (“to occur”) means that something is brought out into the open, comes into the clear: “in die
Lichtung einbeziehen.“ Heidegger reinforces this when he states that das Er-eigen (which he glosses as Eraigen) has the transitive sense of “lichtend - weisen” - “to show by opening up” (in the reflexive: “to appear
by having been opened up”).
As Heidegger's term of art, das Er-eignen pertains to the open as coming into appearance in conjunction
with intrinsic concealment: “das in die Erscheinung kommende und so zugleich sich verbergende Sich zu
=
eigen werden." Thus Ereignis the opening of the open on the basis of the concealment that is human
- finitude (cf. thesis 6).
If we can call Ereignis an event at all, it is the “apriori event” of the opening up of the open. And clearly
this apriori event is less about “appropriation” or “enowning” than about “opening up and appearing”
Nonetheless, this is not to entirely exclude “appropriation” as a possible translation of Ereignis. That word
might work -but only if we understand the proprium of appropriation as the opening up of openness (cf. SD

24.5-7, 28-29).

RE THESES 9 to 11

The hiddenness intrinsic to the opening of the open is what allows for the endless accessibility of entities.
Without the lack that is essential to Da-sein, entities would not be disclosed, and humans beings would not
be human. But given this lack and the open that it generates, entities are endlessly available to human
engagement and manipulation. The technological domination of the globe is thus the gift of the finite open.
Far from having a philosophically negative valence, the global spread of technology is the positive outcome
of Ereignis.
In Heidegger's thought, nihilism and die Technik in and of themselves have nothing to do with a given
ratio between tpücnç and réxvn, or between nature and technology. The disclosedness and presence of entities
is their intrinsic accessibility, not their exhibition of “natural” aiöq. Nihilism is the overlooking of the
intrinsic hiddenness (“withdrawnness”) of the lack that generates, and is, the open. It has no necessaıy
relation to the domination of nature by technology. Nor does limiting the scope of technology and restoring
the powers of nature have any necessary relation to overcoming Seinsvergessenheit, nihilism, or
metaphysics. One can be a nihilist in ıpümg-rich_ and réxvn-poor ancient Greece as much as in today°s ıpümçpoor and réxm-rich North America.
Nihilism and die Technik are not proportionate to the degree of human control over entities. In
Heidegger`s thinking there is no zero-sum game in which the advances of technology entail the oblivion of
the open. One can promote and affirm a world that is, in principle, completely lcnovvable and controllable
by human beings, and still remain resolutely true to the open. And one can be caught up in mystical visions
which, to the degree that they might be oblivious of the open, would be formally no different from the
materialist worldviews of Diamat Marxists.
Stanford University

HEIDEGGER'S PHENOMENOLOGY AND CONTEMPORARY

ENVIRONMENTALISM

MICHAEL E. ZIMMERMAN
The phenomenology developed by Husserl and transformed by Heidegger provided the basic
conceptual distinctions for much of twentieth centuıy continental philosophy. In addition to

challenging customary conceptions of selfliood, language, and metaphysics, continental philosophy
has also contributed significantly to postmodem ethics and multicultural theory by criticizing
humanism and theo-logo-phallo~centrism. In the domain of environmental philosophy, however,
continental philosophy initially played a lessinfluential role than did Anglo-American philosophy.
Soon, however, a number of continentally-oriented philosophers questioned the metaphysical
presuppositions of modem moral philosophy, especially as “extended” to non-human beings, and
began exploring whether thinkers such as Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Merleau-Ponty could help
clarify issues pertinent to humanity'S attitude toward nature'
In what follows, I continue that exploration by examining the extent to which I-Ieidegger°s
phenomenology can contribute to environmental philosophy. His theoretical approach to preserving
nature differs fiom the Anglo~American one in two major and intertwined ways. First, his approach
cannot be adequately conceived in terms of the debate between anthropocentrísts, who say that
inherent value belongs only to humans and that nature has only instrumental value, and biocentrists,
who say that nature itself has inherent value with which human values are continuous. Although
Heideggefs thought is sometimes described as anthropocentric, he himself sharply criticized
anthropocentrism. Yet he was no biocentrist, because he believed that humankind is discontinuous
with nature as understood by physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology. Second, Heidegger's
approach to preserving nature is not axiological, but ontological. That is, he does not propose to
discover some property in natural beings that is “inherently valuable.” Indeed, he maintains that the
very concept of value arose along with the power-hungry modem subject. I-Ience, extending value
to non-human beings encompasses them within the same subjectivity that is central to technological
modernity.2 Heidegger's approach to limiting humanity°s destructive treatment of nature was
ontological. In his view, for something to be means for it to manifest itself, in the sense of being
interpreted, understood, or appropriated by human Dasein. Dasein”s encounter with beings occurs
in the temporal-historical clearing opened up through Dasein. Because Dasein neither produces nor
owns this Clearing, but rather exists only insofar as it has been appropriated as this clearing, Dasein
is summoned to let beings be, by allowing them to manifest themselves in their various kinds of
intelligibility.
In his early work, which sought access to Being as such by analyzing the Being of human
Dasein, Heidegger indicated that nature pıimarily manifests itself as a resource for human ends, and
I
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secondarily as an obj ect for the natural sciences. I-Ie hinted at other modes of nature's Being, but
did not adequately develop them. By the l930s, concemed about the perceived subj ectivism and
anthropocentrisrn of his early work, he approached Being without engaging in extensive analysis of
Dasein's Being, although he always emphasized the close relation between Being and human Dasein.
His later phenomenology, ever more hermeneutical in orientation, amounted to a radical uncovering
of insights gained by the phenomenological ontology of previous great thinkers, above all Aiistotlefl
Heidegger interpreted crucial Aristotelian concepts, such asphysis, energeia, dynamis, kinesis, and
metabole, in ways that offer fi'uitful alteniatives to traditional readings of Aristotle. Recently, in an
essay attempting to demonstrate Heidegger's pertinence for environmental philosophy, Nancy J.
Holland maintains that Heidegger°s version of Aristotle°s view of nature differs dramatically from
the modern scientific view, which objectifies nature. Holland does not point out, however, that
much of contemporary enviromnentalism endorses the scientific view of nature, including the idea
that humans are simply one species among others. Hence, there is no easy way to reconcile
Heidegger' s view of nature and humankind with the environmentalists” view. Even more troubling
for those attempting such a reconciliation is Thomas J. Sheehan's contention that Heidegger himself
concludes that there is no alternative to the nihilism of the scientific/technological understanding of
Being. According to Sheehan, Heideggefs talk of a “new begim1ing,” a post-metaphysical and nondoniineering encounter with beings, is internally inconsistent with his own thought.
EARLY HEIDEGGER'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OFNATURE AS HUMAN RESOURCE

Despite his debt to Husserl, whose account of “categorial intuition” in Logica! Invesrígarions
foreshadowed his own understanding of Being, Heidegger redefined phenomenology in his own
wayfl Agreeing with Husserl that phenomenology's methodologieal aim was to get back to “the
matters [die Sachen] themselves,” Heidegger maintained that the matters most in need of disclosure
and simultaneously most difficult to disclose were “onto1ogical.” In Being and Time, he defined
phenornenology by first analyzing the term into its roots, phenomenon and logos.
Phenomenon, he writes, “means that which shows itself in itself the manifest.” (BT,51; SZ,28)5
Ordinarily, what show themselves are beings of various kind, accessible to what Kant called
empírical intuition. But beings are not what Heidegger has in mind by the phenomenological
concept of phenomenon, which concems “that which already shows itself in the appearance prior to
the 'phenomenon' as ordinarily understood and as accompanying it in eveıy case." (BT, 54-55;
SZ,3l) Kant maintained that space and time - the pure forms of intuition - are phenomena that
appear prior to the appearance of objects of experience. Typically, space andtime are not noticed
as such; instead, attention is given to things appearing within the horizons opened up by space and
time. A true phenomenon, then, does not show itself directly, but instead makes it possible for
beings as such to appear.
Heidegger deñnes logos, the other element of phenomenology, as “discourse” (Rede), which
Aristotle explained as apophainesthai. “The logos lets something be seen (phainesthai), namely,
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what the discourse is about
Discourse 'lets [something] be seen' apa that itself of which the
discourse is [about].” (BT, 56; SZ, 32) This letting be seen makes possible truth, aietheia, which
Heidegger defines not as “correctness” in judgment, but instead as taking something out of its'
hiddenness or dis-covering it. Synthesizing his analysis of phenomenon and logos, Heidegger
defines phenomenology as “To let be seen fi'om itself that which shows itself, just as its shows itself
from itself." (BT, 58; SZ, 34) But what needs to be show itself through phenomenology is not what
primarily shows' itself, i.e., various kinds of beings, but insteadthat which lies hidden: Being.
Although concealed from ordinary view, Being “belongs essentially to what thus first and for the
most part shows itself [beings], so much so as to constitute its meaning and ground." (BT, 59; SZ,
35) According to Heidegger, “This Being can be covered up so extensively that it becomes forgotten
and no question arises about it or about its meaning.” (BT, 59; SZ, 35) Seeking to uncover what has
been hidden in the Western tradition - Being †, phenomenology amounts to ontology, correctly
understood. Indeed, philosophy itself is “universal phenomenological ontology” (BT, 62; SZ, 38)
Early Heidegger maintained that human Dasein's temporality constitutes the “wor1d” in which
beings can manifest or present themselves insofar as they are interpreted "as" something. To speak
of the “Being of beings,” then, means to speak of how beings reveal themselves in the clearing
within which human Dasein's interpretative activity occurs. Synonyms for “clearing” (Lichtung)
in'E:lude: the “world”, “absencing” (Abwesen), and “nothingness.” Seen from later Heidegger's
perspective, this clearing - and not the Being of beings - constitutes the central topic of his thinking.
Indeed, he maintained that metaphysics has long asked: “What is the Being of beings?”, but

phenomenological ontology asks: “What is Being as such?” By “as such,” Heidegger meant the
conditions needed for beings “to be”, in the sense of manifesting themselves in their z'ntelZigibilz'zy
or in their availability to Dasein.
Beings manifest themselves in limited ways to animals, Heidegger maintained, but only the
inteıpretative comportment of human Dasein is capable of disclosing the complex intelligibility and
meaningfuhiess of beingsf Early Heidegger, influenced by Kant, emphasized the intrinsic relation
between manifesting or Being (Anwesen) and the transcendental temporality or absencing (Abwesen)
necessary for such manifesting. Being tends to conceal itself; indeed, beings can appear as beings
only insofar as attention is tumed away from Being and ıfoward the beings that appear. The work
of metaphysicians, which involves uncovering and describing the Being of beings, has been so
difficult precisely because of this self-concealing aspect of the Being of entities _ Even more hidden,
however, is the condition for such manifesting, namely, the clearing, understood first as Dasein's
transcendence, and later as Ereignis, a term that Sheehan translates as “opening up the open [the
clearing].” Ereignis constitutes the “third term” that makes possible the reciprocal relation between
manifesting and the interpretative behavior that allows manifesting to occur.7
So hidden is the clearing/Ereignis that thinkers of the stature of Plato and Aristotle overlooked
it. Heidegger used phenomenology to point out the primal “phenomena” - Being, understanding,
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and the clearing - by virtue of which our eneounter with secondary “phenomena”- beings - can take
place. A particularly powerful phenomenological method is needed to disclose Being and the
clearing, because of their own tendency to conceal themselves. Early Heidegger used “fonnal
indication” to describe the demanding phenomenological practice which Dasein employs as an
inquirer to address its own self-concealing Being as transcendental temporalitys
If early Heidegger said that beings could not “be” apart from the temporal-historical clearing
constituted by human Dasein, later Heidegger added that beings cannot “be” apart from language
(logos), which he equated with Ereignis, the opening within which beings become accessible to
human Dasein's interpretative activity. It is from this concept of language that Jacques Derrida
derives his- claim that there is nothing “outside the text." Such notions disturb those
enviromnentalists who insist that natıue is robustly real, independently of being known, perceived,
encountered, or spoken of by humans.9 Heidegger himself expended a great deal of effort
attempting to clarify the relation between the seeming “independence” of beings, on the one hand,
and the fact that they can “be” only within the temporal-historical world, on the other. As I have
explained elsewhere, Heidegger developed a “realism” regarding beings, and an “idealism” regarding
Being.1° That is, Dasein does not invent or create nature, as in some kind of subjective idealism, but
instead is dependent on nature. Nevertheless, insofar asa being may be said “to be,” it must revealed
as something, that is, as intelligible, asmeaningful, as useful. In 1929, Heidegger wrote: “Although
being [seíend] in the midst of beings and surrounded by them, Dasein - as existing - has always
already surpassed nature.”“ The apparent “alreadiness” of natural beings and their resistance to
human intervention are basic features of beings that Dasein discloses in encountering them.
Criticizing the naive realism of natural science, early Heidegger argued that the interpretation of
beings as “present-at-hand” objects independent of human experience derives from the more
primordial everyday experience of beings as ready-to-hand tools or instruments for human purposes.
In disclosing not just artifacts, but natural beings as ready-to-hand, e.g., the forest as timber and the
wind as power for windmills, everyday human Dasein discloses beings as they are “in themselves”
(BT,l00-101; SZ, 70-71) The priority assigned by Heidegger to productivity and to the instrumental
understanding of Being led Hubert Dreyfus to depict Being and Time as one of the final stages in
12
productionist metaphysics, of which later Heidegger was to become so critical.
At first glance, the claim that “in themselves” (an sich) beings are instruments for human use
seems to be a throwback to primitive anthropocentrism. In contrast, scientists say that a tool is “in
itself” an object formed of materials shaped according to certain specifications. The use to which
a tool is put is secondary to its primary ontological status as a material artifact. Conceding the point
made here, Heidegger writes: “That the world does not 'consist' [besteht] of the ready-to-hand shows
itself in the fact (among others) that whenever the world is lit up [e.g., when tools break down, get
in the way, or get lost] the ready~to-hand becomes deprived of its worldhood so that Being-justpresent-at-hand comes to the fore.” (BT, 106; SZ, 75) For tools to function as tools, neither their
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Being nor the world in which they are involved may become explicitly manifest. The
“inconspicuousness” and “unobtrusiveness” of tools are positive ontological traits that characterize
the “Being-in-itself' of beings ready-to-hand. In saying that “the world lights up,” Heidegger means
in part that we become more aware of the Being of tools as things intertwined in complex sets of
reference relationships (“the worldhood of the world”). As such awareness arises, the tool shows
itself more as (and thus “becomes”) an object present-at~hand; our capacity for working with it as
a tool diminishes; we understood what it “is” differently. In other words, for tools to show up as
tools-, their Being as ready-to-hand must conceal itself or “hold itself in." This self-concealing or
“holding-in” is what Heidegger means by saying that readiness-to-hand constitutes how things are
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“in themselves.“
For Dasein to encounter beings as beings, Dasein must have an a priori understanding of the
Beingıof the beings in question. Drawing on Aristotle, Heidegger maintained that Dasein`s temporal
mode of Being, existence, involves a two-fold movement (kinesis) of excess and regress.13 Always
already, prior to any empirical encounter with beings, Dasein exceeds, steps beyond, or transcends
itself and moves toward Being. This movement constitutes the clearing in terms of which Being can
be understood. Simultaneously, however, Being withdraws, conceals, or effaces itself, such that
Dasein regresses or moves back toward the beings whose Being has been thus understood.
Ordinarily, Dasein is unaware that such ontological motion and understanding make possible our
everyday dealings with beings. Wrongly assuming that all understanding is at the level of beings,
Dasein typically conceals not only the ontological difference between Being and beings, but also the
clearing in which Dasein can encounter beings as such. Dasein's everyday “pre-ontological”
understanding leads us to encounter beings -including natural beings - primarily either as tools or
as raw material. Bruce V. Foltz maintains, however, that strategic and methodological factors help
to explain why Heidegger emphasizes this instrumental understanding of Being. In his insightful
book on Heidegger and environmental ethics, Foltz writes:
~

the primacy of the practical in this case (and elsewhere) is intended strategically to emphasize our involvement with nature
and how involvement alone discloses it as meaningful-thereby dislodging the detached stance of theoria and “beholding“
fr-om their long dominance in the Westem understanding of nature.”'4

As Foltz and others have noted, Being and Tíme does not reduce nature to the either/or of
instruments or scientific objects, but instead alludes to (but does not explore) altemative modes of
nature°s Being, including the romantic. In 1929, Heidegger referred to nature in “a primordial sense"
that cannot be understood either as readiness-to-hand or in terms of virtually any human
relationship.“ Later I-Iieideggefs idea of the self-concealing “earth,” and his analysis of central
concepts in Aristotle”s thought seem to have been efforts to reveal this primordial nature. In a
moment, we will see the extent to which I-Ieidegger's Aristotle-analysis can be read as consistent
with environmental philosophy”s concem to justify protecting nature from needless exploitation.
First, however, let us discuss briefly another aspect of I-Ieidegger°s early thought that is
important for environmental philosophy, namely, bis claim that Dasein°s Being is care. In part, this
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claim emphasizes that Dasein is not a disembodied intellect, but instead radically finite, embodied,
Being-in-the-world for whom beings matter. Dasein cares for itself when it frees itself from
inauthenticity (self-deceptive and self-disowning flight into beings), and when it frees itself for
authenticity (affinnation that one is the mortal, temporal, historical opemiess in which beings can
manifest themselves). Dasein cares for other beings when it lets them be, in the sense of allowing
them to manifest themselves in terms of their own inherent possibilities. Dasein exists not for itself
alone, but instead in the service of the Being of beings. By defining human Dasein in this away,
Heidegger sought to go beyond the “humanism” that deñnes humanity as existing solely for itself.
In 1941, he quoted an old Greek saying, meleta to pan, Take into care beings in the whole.”16
Taking beings into care means not only intervening ontically to preserve them, but more importantly
holding open the clearing in which they can show up as beings. The fonner kind of caring may be
misguided unless the latter kind takes place appropriately. In 1946, describing Dasein as the
“shepherd of Being,” Heidegger urged people not to disclose beings exclusively as raw material for
modern technology. 17 Allegedly, there are aspects of earth (nature) that cannot be brought to light
within the world of modem science and technology. Recognition of this fact, so it has been argued,
may provide the basis for a respect for natural beings, a respectlacking in the modem technological
disclosure of nature.
*
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ARISTOTLFJS PRE-TECHNOLOGICAL DISCLOSURE OF BEINGS

By the l93Os, Heidegger developed in more detail his contention that the Western understanding of
Being had declined since its great beginning in ancient Greek thought. Asserting that modemity was
the nihilistic culmination of the ever-increasing self-concealment of Being, Heidegger claimed that
the powerful, but constricted technological understanding of Being was turning the earth into a
gigantic factory and humanity into the most important raw material. To prepare the way for a “new
beginning" that would disclose 'beings in alternative ways, he contrasted the early Greek
understanding of Being with the nihilistic modern understanding. Ostensibly, Western. history began
when ancient Greek Dasein was appropriated or opened up (vereignet) as the site through which
beings can “be” in the sense of being disclosed. This appropriation involved Violence.
“I-Iurnankind,” Heidegger wrote in 1935,
'

is forced into such Dasein, hurled into the affliction of such Being, because the oveı-powering order as such, in
order to appear in its power, requires a place, a scene of disclosure. The essence of Dasein opens up to us only
when understood through this need compelled by Being itself. [...] [A]t the site of its appearing, omnipotent
Being (literally) violates [vergewaIrigr, from vergewaltigen, to do Violence to, to rape] Dasein.“

According to Heidegger, early Greek thinkers experienced the Violence and strangeness involved
in humankind`s effort to know and to shape physís, usually translated as “nature.” At times, however, Heidegger virtually equated physis with ousíaz Being, presencing, manifesting. Central to
physis is kinesis, the movement by which a living being brings itself into presence by continually
going back into itself in order to unfold itself. Despite his genius, Aristotle did not fully understand
the relation between presencing and human Dasein; nor did he recognize the necessity for the tem-
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poral clearing (Ereignis, Lichtung) in which that reciprocal relation could hold. Heidegger attempted
to read Aristotle in a manner that would reveal aspects of the clearing. Hence, he drew on Aristotle”s concept of kinesis to explain how the “movement” of human temporality opens the clearing
in which beings can be- encountered as beings. Heidegger belíeved that the decline of the West
began when Plato interpreted Being as constant presence (Anwesenheit), eidos, the eternally
unchanging form. Entirely concealed in this ontology is the clearing, the no-thingness or the nihil
within which such eidos can first make itself available or intelligible to human Dasein. According
to Heidegger, millennia of obliviousness to the nihil makes possible the most fundamental kind of
nihilism.
Not surprisingly, in view of Plato and Aristotle's own use of metaphors drawing on handcraft~
production, the Romans interpreted'Greek philosophy as productionist metaphysics: “to be” means
“to be produced,” for example, to cause something merely potential to be actualized. Mctaphysics
became the quest for Being, nowdefined as the ultimate cause, ground, or foundation for beings.
Never fully revealed to the ancient Greeks, and now more hidden than ever, is the Clearing that
makes possible,Dasein's interpretative encounter with beings. With the wedding of Christian
philosophy to baleful Latin translations of crucial Greek philosophical terms, the ultimate ground
became the self-producing God. Later, Descartes tumed human reason itself into that ground, by
asserting that for something “to be” means for it to be representable as a clear and distinct idea of
the human subject. Because only quantifiable phenomena are thus representable, Being became
identified with the objects of the mathematical sciences. Nature was thus deprived of any status
apart fiom that of aniobject for scientific analysis or raw material for modern technology. Certainly,
nature is left with no “inherent worth” or “intrinsic value,” in the parlance of contemporary
environmental ethics.
HEIDEGGER, ARISTOTLE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY
\

Recently, Nancy J. Holland has argued that in his lecture-course, Arisrorle 's Metaphysics E I-3,
Heidegger not only sketches the origins of the technological understanding of Being, but also
provides “an alternative account of the relation between Dasein and the natural world, based on a

different understanding of [B]eing, an altemative with arguably important implications for
contemporary ecological questions.”'9 This altemative reconciles the relative independence and
integrity of beings with the fact that beings “are” only insofar as they manifest themselves within
the clearing constituted through Dasein. Holland would presumably agree that because Dasein does
not itself create the clearing, but instead is appropriated as it, Dasein is obligated to "care" for beíngs
in part by letting them present themselves in ways that accord with their own inherent possibilities.
ln his course on Aristotle, Heidegger focused not on physis, but rather on the meaning of two
terms profoundly related to it, namely, energeía and dynamis, usually translated as actuality and
potentiality. He emphasized that dynamis means force and capability, as well as possibility.
Aristotle himself defined dynamis as “the origin of change, an origin which as such is in being other
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than the one which is itself changing, or, if the originary being and the changing are the same, then
they are so each in a different respect.”2° Heidegger, however, refused to concede that producing
(Herstellen) is the key for understanding dynamis as the origin of change.21_ Moreover, he
eınphasized another, little- noticed aspect of dynamis, namely, Ertragsamkeit, or “bearance,”
meaning both bearing-fruit and bearing-with or enduring and resisting. “Bearance refers to dynamis
as the foundation for what withstands any attempt to change for the worse or to destroy.“22 This
sense of bearance, as Holland points out, may be discerned in Heidegger°s later concept of “earth,”
which “shatters every attempt to penetrate into it.” Even the scientific-technological will to masteıy
is impotent in the face of the self-concealing, enduring earth.23
The other aspect of bearance involves the dynamis in its “for doing, for producing: in the
orientation toward what is to be produced, there is the reference to what can be produced.”2“ That
which is produced is the ergon, or product. Aristotle's opponents, the Megarians, maintain that the
actuality (energeia) ofthe work is nothing other than what has been produced, what “is” really there.
For the Megarians, power resides only in the act of power, that is, they equate Being with what is
“present” in the sense of a being (ergon) whose production is complete. Although there is some
truth in saying that the actuality of artifacts lies in their being the final product of productivity, this
is not an adequate way to characterize all modes of Being, including the natural and the divine.
Moreover, the Megarians' exclusive focus on what is present or actual concealed not only the
complex movement (kínesis) of living beings that goback into themselves in order to bring forth
other aspects of themselves, but also the human kinesis by virtue of which Dasein holds open the
temporal-linguistic clearing in which physis - presencing, self-manifesting self-unfo1ding- can itself
be revealed as such. As Holland comments, the Megarians' error of equating Being with the ergon
is later compounded by the evolution of our understanding of nature itself, first, as the object or result of an act of (divine)
creation, and then as the merely “present-at-hand,” the object of scientific investigation or technological manipulationfs

Heidegger noted that bearance as endurance plays not only a negative role, but a constructive one
as well. For Greek thinking, the limits imposed by material are Crucial in the formation of a being.
The grain of the wood figures into the production of a cabinet. For the technological understanding
of Being, in contrast, natural beings - the earth - are treated as if they involved no inherent limits
whatsoever.
The bitch tree never oversteps its possibility. The colony ofbees dwells in its possibility. It is first the will which arran ges
itself everywhere in technology that devours the eaıth in the exhaustion and consumption and change of the anificial.
Technology drives the earth beyond the developed sphere of its possibility into such things which are no longer a possibility
and are thus the impossible.“

Elscwhere, Heidegger wrote: “The earth can show itself only as an object of assault.... Nature
appears everywhere... as the object of technology.”27 Today, all things are “challenged fo1th”to be
interchangeable raw material. The technological understanding of Being involves a disastrous
combination of subjective idealism and naive realism. On the one hand, modern man reduces
everything to the status of an object for the cognizing subject. In modernity, the subject has
swallowed everything up; all things are interpreted, valued, and assessed according to the subject' s
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_drive for power and security. Eventually, as industrialism comes to fulfıllment in the technological
age, even the subj ect-obj ect distinction is itself overcomeinsofar as everything is transformed into

I

interchangeable raw material.“
Onthe other hand, having forgotten its capacity for understanding the Being of beings, modernhumankind adheres to a na'ı've realism, according to which humans are one species among others.
Heidegger regretted that modern humankind inteıpret itself as a clever animal striving to control all
other beings in order to enhance human power, security, and comfort. Time and again, he insisted
that humans cannot be conceived merely as one being among others, and certainly nor as animals”
His anti-natural conception' of humankind had the virtue of allowing him to distinguish his thought
from the racism of National Socialism, even though he supported this movement in hopes that it
would save the West from nihilism. For some environmentalists, however, I-Ieidegger's refusal to
conceive of humankind as simply another species imbedded in the organic “web of life” puts him
in the camp of anthropocentric humanism, which conceives of nature primarily instrumentally.3°
Still, Holland maintains, I-Ieidegger°s defense of the integrity of natural beings provides the basis
for defending them from exploitation by modern technology. She maintains that “we must respect
the natural world in its own tenns, acknowledging the limits as well as potential of its `bearance.”'“
A little later, she writes: “The actuality [of a being] is independent of perception, but the
perceptibility is not. This is what underlies Heidegger' s doctrine of what one might call
“metaphysical respect.”°32 Such respect arises from acknowledging the relative independence and
integrity of beings, which may be What Heidegger had in mind when he once spoke of their “dignity”
33
Although such respect might forın the basis for an
(Würde) in distinction from their “value.”
environmental ethic, critics would expect Heidegger to define both the meaning of and the basis for
such “dignity.” Philosophers have not yet agreed whether one can successfully identify and defend
any property - ontical or ontological - which would require us to accord “inherent worth” even to
humans, much less to animals and plants, not to mention the ecosystems, mountains, and rivers
regarded as so worthy by many enviromnentalists. Heideggefs brief accounts of the “dignityf' of
living beings usually focus on their Being as physis. But for him, physis somehow means both the
manifesting (Being) ofbeings within the clearing, and the process whereby an organism unfolds its
own structure in the life-process. In my view, Heidegger never adequately reconciles these two
aspects of physis.“ Critics charge that by virtually equating them, Heidegger ends up in a kind of
“ontological aestheticisrn,” which celebrates the beauty of the self-manifesting of beings at the
expense of their merely “ontical” characteristics.35 Whether or not such a critique is j ustified, greater
clarity is needed regarding Heideggefs conception of physis.
'

OBSTACLES TO AN ECO-FRIENDLY INTERPRETATION OF HEIDEGGER'S PHENOMENOLOGY

Heidegger often said that humanlcind may undergo a transformation that will initiate a nondomineering way of disclosing beings. Some commentators, however, contend that such a
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transformation would be inconsistent with the basic thrust of Heideggefs thought. As noted earlier,
Thomas J. Sheehan asserts that Heidegger himself saw no escape ñ'om the nilıilism of technological
modemity.“ For Heidegger, nihilism has two senses: nihilism I and nihilism II. Nihilism I refers
to the Collapse of a culture's guiding values, beliefs, and ideals. Nihilism II refers to a culture°s
obliviousness about the nihil, the clearing, Ereignis, in which can take place Dasein°s
interpretative/practical encounter with beings. Ereignis cannot be grasped by the human intellect,
which is capable only of comprehending beings as beings. Allegedly, nihilism II makes possible
nihilism I, i.e., the obscuration of Ereignis makes Dasein blind to its ontologically unique
endowment. Consequently, Dasein interprets itself merely as the clever animal seeking control of
everything through modern science and technology. Sheehan argues, however, that in Heideggefs
own view, Aristotle°s thought ultimately leads to nihilism I. Moreover, even if a few philosophers
point toward Ereignis, thereby minimally easing nihilism II, this fact cannot' in and of itself influence

I

nihilism I. Dasein°s capacity for (perhaps) completely disclosing beings is not incompatible with
the fact that Dasein is not only blind to Ereignis, but incapable of cornprehending it even when a
sideways glance is caught of it. The ethical, political, and social challenges posed by the looming
possibility of the total disclosure of beings must be met with means other than those used by

l

Heideggerians meditating upon Ereignis.
At one time, Heidegger did seem to think that disclosing nihilism II could transfonn nihilism I.
In fact, he defended his involvement with National Socialism as part of his own philosophical effort
to overcome (Überwínden) nihilism. Later on, however, having abandoned this disastrous political
engagement, he spoke not of überwindung, but rather of Verwindung. As Sheehan comments,
Verwínding involves not the overcoming of nihilism I, but instead of “a “freeing' of oneself from
social and cultural nihilism by seeing its rootedness in a deeper and unsurpassable °nihilism° that is
in fact the human condition.”37 If Sheehan is right, Heidegger's well-known utterance that “only a
god can save us now” is best read ironically, given his views about the inevitability of Dasein
interpreting beings ever more completely. Moreover, his talk of a dispensation (Geschick) that may
enable Dasein to interpret beings in a non-domineering way is best read as an instance of
mythologizing that has been described as Heidegger°s “private religion.”38
Sheehan observes that understanding everything as raw material is possible only insofar as Dasein
still exists within the clearing that makes beings available to Dasein. Heidegger remarked: “Even
if the contemporary and closest humankind, technologized and equipped to the outmost, is in a
planetary condition for which the general distinction between “war and peace“ belongs to things gone
by, even than humanity still lives 'poetically° on this earth....” He immediately adds, however, the
following: “....but he lives in essential opposition (Gegenwesen) to poetry and hence without need
and therefore inaccessible for its essence.”3° Here, Heidegger gives with one hand what he takes
away with another. True, modernity does disclose the Being of beings, but not the poetizing mode
of Being heralded by H!lderlin, nor the self-blossoming mode of Being~physis - revealed by
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Aristotle. To experience an alternative way of disclosing beings, Heidegger maintained, huınankind
must become attuned to its own profound lack, its ontological need. Self-assertive humankind
discloses all beings as flexible raw material without any internal limits. Such disclosure is a nihilism
that correlates with humanism, “the ideology which asserts that human [B]eing is fulfilled in abetting
the limitless availability and intelligibility of everything that is.”4° At times, Heidegger suggested
that humarıkind rej ect modemity and become open for a new mode of ontological understanding that
enables Dasein to become rooted again in the earth. Elsewhere, however, he asserted - for example,
in his essay, “Über die -_Linie,” dedicated to Ernst Jünger - that there is nc alternative to the
teclınological disclosure of Being, which involves the correlation between nature as raw material and
Dasein as the Gestalt of the worker~soldier using such raw material in the quest for ever greater
power, security, and comfort.“ Many commentators on Heidegger conclude that the technological
disclosure of beings decreases Daein's overall capacity for ontological disclosure. Sheehan
maintains, however, that far from offering a constricted disclosure of beings, modern science may
reveal them more thoroughly than ever before. Hence, he asks: “Why are they correlative in an
apparently zero-sum way, such that the increase in the power and domination of the Gestalt of the
worker would necessarily' entail the decrease in the power of appropriation [Ereigm's]?”42 The
scientific-technological disclosure of beings has made possible extraordinary improvements in
human well bieng, but that disclosure also poses enormous social, ethical, political, and political
problems, which some people claim is leading to nihilism, in the sense of nihilism I. Nevertheless,
the technological disclosure of beings does not refiect a constriction in the clearing/Ereignis. In
other words, the history of Being from the pre-Socratics to the present day cannot be understood in
terms of growing obliviousness to the clearing; instead, the clearing makes possible the rise of
modern science and technology.
Heidegger assigns to human Dasein an extraordinary position, outside the great chain of being
and cosmos, even outside of Being itself, but inside the “truth” (Ereignis, clearing) of Being.
Heidegger rendered Parmenides' famous saying, “Being and thinking are the same” (ro gar auto
noein estin te kai einai), as “There is a reciprocal bond between apprehension [Dasein's ontological
understanding] and Being."43 This “guiding principle of Western philosophy” names Ereignis, that
is, the groundless opening that makes possible Dasein°s interpretative encounter with beings.
Heidegger stated: “We always say too little about “Being itself when, in saying “Being,” we leave
out presence io the human essence and thereby fail to recognize that this [human] essence itself goes
to make up “Being'.”44 If Dasein is essentially openness for the self-manifesting of beings, beings
themselves are inherently inclined to make themselves completely accessible to human Dasein. As
Sheehan says, “entities are ontologically “ad hominem”.”'l5 Hence, nihilism I (teclmological
modernity) arises not because Ereignis conceals itself, but instead because Ereignis occurs at all:
Insofar as the essence of entities entails their presence to human cognítion and will, it also entails that they are disposed

robe picked up and used,

to be reshapedas poioumena - and endlessly so. The endless accessibility of the real is at the
core of the Greek-Western vision of [B]eing, which from the pre-Socratics up tc Heidegger, has affirmed the infinity of
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the intelligibility (and thus the transformatibility) of to on, an infinity that is correlative to the infinite reach of nous.“

l

If Sheehan is right, there is no basis in Heidegger”s own ontology for his critical portrayal of
modern technology as a highly attenuated disclosure of beings. Contrary to Heideggefs yearning
for the post- or non-technological era of the fourfold (earth and sky, gods and mortals), and contrary
to some environmentalisfs longing for an era before modem technology, Sheehan argues that
'

we would be doing [B]eing-itself no favors if wejust let entities 'be' in the sense of leaving them pristine and untouched,
perhaps even unknown. To let entities he means to let them bepresent, that is, to take them as endlessly engagable. And
we do that by endlessly engaging them...., and yes, by letting them be submitted to the domination of the worker in the
inevitable humanization of nature and the naturalization of man.“

In effect, Sheehan is saying that from their own side beings “want” to be disclosed and utilized
by humankind. Ereignis itself entails this. Moreover, according to Arístotle, insofar as humans
pursue their desire to know, they are seeking to become godlike. Humans can become godlike,
because they share to some extent in God's own nature. Writes Sheehan:
i

But this means that, whether or not the project is ever actually fulñlled, Aristotle has opened up to human beings the
possibility of the total knowledge (and along with that knowledge, the control) of everything that is insofar as it is.
Aristotle's theology isthe first technology, and modem technology is only the last theology. The 'death of God" begins
with the first sentence of the Metaphysics, and after it nihilism will be only a mopping up exercíse..... [I-I]encefoıth in
Westem thought theos, the highest instance of physis, will be a symbol for the goal and scope of technology: the
humanization of nature and the naturalization ofman.“

In this exegetical tour de force, Sheehan concludes that the ontological kernel of Heidegger's
thought is consistent With Marxism and liberalism, the progressive ideologies according to which
humankind is both capable of and entitled to transform nature in infinite ways. Clearly, this
conclusion would be palatable neither to most I-Ieideggerians, nor to most environmentalists, for
whom progress amounts to an ideological justífication for the exploitation of nature. In Sheehan's
view, however, Heidegger°s dislike for modenıity reflected personal and political considerations that
cannot be reconciled with the gist of his thought. Sheehan seeks to rescue Heidegger froınneoChristian eschatology, according to which Being will one day reveal itself again, thereby saving
humankind fi'omtecl1nologicalnihilism.49 According to Sheehan, the real eschaton concerns “the
ultimate, unsurpassablefacrum,” that humankind lives “into and out of appropriation [Ereı'gm's] .”5°
Humankind must come to tenns with both the insecurity and power imposed by this destiny, i.e.,
nihilism II, obliviousness to the clearing/ Ereignis. Philosophers may leam something profound
from Heidegger's discussion of the clearing, but, writes Sheehan, “the future of the humanization
of nature and naturalization of man, is decided not in classrooms or philosophy conference, nor in
libraries or texts. It is being decided in the hills and in the streets, in the boardrooms and the
maqu1`las.”51

CONCLUSION
Sheehan is the leading exegete of Heidegger's Aristotle-interpretation. For this reason, readers must
take seriously bis striking conclusions that nihilism II cannot be overcome, that Heidegger`s thought
is ultimately irreconcilable with a nostalgic and anti-anthropocentric environrnentalism, and that
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Western history involves not decline, but instead the gradual (progressivel) unfolding of the
extraordinary ontical power with which humankind has been- inexplicably endowed. Many
Heideggerians, particularly those who affirın Heidegger's pertinence for enviromnental philosophy,
however, Would complain that Sheehan either ignores or minimizes aspects of Heidegger's thought
that suggest the possibility of a non-domineering disclosure of nature”
Moreover, even if such Heideggerians concede that later Heidegger mythologizes Being (which
supposedly reveals itself, hide_s itself, initiates new beginnings, etc.), they could argue that his
analysis of early Greek thinking reveals an alternative conception of Being than the teclmological
one. The fact that the technological understanding of Being happens toprevail currently does not
mean either that it is inevitable or enduring.
_
Presumably, the excesses of the technological disclosure of beings could be tempered by
acknowledging two things: first, following Aristotle, that living beings tend both to preserve and to
unfoldg themselves according to their own internal possibilities; and second, that humans have a
responsibility to respect the integrity and relative independence of natural beings, even though often
using those beings in order to serve human ends. If the Kantian doctrine of respect for persons is
based on insight into human existence, as Heidegger°s himself suggested, then respect for animals,
plants, and .even ecosystems may be based on insight into their own modes of Being. The fact that
plants, animals, and ecosystems “show up” as beings only through Dasein°s interpretative activity
does not give Dasein a license to treat such beings in any way whatsoever, any more than the fact
that other persons show up through such activity gives Dasein license to treat persons without due
respect. Endowed with great disclosive capacities, Dasein is also burdened with unparalleled
responsibilities to “care” for beings.
Although he agreed that modern technology culminates Aristotle's metaphysics, Heidegger also
maintained at times that the technological disclosure of beings is as narrow as it is powerful. In
regard to how living beings are disclosed by natural science and machine technology, Heidegger
stated that
an original rqfierence ro things fs ıızissing
We feel that what zoology and botany investigate concerning ani-mals and
plants and how they investigate it may be correct. But are they still animals and plants? Are they not machines duly
prepared beforehand ofwhich one aftenvards even admits that they are “cleverer than we are”?”

In other words, -Heidegger would contest the conclusion that the teclmological disclosure of
beings exhausts their possibilities, even if such disclosure enables “infmite” shaping and altering of
such beings. In a world other than the technological world, beings can “be” other than as scientific
objects or raw material. Beings still need Dasein as the site for their self-manifesting, but can any
particular world make possible a totalizing disclosure of beings?
Even if Heidegger did insist that the technological disclosure of Being is merely partial, however,
Sheehan is right about this: the fact that Dasein was thrown into the clearing at the beginning of
Westem history offers no reason to expect that Dasein will be thrown into a differ`ent-posttechnological, non-domineering-Clearing in the future. Instead, there are far better grounds for
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thinking that “this is it.“ If so, the progressive reading of Western history, according to which
humankind will eventually achieve a godlike power over beings, would make more sense than
Heidegger's reading of history as a decline into the nihilisın II that makes nihilism I possible.
Additionally, as I noted earlier, Heidegger°s insistence not only on the pre-eminence of human
Dasein among all beings, but also on the fact that Dasein cannot be conceived as an animal, poses
grave problems for many of those who want to enlist his thought for environmentalism. Finally, the
fact that he so readily used his thought to support National Socialism should alert Greens to the
dangers posed by ec0faScism.54
In closing, let me suggest that Sheeharfs effort to reconcile a progressive reading of history, fiom
Aristotle to modem technology, with Heidegger's phenomenological onto logy might be transfonned
by re-introducing a certain conception of Spirit, panentheism, which Sheehan - like most modems
prefers to exclude. According to panentheism, Spirit manifests itself in evolutionary processes in
terms of an enormously complex hierarchy, which includes material nature and consciousness, but
Spirit is not exhausted by any such manifestation. Spirit is the clearing, understood as absolute nonduality. Appropriating Dasein as the agent that will interpret beings, Spirit fulfills itself in the
historical process by which humans (and comparable beings elsewhere) discover and actualize their
own incipient divine powers. Such a conception, which I cannot develop here, emphasizes that the
transcendent dimension of Spirit accompanies its immanent dimension. According to the perennial
wisdom, compassíon -including compassion for all sentient beings - spontaneously arises with
increasing wísdom. A wiser humankind would treat all sentient being less bnıtally than we do today.
The capacity for technological control over beings does not constitute wisdom, but neither does
Wisdom involve denying that such power may or even ought to be the destiny of our species.
Sharing with Nietzsche and other modems an antipathy for the otherworldliness of the ontotheological tradition, Heidegger reduced Spirit°s transcendence to the radical finitude of Western
Dasein. In doing so, however, he -like other moderns - limited the possibility of a serious dialogue
among contemporary cosrnologists, environmental philosophers, and teachers fiom diverse spiritual
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MACHINATION, SCIENCE,-AND TECHNOLOGY
DENNIS E. SKOCZ
Is modem natural science the foundation afmodern technology- as supposed - or is it alneady irselflhefundamemal structure
ofteclınological thinking: the determining anticipation and incessant incursion ofıechnological representation imo the
developing and institutiııg machination ofmodem technology?
- Martin Heidegger, Greetings to the Tenth Heidegger Conference, l976

Heidegger invites us to think the relationship between modem science and technology, suggests that
it is not as we might suppose it to be, and provides a hint as to how we might better understand it.
Taking up that invitation we begin by asking: should science and technology be understood in
a side-by-side comparison, specifically in such a way that one would be conceived as the “cause”
of the other?
Commonly, technology is seen as “applied science” such that modem science is the “cause,” that
which makes possible and brings about modern technology. Science discovers the universal and
necessary laws of nature and then technology applies this knowledge to practical tasks. On this
account, astronomy gives us celestial navigation; Newton's laws make possible rocketry; Charles'
and Boyle's laws, the extemal combustion engine. The relationship seems patently obvious, a
truism, and yet Heidegger suggests - with his “as supposed" - that this is not quite right.
Perhaps Husserl was closer to the mark when, in the The Origin ofGeometry, he gave primacy
to technology (life-world technical praxis) and explained the emergence of the ideal objects and
relationships of scientific knowledge from the objects of the everyday world of lived experience.“
In his account, “practical needs” drive technical praxis to “pret`er” certain regularities of form (e.g.
“straight lines” and “smooth surfaces”) and to gradually "improve" these while progressing from
rough to precise measurement. This technico-practical activity takes one to the threshold of an
“idealizíng” activity which nonetheless bases itself on the “pregivens of this factual humanity and
human surrounding world." Husserl does not say so but the textbook historical interpretation has
it that Egyptian pyramid-building and irrigation technology lead to Greek (Euclidean) geometry:
thus science (albeit classical and mathematical) from technology (ancient). This is surely a plausible
explanation.
Could we combine the two explanations in a “virtuous" (vice vicious) cycle so that each science and technology - are conceived as giving impetus to the other? The science of opties
produces the microscope which makes possible cell biology which Isaac Newton hímselfproposed
the following relationship between practical mechanics and geometry: “Therefore geometry if
founded in mechanical practice and is nothing but that part of universal [i.e. scientific] mechanics
which accurately proposes and demonstrates the art of measuring.“2 Practice provides impetus to
theory which then guides practice.
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To be sure, historiographic research might call into question any given causal link - were lenses
bom of optics or was it the other way around?3 Moreover, logico-epistemological inquiıy under the
aegis of the philosophy of science would surely question the concept of “causa1ity” at Work in these
and like explanations.
What is common to both explanations is the underlying notíon of two activities with their
respective and proper objects and methods standing in a yet to be specified sense of causal
relationship to one another - a sense which roughly holds that one precedes and “brings about,”
effects, or makes it possible for the other to come into existence. Might this implicit way of
conceptualizing the issue of the relationship, however, prejudice or fiustrate an answer? Does it not
employ the “cause-effect” relationship, a staple of scientific inquiry and technological practice? Is
it possible to use a tool of science and technology to understand either in its essence? Might there
be a hidden circulaıity in employing the principle paradigm of science and technology to their own
interpretation?
Heidegger°s statements in The Question Concerning Technology upset any simplistic effort to
order the two. On the one hand, Heidegger says, “the modern physical theory of nature prepares the
way first not simply for technology but for the essence of modern technology.“ On the other hand,
not one page further, he says, “modern technology is, from the point of view of the essence holding
sway within it, the historically [not chronologically] earlier.”
The way out of this confusing and seemingly contradictory formulation and conundrum is indi-

cated by way of the hint in Heídegger”s word “machination” from his 1976 greetings, quoted above.
Machination, as developed in Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), will provide the basis
for understanding technology, science, and the relationship of the two.5 The notíon of machination
will not upset what Heidegger has given us to understand regarding science and technology and their
relationship in other contexts and works. Quite to the contrary, the reflection on these issues arguably achieves a depth, coherence, and relevance for understanding our current situation by thinking
them through in terms of machination. Machination itself, we shall see, is a seemingly simple notion
which in actuality affords access to the frontiers of machine technology and the cutting-edge of
science even as it echoes the earliest thinking about doing, making, knowing, and being.
Contributions makes numerous references to the machinational character of science and
technology. In Section 67, Heidegger tells us the “machination relates to techne” and that
“technicity,” the mathematical, and the system are “further consequences” of the rnachinational.
Section 73 refers to “modem science and its ownınost rootedness in machination” Further along in
that section, Heidegger speaks of the present-day university as an institution and place to which the
“machinational being” of science belongs. Paragraph 19 of Section 76, refers to “the growing
consolidation of the machinational-technical essence of all sciences.“ In paragraph 2 of that section,
Heidegger describes science as the “machinational opening of a sphere of accuracies within an
otherwise hidden
zone of truth.“
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None of the above tells us what machination is. What is the sense of “machination”?
Not to be mistaken for a human activity or compoıtment, machination, Heidegger tells us, is a
“manner of the essential swaying of being" (Section 61) which “names a certain truth of being”
(Section 67) "The essence of machination lies in making: “the name should immediately point to
making (poiesis techne)” (Section 61).
The English words, make and made, have distinct but related senses which will help to clarify the
machinational essence of science and technology. Altogether Webster 's I7zird New International
Dictionary identifies some 27 meanings of the verb “make” used transitively and an additional nine
intransitive meaningsf The Pons Collins Grosswoeterbuch delineates without enumeration an array
of meanings as extensive as the English, clustering usages around related verbs, like verursachen,
which express a sense of machen.7 Notably, in German machen has the sense of tun, to do, so that
what Heidegger says about doing, process, operating and the operational falls within the linguistic
sense of machen and the machinational. From the rich and subtly varying senses of "make" in both
English and Gemıan, we select only a handful which shall serve as “markers” of the machinational.
To make is to produce; something produced is made. To make is also to make happen, to cause,
to effect, to bring about. Finally, to make is to force, to compel: “the devil made medo it." All of
these related senses conspire to “make up” the essence of machination. I-leidegger's “defınition” of
machination (Section 67) as “the domination of making and what is made” [emphasis added]
comprises all these senses: making as process; the made as product; and the compelling and forceful
character of machination in the “genus” of Heidegger's definition: domination - one which includes
the “all dominating” cause-effect relationship which emerges in the Judeo-Christian notion of
creation (Section 61).
The role of machination in technology seems self-evident. Technology is equipment and
machíneıy. The information age has brought us to understand that technology includes both
hardware and software, the real and the virtual. Technology is technique, a process for production,
the making of things, effecting them and causing them to be. It is also itself something produced.
Technology is all about cause and effect: using our knowledge of causes in order to bring about
beneñcial effects. Common sense understands the “forcefulness” (domination) of technology in
terms of power: technology empowers us. By means of technology we are put in a position of
dominance. And of course, technology and machination is a human making and doing.
We know from The Question Concerning Technology that for Heidegger such a characteıization
of technology is superficial and does not comprehend the essence of teclmology. The essence of
technology is nothing technological. Nor is it a doing of man. Contributions echoes this latter
thought with respect to machination - “this word [machination] does not name a human
coınportment”; as noted above, Contributions goes on to make the positive characterization, “but,
[it is] a manner of the essential swaying of being” (Section 61)
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Retuming to The Question Concemíng Technology, technology is a revealing which challenges
forth, demands that nature make itself available for this setting upon and expediting. This
domination makes nature into a standing reserves It exhibits all that presences itself within its
unconcealing in the light of the cause-effect nexus - even Godlg The impression comes to prevail
that all that man encounters is his “construct,” an “illusion” that leads to the “delusion” that human
being ultimately only meets up with itself so that the human being relinquishes its being as the one
addressed, “the one spoken to.”'°
This brief reprise of Heídegger's The Question Concerníng Technology hardly begins to do it
justice, but the intention here is to recall from this inexhaustible refiection what we might call
“markers” of machination: making as compelling in the challenging forth; the made as construct;
the ordering according to cause and effect.
We have sketched the way in which the machinational prevails in modern technology. How does
machination “dominate” in modem science? Science, after all, is theory, not practice. It observes,
it does not produce. If science is machination, and machination is the domination of making and the
made, would this mean that nature, what science studies, is somehow produced by science?
Science°s making of things-made begins with a making-happen, a compelling. Science
challenges forth, has its own Herausfordern which Heidegger alludes to numerous times but
carefully traces in theevolution of experiment from experience.
Experiment is not just one of many characteristics of modern science which one might observe
and note in a survey of scientific practice conducted across a variety of scientific disciplines.
Experiment goes to the heart of modern science. it is the way in which modern science challenges
foıth, or demands of nature that it yield us knowledge of itself in accordance with our prior questions
and specifications. Experimental method represented a revolution in science: between its
knowledge and that of casual experience lies an enormous gulf. Kant reflects the revolutionaıy
character of experiment and modern science in the “Preface to the Second Edition” of the Cririque
ofPure Reason and he describes there the “challenging forth” implicit in experiment. Referring to
the experiments of Galileo, Torricelli, and Stahl, Kant writes:
a light broke upon all students of nature. They leamed that reason has insight only in that which it produces after a plan of
its own, and that it must not allow itself to be kept, as it were, I nature's leading-strings, but must itself show the way with
principles ofjudgment based upon fixed laws, constraíning nature to give answer to questions reas0n's own determining”
[emphasís added]

Reason, Kant continues, holding in hand its principles and experiments based on those principles
must “approach nature” in the manner of “an appointed judge who compels the witnesses to answer
questions which he himself has fonnulated.”“
Heidegger°s “genius” in the following description of the emergence of experience as experiment
is to trace the subtle shifis in the relationship of knower and known which make possible the change
from a purely passive encounter with something and the active effort to bring experience Within the
rule-bound framework of our understanding.
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Following Heidegger's path in Contributions (Sections 77-78), we see that initially, experience
means “to come upon something” in such a way that what one comes upon actually “comes upon
one ... encounters one without one's having to do anything."
This sense of experience changes into the next, “going up to something” exploring, but only with
initiative vis~à-vis the thing, but
respect to “how it looks." With this step the observer takes some
defers to what it gives of itself. Next, “mere looking around” becomes an “observing that pursues”
The observirıg is a testing which questions. The thing is not merely taken as given but examined under different conditions of encountering. lndeed, we “provide ourselves with certain experiences”we alter our relation to the thing, possibly using instruments - all with a view to “gathering up of
many and varied observations” which, however, lack, at this stage, a definite arrangement. Working
out a regularity” becomes the thmst of the next “stage” of experience/experiment.The object is “what
constantly retums under the same conditions.” The final and full sense of experiment is an “aiming
at rules” in which “the rule [Regelhafie] and only this determine in advance what is objective
At this point experience becomes experiment and modern science holds sway. One could make
Heidegger thinking on the nature of experiment the subject of a separate reflection but the point here
is to see that experiment (vice casual experience or even earnest observíng) is the way in which
science “challenges forth” and that such “challenging forth” as compelling, making nature yield us
nature
knowledge of itself, is part of the machinational essence of modem science. In technology,
is challenged to make its energy available to human being. In science, nature is challenged to
disclose itself, but only insofar as it is “rulefu1,” only if it conforms to the requirement that science
imposes that itmake itself available to science°s measure and measuring (Masordnung) (Section 78).
As experimental, modem science is machinational. It is a making happen. Experiment is a
happening made to happen. Experiment entails making nature disclose itself to the measure of
science. But experiment is nothing merely occasional and arbitrary. Experiment is also exacting
procedure and method, so that in experiment still another sense of the machinational essence of
modem science manifest itself, i.e. science as a “mechanism for knowing.” Before science is a body
of knowledge or a theory of the world, it is such a “mechanism”; it is method and procedure (Section
76, paragraph 2) The “machinational essence of science” requires a procedure that explains via cause
and effect.“ In this requirement, science is doubly machinational, first in imposing the requirement
and then in the notion of causality itself which, as we learn from The Question Concerning
Technology, is a making-happen.“
According to Contributions, the task of science is to intensify its making and doing, proceeding
and operating, to achieve results (Section 76, pp. 102-3). Heidegger does not say so, but we can call
the results of scientific making/doing the product of science, what it makes. Results, Heidegger
cautions, should not be understood as exposing the basic character of the being which defines a
domain ofresearch” Results are essentially related to the methods of investigation which produce
them. Method aims at results; results are always the results of a method. Method determines in
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advance what will count as a result so that when the results come in there should be no surprise.
“Something always comes out.”'5
But science not only produces results, it produces theories. It is in the modern understanding of
theory that we see yet another evidence of the machinational character of science, for theory is not
the pure vision of what gives itself to us of itself but what the knowing subject as scientist makes of
nature. Theory is construct. From the “Age of the World Picture": “The fundamental event of the
modern age is the ccnquest of the world as picture. The word "picture" [Bild] now means the
structured image [Gebíld] that is the creature of man's producing which represents and sets before.”'°
When science is so thoroughly machinational what becomes of nature, that which science
investigates? Does it become product? The passage cited immediately above suggests that it does.
If so, then the “makeable” in I-Ieidegger's definition of machination would be nature itself and the
upshot of scientiñc machination would be the production ofnature.
But nature itself is not a static ensemble of beings. lt is a being, a motion (kinesis) which has the
principle (arche) of its being in itself." When the being of nature is understood machinationally,
then the being of nature is understood as self-making. Indeed, the culmination of the machinational
essence of science occurs when the nature (physis) is so understood.
Heidegger has told us that the transition/difference between Greek and modem science is that
between Herstellung understood as putting foıth into appearance and production as making.“ For
the Greeks, nature puts itself forward into appearance. Physis is the very name for this emerging into
appearance from out of itself. To call this “growth," is correct but possibly misleading, because for
modem science growth is understood as re-production. The paradigm for production is the
fabrication of the artisan in which the paradigm - as eidos, vision, pre-vision - becomes that in
virtue of which matter is formed to make the thing. To say that nature makes itself is to conceive
of nature as an anifact of nature - a paradoxical fonnulation of what is nonetheless deeply embedded
in our present-day understanding of nature.
Perhaps the most thought-provoking statement regarding the machinational is the following from
Contributions (Section 61): “. _. self-making by itself is the interpretation of physis that is
accomplished by rechne and its horizon of orientation, so that what counts now is the preponderance
of the makeable and the self-making, in a word: machination.” The statement also suggests how we
might iind such self-making: Techne brings the interpretation of physis within techne's orientation
precisely by interpreting physis as self-making by itself
In the Physis essay, Heidegger notes how plant growth has come to be understood as a selfmaking." In The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger wams of the danger in
characterizing the organism (already a suspect notion for Heidegger) in tenns of self-production,
self-regulation, and self-renewal. So conceived, the organism could be misunderstood to “contain”
a “vital agent" or “causal factor”; this would account for the three characteristics, but it leaves the
“essence of life” entirely unthought.2°
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Perhaps the best example of self-making is from the realın of genetics, in which DNA, the
blueprint, becomes the paradigm - and effective agency - according to which nucleotides (the
“matter”) combine to (re)produce the chromosome. One “piece” of nature, the DNA strand both
product and paradigm - “urızips” and combines with available nucleotides acids to fonn two new
strands of DNA. The combination proceeds according to the mechanisms (causal links) of organochemical bonding between the nucieotides in the DNA strand and available acids in the nucleus of
the cell in which the process plays out. Jacques Monod, who with Andre Lwoff and Francois Jacob
was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1965 for elucidating the replication mechanism of genetic material
and the manner in which cells synthesis protein, offers a more detailed and precise description of the
process in his book Chance and Necessity, An Essay on the Natural Philosophy ofModern Bz'ology.2]
It goes well beyond the scope of the present paper - or its author”s primitive knowledge of
biochemistry - to replicate Monod's description of genetic replication. The language and the
metaphors he uses in the course of his description are striking, however, in view of what Heidegger
says about self-making and the ancient doctrine of making (poeisis/rechne) with its references to
eidos and paradigma. “The genetic code (strictu sensu) is the rule which prescríbes, given
polynucleotide sequence, the corresponding polypeptide sequence,” Monod explains." Here we see
a “prescribing rule” embedded in a polynucleotide sequence; the rule is that sequence. It does its
“work” of making or building a new DNA molecule through a sequence of biochemical bondings.
It is nothing of a higher order outside the production process but is itself a biochemical product
within theprocess. “Messenger RNA” (doing double duty as artisan and paradigm in one) is
characterized as “template for the sequential assembly of the amino acids.”” The “ribosome” is the
“Workbench upon which the various components of the [replication] mechanism are put together.“
Given the demonstrably appropriate language of making, assembling, producing, and effecting
throughout the description it is no surprise when Monod declares, “The organism is a selfconstructing machine. Its macroscopic structure is not imposed upon it by outside forces. It shapes
itself autonomously by dint of constructive interactions.”25
Nature then makes itself, is a self-making. It is a making because matter is formed according to
a pre-given blueprint so as to bring something into being, í.e. to make something present-at-hand.
The making proceeds entirely by virtue of (efficient) causal relations which obtain between the
organo-chemical constituents. It is a self-making because nothing outside the process of nature
intervenes to bring about the design in the blueprint. Notably, all of this takes place well-removed
from any “space of appearance” and the understanding of nature implicit in this process is well
removed from the Greek notion of emergence into appearance.
If in science, machination culminates in “self-making” _(e.g. microbiological replicationfreproduction) and the machinational expresses itself in both modem science and technology, is there
a self-making within the domain of technology? Consider what Heidegger says in the Ister book
where he writes about machine tool factories, in which machines make machines.“ If this is an
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example of “self-making,” then we have not only a self-making operative in science, but manifestly
within the realm of modem teclmology as well.
The tum-key factory, robotics, artificial intelligence - these suggest a kind of autonomy (qua
automaticíty) that derives fi'om a “self-making." The examples do not, however, penetrate to what
is essential, to what applies to technology as a whole and in its essence. From the “Isteı-” book:
“Conceived metaphysically, modern machine technology is a specific kind of 'truth,' in terms of
which the essence of the actuality of everything actual is detemiined. ... for technology itself is selfsubsistent.”” The concluding line expresses the distinctive autonomy which characterizes the
essence of technology. Technology, it implies, is not just a means available to human “end-setting."
The distinction of means and ends itself is questionable, indeed “erroneous" because it fails to grasp
the essence of modern technology." This essence, The Question Concerning Technology tells us,
is a “destining of revealing.”” The revealing discloses “the real everywhere” as the “standing

reserve.”3°
It might seem that technology renders nature subservient to human purposes and thereby discloses
itself as subservient in its essence - decidedly not self-subsístent! But far from being itselfa pliant
means at the service of humankind, the essence of modem technology “is unfolding a kind of
domination of its own.”3' In disclosing “the real everywhere" as “standing reserve" the disclosure
is one which not only “blocks” other, earlier modes of disclosure but disclosure itself (“primal
tmth") - thereby, we may infer, “hiding” its own disclosing from itself." The essence of modem
technology, then, “dominates” inasmuch as it “destines” us into a peculiar kind of disclosure, one
that precludes and occludes: "blocks" any other kind of disclosure and then hides its precluding
disclosure from itself. We might proceed to reflect on the “danger” which this peculiar disclosing
harbors and the “sa1vation” enfolded within the danger, but that is fully the subject of a separate and
demanding reflection.
Self-subsistent, revealing/destining, unfolding/dominatíng: might these temis name the essence
of the technical as [a] physis? Is not physís an unfolding? a revealing? “Physı's,” Heidegger tells
us, "_ ..denotes self-blossorning emergence ..., opening up, unfolding, that which manifests itself in
such unfolding and perseveres and endures.”” ls not physis “self-subsistent” - a being having the
principle (arche ) of its being within itself? Does not principle as arche mean not only that from
which a being originates but that which from the beginning or origin orders, controls, and
dominates?“ If, as Heidegger says, physis is arche, is physis, then, not a power which holds sway,
rules, destines and dominates? lndeed Heidegger says that “Physis means the power that emerges
and the enduring realm under its sway” and he adds that “this power is the overpoweıing presence
that is not yet mastered [bewaltigt] in thought” a dominatíng power.“
If the essence of modem technology is a physis then consider where our path of thinking leads
when we recall what Heidegger says about science: modem science addresses a nature that is
“accomplished” by techne. To this we add: modem technology comes into its own as a kind of
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nature. Is the “end result” of the machination of the machinational the technification of nature
(physis “accomplished” as techne) and the “naturalization” of the technical (technology as a physis),

sothat, to use an Hegelian expression, “each passes into the other” and the distinction between the
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technical and the natural blurs? Could it be that the blurring is not some defect of thought, the
product of “fuzzy 1ogic,” but the very way in which being unfolds as machination? ls it the destiny
of machination to “make a blur of things” - confounding science and technolgy - but, more deeply,
making nature, artifact and the technical a nature unto itself?
Let us reprise the course of reflection. We have addressed Heidegger”s challenge to think the
relationship of science and technology from the standpoint of machination, a notion which arguably
receives its fullest exposition in Conrribuáons. Both modern science and modern technology spring
from the same source. Both are ways in which machination holds sway. Both manifest a
challenging forth. Technology demarıds that nature (as standing reserve) make itself available for
technology°s expediting and setting upon. Science, via experiment, demands that nature make itself
available to its measuring and ordering. For both nature is the makeable. For each, the paradigm
of the artisan shaping the raw material of nature in virtue of a pre-given vision underlies its
distinctive making and doing. Gestell is the name that Heidegger gives to technology's allencompassing framework For science, the cause-effect paradigm of explanation becomes the
unifying measure for guiding scientific research across disciplines.
The making that underlies the essence of modern technology and modern science culminates in
a self-making. For Heidegger, the machine tool factory embodies the self-making of modern
technology. We have suggested that genetics manifests the understanding of nature as self-making
which holds sway in modem science. The full measure of significance in the self-making essence

of machination is only indicated in these examples.
“Self-making” requires a different accentuation depending on whether it refers to science or

il

technology. For the science of nature - where nature, since Aristotle, is determined as that which
has the principle of its being within itself- the note of autonomy sounded by “self” in “self-making”
is not determinative. It is rather the shift from being to making that makes for the difference: the
shifl or turn from self-unfolding into truth to self-making understood as the production of nature by
nature.

For technology - commonly and readily understood as making the accent falls on “self.” The
shift is fiom a making by a maker outside the made to a making in which product and producer are
of the same order of being. The “autonomy” of modem technology goes deeper than automatism.
It lies within the essence of modem technology as revealing/destining or a mode of unfolding which
comes to domination.
Springing fiom a common source which can be called machination, both science and technology
exhibit what we have called markers of machninational essence: (a) a challenging forth, (b) the
emergence of production as the predominant mode-of-being and the making of nature as product,
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(c) the prevailing of the cause-effect paradigm, and (d) self-making, in which the machinational
culminates. Stemming from a common essence, science and technology do not pursue separate
íı

íf
_ ,_ › ~

courses but rather come to a common fate. The upshot of the unfolding ofthe machinational, we
suggest somewhat tentatively and speculatively, is a blurring ofscience and technology and, more
fundamentally, ofphysís and rechne - a passing of one into the other which may represent the fullest
expression and domirıation of the machinational.
Arlington, VA

.-4-

NOTES
1. Husserl, Edmund, “The Origin ofGeometry“ (manuscript written 1936) Appendix Vl, The Crisis ofEuropean Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology, translated by David Carr, Northwestem University Press, Evanston, 1970, originally published
by Martinus Nijhotf, The Hague, 1954, p. 375
_
2. Newton, lsaac. "Preface to the First Edition ofthe Principia," May 8, 1686, from Newton 's Philosophy ofNature, Selections
from His Wrirings, ed. H. S. Thayer, Hafner Publishing Company, New York, 1953, p. 10. Emphasis added.
3. BJ. Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture, translated by C. Dikshoom, Oxford University Press,
London/Oxford/New York, 1969, first published in Amsterdam, 1950. See the discussion of "Geometrica1Optics" pp. 388-91.
4. Heidegger, Martin, "'l`he Question Conceming Technology." from The Question Cancer-ning Technologv and Other Essays,
Translated by William Lovitt, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1977, from a lecture November 18, 1955, p. 22
5. Heidegger, Martin, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), Translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, lndiana
University Press. Bloomington/Indianapolis, 1999. Published inGerman as Beitraege zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Vittorio
Klostemian, Frankfurt am Main, 1989 (from manuscript, 1938)
6. Webster 's Third New International Dictionary ofthe English Language, Unabridged, Philip Babcock Grove, Editor-in-Chief,
G.&C. Merriam Co., 1961
7. Pons Collins Grosswoerterbuch fuer Experten and Universitat, Peter Terrell et. Alia, Emst Klett Verlag,
Stuttgart/Muchen/Dusseldorf/Leipzig, 1999.
8. Heidegger, QCT,p. 17
9. Heidegger, QCT,p. 26
10. Heidegger, QCT, p. 27
11. Kant, lmanuel, Critique ofPure Reason, translated by Nom-ran Kemp Smith, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1965, from the
German (second edition, 1787), p. 20. Emphasis added.
12. Heidegger, Contributions, Section 76, paragraph 9, p. 102: “Although not recognized as such, the machinational essence of
beings not only justiñes but also requires, 1boundless intensitication, this thinking in 'causalities'
Emphasis added.
13. Heidegger, QCT, p. 7: “For a long time wehave been accustomed to representing cause as that which brings something about.
ln this connection, to bring about means to obtain results, effects. The causa efficiens, but one among the four causes, sets the
_standard for all causality."
14. Heidegger, Contributions, Section 76, paragraph 10, p. 103: "The decisive question for science as such is not which essential
character a being itself has that lies at the basis of the field ofthe subject matter, but rather whether with this or that procedure
a 'knowledge' i.e., a result ofthe research, may be expected."
15. Heidegger, Contributions, Section 76, paragraph 9, p. 102: "Therigor ofa science unfolds and is accomplished 1 the ways of
proceeding (depending onthe disciplinary field) and ofoperating (carrying out the investigation and the presentation), in the
'method' This way of proceeding places the field of objects in each case in a definitive direction of explainability, which
already basically guarantees that there will always be a 'result' (Something always comes out.)"
16 Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture," from QCT,(lecture of .lune 9, 1938)p. 134
17. Heidegger, “On the Essence and Concept of Physis," (manuscript written in 1939 translated by Thomas Sheehan) from
Parhmarlrs, edited by William McNeill, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 189
18. Heidegger, “Physis" p. 221: “to pro-duce [in the Greek sense] cannot men 'to make'but rather: to place something into the
unhiddenness of its appearance; to let something become present; presencing. ln those cases where the appearance merely
shows up, and in showing up only guides a know-how in the producing of it and plays an accompanying role rather than actually
performing the production there production is a making."
19. Heidegger, “Physis" p. 195: "the idea of 'organism' and of the 'organic' is a purely modem,mechanistic-technological concept,
according to which 'growing things' are interpreted as artifacts that make themselves."
20. Heidegger, Martin, The Furıdamental Concepts ofMeraphysics, translated by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, lndiana
University Press, Bloomingtonllndianapolis, 1995, from text oflecture course 1929-30, p. 223

-

í

MACHIN/m0N, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY

Monod, Jacques, Chance and Necessity, An Essay on the Natural Philosophy of Modern Biology, translated by Austryn
Wainhouse, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1971
Monod, Chance, p. 193.Emphasis added.
Ibíd.
Monod, Chance, p. 195. Emphasis added.
Monod, Chance, p. 46. Emphasis added.
Heidegger, Martin, Hoelderlin 's Hymn 'The Ister ', translated by William NcNeill and Julia Davis, Indiana University Press,
Bloomington/Indianapolis, 1996, p. 44
Heidegger, "Ister” p. 44
Heidegger, “Ister” p. 45
Heidegger, QCT, p. 25: “The essence of modern technology lies in Enframing. Enframing belorıgs within the destining of

Wi

1']

.

"I

revealíng.”

Heidegger, QCT, p. 24: “The essence of modern technology starts man upon the way of that revealing through which the real
everywhere, more or less distinctly, become standing-reserve."
Heidegger, “lster” p. 44
Heidegger, QCT, p. 27: “Thus the challenging Enframing not only conceals a former way of revealing, bringing-forth, but it
conceals revealing itself and with it That wherein unconcealment, i.e., truth, comes to pass.“
Heidegger, Martin, An Introduction to Metaphysics, translated by Ralph Manheim, Doubleday & Co., Inc., Garden City, New
York, lecture of 1935 reworked in 1953, p. ll-12
Heidegger, “Physis," p. 189
Heidegger, Introduction, p. 5.

ı¬-`

_l
v

,

_

l
t

l

149

l

`l
l

l

.l
l
l

ll
J

__,]

1

IMAGING THE 1Nv1s1BLs= HE1DsGGER*s MEDITATION

VERONIQUE FoTí

i

l

Because art, as technë, resides in a lcnowing, because such lmowing is a looking ahead into that which shows the
form and gives the measure, but which is still the invisible, and which must first be brought to vísíbility and to
the peceptibility of the work - for these reasons, such a looking ahead into what has not as yet been given to see
'

requires, in a singular way, vision and clarity.

- M. Heidegger'

1
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With a view to [its essence], art is a consecration and a strorıghold, wherein that which is actual [das Wir-klicke]
each time anew makes a gift to man of its heretofore hidden splendor, so that he may, amidst such bright- rıess,
see more purely and hear more clearly.
- M. Heidegger:

In his 1938 essay, “The Time of the World Picture” (“Die Zeit des Weltbildes”),3 Heidegger singles
out the emergence of a world picture as the mark of modemity. The world picture, as he understands
it, is not a spontaneous, or else culturally specific, symbolic image one might form of the world
(such as, for instance, a mandala), but rather the sort of picture that allows one to “get the picture”
( ı'm Bilde zu sein) 'and to use it for the purpose of installing oneself in the world understood as the
totality of beings. The picture at stake here is not visual in any significant sense; but rather, what
visuality it may possess is schematic or diagrammatic and serves to facilitate human self-orientation,
with a view to technological, or technologically inspired, productivity and mastery. It functions as
the quasi-visual encoding of the parameters of a legitimating projective conception which is, as such,
of the order of the invisible.
The loss of visuality involved is not merely a loss of seeing, but also a loss of being looked at and
seen. Taking his cue fi'om Parmenides's saying that 1:<`› yàp aótô voeív te Kai eivou (“For it is the.
same to think and to be”),'° Heidegger contrasts with such picturing a receptive openness to beings
as they in turn lay themselves open in their presencing (Anwesen) and regard her Who is prepared
to receive them:
Beings do not become such because man, to begin with, looks at them let alone in the sense of representing
them in the manner of subjective perception. Rather, man is the one who is looked at by beings, who is gathered
unto presencing close unto and by that which opens itself. To be looked at by beings and kept within their
opeııness, and thus to be home by them, to be driven about by their contradictions and marked by their schism:
That is the essence [Wesen] of man in the great Greek time of history.5
The Parmenidean verse motivates this train of thought by suggesting that thinking, far from being
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representation geared to mastery, is a receptive attunement to beings in their presencing, and that such
receptive attunement (which Heidegger terms (Vernehmen) responds to the very being of beings.
Heidegger develops the speculative reaches of these thoughts more fully and more daringly in his lecturre
course on Pannerıides, offered in 1942/43.6 Given that Parmenides refers to the unnamed goddess of his
philosophical poem as both daimon and thea, Heidegger links his own meditation on the look or the glance
to these two designations. He interprets the daimones or spirits as those who both envisage and glance into
whatever comes to presence, so that their look entrances the uncanniness of presencing into the aspect of
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familiar presences. The close similarity of the Greek terms

Gšot

151

(“look”) and Geôc (“goddesS”) attests for

hirn, similarly, to an essential Greek understanding of divinity as an appearing that looks or glances
into presencing (hereinblickende Erscheinung). The human glance itself is not an intentionality
issuing from a subject; but rather, in soliciting appearance, it also relinquishes itself to appearance,
and to being encountered by the other. As Heidegger writes:
If man, rather, experiences the look, by allowing for an encounter without reflection, as the looking-at-him of the human
being who comes toward him, then it is evident that the look of the human being encountered shows itself as that, wherein
the human being itself waits toward the other, that is, appears and is.

A similarly telling fonnulation is the following:

We need here, to be sure, to understand looking in the original and Greek way as the manner in which we encounter a
human being, in that he looks at us and, in looking, gathers himself into this dísclosive arising wherein, offering up his
essen ce without reserving a remainder, he lets himself “aríse.”8

Although the Levinasian resonance of these fonnulations is obvious, the regard (Anblick) by
Which the other solicits one's glance is not, for Heidegger, the “face,” but the aspect of being which
claims man in the openness of unconcealment. By contrast, the ascendancy of the world picture,
which is characterized by systematicity, not only suppresses the intense Visuality of a receptive
attunement to presencing, together with the rich interplay of the soliciting and the encountered
glance; but it also occludes the aspect of the invisible, of being”s enigma and emptiness, that is
glimpsed in such presencing without, of course, ever becoming a presence. This invisible, glimpsed
within the visible, yet absolutely withdrawn, is of a different order than the invisible that holds sway
in the world picture, and that is inimical to Visuality. One must guard, however, against a facile
rej ection of the picture or image? Such a rejection not only could not be justified by independent
reflection (and even cultures that observe an interdiction against picturing man or living beings have
continued to treasure the image); it is also in no way countenanced by Heidegger. He writes, to be
sure, that a questioning thinking seeks the truth of being through “the imageless saying of the word
[im bildlosen Sagen des Wortes];” and he likes to point out that what unconceals and stands
unconcealed (6t7\.r|6áç) has a privileged relationship to the word. Thus he states in Parmenides that
“the essential relation to the cpatvó!evov, to that which shows itself in unconcealment, is saying and
to say [die Sage und das Sagen].”m However, the lyric, epic, or dramatic word of the poets with
which Heidegger”s thinking sustains an essential dialogue - the word of Homer, Pindar, Sophocles,
Holderlin, Trakl, or George - is far fi'om being “imageless.” Heidegger's thinking, moreover, also
engages importantly with the visual arts which are arts of the image and of form. His intense
engagement with the painting of Cezanne and of Klee constitutes a link between his own mature
thought and that of Merleau-Ponty.“ One might speculate that the inclusive scope of the tennbilden
(given that the Visual arts are, in German, die bildenden Kunste), together with its connotation of
shaping and constructing, facilitates Heidegger's ready passage, in his discussions of visual art, from
painting to sculpture and architecture.
The importance of the artistically created image or form is brought out in I-Ieidegger°s 1935/36
essay “The Origin of the Work of Art” (“Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes”), where he asserts that,
for there to be the open or openness, a being must take up its stand and steadfastness within the open,
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whereby “it keeps the latter open and endures it.”'2 Something that is created or “brought-forth”
specifically so as to bring about “the openness 0fbeings,” or truth is, he adds, a genuine work (an
art wcrk); and the work constitutes an essential manner in which truth orients and “arranges”
(einrichtet) itself in the open. Whereas the world picture occludes the enigma of the grarıting or
refusal of presencing (which Heidegger, in “The Origin of the Work of Art,” calls “Earth”),13 the
work sets its own articulation back into the sheltering impenetrability of Earth, which juts out into
the open. Where the essential strife between Earth and “World” (understanding the latter here as a
historical configuration of unconcealment) informs the dissevering draft (Riss) that defines artistic
form in such a way as to set it back into Earth, that created form is what Heidegger terıns a Gestalt. E4
This Gestalt is closely akin to the artistically created image or plastic fonn.
One needs then to ask - beyond the indications already given - how such a Gestalt or image
differs essentially fiom the totalizing world picture, and specifically, what are the constellations of
the visible and the invisible that mark this difference. Furthermore, one needs at least to broach the
question (a question too complex for ready resolution) whether and in what ways the artistically
configured image can, at least sometimes, or even vestiginally, safeguard its power of
unconcealment against the totalizing constraints that mandate the world picture - the constraints of
the constrictive and self-absolutizing posit that Heidegger temıs Ge~stell.'5
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THE IMAGE, THAT RENDERS VISIB LE
The invisible that informs the world picture is inimical to the visible. As a reductive and totalizing

projective representation (inspired by technicity), the world picture keeps vision and the visible in
abeyance. Since vision, in its solicitation of the visible, is inherently differentiating, it resists the
yoke of representation geared to uniformity and must, from the latter's perspective, be subjugated.
Reductive totalization, and the ideal of mastery to which it is subservient, do not allow for open
encounter. Given that vision is a key arena of encounter, the totalizing world picture renders the
other (whether human or non-human) essentially invisible. The other can, to be sure, still be seen
in a certain way (and her or its visual aspect may even be glamorized by the advertising image); but
this seeing is utterly bound to the framework of the legitimizing pre-interpretation (which may allow,
at its fringes, for the “picturesque”). Such captive and constrained seeing is not genuine vision.
If the reductive totalization that informs the world picture cannot abide the otherness of the other,
neither can it tolerate any challenge to comprehensibility and predictability -the challenge posed
by manifestation as such, or by the being ofbeings. It repudiates the glance of the daimones or the
goddess that affects the familiar with strangeness; and it also seeks to minimize and regulate the play
of the human glance, subordinating it to the level gaze. It displaces the shadow play of presencing
with a daylit panorama of presences.
By contrast, the image or Gestalt created in and as the work of art renders visible; it allows one
to glimpse what otherwise tends to remain inapparent, since it is not phenomenal. In “The Origin
of the Work ofArt,” Heideggefs most telling discussion of how the work does so is perhaps not his
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foregrounded if somewhat problematic discussion of one of Van Gogh”s paintings of peasant shoes,
but rather his reflection (fraught with Hegelian allusions) of an umiamed Greek temple.“
Representational depiction is not, of course, the issue in Heideggefs meditation on the Van Gogh
painting, or even on C.F. Meyer's thing-poem (Dinggedichr) “The Roman Fountain.“ However,
the temple as an architectural work, and as a ruin, allows him to dissociate the revelatory power of
the work of art more decisively from depiction. The temple “simply stands there” on the rocky
ground, despoiled perhaps of whatever statuary or friezes may once have adorned it. Yet, as a work,
it brings a World-configuration to stand forth. World as such remains invisible and withdrawn from
contemplation; it is, as Heidegger puts it, “the ever non-obj ective that holds sway over us, so long
as thecourses of birth and death, blessing and curse, keep us transported into being.”“š Where World
holds sway, the essential decisions of history are made; and things take on the aspect that they offer
to the encountering glance. In configuıing the openness or disclosive dimensionality of World, the
aıt work keeps it open; and out of this openness, it (here the temple) “fırst gives to things their face
[Gesicht], and to humans an outlook [Ansicht] upon themselves.”19 To canonize or absolutize such
an outlook, in the m a m i e r of the world picture, would foreclose openness. Far from encouraging
absolutization or totalization, the Gestalt or image defmed by the work consigns itself to the enigma
of presencing or, in I-Ieidegger's wording, sets itself back upon the self-concealing Earth. By doing
so, it brings Earth itself into proximity, letting it, as it were, be glimpsed in its inviolate selfconcealment, its infrangible withdrawal from presencing.
Heidegger emphasizes that the setting up of World, as well as the bringing close of Earth, are
accomplished, so to speak, in the beings, that is, in what presences.2° The invisible dimensions of
Earth and world are thus brought to show themselves as the invisible of the visible. His discussion
of the bringing close of Earth puts into play the ordinary and literal meanings of herstellen, which
are, respectively, “to produce” or “to manufacture” and “to put into proximity.” He suggests that,
whereas things of use (das Zeug) do not foreground their materiality but let it be absorbed into their
serviceability, the Work (which is non-telic) brings its materiality to the fore. It does so, for
Heidegger, by setting itself back into what it works with, such as the massiveness of stone, the
special characteristics of different kinds of wood, the hardness and luster of metals, or, in a different
register, “the naming power of the word." Although this argument is not entirely convincing, given
its reliance on a sharp distinction between the traditional “fine” and “applied” arts, its implicit denial
to the latter of sensitivity to their materials, and its tacit assimilation of the work°s materiality to its
Earth aspect, Heidegger°s point that the radical invisibility of Earth presences in and through the
visible is important. He complements it by a discussion of how the work, in setting up World and
bringing Earth close, lets beings be genuinely seen:
'

The glimmer and luster of the stone, itself apparent [ anscheinend] only by the grace of the sun, first brings the luminosity
of day, the vastrıess of the sky, or the darkness of night to shine forth [zum Vorschein]. The secure uprightness [of the
temple] first renders visible the invisible realm of the air. The unshaken [fımıness] of the work stands over against the surge
of the sea and lets isturbulence appear out of its own calm. Tree and grass, eagle and bull, snake and cricket first enter into
their defined form and thus come toshine forth [kommen zum Vorschein ] what they are.“
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The created image or Gestalt primordially enables visual encounter. The truth that it brings to
pass is, it must be emphasized, always a shadowed truth. Every being that stands out into the
openness of the clearing of manifestation is marked by the “uncanniness” of presencing, an
uncanniness that is easily disregarded but that is brought home with almost shocking forcefulness
by the work. Since the work is conipelling but repudiates explanation in terms of final or efficient
causality, it confronts one with the sheer astonishment of its being.“ Moreover, Heidegger points
out, any being that is encountered occludes, displaces, or disguises (verstellt) other beings or
modalities and configurations of presencing. In keeping with the double meaning of the German
scheinen or Schein as both shining and semblance, it shines forth with the beguiling and deceptive
power proper to appearance.
Truth involves the counterplay of luminous appearing with two modalities of concealment that
are inextricable and do not reveal themselves for what they are, so that concealment “hides and
disguises itselt`.”23 By contrast, the concealment brought about by the world picture is not a play of

Shadows, but rather a deliberate effacement of shadows and a consequent flattening out of
dimensionality that allows for no ambiguities or surprises. What is seen is not allowed to configure
itself otherwise. The concealment characteristic of the world picture springs from a willful exclusion
and occlusion, not from the inevitable incursions of essential untruth (although it is itself a modality
of verstellen). Its force is that of blinding one to the other, as well as to the happening of
manifestation.
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A reflection that contrasts the created image or Gestalt with the world picture of technicity or the
infonnation age (which Heidegger discemed on the horizon) might lead one to suppose that these
are alteniative modalities of unconceahnent, or of negotiating the visible and the invisible, between
which one might choose. Such is not the case - as becomes evident if one considers the blinding
power of the reductive totalization that gives rise to the world picture. In “The Question Concerning
Technology” of 1953/54,24 where Heidegger no longer speaks of the world picture but characterizes
the essence of technicity as the encompassing posit or Ge-stell, he stresses its radically occlusive
character. Every destiny (Geschickfs of un-concealment will, to be sure, tend to render one
preoccupied with what, within its compass, is un-concealed, and correspondingly oblivious of the
essential character of the given ınodality of un-concealment, as well as of un-concealment er
manifestation as such. In this sense, Heidegger writes that a destiny of un-concealment “is as such
in each of its modalities, and therefore necessarily, danger.”2°
In the configuration of un-concealment that Heidegger calls Ge-stell, however, this danger
escalates and reaches its extremity .Humans can no longer see themselves as anything other than
manipulators of the system of the posit (Besteller des Bestandes), in tenns of which they have come
to understand themselves, thus losing sight of their own essence.27 By its inherent totalization,
moreover, Ge-stell also occludes any alternative modalities of un-concealment and, in particular,
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the rnodality that “in the manner of poiesís, allows [ lässt] what presences to come forth in the
manner of appearing”28 - that is, flırough the creation of an image or form that can bring to pass what
Heideggercalls a happening oftruth. This occlusion also obscures un-concealınent as such and hides
its own occlusive power. The tlneatening extremity of danger is a blinding so complete that it passes
without self-awareness and motivates no quest for a visionaryrenewal.
Danger, however extreme, is nevertheless not doom. The configuration of Ge-stell consummates
verstellen, the second fonn of essential untruth, so that “all the splendor of all unconcealment, all
the Shining of truth” is covered over and disguised” Yet it remains a destiny of unconcealment and
'Can be revealed as such, rather than blindly submitted to. Its very ess ence will then be brought into
“its proper shining.” Such a-“free relationship" to technícity cannot, to be sure, be accomplished by
human ingenuity; it must, rather, spring from technicity itself. The seeming paradox of this crucial
thought resolves_ itself once one is mindfiıl of the essential ambiguity of teclmicity (which attests
to the more fundamental ambiguity between truth and essential untruth):_
Unconcealment is th-at destiny which, each time and abruptly, and in a manner inexplicable to all thinking, divides itself
into unconcealment that brings foıth and [unconcealment] that challenges forth, and apportions itself to humans. The
uncorıcealment that challenges forth has its dcstinal provenance in the unconcealment that brings forth.3°

This ambiguity bespeaks itself, for Heidegger, in the Greek notion of techncj which names at once
the technological ingenuity of man and artisticpoiäsís - the art of the sculptor, the architect, or the
painter, as well as of the rnusician and poet - understanding both of these, moreover, as ways of
letting beings be manifest or revealed.“ Techncí then, conj oins productive ingenuity with “a bringing
forth of the true into the beautiful." In “The Origin of the Work of Art,”Heidegger characterizes
beauty as a self-consignment of the “shining” of the open or the clearing to the work.32 Art, given
both its essential kinship to technicity and the profound difference that sets it apart therefrom, has
the essential possibility (which is its highest possibility) of awakening a thoughtful questioníng of
technicity, capable of revealing “the constellation in which unconcealrnent and concealment, in
which the essential being [das Wesende] of truth passes into its own [sich ereı`gnet].”33
If art, however, grants access to Ge-stell as a destiny of unconcealment, in cannot do so in the
same way in which it brings Earth and World into their counterplay. Earth and World are the
invisible of the visible, whereas technicity, giving rise to the world picture and consurnmating itself
as Ge-stell, suppresses and negates the visible, as well as occluding the invisible of the visible. The
image or Gestalt created in the work of art therefore could not illuıninate, or let itself be irradiated
by, the configuration of technicity as a destinal sending, in the manner in which it lets the enigrna
of presencing shine into what presences.
Heidegger is strangely reticent concerning this difficulty , which seems to call for a tracing out
of the indirect path by which the work of art in its sensuous form could possibly enable one to enter
into a free relationship with technicity .Based on the suggestions he offers in relevant texts, a Sketch
of such a tracing out will be atternpted here.
"
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The work of art is compelling: It has the power to fascinate, to enthrall, to disturb, or to haunt (a
power that opens up another approach - although one that, for Heidegger, is probably too “subject”centered - to thinking the continuing importance of what is called beauty). It has that power
precisely because its consurnınate form does not and cannot subordinate itself to what Heidegger,
in the Athens lecture of 1967, describes as the circle of the rule (der Regelkreis), or the victory of
method. He is referring to “the cybernetic world proj ection” that makes for universal calculability
and that, with the aid of genetic engineering, has come to encornpass man. Given its fundamental
character of reductive totalization, its key trait is the erasure of any significant differences, which
is to say of the otherness of the other, and of the delimitations that set things apart and thereby enable
presencing. Such differences are “neutralized down to the in-different processing of inforrnation.”34
The art work, however, has its very being in the differential delimitation that issues into its unique
Gestalt. It dernands encounter, repudiating the neutralization that pennits nothing to be encountered
or genuinely seen. It shocks one into an awareness of the event-character of manifestation, the
Ereignis which Heidegger, in an untranslatable wordplay, also likes to hear as Eräugnis, which is
literally “eneyement.” What such an awareness gives one eyes for is the differential arising into
presences that isphysis, together with its interrelation with rechne? One needs to realize here that
Heídegger°s sharp distinction between technicity, which is totalizing, and traditional technologies,
which are not, is not motivated by nostalgia for windmills or farm implements. It is motivated by
the fact that such technologies, unlike technicity , presuppose a careful study of the properties and
possibilities of what they work with, so that they run counter to a reductive totalization. They
presuppose, in other words, an attunement to the differential character of presencing which may, to
be sure, remain below the threshold of the explicit awareness made possible by the work of art.
This awareness provides, as it were, the ground against which the featureless circle of the rule can
delineate itself, so that it can now be envisaged. Given that the shock (the manifold Stoss35) worked
by the work of art has already transposed awareness into the openness of unconcealment, the way
is now laid open for aimindful reflection (Besinnung) that could come to understand the circle of the
rule as a destinal configuration, thus allowing one to beak free of its stranglehold. Such a realization
differs from the initial awareness of the opening of manifestation, of the clearing, or of Ereignis, in
that it cannot happen in the immediacy of encountering the work of art but requires the mediacy of
reflection. Thought alone - and not the sheer glance - can gain access to the in-different invisible
that holds sway in technicity. Perhaps this is why Heidegger, in the Athens lecture, emphasizes that
the goddess, who is now Athena, is not only clear-eyed (glaukopis), but also clever in her manifold
resourcefulness (polymeris) and “the meditative one” (die Sinnende, for skepromeí1ë,”she of the
penetrating, or reflective, look”).36 Inventiveness and reflection (which point, respectively, to rechne"
and to essential questioning) go far beyond the immediacy of the glance in terms of which Heidegger
had earlier characterized the Parmenidean goddess.
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THE SIGHT OF MORTAL DWELLIN G
Heidegger explores the deeper sense of the creation of a significant image or form in his essays
“Building Dwelling Thinkingf' “The Thing,” and “...Poetically Man Dwells. ..,” dating from 1950
and 1951.37 In these essays his focus has shifted from the atelic perfection of the work of art to the
form and aspect of the humble and faıniliar things of everyday use: the bridge, the jug, or the
traditional Black Forest homestead. Artistic creation has yielded place to a more encompassing
“making” or poišsis that is not of the nature of Machenschafr or machinations attesting to human
in
power and subservient to Ge-stellfs but is the essential modality of human dwelling. Dwelling
this sense is not just a matter ofmaking oneself at home in one' s house or apartment but is, rather,
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the fundamental trait of mortal existence in its temporalizing and spatializing character.Heidegger
lims the structure of dwelling in terms of the polarities of the Fourfold (and with a resonance of the“
figures of heaven and earth in Chinese thoughtw) as a “saving” of the earth that releases it to its own
essence rather than seeking to master it, a “receiving” of heaven (with its astral courses of the times
of life, of history, or of the seasons), an “awaiting” of divinity or of the holy that persists, without
expectation, in its fail, and an “escorting” of mortals into the mystery of death.4° Building Springs
from this structure of dwelling in both of its modalities of cultivating (colere) and of setting up
edifices (aedıficare), which are the twin senses of the German verb bauen ("to build”). Such building
and dwelling has, for Heidegger, the pervasive character of a “sparing”(schonen) that is not a matter
of preserving something against wear and tear, but of releasing it to abide, freely and at peace, in its
_
essentializy , or its very being.
Although Heidegger, in these essays, stresses a poetic responsiveness to the self-articulation of
language over visuality, a “sparing” releasement ofwhat presences could not come about without
a differential seeing that turns a blind eye on reductive totalization. Differential seeing is not only
sensitive to each being's essentialily, but also, and fundamentally, to the invisible which is here
thought as being“s emptiness.With an echo of chapter ll of the Dao de Jing, Heidegger points out
that the vessel or jug (an example of “the thing” that facilitates his showing what he wants to show)
is what it is not so much in virtue of its formal configuration (which is quite variable) as of its
constitutive emptiness. The potter who made it, he notes, gave form to emptiness. Even though
visible form is alien to invisible emptiness, emptiness can reveal its penneation of all presencing
only insofar as things (or events, which Heidegger does not mention here) are delimited, formed, and
differentiated. Limits, as he likes to point out, do not so much close something off as they enable its
presencing. His reniark that the thing cannot be experienced as what it is in terms of its look or
appearance (Aussehen), or its idea in the Platonic sense,'“ does not indicate that visual appearance
is dispensable, but that it must not be regarded as representing an original presence which would,
as such, occlude emptiness. Conversely, while the emptiness of the jug is reeeptive and containing,
it must not be thought of as a void that would swallow up appearance and form, ultimately
dissolving them into the formless. The emptiness of the vessel is rather, Heidegger stresses,
essemfially gathered into a donation (Schenken)42 that offers a way ofabiding, or a temporal “while”
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to the Fourfold in such a manner as to bring earth and heaven, divinities and mortals, into the easeful
reciprocity of their mirrorplay, which Heidegger now calls “world:”

E

The thing whiles [verweilt] the Fourfold. The thing things world. Each thing whiles the Fourfold into something that hasits while [ein je Weíliges] with the simplicity [Einfiılt] of world.43

Emptiness donates appearance and visible form, through which alone it can be-speak itself as
emptiness (and- not as a withdrawn or blinding primordial presence, to be approximated by
representation). It should be obvious that the thing in its inconspicuous slightness“ is not thought
here as some object that perdures for a span of measurable time, but that both things and the
disowning and enowning (enteignend, ereignend) mirrorplay of the Fourfold are facets of a
temporalizing dynamic that cannot be adequately understood in terms of ordinary conceptions of
time. In keeping with the topological emphasis of his late thought and with his concern for dwelling,
however, Heidegger focuses here on the spatializing and place-granting character of this dynamic.
The kind of building that springs from essential human dwelling allows the polaıities of the Fourfold
to be held together in such a way as to let the terrain or surroundings come to significant appearance.
The bridge of Heidegger's exaınple lets the banks or shores appear as such by .spanning the stream
or strait; it lets the configurations of earth, water, and skies be seen as landscape; it maps out
pathways or the peregrinations of mortals; and it holds up to them a visual figure of their ultimate
passage. Unfortunately, Heidegger offers no help to the reader who would like to understand how
such a gathering into significant appearance can equally characterize the rural bridge that he seems
to have in mind and technological achievements such as the Brooklyn Bridge that inspired Hart
Crane - or, to remain on the European continent, Robert Maillart's Salginatobel Bridge of 1930,
which lets consummate structural engineering function equally as environmental sculpture. An
exclusive reference to traditional examples is characteristic of Heidegger's discussion throughout.
One may wish that, for instance, he had complemented his reflections on the Greek temple or the
Black Forest homestead with a consideration of how poetic dwelling is articulated by a 1928-29),
an aesthetically compelling work which the architect himself described as conjoining industrial
technology with thought and culture.
Building in Heidegger°s sense is not, however, the prerogative of architecture or city planning;
it encompasses craft and design; and one may be tempted to extend it further to encompass, say,
ceremony and ritual. Edifices as well as the things in the compass of which humans lead their lives
have, for Heidegger, the fundamental nature of place (Ort) rather than being simply put into places
that would be available quite apart from them. Through such places and constellations of place
(Ortschaften, Gegenden), spaces (Räume) are opened up and rendered available for human dwelling.
Heidegger°s thought here is similar to the thought he voiced in “The Origin of the Work of Art”
conceming the need for some being - a work or, here, a thing -to be set into the open, so as to let
its openness be revealed. In the 1969 text Die Kunst und der Raum (Art and Space), which
Heidegger wrote on lithographic stone to accompany an edition of seven litho-collages by the
sculptor Eduardo Chillida, he understands the “freeing up” of space to involve not only the sort of
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orienting “arranging” (einrichten) that allows things to belong somewhere and to belong together,
but also letting opemiess hold sway in such a manner as to allow for appearing (das
Erscheinen).45Lest his concem for things, regions, places, and place-scapes encourage an undue
preoccupation with positivity (with the "solid" and the “real”), his meditation, in Art and Space,
focuses, in the end, on emptiness:
Presumably, however, emptiness is closely related to what is proper to place and is therefore not
a lacking but a bringing forth Emptiness is not nothing. It is not a deficiency. In plastic embodiment
emptiness plays in the manner of a searching-proj ective instituting of places.“
Vlfhat Heidegger is striving for in these sometimes tortuous texts is to think the close interrelation
of location or place, region, orientation, things, experience, and modes of spatiality, as well as to
show the derivative and impoverished character of the abstract, featureless, schematic spatial grid
that he calls “the technical-scientific conquest of space” and describes as an “apartness that is not
perceptible by the senses.”'" The world picture is marked out exclusively in schematic space, which
now can be seen to bear much of the responsibility for the foımer's visually occlusive character.
Schematic space, ımlike the open* and regioned space to which the created or built form or image
grants access, is inimícal to appearance, together with the dimensions of invisibility that are proper
to it. If building, in Heidegger's sense, cannot come about without the sight of mortal dwelling,
which is fine~tuned to the differential character of presencing, it also enables and gives free scope
to such a seeing. The trait of the image, the enchantment of its colors or gradations of ink, the
modelling of form, or the visual aspect of the river or mountain that the temple, the pagoda, the
travellers° lodge, or the stone steps of the ghat reveal, letting river or mountain be seen as regions
of mortal dwelling ( even though they may be forbidding, unnavigable, or uninhabited), grant an
abode to the invisible Within the familiar. In keeping with his thought of the Fourfold, Heidegger
likes to speak of the invisible that is here allowed to show itself in its infrangible occultation as
“divinity” (die Gottheit). This term, however, is somewhat misleading because of its connotation,
in this context, of a negative theology, which is incompatible with the guiding thought of emptiness
at the core of the teniporalizing and spatializing dynamics of manifestation. This emptiness is what
Heidegger, in “...Poetically Man Dwells. ..,” calls the “measure” of mortal dwelling, a measure
which poiešis, and especially poetic saying (das Dichten) “takes” without seeking to make it
graspable:

.

The Poet calls fcrth in the visual aspects [Anblíchen] ofthe sky that which, in Linveiling itself, lets appear precisely what
conceals itself, namely as the self-concealing. ln familiar appearances the poet calls forth the alien as that to which the
invisible consigns itself, so as to remain what it is: unkn0wable.48
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Such calling forth is essential poicšis which issues into images and imaginal fonnations (EinBtldungen ). Heidegger characterizes these as “envisageable inclusions of the alien into the aspect
of the familiar.”49 This incursion of the alien counteracts the reductive sort of seeing, Wedded to
positivity, that conjures up the world picture.
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Sight can reach out to the invisible (whereas touch simply fails in coming up against the
intangible or ımgraspable) because it is, even in its most ordinary employment, a distance sense. Its
very arena is the open span of distance, the in-between. Human beings, according to Heidegger,
stand out into and endure (stehen aus) the open dimension (opened up, importantly, by sight), sothat
human dwelling “resides in the measuring out [Vermessen] of the dimension into which heaven
belongs, no less than earth.”5° The measure of mortal dwelling istherefore not earth-bound, nor does
it flee the earth.
Precisely because such measuring moves through an open dimension, however, it lacks stability
and is inherently ambiguous. Heidegger°s term vermessen (together with its cognates sich vermessen
and Vermessenheiı) is an almost uncaımy marker of this ambiguity; for, while it can mean simply
“to take the measure,” or “to measure out” (the senses that Heidegger privileges), it readily veers to
mean “to measure wrongly” or “to transgress measure” in the manner of hybristic excess. “Thus,”
Heidegger remarks, “it could be that our unpoetie dwelling, our inability to take the measure, might
spring from a strange excess of measure [Übermass] due to a fienzied measuring and calculating.”51
In other words, the world picture, though inimical to imaged dwelling and destructive of its sight,
is not 'simply foreign to it, so that it could safely be excluded. It constitutes, rather, its always
imıninent perversion. Its danger is one that man°s limit-walking and standing out into the open has
no assured protection from.
i
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It may seem puzzling that Heidegger, who looked to the work of art as a happening of truth in 193536, should have moved on, in the essays of 1950-51, to allow things rather than the work of art to
configure the disclosive image-only to reaffirm the privilege of art (if not of the work) in “The
Question Concerning Technology” and in the Athens lecture. Fundamentally, however, there need
be no puzzlement, given that art, work, and thing are held together within the compass of technë,
understood as the knowing that “sustains and guides all human Ventures amidst beings.”52
Nevertheless, the fact that Heidegger, in “The Origin of the Work of Aı't,” distinguishes the art work
sharply ñ'om the thing of use and the mere thing (to both ofwhich it grants essential access), whereas
he carries on a sustained questioning of art and work in Besinnung (1938-39) and moves on from
there to efface his earlier setting apart of art, work and thing calls for reflection and comment.
<... material missing in text> the age of the World picture), of art's essence, insofar as that
essence has so far remained metaphysical.53 More fundamentally, this is the consummation of the
reign of machinations (Machenschafl). As concerns the understanding of art, the key task, Heidegger
notes, is not to overcome philosophical aesthetics, but to put up for decision a change in the very
essence of art, which means also to change humanvself-understanding and constitutes, ultimately,
“a decision for being [zum Seyn].” The work of art plays here a crucial role:
The question within the history of being concerning the work takes on a completely different sense, as soon as the work
is seen in its essence together with being itself and with the founding of its truth. The work itself now fulfills the essential
mandate of contributing to theunfolding of such a decision for being.“
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Why then is the work endangered to the point of being threatened with disappearance?
Heidegger”s discussion in Besinnung, which repays a close reading, and sometimes a reading
between the tines, reveals that he was deeply disturbed by the National Socialist appropriation of the
arts as instruments of ideological propaganda and of the consolidation of power - an appropriation
that enlisted the appeal of lived experience (Erlebnis) and of beauty. Beauty , Heidegger remarks,
has become “what pleases and must please the power-essence [dem Machtwesen] of the beast of prey
man;” and he offers a graphic description of the prevailing ideal of male beauty as consisting in
“giant muscles and sexual parts, and vacant faces intent only on brutality.”55 The contrast to the
Greek ideal of male beauty requires no comment; and it is also clear that art subservient to ideology
and propaganda is incapable of awakening genuine vision.
.
Sub rosa, Heidegger decries the passion of the regime for an imposing but banal monumentality,
and for comprehensive and megalomaniac urban planning, as well as its fostering of sentimentality
in art, which is to say, of kitsch. Kitsch, he writes, “is not 'bad' art [Kunsr], but best expertise
[können] however, of the empty and inessential [des Unwesens ], Which then calls for the aid of
public propaganda, so as to assure itself of significance.”56 Although Heidegger did not valorize
kitsch, the issue of sentimentality in art may have been a particularly touchy one for him, since he
could not readily dissociate himself fi'om the National Socialist show of respect for supposedly
indigenous traditions, conceming which the architectural historian William J. R. Curtis writes
.
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perceptively:
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A persistent theme. „was the reinforcement ofnationalist sentiments by appeal to earlier national architectural traditions.
Allied to this was anostalgia for supposedly indígenous virtues which were to be reclaimed from the onslaught of modem
fragmentation. It was necessary for totalítariarı regimes tofester the impression that their right to rule was embedded in the
deepest aspirations of the peop1e.57

What is at issue here is not, however, Heidegger°s complex relationship to National Socialism,
in its interrelation with his understanding of technicity, but rather his realization that the work of art
cannot be secured against an aımexation by the Sinister forces of the times. Art is too closely
integrated with the thought-structures of a particular epoch, as well as with political, cultural, and
sociological fonnations, to remain an infrangible preserve wherein truth can set itself into a work.
The images that it offers can become the reflections of transient human concerns rather than allowing
for a coming to appearance of essential truth. It is questionable, however, to what extent Heidegger
was willing to countenance this realization.
H. W Petzet reports some interesting personal exchanges with Heidegger conceming the rise of
abstract art in postwar Europe. He quotes the philosopher's comments on an essay of his which
focused on an abstract painting, to the effect that the hidden question is whether there still exists a
genuine art Work, or whether art has become untenable along with metaphysics:
Is there, perhaps, behind the uneasiness brought about by nonobj ective art, a muchdeeper shock?
Is that the end of art? The arrival of something for which we do not have a name?58
Although this questioning arises on the occasion of considering a quite irmocuous non-figurative
work, a gouache by the painter Mathias Goeritz, it points ahead to the far more radical challenges
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that art, and the understanding of the work of art, was soon to face. These challenges have prompted
Jean-Luc Nancy to seek to trace the bare vestige of art, given that the Vestige is what holds out
against destruction, so that what is essential to art might be understood to be of the order of the
vestige” Heidegger, however, does not undertake such a meditation; but rather, he seeks to reintegrate art more fully into the essential domain of technég' so that his thought comes to oscillate, as
already noted, between the challenging work of art and the relative gentleness of the thing. The
thing°s gentleness is, of course, precarious as well as relative, as becomes apparent once one turns
from Heidegger°s somewhat purist examples of the clay jug or the chalice to consider the tíde of
heavily advertised consumer goods that today engulfs even young children. Things of this sort can
hardly be said to make possible a presencing of the invisible within the aspect of the familiar.
Nevertheless, insofar as it brings out what it may mean to live, not in thrall to things, but in the
manner of a “be-thinged” dwelling, Heidegger's meditation is faréreaching. In the Athens lecture,
he reflects on the position of art within (post)industrial society which is “enclosed within its own
configuration of power [Gemà'cht].” It would be hybris ( Vermessenheíıj for humans to think that
they could force open this closure, which nonetheless camıot begin to open up unless they prepare
for its opening. Heidegger reflects on thinking and on the art work as modalities of such preparation,
asking whether the work must not as such point toward what conceals itself and withdraws from
human deployment. The question is left open, partly because self-concealing unconcealment
(manifestation, or as Heidegger here calls it, aläheı'a)is too ínconspicuous and disregarded to allow
a work attuned to it to function as such in a world govemed by technicity, or by a market economy.
Given that the things of daily use, such as the lamp, the mat, or the cup, are themselves often
inconspicuous and aspire to no prominence, it seems easier to extricate them, at least now and then,
from the banalization or else the meretriciousness that tends to despoil their intrinsically revelatory
character. What they fundamentally reveal is the ungroundedness and interdependent character of
human dwelling, as well as the enigma that announces itself in one's exposure to biıthand death,
health and sickness, or in the rhythms of care and relinquishment.
However, neither Work nor thing are uniquely capable of bringing about an openness that could
be calledvisionary. It is not a question of turning fiom one to the other. Within the wider coınpass
of I-Ieidegger's thought, this realization bespeaks itself with particular clarity not in his solitaıy
reflection, but in dialogue. The partner in dialogue is Hoseki Shin' ichi Hisamatsu; and the occasion
is the Freiburg colloquium on “Art and Thinking” of 18 May 1958.“ In answer to Heidegger's
question as to how art was experienced in Japan before being designated by a term (get-jirsu) that
reflects its Western understanding, Hisamatsu indicates the two pathways of “the way of art” (geido). The first leads one, perhaps with suddenness, from the “real” in the sense of what is visible,
tangible, or otherwise present to the non-present “origin,” while the second leads back from the
origin to what comes to presence. The origin, Hisamatsu stresses, is not something eidetic; it is
formless and empty, which allows for its dynamic freedom. Since this formless emptiness must
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nevertheless be brought to appear (which it cannot do as such), the return movement from the empty
origin to what presences is of key importance. At this point, Hisamatsu notes, artistic
(re)presentation (Darstellung) or the image in no way obstruct the self-appearing of the origin (as
Heidegger had briefly supposed): “Making the eidetic visible is then no longer an obstacle; it is the
appearing of originary truth itself.”6' Letting something eidetic become visible does not mean
primarily or exclusively to create a work of art. If beauty is (as Hisamatsu understands it to be) the
unconstrained movement of the originary that animates something formed or eidetic, it can irradiate
the tea bowl or the gesture no less than the painting or calligraphic work. In Hisamatsu”s words, “this
motion can come to appearance [zum Vorschein] ever'ywhere;”62 it does not even require What one
colloquium participant refers to with some misgivings as “arts which we do not consider such,” for
instance, the tea ceremony or flower arrangement.
The placement of a stone or the folding of a sheet of paper may suffice. If so, there is no need for
thinking to entrench itself in what Heidegger had called “the imageless word." It is significant that,
in a 1959 letter to Alcopley, he expresses his excitement as to “the interconnection (identity?) of
image and writ” in classical Chinese art, noting the tuisatísfactoriness of the metaphysically derived
conceptuality that dissevers them.“ A thinking that has freed itself from the constraints of this
system of concepts can open itself and grant access to invisibles that do not diminish or negate the
richness fof visuality. _
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l. Martin Heidegger, “La Provenance de l'art et la destination de la pensee,” trans. Jean-Louis Chretien and Michele Reifenrath,
in Michel Haar, ed., L 'Herne: Martin Heidegger (Paris: Editions de I'Heme, 1983), 367. Heidegger presented this Iecture, “Die
Herkunft der Kunst und die Bestimmung des Denkens,” in Athens on 2 April 1967. My translation of passages from this text
is based both on the French translation cited and on a somewhat lacunary copy of Heidegger's typescript which is of uncertain
provenance but accords closely with the French.
2. M. Heidegger, “Wissenschaft und Besinnung” (“Science and Meditative Reflection”), Vorträge und Aufiräıze, I, 3rd ed.
(Pfullingen: Neske, 1967), 37.
3. M. Heidegger, “Die Zeit des Weltbi1des,” Holzwege; “Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe,” vol.5 (Frankfurt a.M.: Klostermann),
75-l 13. The Heidegger Gesamtausgabe (1977-)wí1l be referred to as GA, followed by volume number. Translations from the
German are my own.
4. Parmenides, Fr.3. English translations vary, since most translators find it necessary to insert explanatory words or phrases. See
David Gallop, Parmenides ofElea: F mgments (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), 57. In keeping with my usual
practice, 1translate Heidegger's Wesen, a word for the being of beings, as essence, itaiicizing esse (“to be”).
_ GA 5, S9f.
. M. Heidegger, Parnzenídes; GA54.
GA 54, 153.
. GA 54, 158.
The distinction between picture and image has no German counterpart; but the German Bild, which encompasss both, has a
connotation of form-giving which is Iacking in the English equivalents of the term.
10. See Heidegger, Besinnung; GA 66, 23; and GA 54, 212.
1 1. See here Heinrich W. Petzet, Encounters and Dialogues with Martin Heidegger, 1926-1976, trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth
Maly (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), ch. 6.
12. GA 5, 48.
*

í
I

J

1

I

li
l

ı
4

l

1
1

6

164

l

VERoN1QUs Fori

13. I capitalize this usage of "Earth" and "World" to distirıguish it from other I-Ieideggerian usages of these terms, none of which
carry just their ordinary meanings.
14. GA 5, 51.
15. In “The Origin of the Work of Art,“ Heidegger writes that Gestalt is to be thought here “aus jenem Stellen und Ge-steli als
welches das Werk west. ..“ (“out of that positing and encompassing posit. . as which the work essences. ..."; GA 5,51). He
comments on this passage in the Addendum,poínting out that, while Ge-stell is thought here in a manner that clarifies the Greek
understanding of morphe (shape or form), rather than as characterizing the essence of technicity, there is an essential connection
between the two senses. The connection concerns the historical provenance of the essence of technicity (see GA 5, 72).
16. Concerning the temple, see John Sallis, Stone (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), ch.4. Conceming the peasant
shoes, see Jacques Derrida, La vertte en petnture (Paris: Flamrrıarion, 1978), ch. 4; English translation by Geoff Bennington and
Ian McLeod, The Truth in Painting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). Derrida 's chapter builds on an earlier

interchange between Meyer Shapiro and Heidegger.
17. See GA 5, 23. The Dtnggedicht is a poetic genre.
18. GA 5, 301".
19. GA 5, 29.
20. In the Addendum (Zusatz, written in 1957), Heidegger remarks tellingly that what he calls the self-arrangement (das
Sicheinrichten) of truth, or of being, in beings “touches upon the questionableness of the ontological difference” (GA 5, 73).
21. GA 5,28.
22. GA 5, 52.
23. GA 5, 40. Heidegger here builds on his 1933 essay “Vom.Wesen der Wahrheir,” Wegmarken, GA 9.
24. M. Heidegger, “Die Frage nach der Technik,” Vorträge und Aufsäı'ze,I; 5-37. To be referred to as FT.
25. Geschick, for Heidegger, is a sending of un-concealment which is, as such, not within human power, but which needs to be
dissociated from any notion offate. Thus, Heidegger writes that "Freedom is the domain of Geschick” ( FT, 25).
26. FT, 26.
27. Merleau-Ponty voices the same thought in his discussion of techno-science in the opening section of “Eye and Mind,” where
he writes that “since man tn.ıly becomes the manípulandum that hethinks he is, one enters into. ..a sleep or a nightmare from which
nothing could reawaken him” (OE,l2; EM.,122). ln keeping with Merleau-Ponty's extensive discussion of Descartes in this text,
the figure of sleep or nightmare is Cartesian.
28. FT, 27. Heidegger remarks that the stellen of Ge-stell is not to be understood as just to be understood as the challenging forth
of things to show themselves in keeping with the conñgurationbf the posít (i.e.. as Bestand), but that it “guards the resonance of
another "stellen" from which it is derived, namely ofthat Her-stellen [manufacturing] and Dar-stellen [presenting] which, in the
sense of potests, lets what presences come fonh into unconcealment" (FT ,20). Concerning this resonance of stellen, compare Note
12, above.
29. FT, 28.
30. FT, 30.
31. See here Heideggers meditation on the first stasiman of Sophocles's Antigone, which exalts and problematizes man's technical
ingenuity, in his lecture course on Holderlins Hymne "Der Ister," GA 53, Plato emphatically denies the poet's claim to be
practitioner oftekhné in the ton and the Phaedrus, he identiñes inspiration or transport (enthoustasmos, mania) as the chief source
of poetic creativity .
32. GA 5, 43.
33. FT, 33.
34. “La Provenance de l'art ...,” section II, 370-375.
35. GA 5, 54.
36. “La Provenance de l`art
376 í
37. M. Heidegger, “Bauen Wohnen Denken,” "DasDing,” and “...dichterisch wohnet der Mensch” in Vorträge uııdfiufitärze, II ,3rd
ed. (Pfullingen: Neske, 1967), I9-36; 37-55; 61- 78.
38. In Besinnung (1938), Heidegger characterizes Machenschafl as “the arranging of things with a view to the makeability of
everything, namely in such a way as topre-arrange the iıresistibility of the unconditional calculation [Verrechnung] ofeach thing;
GA 66, 16. See also 'ídichterisch wohnet der Mensch. ..” 64, and Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), GA 65, sections 6468.
39. Conceming Heidegger's relationship to daoism, chan, and zen thought, see Reinhard May, Heideggers Hidden Sources: East
Asian Influences on his Work, trans. Graham Parkes (London: Routledge, 1989); Graham Parkes, ed., Heidegger and Asian
Thought (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989); and my “"Heidegger and the Way of Art: The Empty Origin and
Contemporary Abstraction," Continental Phıiosophylievíew, 31:4 (October, 1998): 337-351 (in the printing of this article, some
of the Notes were unfoıtunately omitted). [This latter omission was unquestionably a printer's error (as 1 know from direct,
corrected, experience) but in the case of the missing notes below, the paper as submitted for these proceedings did not feature
notes 44 (in part) through 55 _ BB]
40. “Building Dwelling Thinking,” 24t`.
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“Das Ding,” 40.

Schenken, modified with various prefixes, means both “to donate” and “to pour,” so that here again the exarnple ofthe jug is

felicitous.
“Das Ding,“ 53.
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Heidegger's play on Ring, ringen, and ring engages Allemannic dialect (and the resonance in it of older forms of the German
language), which lets ring mean “slight,” “easeful,” or, more figuratively, “p1iant,” <continuation of note alas not sı.ıpplied>
<Note not supplied>
<Note not supp1ied>
<Note not suppliecl>
<Note not supplied>
<Note not supplied>
. <Note not supplied>
. <Note not supplied>
<N0te not supplied>
<Note not supplied>
<Note not supplied>
<Note not supplied>
GA 66, 31.
William J.R. Curtis, Modern Architecture Since 1900, 41h revised ed. (London: Phaidon, 1966), 351.
Encounters and Dialogues, 153.
Jean-Luc, Nancy, "The Vestige of Art," The Muses, 81.
L. Alcopley, Listening to Heidegger :ind Hisamatsu (Kyoto: Bokubi Press, 1963). This is a limited edition with trilingual text
and with callígraphy and L. Alcopley`s artwork. The bare record of the colloquium can also be found as “Die Kunst und das
Denken" in Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges, GA 16, 552-557. My references are to the Bokubi Press edition;
given the sliortness of the text, l have not given cross references. See also “Wechselseitige Spíegelungen,” the parting
conversation of Heidegger and Hisamatsu on 19 May 1958; GA 16, 776-780. l have given Hisamatsu`s name according to
Western convention, that is, sumame last.
“Listening,” 56.
“Listening,-” 80.
This letter appears in facsimile, typescript, and translations in the Bokubi Press volume and can also be found in GA 16, 562.
*

THE DESTINY OF TECHNOLOGY:
MODERN SCIENCE AND HUMAN FREEDOM IN THE LATER HEIDEGGER

REX GILLILAND
When we read I-Ieidegger's lectures Insight into That Which Is (1949) and Ihe Thing (1950) once
again, the underlying theme is still striking: According to Heidegger, the invention of the airplane
and the radio may bring the distant comers of the world within reach in far less time than was
forrnerly possible, but this does not mean that we have brought things into nearness. Modem
technology may remove distances (Entfernungen, Abstände), but it does not grasp the essence of the
neamess (Nähe) and remoteness (Ferne) of things because the latter never arises as a question for
it (see GA 79:3-4; VA 157-158/'l` 165-166).' By elucidating the difference between these two ways
of relating to the thing, Heidegger raises not only the issue of the essence of the thing, but also the
issue of the essence of technology. However, some may wonder whether I-Ieidegger's discussion of
technology is still relevant today, given the many scientific and teclmological advancements that
have occurred in recent decades. His references to the radio, the airplane, machine technology, and
the hydrogen bomb seem somewhat facile in an age of space exploration, cell phones, and the
intemet. Technological innovations such as the partícle accelerator and gene sequencing have
enabled science to penetrate into the microstructure of the organic and inorganic, opening up new
vistas for the representation and manipulation ofbeings. Has the essence of technology and science
changed in the last fifiy years?
The datedness of Heidegger's examples and the tireless pace of scientific advancement appear to
confirm l~Ieidegger's claims about the essence of technology instead of undennining them. The
novelty of such examples is wearíng off even faster today, and this suggests that our ability to be
enchanted by technological innovation is decreasing. Current discoveries make much less of an
impact today than did the invention of the radio, airplane transportation, and the nuclear bomb. We
are less suıprised by new innovations because wehave grown to expect them, and are so impatiently
focused on how science promises to improve our lives in the future that the current cutting edge of
technology is experienced as little more than a stopgap measure whose limitations are painfully
apparent. Does our decreasing ability to experience wonder in the face of technology not conñmi
l~leidegger's claim that human being is “continually approaching the brink of the possibility of
pursuing and pushing forward nothing but what is revealed in ordering (Bestellen), and of deriving
all of its standards on this basis" (VA 29/QCT 26)?
This danger is what Heidegger calls machination (Machenschaft). According to Heidegger,
machinatíon is the total disappearance of enchantment and questioning. In machination, beings are
reduced to that which is representable and makeable (machbar), what can be calculated and
manipulated (see GA 65:l08›l09, 123-127/CP 76, 86-88). The extinction of all wonder is, for
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Heidegger, the cuhnination of the type of technological thinking so prevalent today in the sciences.
The danger of machination can be seen in the contemporary scientific inquiry into the nature of
human being, a topic that has long generated some of the most difficult issues for scientists.
Cognitive science attempts to explain human behavior by Studying such things as the architecture
of the brain, the nature of language, memory, perceptions and motor function, as well as the
possibility of simulating human intelligence with a computer. What is common to the various fomis
of research conducted under the nıbric of cognitive science is the general assuınption that human
cognition, at least in principle, is representable in much the same way as other natural beings.
Though not all cognitive scientists espouse material eliminativism or epiphenomenalism, the attempt
to uncover the basic elements that determine human activity threatens to reduce human being into
something that we no longer experience as wonderous.
What does Heidegger have to say about the W a y that science and technology conceal the
mysterious and unique presencing of beings, especially that of the human being? What response to
science and technology does he develop in his thought? In this paper, we will explore these questions
by considering how Heidegger raises the issue of human freedom in his discussion of technology.
This may sound strange, because is it not the case that, in his later thought, Heidegger critiques the
notion of the will and subsumes human agency to the granting of being? Does Heidegger`s thinking
not turn from Dasein to the history of being? The claim that Heidegger jettisons the notion of human
freedom in his later thought may be the prevailing view, but Heideggers discussion of technology
suggests otherwise. This is seen especially in the 1953 lecture The Question Concerníng Technology,
where Heidegger examines the difference between destiny (Geschick) and fate (Schicksal). At the
beginning of the lecture, Heidegger states that his purpose there is to prepare a free relationship to
technology. What this relationship reveals about the essence of technology and the possibility of
human freedom is something we will consider in detail. Does the historical transformation of the
essence of technology in another beginning have anything to do With human decision? Is the destiny
of technology intrinsically comiected to the human being?
In addition, the question arises as to whether Heidegger°s response to modern science and
technology is merely critical. Richard Rorty stated recently that “Heidegger had considerable
contempt for the natural sciences.”2 Is this an overstatement of Heidegger°s critique of modem
science, or does science, for Heidegger, lack a destiny? Does I-Ieidegger's critique of science leave
a space open for scientific and technological innovation and for the possibility of a scientific respect
for the question of being? We will consider these questions surrounding Heidegger”s “philosophy
of science° briefly by way of conclusion.
As we have seen, Heidegger begins the lecture The Question Concerning Technology by
introducing the issue of freedom. At the outset, he states that his purpose in the lecture is to prepare
a free relationship to technology, a relationship that “opens our Dasein to the essence of technology”
(VA 9/QCT 3). What is free about this relationship to technology and how is it distinguished from
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of relating to technology? Heidegger provides a hint of the direction in which he will
develop this issue when he states that “the essence of technology,” in contrast to the way it is
prevalently understood, “is by no means anything technical” According to Heidegger, when we
relate to technology as something technical, our relationship to it is not free. “Everywhere we remain
unfree, chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny technology" or “regard it as
something neutral" (VA 9/QCT 4). As this suggests, the openness to the essence of technology that
characterizes a free relationship to technology is significantly different from the usual ways of
relating to technology. The latter treat technology as something technical and, as a result, the essence
of technology is not experienced. But what is this openness to the essence of technology, and why
does it constitute a free relationship to technology? What is the essence of technology if it is not
something technical?
These questions reemerge later in the lecture after a discussion of modern physics and the current
conception of technology. According to Heidegger, technology is presently defined in a way that is
"instrumental and anthropological.” Technology is defined as something produced by human beings
to serve the ends that they posit for themselves (VA 10/QCT 4-5). It is on this basis that it is often
asked whether we are properly mastering technology or whether technology is slipping out of our
control (VA l 1/QCT 5). However, as Heidegger points out, this definition of technology is severely
limited because it fails to distinguish between the hand- crafts and modern machine-powered
technology. If it is only the latter that threatens to oveıwhelm us and become our master, what
specifically is it about modem technology that makes this possible? According to Heidegger, it is
said that the relationship of modem technology to modem physics is what sets modern technology
apart from earlier forms of technology. According to this view, modem technology is based on
modern physics (VA 17-18/QCT 13-14). The conceptual and mathematical foundation of the latter
provides a degree of precision that allows modem technology to manipulate nature to an extent
previously unforeseen. Heidegger does not agree, however, that the essence of modern technology
is found in modem science. Instead, he maintains that the reverse is the case: Although “modem
technology must employ exact physical science,” the claim that “modem technology is applied
physical science” is a deceptive illusion (VA 27/QCT 23).
Heidegger's claim may appear strange to us because, as he points out, modern physics arose
almost two centuries prior to the development of machine-powered technology (VA 25-26/QCT 2122). In his discussion of the essence of modem technology, however, Hediegger is not only
challenging the priority of modern science, but also the claim that technology is a merely human
activity. According to Heidegger, what distinguishes modern technology from earlier forms of
technology is that the former is a challenging (Herausfordem), “which puts to nature the
unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such” (VA 18/QCT
14). Although earlier fonns of technology used nature in order to bring forth (Hervorbringen) certain
products, they still let nature presence in its own unique way. Modern technology, in contrast,
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challenges nature by reducing it to standing reserve (Bestand), to a mere resource for energy. The
presencing of beings changes because they are now only revealed as something orderable
(bestellbar) (VA 20-21/QCT 17). The difference between modem technology and the previous forms
of technology, for Heidegger, is the scope and degree to which beings become a resource for
technology. But is this not exactly what is made possible by modern physics?
We might also wonder why modem technology is not a human creation. Heidegger foresees this
objection when he writes that although the human being is the one that “accomplishes the
challenging framing [stellen] through which what we call the real is revealed as standing rcserve,”
and does this by representing, arranging, and managing various beings in this way or that, the human
being does not have control over the way that the real is revealed. “Only to the extent that the human
being for its part is already challenged to challenge the energies of nature can this ordering revealing
happen” (VA 21/QCT 18). According to Heidegger, the human being “always corresponds
[entspricht] to the encouragement [Zuspruch] of unconcealment even when contradicting it. Thus,
if the htunan being, investigating, observing, pursues nature as an area of human representing, then
the human being is already claimed by a manner of revealing that challenges it to tackle nature as
an object of research” (VA 22/QCT I9). The challenging that reveals the real as standing reserve is

no merely human activity. Heidegger names this challenging claim 'enframing' (Ge-stell). According
to Heidegger, enframing is the essence of technology and is itself nothing technical (VA 23-24/QCT
19-20).
But what about the chronological precedence of modem physics? in addition, if mathematical
physics is a discovery of human beings, does this not suggest that modern technology is a human
creation? Heidegger argues that the chronological priority of modem physics is misleading. If this
claim is calculated in historiology (Historie), then it is correct. However, if it is thought historically
(geschichtlich), it becomes apparent that the essence of modern technology - enframing - already
holds sway in modern physics (VA 25-26/QCT 22). According to Heidegger, modern physics
prepares the way for the essence of modem technology, but not technology itself. This essence not
only has its roots in something that vastly precedes modem physics, but it also, in incipient form,
is the guiding impulse behind modem physics. Heidegger argues that modern physics represents
nature mathematically because the ordering comportment of human beings emerges in it. “[A]1ready
in physics the challenging gathering-together into ordering-revealing holds sway. But in it that
gathering does not yet come expressly to appearance. Modem physics is the herald of enframing, a
herald whose origin is still unknown” (VA 25/QCT 21-22).
Does this mean that modern technology and modern physics are not human discoveries? If so,
what does this imply about the possibility of human freedom? Heidegger takes up these questions
in the pivotal passage of The Question Concerning Technology in an attempt to further elucidate the
essence of technology as enframing. He does this by retuming to the issue that he raised at the
beginning of the lecture, namely, the possibility of a free relationship to technology. As we saw
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above, Heidegger states that the essence of technology is nothing technical. Seen in the context of
his discussion of modem physícs, this claim makes more sense. The essence of modern technology
is found not in power machínery nor in the apparati that modern physics applies to nature (VA 25,
27/QCT 21, 23). Rather, it is found in enframing, the challenging that makes_ possible anything
technical because it reveals beings as standing reserve. A free
relationship to technology is a
relationship to technology as enframing. But how does one prepare for such a relationship to
technology? Why is this relationship free and the relationship to technology as something technical
unfree?
Elucidating the nature of a free relationship to technology is much more difficult for Heidegger
than explainjng why the prevalent relationship to technology is unfree because in this notion ofa free
relationship, Heidegger effaces the schematic boundaries found in the traditional concepts of
freedom. Key to Heidegger's treatment of both of these issues is the distinction he introduces
between destiny (Geschick) and fate (Schicksal). According to Heidegger, enframing is a
destiny for
human beings. It is a gathering sending (Schicken) that “brings the human being to a way of
revealing” (VA 28/QCT 24). As we saw above, Heidegger maintained earlier in the lecture that the
human being is challenged and claimed by enframing. Although the human being has some
leeway
in representing and managing beings, within enframing it has no control over the fact that
beings are
revealed as standing reserve (VA 2l~22/QCT 18-19). As a form of destiny,
enframing determines
the general possibilities of unconcealment.
As this suggests, there is a place for human freedom within Heidegger°s notion of destiny, though
the notion of fieedom here freedom is much more constrained than the one found in the common
view that technology is a human discovery. According to Heidegger, revealing does not occur
“somewhere beyond all human activity,” though “it occurs only in the human being and not
authoritatively through the human being” (VA 27/QCT 24). Although the human being is an
essential moment in unconcealment, the general way in which beings are revealed is
something
beyond human control. However, Heidegger°s claim is misleading if one interprets it to mean that
due to the finitude of human freedom, human decision is limited to
relatively unimportant, i.e., ontic,
matters. If that were the case, there would be no difference between
destiny and fate, and history
in
(Geschichte) Heidegger's sense would be impossible. According to Heidegger, we often hear the
statement that “technology is the fate of our age, where “fate' means the inevitableness of an
unalterable course." However, as a destiny, enframing “in no way confines us to a stultified
compulsion to push on blindly with technology or, what comes to the same thing, to rebel
helplessly
against it and cnrse it as the work of the devil. Quite to the contraıy, when we once open ourselves
expressly to the essence of technology, we find ourselves unexpectedly taken into a freeing claim”
(VA 29/QCT 25-26). In the fatalism discussed here, human beings are unfree: Though fatalism
leaves open the possibility of responding to technology in a variety of ways, none of these
ways have
any affect on the history of teclmology. On this view, technology guides the course of our age and
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not human beings. Although the fatalistic definition of the essence of technology is different than
the claim, seen above, that technology is the discovery of human beings, the two are by no means
incompatible.
If destiny challenges and claims human beings, how does it differ from the compulsion of an
unalterable course? Heidegger writes, “The destiny of revealing always holds complete sway over
human beings. But that destiny is never a fate that compels [das Verhängnis eines Zwanges]. For the
human being becomes truly free only insofar as it belongs [gehört] to the realm of destiny, and so
becomes one who listens and hears [Hörender], and not one who is simply constrained to obey
[Hört'ger]” (VA 28/QCT 25). Belonging to the realm of destiny requires that one listen and respond
to destiny. It demands a sensitivity to the way that one is called forth in the claim that destiny places
on us. But the fact that one does not blindly accept or helplessly rebel against technology does not
explain why this is a freeing claim instead of the compulsion of an unalterable course. Additionally,
in the following paragraphs, where Heidegger discusses the issue of freedom most explicitly, it is
unclear whether he still has human freedom in mind. After stating that “The essence of freedom is
oríginaríly not comiected with the will or even with the causality of human willing” (VA 28/QCT
25), Heidegger proceeds to describe freedom in terms of its relation to truth, to which freedom
"stands in the closest and most intimate kinship.” According to Heidegger, “Freedom governs the
fiee in the sense of the cleared, i.e., the revealed” “Freedom is the realm of the destiny that at any
given time starts a revealing on its way” (VA 28-29/QCT 25). Is freedom, as the realm of destiny,
different from the human being - who belongs to this realm? If so, what distinguishes destiny from
fatalism besides the responsiveness to destiny found in the former? How does human freedom
emerge out of the freeing claim of destiny?
The fact that, up to this point in the lecture, freedom was always the freedom found in the
relationship to the essence of technology might suggest that Heidegger still has human freedom in
mind. However, Heidegger”s description of freedom in its relation to truth should give us pause. Is
this freedom the freedom of being, as it is often interpreted a freedom in which human beings have
nopart? Given the prominence of the issue of truth in The Question Concerning Technology, perhaps
a look at Heidegger°s earlier discussions of truth will help us to clarify the nature of this freedom.
The cross-reference is justified by the fact that Heidegger cites his I943 essay On the Essence of
Truth when he introduces the notion of destiny, and paraphrases that essay in his discussion of
freedom when he writes, “The freedom of the fiee consists neither in unfettered arbitrariness nor in
the constraint of mere laws” (VA 28-29/QCT 24~25). In the 1943 essay, there is a similar ambiguity
about the nature of freedom, though there is a clearer suggestion of human freedom here than in the
passage from The Question Concerning Technology. Heidegger states that “The human being does
not 'possess” freedom as a property. At best the reverse holds true: Freedom, the ek-sistent, revealing
Da-sein, possesses the human being” (W 85/ET 145). The passage just quoted might suggest that
freedom in this sense is not something human. However, Heidegger's description of freedom implies
~
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a human involvement that would not be found in an impersonal force or occurrence. According to
Heidegger, freedom as letting beings be (Seinlassen von Seiendem) is not “neglect and indifference
but rather the opposite. To let be is to engage oneself [Sicheinlassen] with beings." Letting beis not
“the mere management, preservation, tending, and planning of the beings in each case encountered
or sought out." Letting be is letting beings be “as the beings that they are." In other words, letting
betakes its standard from the beings themselves (W83-84/ET 144). This engagement with beings
is very similar to the responsiveness to the destiny ofunconcealment that Heidegger referred to in
The Question Conceming Technology. Heidegger contrasts letting beings be with covering up and
distorting beings by not letting them be as the beings they are (W 86/ET 146), which corresponds
in tum to the relationship to technology that - due to its lack of responsiveness to the essence of
technology - is not free?
Although Heidegger associates fieedom and engagement with ek-sistent Da-sein, his discussion
suggests that the latter is not merely the ground that makes human existentiell fieedom possible, but
human being in a more originary sense. For the engagement with beings appears to arise out of a
decision to let beings be, a decision that the human being is not compelled to make. This decision
to let beings be is not one manner of treating beings among others, but rather in incipient way of
raising the question of being. The suggestion that engagement arises out of human decision is
especially strong in 1~leidegger's discussion of historical decision in On the Essence of Truth.
According to Heidegger, Da-sein is the essential ground from which human beings are able to ek-sist
historically. When it possesses human beings as the engagement of letting beings be, ek-sistent Dasein “secures for hurnanity that distinctive relatedness to beings as a whole as such that first founds
history" (W 84-85/ET 145-146). Nevertheless, this engagement is not a random occurrence, but
starts with a decision to comport oneself to beings inthis way. “[T]he ek-sistence of historical human
beings begins at the moment when the first thinker takes a questioning stand with regard to the
unconcealment of beings by asking: What are beings?“ (W 85/ET 145). This is not to suggest,
however, that the engagement with beings is merely a matter of human decision. As wehave seen,
human freedom requires responsiveness not only to beings but also to the destiny of unconcealment.
According to Heidegger, “The rare and simple decisions of history arise from the way the ori ginary
essence of truth essentially unfolds” (W 86/ET 146). Human decision is not made in a vacuum but
is engagement with the destiny of unconcealment. At the same time, Heidegger states, as wehave
seen, that freedom is neither unfettered arbitrariness nor the constraint of mere laws (VA 29/QCT
25). This entails that there are no specific rules goveming the engagement with destiny, a point we
will return to below.
Ifthis is so, how is the relationship to the essence of technology fiee in the sense of engaging with
destiny? The issue of whether there is a substantive type ofhuman fieedom in the free relationship
to enframing is a question about the possibility of destiny developing into something other than
enfmming and the role that human freedom might have in this. As Heidegger indicates, enframing
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is not the first way that destiny has revealed itself, and it will not necessarily be the last. According
to Heidegger, pre-modem technology revealed in the manner of poiesis, bringing forth (VA 28/QCT
ori
24-25). In addition, he raises the possibility that destiny could reveal itself in a way more ginaıy
than enframing (VA 38/QCT 34). Is human freedom relevant to this possibility? The question
whether human freedom, i.e., historical decision, has a significant role to play in the possible
within the context of The Question
emergence of a new begimiing in history can be explored
of historical
Concerning Technology by turning to Heidegger°s notion of danger. What sort
states that
possibility does danger point toward? While introducing the notion of destiny, Heidegger
the
destiny (Geschick) “determines the essence of all history [Geschichre]. History is neither simply
first becomes
object of historiography nor the fulfillment of human activity. Human activity
historical as something destined” (VA 28/QCT 25). If human decision is only historical when it
raises
responds to destiny, what possibilities for historical humanity does destiny offer us? Heidegger
this issue by introducing the notion of danger, a notion he develops through the rernainder of the
lecture. According to Heidegger, destiny as such carries with it a danger. lt does this because it
cun~ent way
places the human being between two possibilities, the possibility of losing itself in the
of revealing and that of being admitted more originarily into the essence of unconcealment. In the
latter, the human being experiences “its needed belongingness to revealing as its human essence”
will
(VA 29-30/ QCT 26). Within the context of enframing, the danger is that the human being
“pursue and put forward only what is revealed in ordering and take all of its standards from here”
to all
(VA 29/QCT 26). The human being is in danger of falling prey to machination by comporting
beings, including human bcings, as standing reserve. The danger, for Heidegger, is that every other

possibility of revealing will be driven out and concealed (VA 30-31/QCT 26-27).
lt is in the possibility of being admitted more originarily into the essence of unconcealment that
the issue of human freedom arises most clearly. How is this a way of relating to enframing as the
essence of technology, and how is this a free relationship? To what extent is the human being able
to decide between the two possibilities of destiny? Heidegger elucidates the second possibility of
destiny by tıırning to Hölderlin's famous words, “But where danger is, also grows the saving power.“
arises
According to Heidegger, the possibility of destiny revealing itself in a more oıiginary way
from the saving power. Enframing, since it is a way that destiny reveals, harbors in itself not only
the danger of machination but also the saving power ~ the possibility of its own overcoming
not
(Verwindung). Despite the fact that the saving power is found already in enframing, one should
assume that “we should be able to lay hold of it immediately and without preparation” (VA 3233/QCT 28-29). The human being belongs to revealing insofar as it engages with destiny in the form
of enframing. The saving power is not something that we can simply choose to release. According
to Heidegger, “Human activity can never directly counter” and “by itself can never banish” the
danger of machinatiorı (VA 38/QCT 33).
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Then what role, íf any, does human freedom play in the historical possibility that destiny will
reveal itself in a more originary way? According to Heidegger, destiny is a granting - even in the
form of enfiaming - because it “gives the human being entry into that which the human being can,
by itself, neither discover nor even make” (VA 35-36/QCT 31). Although human beings did not
create enframing or the possibility of another beginning, Heidegger suggests that human engagement
is an essential moment in the over-coming of enframing. Destiny grants to the human being a “share
in revealing,” a share “that is needed by the enownment of revealing.” The human being belongs to
the enownment of revealing as “the one who is needed for the preservation of the essence of truth,”
and it is here that the human being enters into the highest dignity of its essence (VA 36-37/QCT 3233). As this indicates, Heidegger's statement, seen above, that revealing “occurs only in the human
being and not authoritatively through the human being” (VA 27/ QCT 24) is misleading if it is taken
to suggest that the human being is merely a passive participant in revealing. Although the human
being does not control the emergence of another begimıing in history, this historical occurance is not
possible without the decision to share in revealing by engaging with the destiny of unconcealment.
The danger of enframing arises from the possibility that the human being will abandon its free
essence and will reveal beings merely as standing reserve (VA 36/QCT 32). By deciding to respond
to destiny and ask the question of being, the human being keeps open the possibility that destiny will
reveal itself in a more originary way.
But what does it mean to respond to and engage with destiny? How does one prepare for the
occurrence ofanother beginning? As we noted above, Heidegger states that human freedom is not
“the constraint of mere laws” (VA 29/QCT 25). There are no strict rules to guide the engagement
with destiny. Engagement should be responsive in the sense of letting destiny reveal itself as what
it is, letting it unfold in its urıique essence. Engagement is free in the sense that it is not the passive
reception of an object's impression or the act of merely following directions. It is an active way of
responding. On the other hand, engagement is not arbitrary, despite the fact that there are no strict
rules to guide it, because it is sensitive to destiny. This may bring to mind I-Ieidegger's notion of
Gelassenheit, which he describes as being between passivity and activity (G 35/CCP 61). However,
it also raises the same basic question that surrounds Heidegger`s notion of authenticity: I-low can
Dasein, as a thrown being, respond to the call of conscience in a way that preserves the uniqueness
peculiar to the moment of vision? I-low do we think the relationship of human freedom to the
granting that is beyond its control? How do we enter into that which lies between arbitrariness and
brute necessity? These rich yet difficult questions are a constant theme in Heidegger”s thought.
Ultimately, the question of the free relationship to destiny is a question for us. The only
appropriate response to this question is to seek a free relationship to destiny, i.e., to take part in the
revealing of the destiny of technology through engaging with its essence in enframing. By doing this,
we prepare for the possibility that destiny will reveal itself in a more originary way. Similarly, the
question whether modem science and technology have a destiny is a question that can be broached
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only through an engagement with science and technology in their current form. To determine
whether modern science and technology contain possibilities that lead outside the domain of
machination is something that can only be carried out by engaging with and unfolding their
possibilities. Since the attempt to establish a free relationship to modern science is really a topic for
another paper, Iwill conclude with a brief look at some of Heidegger°s remarks on this issue.
For Heidegger, does modern science have a destiny? Rorty”s claim that Heidegger had
“considerable contempt for the natural sciences” would suggest not. However, Heidegger°s critical
remarks on many issues are fiequently read in a merely negative sense. These readers do not consider
whether Heidegger°s response to what he is criticizing is more subtle that a simple rejection of it.
This is not only the case with Heidegger°s remarks on modem science and technology, but also with
his criticisms of causality, the will, and metaphysics. Heidegger has these sorts of readings in mind
when he writes in the Letter on “Humanism ", “Because we are speaking against 'humanism` people
fear a defense of the inhmnan and a glorification ofbarbaric brutality. For what is more 'logical' than
that for somebody who rejects humanism, nothing remains but the affirrnation of inhumanity?” (W
176-177/LH 263; see W 177-179/LH 264«265).
That Heidegger°s critique of modern science does not entail a rej ection of science can be seen in
various aspects of our discussion of The Question Concerning Technology. Though Heidegger
argues that the essence of modern technology does not arise out of modern physics, his discussion
of the latter is hardly contemptuous or dismissive. In fact, he aclmowledges the historical importance
of modem physics in the initial emergence of enframing (VA 25/QCT 21-22). On the question of
the destiny of modem science, it is possible to draw parallels from Heidegger's treatment of
technology. As we have seen, Heidegger distinguishes the free relationship to modern technology
from the common rejection of the latter “as the work of the devil” (VA 9, 29/QCT 4, 26). If
Heidegger is not recommending that we abandon modern technology, it is likely that he is not
recommending this about modern science either. In addition, where would we experience enframing
if not in modem science and technology? And if we can only engage with destiny through a
relationship to enframing, does this not suggest that enframing - and that through which we
experience enframing - are essential to the possibility that destiny will reveal itself in a more
'

originary way?
In The Question Conceming Technology, Heidegger argues that modern science, like modern
technology, is grounded in enframing. The claim that science is grounded in something more
oıiginary, that science is a derivative discipline that is incapable of conceiving its own essence, goes
back at least as far as Being and Time (see SZ 11-13) and is a constant theme in Heidegger's thought.
However, this claim is not a contemptuous rejection of the sciences, but an attempt to identify their
limits and to trace the relationship of the sciences to philosophical thinking. Although Heidegger is
critical of claims made about the sciences and their discoveries that display an ignorance of these
limits, as seen in his discussion of machina_tion, he also leaves open the possibility of a free
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relationship to science. In the Beiträge (1936-1938), Heidegger discusses reflection (Besinnung) on
science, a fonn of thinking similar to the responsiveness to destiny discussed above. According to
Heidegger, reflection on science is only possible today by means of grasping science historically as
one possibility of unfolding grounded in the truth of being, and considering the impulses that
determine the essence of modern science in its present form (GA 65:l44/CP 100). In reflection,
science is not conceived as something present at hand, something that is established in its present
state. Rather, science is thought in terms of its grounding in the truth of being, as something that
continues to unfold from out of this ground.
Heidegger takes this issue up again in the 1953 lecture Science and Reflection, a lecture that is
closely related to The Question Conceming Technology. In this lecture, Heidegger examines in detail
how the various sciences reduce nature into standing reserve and why the essence of science is
inaccessible to the sciences (see VA 55-64/SR 171-179). But what is most interesting for us is what
Heidegger suggests about the possibility of a fi'ee relationship to science. Heidegger describes
reflection as “releasement [Gelassenheit] into what is worthy of question” (VA 64/SR 180), and he
writes, atthe end of the lecture, “Even if the sciences, precisely in following their ways and using
their means, can never press forward to the essence of science, every researcher and teacher of the
sciences, every human being pursuing a way through a science, can indeed move, asa thinking being
[Wesen], onvarious levels of reflection and can keep reflection vigilant” (VA 66/SR 181-182; see
also GA 65:96-97/CP 66-67). According to Heidegger, although science is not the highest form of
reflection, it is still possible for those involved with the sciences to remain open to what is worthy
of question in science. These people might not engage with the essence of science as enframing or
reflect on the possibility that destiny will reveal itself in a more originary way in science. However,
by keeping in mind that the essence of science is not itself scientific and that science emerges
through impulses that arise fi'om a more originary ground, one can sustain an opemiess to the nonmachinational possibilities of science and preserve the wonder of what science can reveal to us about
beings. Ultimately, the question whether these possibilities will unfold themselves or whether
science will myopically tum its back upon its destiny is a question for us. For only if we raise the
question of the essence of science will we prepare the way for a free relationship to science, a
relationship that helps to preserve and unfold the destiny of science. Only by engaging with the
essential possibilities of science can we experience its destiny in the transfonnation to another
beginning, and not by tuming our backs on science or naively trumpeting its advancement.
Kent State University

NOTES

1. ln this paper, Heidegger's texts will be cited by means of the following abbreviations: CCP = “Conversations on a Country
Path." in Discourse on Thinking. Trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund. New York: Harper & Row. 1966; CP =

Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning). Trans. Parvis Bmad and Kenneth Maly. Bloomington: lndiana University Press,
1999; ET = “On the Essence of Truth," trans. John Sallis, in Pathmarks. Ed. William McNeill. Cambridge: Cambridge
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University Press, 1998; G Gelassenheit. Pfullingen: Neske, 1959; GA = Gesamtausgabe. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von
Herrmann. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978; LH = “Letter on “Humanism'," trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, in Pathmarks;
QCT = “The
Question Conceming '1`echno1ogy,” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. Trans. William Lovitt. New
York: Harper & Row, 1977; SR = “Science and Reflection,” in The Question Concerníng Technology and Other Essays. SZ
= Sein und Zeit. 7'“ ed.
Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1953; T = “The Thing," in Poetry, Language, Thought. Trans. Albert Hofstadter.
New York: Harper & Row, 1971; VA = Vorträge und Aufiätze. 9"' ed. Pfullingen: Neske, 2000; W = Wegmarken. Frankfurt:
Klostermann, 1967.
Richard Rorty, “An Imaginative Philosopher: The Legacy of W.V. Quine,” The Chronicie ofHigher Education, February 2,
2001, sec. B 8, 9.
When one ís unresponsiveness tothe essence of technology, one is dominated by technology. ln other words, one finds oneself
in a relationship to technology in which one can only “push on blindly with technology or rebel helplessly against it” (VA
29/QCT 25-26). Similarly, not lelting beings be the beings they are takes place, for the most part, within the confines of a
metaphysical understanding of beings.
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Abstract: 'lhis paper attempts to develop a philosophical neorientation to contemporary circumstances that takes into account
the constitutive effects of technology, in the broadest sense of the word. on political subjectivity and its environment. A
questioning of the value and usefulness of the prevailing criteria by which our "knowledge" of socio-political experience is
developed is central to the purpose at hand. Dewey's philosophy, while differing fundamentally in crucial areas in both its
critical and positive phases from Heidegger's thought, is brought forward as an effective way of exterıding the tatter's
intenogation into the nature of technology and its relationship to subjectivity. lpropose a reconsideration of Dewey's notion
of "experimental science" asa potential model for reckoning with anincreasingly technological "world" of experience. The
transposition of Dewey's pfescriptions for dealing with the "perils" of nature onto the sphere of "technotopic" experience,
l suggest. may be instrumental in establishing some measure of control over, and awareness of, the determinative effects of
technology on both the content and form of contemporary experience. In doing so, the paper offers a new take on
Heideggefs contention that, with respect to technology, "...where the danger is, grows the saving power also."

For better or for worse, technology's effects on society and the individuals who comprise it are beyond measure not only
in the quantitative sense of the breadth of technology`s intrications into virtually every aspect of our physical
environment, but also, and perhaps most significantly, interms of its qualitative effects on intersubjectivity on the very
way we interpret who we are, how we relate to each other. Technology's pervasive logic as a structuring principle
behind the institutions of our social relations calls for a reconsiderat-ion of “the world” that environs us, a reconsideration
that takes into account the fact that our environment is constituted less and less by "natural" features, and increasingly
by artificial ones. In his later writings ("Letter On Humanism," “On the Essence of Truth,” and “The Question
Coneeming Technology”), Heidegger's project changes from one of pursuing the question of the meaning of Being
(Being and Time) to one of elucidating the “dangers” engendered by Dasein 's creative complicity in the disclosure of
being's truth. This shift in Heidegger`s focus toward a thought more sensitive to the ramifications of humankind's
henneneutical privilege is the point of departure from which the above stated reorientation to the world begins with
a focus on the intimate connection between knowing and doing at the heart ofhuman interaction with the world.

-

-

PRELIMINARY THESIS: THE SHAREDLOGIC OFTECHNOLOGICAL AND DISCURSIVE POIESIS
Heidegger's focus onhumankind's performative complicity in ~ and responsibility for the disclosure of Being's truth
through interpretive action in his later works further develops a perspective on the unique status of human beings as the
“shepherds of Being" initiated inBeing and Time. As an essential paıt of the "tum" towards a meditation on technology.
Heidegger underscores the necessity of thoroughly interrogating human interpretive action as a tremendous power
whose nature and ramifications are yet tobe fully comprehended. Heidegger catries out this project in “The Question
Conceming Technology," where he distinguishes between modes of “bringing forth,“ of the unconcealment of the true.
While technology, rooted in the purposive (active) bringing forth of objects of experience through (instrumentalized)
human ıechnê, is artificial, it nevertheless remains akin to the (natural) self-presencing effected through the poiêsis of
physis. The nature of the “truth" that is revealed by either ofthese two modes of unconcealment is radically conditioned
by the very mode of that unconcealment. ". _.what presences by means of physis has the bursting open belonging to
bringing foith, e.g., the bursting of a blossom into bloom in itself (en heautôi). In contrast, what isbrought forth by the
artisan or the artist, e.g., the silver chalice, has the bursting open belonging to bringing forth not in itself, but in another
(en allôi), in the craftsman or the artist” (Heidegger, 1977: l0-l l). What makes technology as a specific mode of
unconcealment an object of concem for Heidegger is the way in which the “setting in order” of ıechnë's artificial mode
of unconcealment mimics nature's self-presencing as physis. The danger implied in this is twofold. Onthe one hand,
the simple fact that experience can be disclosed through technology as alethic "truth" threatens the distinction between
“natural" or unchallenged and artificial or purposively ordered “tnith.” Secondly, the fact that every technological
disclosure is simultaneously the effect of a concomitant concealment is itself specifically concealed by the logic of
technology as a kind of epistemological relationship with the “world” of experience. It is this connection between the
“bringing forth" of technological poiêsis as creative act and the nature and process ofhuman knowledge formation that
Heidegger foregrounds throughout his later work; “ıech›tê," at the etymologicai roots of “technology,” is not only a
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specific form of unconcealment or bringirıg forth, but, “_. .fromearliest times until Plato the word rechné is linked with
the word epistêmê. Both words are names for knowing in the widest sense" (1977: 13).
Heidegger elucidates the way in which modem technology, as a mode of revealing - and thus as a mediating force
in the process of how we come to kııow the world (and ourselves), has gotten “out of hand.“ As a simultaneously
mediatory and creative phenomenon, technology-as-knowledge of the world limits the disclosure of nature to a
“standing reserve” of resources that, significantly, includes among those resources human beings as objects. The
"setting to order” (stellen) effected by technology constitutes an “enframement” which .means the gathering together
of that setting-upon which sets upon man, i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as
standing reserve" (1977: 20). In a thinking that opens up to thought utter armihilation of the myth of technology as
purely instrumental, Heidegger suggests a reading of technology as a phenomenon that challenges forth mankind to
ceaselessly sustain teclmology's own “work” of setting upon nature: mankind becomes technology`s alibi for its
independent self-perpetuation. This fact places human subjectivity in a new and profoundly problematic relation with
itself. 'I`he result is that technology can no longer be understood as functioning as a system of teclmiques by which
mankind is enabled to harmoniously inhabit and interact with nature, but must instead be seen as the effect of unique
human subjectivity that places nature in abeyance through an exclusive orientation to the latter that “sets upon” it, in
a process which “challenges forth" nature rather than revealing it in an authentic manner.
I-Ieidegger`s concem over the exclusionaıy nature of technologically mediated experience is echoed in the work of
recent continental thinkers such as Foucault, Derrida, and Althusserf who theorize the inextncable relationship between
discourse conceived as a performative act of representation, and the way “authoritative” (legitimized) knowledge is
produced by these performative acts through the work of our social and political institutions. As a mediator of human
experience, discourse is generated to perform the specific political task of revealing the individua1's subjectivity to
him/herself as part of a larger context in which he/she functions interactively in a kind of meta-natural environment:
the socio-politico~economic environment. The concept that institutionalized forms of discourse place the subject in a
larger context of social and political “reality” in such a way that he/she “recognizes” him/herself as "fitting in” in a
particular way is not only reminiscent of Heideggefs conceptualization of the technological disposition (as one which
interprets human subjects as a part of the overall field of natural objects in terms of “standing reserve" - as functional
elements of something outside themselves), but it also presents a characterization of the effect of institutionalized
discourse as one which creates a toıalizing (self-enclosed) depiction of social reality, “enframing” subjectivity within
a seamless set of epistemological categories.
The discursive basis of an “enframing” (re) production of subjectivity as the epistemological locus of the sociopolitical order is elucidated by Althusser in “Ideoiogy and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Toward an
Investigation).” Althusser describes what we normally call the process of “socialization" in utterly radical terms that
imply that this process (which Althusser calls “interpellation”) is not simply one where the already formed subject is
“indoc1rinated” or educated into the norms of behavior demanded for his/her functional participation in social relations,
but rather one that actually constitutes the very identity of the individual subjectz ideologically. Through “ideological
state apparatuses” such as schools, churches, and the family, the prevailing epistemological and valuative codes, which
constitute the specific character of ideologies, “call forth" the subject in an interpellation. The subject responds to the
calling forth of ideology and thereby recognizes himself as the one called forth. As Althusser uses it to describe this
event, the expression “to call forth” bears all the creative, forınative connotations inherent in the creative act of poiesis
as a “bringing forth“ that Heidegger notes in “Question”: the subject is identified according to a socially constmcted,
contingent set of valuative conventions (a disclosure of a specific subjectivity). Conceived as a prevailing set of
valuative conventions, ideology, as Althusser uses the term, is exemplary of the fundamental complicity between
knowledge and valuation in the Western tradition and functions according to the same logie by which technology, as
understood by Heidegger, “brings forth" the world of experience in an exclusionary and inauthentic way through its
representations.
Althusser's depíction of the method by which “ideology“ functions to create an axio-epistemological ordering of
sociopolitical experience, is echoed in Habermas' discussion of the Marcusian understanding of technology as a veiled
form of political domination in “Science and Technology as 'Ideology.'” Habemias depicts technology in Marcusian
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terms as something manifested in institutionalized “purposive rational action," as
something that follows an irıtrinsic

logic of dominatíon, stating that the rationality of technology-as-ideoiogy:

...extends only to relations of possible technical control and therefore requires a type of action that implies domination, whether of nature
or of society. By virtue of its structure, puiposive rational action is the exercise of control. That is
why, in accordance with this
rationality, the “rationalization” of the conditions of life is synonymous with the instítutionalization ofa form of domination whose
political character becomes unrecognizable. (Habermas, 1982: 82)

Technology-as-ideology functions, for Marcuse, according to exactly the same principle as it does for Althusser:
as a self-concealing form of political control which completely environs the individual subject. With this thematic
comiection, we can see the apmess of Althusser's description of the process of subject-constitution through ideology
as one of subjection, as it brings out the Marcusian notion of technological rationality as a form of ideological

domínation.
The purpose of arguing that there are fundamental similarities between the Hiedeggerian account of the way
technology effects an all-encompassing, “enframing” limit on the way the subject experiences and lorows the world and
the way in which structuralist and poststructuralist thinkers describe institutionalized social discourse as
functioning
through mechanisms by which the dominant valuations of modern Western society enforce a rigid and specific
“authorized” interpretation of experience, is to lay the groundwork for a conceptualization of contemporary
circumstances as comprising a “technotopia." What is particularly significant about the combined contribution of these
thiııkers to this depiction of political experience is that, through the insights they provide, one can begin to understand
that the “technologization” of contemporary experience rests fundamentally on the fact that the
very identity of the
contemporary subject is largely formed through the interpellative process by institutions which reflect the prevailing
values of the society/culture in which he/she lives. This epistemoiogical ordering of experience is, we suggest, a much
more profoundly effective way in which discourse-as-technology can radically (re) configure our
experience than the
simple facticity of the artifacts of industry and engineering that largely constitute the physical environment we find
ourselves in. According to the Foucaldian/Althusserian understanding of this process, as subjects, we
only are insofar
as we are something that corresponds fiınctionally to the socio-polı`tical circumstances we inhabit. As such we are, to
use a Marxian term, the products of a specified knowledge structure which, to say the least, has
largely displaced a
“natural” relation between ourselves, others, and the world. The Greek term technê, as a form of knowledge mobilízed
to some routínized larger purpose outside of individual, private (“authentic” in Heidegger's sense of
being the pursuit
of one's “ownmost possibility”) endeavors, provides an important conceptual link between
“know1edge” and “purpose”
(the latter always determined with reference to a hierarchical scheme of values) and gives sense to the depiction of the
contemporary situation as “technotopic” through aninterpretation of the similarity of the logic by which both technology
and discourse work. The Poiésis of a discursive knowledge structure that is guided by a thoroughly
technological modus
operandi “brings forth” subjectivity and the environment in which it is contextualized in a fundamentally distorted,
because exclusionary, way. lt is with this notion of the human subject's severance from an authentic relation with nature
due to the long-term development of a Westem epistemology that is foreign to the "actual" nature of “authentic” human
experience that we arrive at the problematic with which Dewey concems himself in Experience and Nature.
MYTH AND TECHNOLOGY IN DEWEY: EXISTENCE, KNOWLEDGE, AND EXPERIENCE
In both Experience and Nature and The Quest for Certainty, Dewey perfomıs a
geneaiogy of human knowledge forms,
viewing what has in the modem period become institutionalized scientific knowledge as having originated in the human
impulse to “escape from peril.” In keeping with his thesis that the actual nature of experience is one of process and the
flux of becoming, Dewey stresses the fact that the
original position from which human individuals and societies undergo
experience is one which is “precarious and perilous,” devoid of predictability and, as a result full of risk. His description
of the nature of "existence" in chapter 2 of Experience and Nature is reminiscent of the depiction
given by Heidegger
to Dasein 's condition of “thrownness” in Being and Time as an initially
overwhelming, passive moment of self
discovery within adverse circumstances. Another aspect of Dewey's description of the human existential constitution
that bears comparison with Heideggefs is the notion of “care as the being of Dasein" specifically in the notion of
anxiety as a “basic state of mind” through which the human existential situation of Dasein is “disclosed.”3 For
Heidegger in Being and Time, the fundamental existential condition that makes possible all of the subsequent
constitutional qualities he attributes to the human existence of Dasein is that of
being a temporaiiy constituted and
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existing being. Dewey makes a similar recognition that the source of human anxiety in the face of the precarious nature
of experience is due to its temporal, processual nature. Indeed, it is temporality itself which alone can give rise to the
possibility of peril in the unknown and unfamiliar. Dewey offers an explanation of human emotion as an immediate
response tothe “irıdetenninateness of present sittıations,” drawing conclusions about the nature of the human existential
constitution as deriving directly from its situatedness in a temporal mode of being:
Fear, hope,joy and sonow, aversion and desire, as perturbations, are qualities ofa divided response. They involve concern, solicitude,
for what the present situation may become. "Care" sigrıities two quite different things: fret, worry, and anxiety, and cherished attention
to that in whose potcntialities weare interested. These two meanings represent different poles of reactive behavior to a present having
a future that is ambiguous. (Dewey, 1988: 180)
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While demonstrating the commonality of Dewey's thought with that of Heidegger on the issue of the temporal basis
of human experience, the above passage also reveals a fundamerıtal difference of preoccupation between the two
thinkers which will become central to our later discussion of the important difference in the quality of concem about
the nature and potcntialities of technology demonstrated by the two philosophers. ln Heidegger's account of “care,”
we already see a nascent concem about the quality of the human reaction to the adversity of existence in his
prcoccupation with “anxiety,” fear," and the resulting tendency for human beings to seek refuge in everydayness and
“the they” as a way of fleeing their existentially constituted responsibility for themselves, abiding in an “inauthentic”
mode of “care.” For Dewey, clearly the preoccupation lies in the other, more sanguine (and perhaps more naive) side
of the bivalence of “care” indicated in the above citation.
In Experience and Nature, Dewey develops his own account of the initial human response to the natural world of
intractable risk that seeks to establish the origins of the human institution of science and knowledge. Reinforcing the
thesis of the necessity of understanding and establishing the possibility of a direct connection with nature as a feature
of human experience that pervades nearly all of his philosophical work, Dewey attempts to demonstrate that one of the
most fundamental tendencies of human behavior is the privileging of “direct enjoyment,” the attribution to human nature
of a preference for “consummations” Consummations, as perfected, fınalized and complete experiences, are for Dewey
exemplary of htımanl-tind`s pre-scientific/technological response to the diffıculties presented by the perílous and
precarious nature of actual experience as a process of becoming wherein ñnalities and consummations are at best rare.
Consummations, directly enjoyed, offer the experience (however temporary and mythological) of security in a
momentary escape from nonnal experience. Dewey recognizes this tendency to fabricate and cling to artificial myths
that depict “the contingencies of existence combined with happier endings” (l958:79) as a legitimate response to the
adversities of natural experience. The problem for Dewey lies in the fact that this “mythical impulse” is not only the
source of inspiration for what he considers the legitimate and potentially authentic pursuit of an “experimental science”
based on a pragmatic program of working within the conñnes of the flux of experience. It is also the source of the
Western tradition of the rational, ahistorical epistemological rendering of the objects of experience which, according
to Dewey, can be neither “accurate” nor productive as a way of actually understanding and taking some measure of
control over nature. The philosophical tradition`s “refuge” in the timeless categories of absolute forıns of knowledge
represent for Dewey the pathological path to the overcoming of natural adversity, fundamentally opposed to the
altemative of developing the “experimental science” mentioned above. Dewey's understanding of the human condition
and the mythical practice of rites as reflective of the desire for the “direct enjoyment” of consummations is developed
as part of his overall project of understanding the natural conditions of human existence as well as the corresponding
naturally legítimate responses to it.
ln Chapter 3 of Experience and Nature, Dewey gives a preliminary (naturalist) justiñcation for the pursuit of science
and technology as a means of placing some degree of control over the contingencies of natural experience: “For man
is more preoccupied with enhancing life than with bare living; so that a sense of living when it attends labor and utility
is borrowed not intrinsic, having been generated in those peıiods of relief when activity was dramatic” (1958: 80). With
this statement Dewey develops the thesis that the primacy of the aesthetic in experience as a human value is an organic
and therefore legitimate outcome of the fact of experience. Dewey therefore sees the resulting fact that the practical
business of the work required for survival is endowed with a super-added aesthetic quality as non-problematic. The lack
of concem over the possible ramifications of the aestheticization of cultural means of self preservation and perpetuation
- especially in the form of teclmology - represents, as discussed below, both the strength and weakness of Dewey's
philosophy of technology. On the one hand, Dewey fails to make the critical qualitative distinction drawn by Heidegger
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- between the authentic creative process ofpoiêsıls and the potential problems of a forced “bringing forth” characteristic

of rechnê. On the other hand, his sense of the importance of respecting and fomenting the spontaneous and organic
creative potential of a science that is practiced in a manner such that it appropriates the objects of dynamic experience
in temıs which are reflectíve of that dynamism represents a bold call for the kind of action without which the human
creative capacity may not be fully or properly realized.

EXPERIMENTAL ACTION: A SCIENCE OF DISCOVERY
a
true
reverence
for the purity and sanctity of immediate experience of the world. Reverence implies
Dewey expresses
humility, which is precisely indicated in Dewey`s suggestion of the importance of recognizing the limits of our ability
to appropriate experience in knowledge forms. Neveıtheless, he clearly feels it is worthwhile, even imperative to
attempt to do so, as weare beset, on the horizons of the world of experience, by incessant perils. Hence, when he claims
that “...things in their immediacy are unknown and unknowable,” that the nature of direct experience is one of an
“ineffable presence" (1958: 82), bis mairı concem is that we abandon the "traditional" scientific mode of appropriating
this ineffable presence in a knowledge form “in which the esthetic and the rational are confused on principle" (1958:
87) because such a "knowledge" fails to respect or adequately convey the power of this immediacy. Against the
Western epistemological tradition, which reorganizes the dynamic flux of experience in static temıs and thus amounts
to a distorted and therefore useless conceptualization of its objects, Dewey proposes the practice of “experimental
inquiry and of reflection efticacious in action" (1958: 94). In this sense, Dewey deprecates the Platonic/Kantian
approach primarily because it reinterprets the historical, temporal world of experience, which is composed of
“beginnings instead of endings” in ahistorical, static terms. This deprecation is performed as a necessary critical
prerequisite for aııy approach to a science that would proceed by a logic of discovery. Dewey thereby valorizes a pursuit
of knowledge which can be described as one guided by and engendering of phronésis - a practical knowledge as
opposed to one divorced from organic experience, by which alone the task of property getting the precarious aspects
of natural events “in hand" is possible and useful for worldly action The specific call for a practical, historically engaged
epistemological tradition by Dewey is another significant way in which his work resonates with that of Heidegger.
Throughout the critical phase of Experience and Nature, Dewey makes repeated reference to the ancient Greeks as
the initiators of the division maintained between the life of practical action, that of the artisan or laborer, and the
intellectual life of those who, freed from the immediate necessities of practical action, dwell in a contemplative world
of perfected absolutes. This is significant because it brings to light the fact that for Dewey, the aesthetic preoccupations
of the contemplative life are dependent on the practical work of the artists and artisans who, through the process of
working in the world of becomings, of process, bring about the objects which can be appreciated as consummatory
ñnalities. This understanding of the priority of practical experience and work in the flow of experience brings us to
perhaps one of the most significant implications of Dewey`s fomıulation of science as the experimental pursuit of
successive discoveries in a process of phronêsis. Dewey`s naturalistic understanding of the essentially practical, utile
disposition from out of which knowledge arises in experimental science consciously opposes the Westem tradition's
disposition toward knowledge as an independent aesthetic construct divorced from practice fetishized for its own
“intrinsic” value. lt is precisely this perspective provided by Dewey that we suggest aligns him with the later
I-leidegger's concem with technology and the location of the problems engendered by technology with respect to
subjectivity's relationship with its environment in the Western epistemological tradition:
But in the practice of science, knowledge is an affair ofmalriııg sure, not of grasping antecedently given sureties. What is already known,
what is accepted as truth. is of immense importance; inquiry could not proceed a step without it. But it is held subject to use, and is at
the mercy of the discoveries which it makes possible. lt has to be adjusted to the latter and not the latter to it...eonsequences and not
antecedents supply meaning and verity (1958: 154).

What is significant about the above passage is that the absolutely positive terms in which Dewey characterizes his
offered alternative to the fetishizing epistemological relationship with "truth" provide the beginnings of a method by
which the practice of practical knowledge acquisition can free itself from the dominant discursive structures discussed
in the opening section of the present essay. By devaluing the tradition's fetishization of “knowledge-as-an-end-im
itself," Dewey frees knowledge för whatever possible creative endeavor that it might be put to use in. Furthermore, his
naturalism roots the human valorization of the aesthetic in practice, which enables him to retain a defensible expression
of the “fiıse value“ of the aesthetic. In this way, Dewey introduces a new and all-important elemental capacity into the
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vision of his experimental science, one which takes it beyond the reactíve project of simply getting the adversities of
nature under control and into an active mode of potentially limitless creation. While Dewey is distiıiguished from
to
Heidegger in so far as the former does not thoroughly interrogate the “traditional“ rationalist approach knowledge
is
a
certain
sense
in which
as to whether or not it lends itself to functioning as an ideologically repressive structure, there
the "organic" basis of human aestheticization of cultural practices resonates with a Heideggerian poiésis. There is as
reverence here (discussed above) for the importance of humility as an essential part of the human relationship with
nature. This humilíty promoted by Dewey`s critical prescriptions can be characterized as a sensitivity to the “tnıth of

nature" much like the “truth of Being"
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TECHNOTOPIC EXPERIENCE: A USER'S GUIDE
The critical phase of Dewey's project in both Quest For Cerramry and Experience and Nature is quite limited when we
compare it to either Heidegger or Habermas°s Marcuse, as Dewey's most significant critical concern is with the
prevalence of rationalist ways of understanding the human knowledge process. Dewey never sees this predominance
as reflective of a tendency inherent in the tradition which is either ideologically active as a suspect means of domination
or as containing within it a logic of control that leads to questions about its capacity to be free from the possibility of
resulting in “kiiowledge” that is not only “i`nauthentic” but socially and politically restrictive of possibilities. For
Dewey, the only tlueat posed by traditional Western rationality is the continuation of a niisguided appropriatiori of
experience and thus a science which cannot properly appropriate the world of experience in a way that can contribute
to the human task of getting the adversity of nature under control. Indeed, the issue of control is hardly problematic for
Dewey, and as we shall see later, this amounts to a very significant oversight on his part in temis of the implications of
his notion of “experimental science” For, with the beneñts of the insights provided by Heidegger and the other thiıikers
discussed above, the failure to retain a cautionary foresight into the potential problems created by a technological
apparatus of control - primarily in terms of its potential for use as a way of controlling human beings - represents an
all-importanttlacuna in any theory of technology.
There are two significant reasons why the use of Dewey's philosophy as a prescriptive guide to orientation and
conduct in what we are here conceiving as a technotopic environment may seem questionable. First of all, it may be
noted that Dewey°s experimental science is developed primarily as a response to and a prescription for overcoming the
contingencies and adversities of a natural (not technological) environment. The second query, hinted at above, that may
be raised is a response to the fact that Dewey's celebration of the possibilities of experimental science and the
technologies that it develops to pursue its ends lacks an internal critical element which would ask two fundamental
questions: Who decides the directives that science will follow, and, have all the possible consequences of this science
and technology (or even just the potentially negative ones) been considered? Considering the second of these
considerations, it may seem ironic or even perverse to propose the application of Dewey's insights to the development
of a philosophy that recognizes at the outset that technology has clearly resulted in some problems of a profound nature
in terms of both the extent and breadth of the effects it has wrought. It will be the purpose of this final section to work
through these problems and develop a philosophy of technotopic experience which combines the fruits of Dewey°s
thought and those of Heidegger, creating a hybrid which is both “proactive” and open to the maximum exploitation of
freedom available to the contemporary individual, while simultaneously not limited (or endangered) by a naiveté which
fails to properly recognize the limits placed on subjectivity and experience in the current situation.
Looking first at the elements of Dewey's project that are useful for the present project, that is, those elements of
insight which are transposable from the natural paradigm of experience to the technotopic one, we note two of
significance. The first is the simple notion of the absolute necessity of making sure that one's method of epistemological
orientation to one`s circumstances remains "true" to the actual nature of those circumstances. One need not dispense
with the Wisdom offered by Dewey concerning the importance of this principle simply because he failed to perform a
complete evaluation of the implications of the Western scientific tradition's wayward approach to knowing the world.
The value of phronêsis, as exemplifiecl by Dewey`s insistence on the importance of developing an epistemological
exercise tlıat adequately reflects the inherent qualities of the object of experience - nature as historical ílux, is something
that can and should be applied as a general principle guiding one's orientation to one”s environment - no matter what
that environment is. The important contribution here can be summed up in the foliowing phrase: “know your object."
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If one's environment is constituted primarily by natural factors, then one should “kı1ow” it accordingly; if it is an
environment constituted primarily by technology, the same Wisdom applies. The purpose of the opening section of this
paper is to do precisely this - to demonstrate with clarity an apprehension of the current situation in which we find
ourselves and to which we must relate.
The second positive insight put to use in the present essay is arguably the more important one because it involves
the question of risk framed in Nietzschean temis. Rather than conceiving risk in a generally negative light (as is the case
in most of the literature on the subject of risk), the present essay mobilizes Dewey's thought in a Nietzschean spirit,
which approaches the phenomenon of risk from the point of view that vital interests may entail the conscious taking of
risks when this is done in view of a potential reward that otherwise may not result. Furthermore, as an alternative to
the prevalent disposition of muchcontemporary political and social theory, the present essay takes up the liberating
element of opemiess to experimentation in Dewey's thought and conjoins it with the critical element of Heideggefis
concern over the problematic effects of the technological mode of appropriating experience (“knowledge”). As such,
we propose the cultivation of a willingness to go forward with the creative process of human endeavor in spite of (even
the simple possibility of) risks, which - unlike in the case of Dewey - are recognizable in advance. From a Nietzschean
point of view, the problem with the overly concemed disposition of Enlightenrnent-rooted contemporary political and
social theoıy (e.g., the work of Rawles, Taylor, the later Habermas) is that its response to the Heideggerian insight into
the traumatic effects of the prevailing technological disposition that perpetrates untold Violence against both the physical
and theoretical possibilities of contemporary subjectivity is to “flee” back into the arms of a salvific notion of rationality
which even the naive Dewey had the sense to question.“ It is in opposition to this conservative, reactive spirit that the
naive and optimistic spirit of Deweyan experimentalism is taken up in the present essay, with the qualification that the
naiveté is not the quality that pennits it to pursue such an approach.
It is the contention of the present essay that a willingness to take a disposition towards one's subjectivity that accepts
its ideologico-technological (at least co-) constitution is the only proper response to the situation, given the interpretation
that, as suggested in the preliminary thesis of this paper, this teclmologically (co-) constitution is a result of our
interpellation through the discursive practices of the social institutions that surround us. As such, the present approach
to subjectivity in a technotopic enviromnent puts a new spin on the Deweyan notion of “acceptance and control":
accepting our constitution as largely conditioned by the technotopic circumstances that environ, us, one seeks whatever
level of control over one's circumstances is possible. Whether or not actual control over one's identity and
circumstances is possible, it is clearly not possible without a Dewey inspired attention to the actual nature of the
circumstances one finds oneself in.
The “emancipatoıy” aspect of the present argument thus takes the position, along with Deleuze and Guattari, that
the subject must perform the operation of conscious self-identity (re) construction through a disposition of becoming
a “desiring machine,”5 taking up a conscious technological/discursive approach to the apprehension and development
of one`s identity. The individual level at which this prescription for orientation in a technotopic environment takes place
is a result of the insight provided by the work of Althusser, Foucault, and Derrida, which, when considered along with
the Weberian insights taken up by Marcuse and the early Habermas, imply that, contrary to Dewey`s aspirations,
emancipation from the conñning qualities of the contemporary technologically constituted environment is in some sense
diametrically opposed to any fomi of institutionalization. Contemporary Western institutions of culture, as embodiments
of the axio-epistemology of the prevailing techno-ideology, are legacies of Erılightenment “progress.” Extending
Althusser”s extension of Manr`s work, we suggest that they are the sites at which ideology-as-technology is formulated
and perpetually reproduced. Thus, from the point of view of the present essay, any possible emancipation must occur
outside the “apparatuses” and logic of these institutions. By undertaking the creative project of a reforrnulated (and
admittedly ironic) version of the Heideggerian pursuit of authentic existence by applying a Deweyan program of
experimental action at the individual level, one also avoids the a inherent in any institutionalized version thereof, a risk
that presents itself with the above-asked question: “who makes the decisions as to what direction the experimental
program will take?" The question of whether and how large scale institutions may be informed by this approach in a
way that adequately deals with this risk is perhaps one of the most significant and pressing considerations for political
philosophy, but it lies outside the scope of this essay.
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We simply wish to corıjecture that, through a refomıulated project of taking up responsibility for the ways in which
one's identity is discursively determined, one is able, if not to truly and completely determine one's identity in an extradiscursive and/or non-technologically conditioned way, to at least be freed from the confines of a total detemıination
by existing discursive codes.
The present thesis of quasi-self-detemıination in a technotopic environment is therefore a bringing together of the
emancipatory aspects of a freed relation to ones circumstances supplied by Dewey and a recognition ot' the limits on
the possibilities of this disposition by a Heideggerian admonitory recognition of the risks that would be involved if such
a program were attempted at the large-scale, institutional level. hi a sense, it is a compromise formation that recognizes
the lack ofrealism of both Dewey and Heidegger in their respective assessments of the possibilities of dealing with the
environment about which they wrote. For on the one hand, with respect to Dewey, one might ask: does instítutionalized
science ever really work according to an ethic and procedure of politically untainted free experímentalism? And of
Heidegger, we might ask, in light of the dismal picture painted concerning the state of affaiıs brought about by the
technological disposition of our culture: Is it really at all possible to perform a truly “authentic" “bringing forth" of
nature in an alêtheia that is adequate to the poiêsis of physis? From the point of view of the thesis being developed here,
the answer to these questions would be negative. The present project is offered asa way of applying the useful qualities,
both critical and positive, of each of these thinkers in a realistic program that simultaneously recognizes and attcmpts
to get beyond their deñciencies.
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THE STRANGENESS OF MAN AND THE QUESTION OF TECHNOLOGY
TODD LAVIN
“There is much that is strange, but nothing that surpasses man in strangeness“
- Sophocles
“We are necessarily strangers to ourselves”

- Friedrich Nietzsche
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Man is strange, wrote Sophocles. Yet, to us, these words may strike us as strange. Do we today confront ourselves as
strange, as uncamıy? “We are takirıg the strange, the uncanny, as that which casts us out of the “homelyj i.e. the
customary, familiar, secure,”3' writes Heidegger in his cornmentary on Sophocles' play Antigene. In Being ana' Time,
Heidegger had already used the word 'uncanny' in a like mamer, to mean “not-being-at-home” .”“ Later, in
Parmenides, Heidegger defmes the uncanny as “the extra-ordinary,”5 that which “strays “beyond' the ordinary.“
Do we today confront ourselves as unfamiliar, as unknown, in which we no longer feel at home within our own
selves? Or rather, do we not-find ourselves as what is most familiar, most ordinary and least strange? Is it not one of
the marks of modemity that man is no longer strange to himself, but through his own reason and reflection is able to
know himself fully and transparently? We fmd this expressed most clearly in Descartes. Man is disclosed to himself
through his own rational reflection, for man is first and foremost a rational being. This self-disclosure is immediate and
self-certain. What then could be less strange that we are to ourselves? Today, modern man still stands with Descartes.
Yet, to Descartes' self-certainty, Sophocles claims that man is strange, that indeed, he is the strangest.
Maybe it is this absence of uncanniness that is the most uncanny thing about our present humanity, and our very
familiarity with ourselves the sign that we are still 'unknown and strange to ourselves. Nietzsche wrote,“We are
unknown to ourselves, we men of knowledge - and with good reason. We have never sought ourselves [.. .] - So we
are necessarily strangers to ourselves, we do not comprehend ourselves, we have to misunderstand ourselves.“
Nietzsche implicated himself within this estrangement because he too is a man of knowledge. It is precisely our
prejudice of knowledge that conceals us from ourselves. Nietzsche responds directly to the project of modernity and
undermines its evaluation of knowledge and reason. We are strangers to ourselves precisely because we are no longer
strange to ourselves. We have created ourselves in the image of reason, yet such an image is merely a mask and a
deceptiorı. To know ourselves we must be lead beneath our reason and rediscover the strange and uncanny beings which
i

we ourselves are.
It is here that we need to take up the philosophy of Martin Heidegger, for it is he, even more than Nietzsche, who
takes up Sophocles° claim and leads us back to our uncarıniness, questioning rationality, the will-to-knowledge, and our
own self-understanding. The very project of modernity, the very project of the rationalization of the life-world, must
itself be questioned. “Nothing without reason - thus reads the formula [...] of a notion that is normative everywhere,
a notion to which we have entrusted our cognition.“ It is this norm of reason that Heidegger questions, exposing the
perversity of this norm and thus cleaı-ing a space for that which is beyond this norm. Yet, in doing so, Heidegger's
philosophy isthreatened with a perversity and strangeness all its own.
We cannot deny the period within which we write and think, an age of world civilization encoded by technology.
“The essence of teclmology is by no means anything technological,”° but rather ontological. It denotes a fundamental
relation of Being to man - precisely the relation that is dominated by the norm of reason. It is this norm, or principle,
of reason that “permeates and deterrnines what we call the spirit of modemity.”1° The principle reads: nothing is without
reason, nothing is without a why. Everything that is has its reason and this reason is capable of being “rendered to the
representing, thinking person.”“ The principle of reason reduced being to an object that can be comprehended and
grasped by a tln`nking subject, and thus reduces being to an object for the cognitive subject. Everything that is, demands
the principle of reason, is to be re-presented to cognition by the cognitive subject and for this subject. The principle of
reason thereby reduces being to what human cognjtion can secure for itself as its own object of cognition. In defining,
and thus limiting, being as an object of cognition, so too does the principle of reason defme and limit us to the cognitive
subject.
'
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The principle of reason is the guide of modern philosophy, of the spirit of modernity, and of this age of technology.
We exist, writes Heidegger, “in an age pervasively bepowered by the power of [reason].”” lt is not without thought
that Heidegger used the language of power for reason is power, the power of the cognizing subject seeking to gain
mastery over being and thus over itself. Under the power of reason, all that is becomes an object for the cognizing
subject and it is only within this realm that decisions are made about being. Humariity is now the rational subject before
whom being stretches out as the terrain to be subjected to its own rational ends. Modem technology is nothing but the
continuation and amplification of this power. Technology is continued reduction of being to a mere means for man,
through which man can realize his own self-detemiined ends. “Modern technology is a challenging,””' writes
Heidegger, for in modern technology, man challenges rieiture to supply endless energy for man to be stored at his
disposal. In modem technology, man seeks to subordinate nature to such an extend that it exists “immediately”'”' at our
disposal, wholly "something at our command.”'5 Being is thus reduced to a mere “standing-reserve”1° for man`s own
self-determined ends. In contrasting modern technology with previous fonns of rechne Heidegger writes, “the hydroe1e'ctn'c plant is not built into the Rhine River as was the old Wooden bridge [.. .]. Rather, the river is darnmed up into
the power plant.”” The change here is fundamental. No longer does man abide with the earth and receive his place and
his limits from the earth. Rather,'the earth is now set upon by man, and totally co-opted by man's own self-determined
ends. Thus technology is itself the glorification of man as the end of being. In technology, man is setup as the measure
of all things.
»

as

Man.. .exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth. In this way the illusion comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists
only insofar as it is his construct. This illusion gives rise to one final delusion: it seems as though man everywhere and always encounters
only himself."

To use a phrase of Nietzsche's, technology may be seen as the way of the Last Man, he who is unable to go beyond
himself, to leave the familiar. “Alas, the time is con1ing,”writes Nietzsche, “when man will no longer shoot the arrow
of his longing beyond man.”” Such is the last man, and such is technology, for it reduces being to man and man to a
Cognitive subject. The unfamiliar and strange is cast out for man now only confronts himself.
Stich a restriction is reflected in language and communication itself, a restriction of language to “an instnıment”1°
of man. Language too becomes a mere means for man, through which man can realize his own self-detennined ends.
in-formation, transmitted by instant and electronic news, whereby both the matter of which we
Language becomes
speak, and the reader or listener to whom we speak, are formed into means “to sectuely establish human domination.”“
The reader or listener is no longer spoken to as a thirıker, but asan information processor, who is communicated to only
so that this information processor can better dominate its world. Heidegger's words will remain, and must remain,
strange to such a reader or listener. Yet, maybe this uncanniness can become an occasion for the reader to rediscover
his or her own uncarminess.
The reduction of being to being mastered is also reflected in the shrinking of time and space. Heidegger wrote,
'

Man now reaches ovemight, by plane, places which forrnerly took weeks and months of travel. He now receives instant information,
by radio, of events which he formcrly leamed about only years later, if at all. [...] Man puts the longest distances behind him in the
shortest time. He puts the greatest distances behind himself and thus puts everything before himself at the shortage ran ge.“

'

Space and time are increasingly coming under the disposal of man for his own usage. Yet, what does all this “frantic
abolition of all distances”23 bring? It brings a world of familiarity, a world in which man finds himself entirely at home
for he created it in his own image. Yet, Nietzsche writes, “the earth has become small, and on it hops the last man, who
makes everything small. His race is as ineradicable as the flea~beetle; the last man lives longest.”“ Nietzsche isubverts
the accomplishments of technology. In making the earth small, in abolishing all distances and reducing the earth to the
last man's own level, the last man has not uplifted the earth. He has undennined its value and unleashed a wave of
nihilism. Heidegger would agree. Modern man, in his ability to gain mastery over the earth, has increasingly found
in technology the solution to the problems of human existence. Only through technology does modern man believe he
will fulfıll his humanity. Heidegger thinks otherwise. “The more decisively humans try to harness the 'mega-energies”
that would, once and for all, satisfy all human energy needs, the more impoverished becomes the human faculty for
building and dwelling in the realm of what is essential.”” Technology not only offers no solutions to the problem of
human existence; technology conceals the true nature of these problems so that no adequate solution may be given.
“Insight into the 'metaphysical' essence of technology is for us historically necessary if the essence of Westem historical
man is to be saved,”2° writes Heidegger. It is not in technology that we find the solution to the problems of human
existence, but in the demystification and indictment of technology. Technology, in reducing being to a mere means for
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man, conceals from man his own ııncanniness and thus conceals from man his own self. “Nowhere does man today any
and always
longer encounter himself, i.e., his essence,”” wrote Heidegger, and this precisely because “man everywhere
encounters only himself.”"
Modern man sees himself ever progressing towards a masteıy of nature and thus towards a masteıy of himself. “My
plan has never been more than to. ..build upon a foundation which is completely my own,”29 wrote Descartes. Modern
man still holds fast to the Cartesian dream, to build not only its epístemology, but its very existence wholly on a
foundation that is entirely of its own construction. And in modern technology, modern man is finding this dream
fulfilled. Yet, is modem man, in the midst of his own power, the measure of himself? Does technology give man the
rnasteıy and autonomy that he seeks, or rather, is not modem man himself included within and thus challenged by the
essence technology?
Man is challenged by the essence of modem technology in a fundamentally unique way. He is not so much set upon,
subordinated and exploited for another's end. Rather, he is set upon to subordinate and to exploit by the very essence
of technology. “Modern technology is no mere human doing,”3° writes Heidegger. Man may drive the instrumentality
of technology forwards, but it is the essence of teclmology, being as enframing, that drives man forward into a mode
of manipulation and exploitation. Modern man finds himself always and already in a world in which masteıy of nature
and the masteıy of himself guide the destiny of his history. When modern man thinks he thinlcs within this paradigm,
a paradigm over which he does not have masteıy.
The question of teclmology, therefore, can never be “whether technology makes man its slave or whether man will
be able tobe the master of technology.“ ' Heidegger reveals that these different altematives are not really different at
all. Both dwell within the 'metaphysical' essence of technology, that is, they both dwell within the same relation of
being to man. To be is to be mastered - and thus neither of these alternatives offers us options outside of the essence
of technology. To phrase the debate with technology thus is to already capitulate to technology. What then should be
the question conceming technology? It is not whether technology will master us or whether wewill master technology.
However, nor is it whether we are willing to step out of the metaphysical essence of technology and confront once again
our own strangeness. Both questions are too naive. Neither questions recognize the extent of the dominance of
teclmology, and the way the very concept of the will is itself part of this domination.
In this age in which even thinking has been reduced to technology, reduced to mere production and consumption
of information, wemust prepare ourselves to think, to think against information. Heidegger wrote,
“today [_..] we[...} consign our speaking to electronic thinking and calculating machines, an occurrence that will lead modem technology
and science to completely new procedures and unforeseeable results that probably will push reflective thinking aside as something useless

and hence superfluous”

for thought.
_In our thinking against information, we must recognize that all our thoughts are only preparations

Heidegger was by no means naive when it came to the dominance of technology and infonnation on the present age.
Seeking a transfonnation of humanity from out of its essential relation to Being is prernised on
the reacliness for such a change, before that the preparation for this readiness, before that artendin g to this preparation, before that the
impulse to such a preparation, before that the first rcmembrance into being. Everything that can be attempted to this end remains

“pre1iminary."”
The proper question conceming technology is whether we, while still dominated and framed by technology and thus
by the norm of reason, can hear what speaks within techrıology and reason. Paradoxically, the task at hand is not to
elevate our historical being beyond enframing ancl the power of reason, but to enter into this enframing all the more
primordially, to experience our historical being as wholly existing within the destiny of enframing. The greater we
understand ourselves within enframing, the greater will we understand that the essence of technology is neither
technological nor anthropological. The essence of technology is a relation of being to man. In discovering the truth
of teclmology, we will rediscover the truth of ourselves. We discover that we always and already exist in a relation with
being and thus it is only from out of this relation of being to man that any response to the essence of technology is
possible. “When we once open ourselves expressly to the essence of technology we find ourselves unexpectedly taken
into a freeing claim."3“ In finding ourselves taken into a freeing claim, we are not so much freed from enframing, as
we are freed within enframing. Our historical being still participates in the essence of technology, but in recognizing
the essence of technology for what it is, we are no longer liınited by it. Only if
are able to recognize the essence of
for
what
it
and
thus
are
we
able
to
and
indict
what is in the light of unrealizecl
is,
it,
technology
de-mystify
critique

we
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possibilities. Even in the midst of this freeing claim, the essence of technology still grants to modem man his own
destiny, but modern man will no longer have acquiesced to this destiny.

l

To “pay heed to the essence ofteclmo1ogy,”” to “ponder”3° and “watch over”” the world into which it destines us,
rather than to deny or avoid this destiny, become the task of this hour. This paper began with the question of the
uncanniness of being human, and we found this question itself uncanny because man no longer finds himself strange
in the midst of world in which he has created in his own image.
we truly pay heed to this world, do we not find
the strangeness of being htunan even here? Do we not find the un
Yeßt/if
anniness of being human precisely in this world in
which man confronts only himself? If previous generations had faced the reduction of one class to an appendage of the
machine by another class, today we fnd the reduction of all classes to a self-administrating society made possible by
the technologicalapparatus. Here all members wiflrin the society are reduced to a function of society, and are no longer
recognized beyond that function. Oppression is not removed but radically concealed aud thus transfonned. Since all
are now co-opted by the self-administrating teclınological society, the oppressed can no longer gain the recognition of
their own oppression from their oppressors, and thus no longer recognize themselves as oppressed. All are reduced to
an apparatus of this society, and through mass production and mass distribution made possible by modern technology,
the distance between authentic existence and mass culture is ever being eradicated. The predicament of modern man
is that “he is. ..thrown back on the paths that he himself has laid out, he becomes mired in his paths, caught in the beaten
track. . ..He turns round and round in his own circle,”” writes Heidegger. Thus, what is most strange is that modern mau,
in seeking to build its existence on a fotmdation that is completely its own, no longer has an existence to call its own.
Our identities, whether in terms of health, income, marital status, age, gender or race, are becoming more and more coopted by the anonymous system and made a function of this system. And, while we are losing control over our
identities, we are increasingly reduced to these artificial identities by the self-administrating society. We are recognized
only to the degree that our identities are fully encoded within the system. Thus, it is precisely in this techn ologically
advanced, self-administrating society, that we are no longer at home. The more we seek to master and secure our world,
the stranger that world becomes, and the more we cast ourselves out of any sense of the familiar and the secure. The
rational has become the iı-rational. It is in these moments that we begin to recognize the strangeness of our existence,
and of the essence of technology. And it is in these moments that we might begin to hear a deeper and more radical
'

strangeness.

T

_

Nothing is without reason, nothing is without why. So reads the principle of reason. Yet, in the midst of our rational
society, govemed by rational subjects, we fnd only the irrational. Everything has its reason, and yet the whole seems
irrational. It is in these moments, brought on by technology and the power of reason, that we begin to question the
principle of reason itself. “What reason is there for the principle of reason'?”39 In asking this question we move toward
“the edge of the abysses of thought,”4° yet only thus will we understand either the predicament of modern man or the
strangeness of the human condition. In the principle of reason, beingiis reduced to an object of cognition, man is
reduced to the cognitive subject, and it is “this relation between subject and Object [that] counts as the sole realm
wherein a decision is made about beings regarding their being.”4] The principle of reason is founded on being, for in
this principle “beings appear as objects. Being comes to shine in the objectness of objects.”“2 The principle of -reason
is a disclosure of being itself, a disclosure of being as an object for a cognizing subject. Thus, while a decision is made
about being within the principle of reason, it is “made solely in terms of the objectness of the object but never about
being itself.”“3 The principle of reason is made possible by being, but does not include being within itself. Being, as
the basis of this principle, falls outside of the principle of reason, for it is that by which this principle is. Being itself
does not fall within the orbit of the principle of reason; it cannot be encoded within this principle. “Accordingly,
groundlrcason is missing from being.”“ The principle of reason says: nothing is without reason, nothing is without why.
In hearing only the principle of reason, we remain deaf to that which is silent within this principle; we remain deaf to
being as such. Nothing is Withoutreason. Nothing is without why. In hearing only this, we remain deaf to the
reasonlessness and whylessness of being itself. Insofar as beings are, they have their reasons and their whys, but being
is without why. “Being 'is' the abyss.”“ To hear that which speaks in the principle of reason requires a leap, “the leap
from the principle of reason into the principle of being.”“°
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Yet, where does one leap to when one leaps from the principle of reason? “The leap itself hangs in the air. [Yet]
in what air, in what ether?” asks Heidegger. “Do we not fall into the fathomless with this leap?””
Whither are wemoving now? Away ii-om all suns? Are wenot plunging comiııually? Baelcward, sideward, forward, in all directions?
Is there any up or down left? Are wenot straying as through an infinite nothing? Do wenot feel the breath of empty space'?°”

In thinkingbeing as being, we fmd that which is “strangest of all,”"° we find that which casts us out of the customary,
the familiar and the secure. In thinking being as being, we fnd that which can no longer be rendered to the representing,
thinking subject, which can no longer be comprehended and thus reduced to an object of cognition. The cognitive
subject is deprived of its home, deprived of securing for itself its own rational, transparent world. In being as being,
we stray beyond the norm of reason, we stray beyond the ordinary and face that which is, and must remain, strange and
unknown. Being, as that which strays beyond the principle of reason, cannot be_ mastered or made familiar to rational
thought. Thought does not ground being; rather, being grounds thought and thus can never be made an adequate object
of thought. In leaping from the principle of reason into the principle of being, we leap into the strange, the uncanny,
into that which casts us out of any home that can be made secure or known.
The uncanniness of being must be made clear. It is not that being “is too pregnant with intelligibility, too pure for
our intellect,"5° asJacques Maritain wrote. It is not that being surpasses our intellect, but rather refuses it, indicts it as
amask and a deception. It is not that being harbors within itself its own why, a why that exceeds our cognition. Rather,
bbing is without a why and thus refuses the very project of cognition. In the fonner, being is still included within the
principle of reason as the supreme object of this principle. In the latter, being stands outside of the principle of reason
and de-mystifies this principle as supreme. In the language of Heidegger, “self-withdrawing is the manner that being
essentially comes to be.”5' “To being there belongs a self-concealing.”52 We may hear this as follows: without a why
is the manner that being essentially comes tobe. To being there belongs a whylessness.
So long as we seek a grotuıd and a why for being, we will find this leap to be a fall, a fall not into being but into the
absence of reason. So long as we continue to seek to give a reason for being in the sense of beings, we feel only the
breath of empty space. However, if we give up and relinquish the project of reason, and thus the project of modernity,
we leap not into nothingness but into being. Where does the leap lead us? Paraphrasing Angelus Silesius, it leads us
here: Being is without why: it is because it is. The “be-cause” is supposed to supply us with a reason for being. Yet,
in the statement, the “because' simply points being back to itself. In the 'because' we “tum our cognition loose”53 from
the principle of reason. In the *because* we “give way”“ to being without asking for a why. “We relinquish the matter
to itse1f,”“ no longer as an object of cognition that must be rendered back to a cognizing subject. Where does this leap
lead? It leads us into the innocent play of being, a play in which we ourselves stand. “Through this leap, thinking enters
into the breadth and depth of that play upon which our human nature is staked.”5°
It is here that we discover the true uncanniııess of the human being. We are the ones who stand within this whyless
play of being, we who are ushered into the uncanniness of being. “Hurnans stand in the openness of the projectiori of
being and suffer this understandingfsl We suffer this understanding in a two-fold sense. We suffer it because it is not
we who bring ourselves into this openness. We are brought into this openness by being. It is a passivity over which
we cannot gain mastery. Yet, we also suffer this understanding for, in standing in the openness of being, our own claims
to mastery and self-mastery are shattered. It is from being that man must receive his own place and his own limits. 'Ihe
Cartesian dream of building upon a foundation that is completely one's own is radically undermined. In suffering this
openness of being, man “becomes the strangest of all beings,” writes Heidegger, “because, without issue on all paths,
he is cast out of every relation to the faıniliar.”5“ In suffering this openness of being, man ceases to be at home within
his own rational reflectíon. Man strays beyond reason, beyond the familiar and the secure and into the uncanny. And
in this man is and must remain strange. “There is much that is strange,” wrote Sophocles, “but nothing that surpasses
man in strangeness”
Thus, what speaks within technology is our own uncanniness for it is this that speaks of man`s essential relation to
being. We must reclaim our own uncanniness if we seek to tmly address the problems of human existence. Today we
are encoded by teclmology. Today the power of reason holds sway and all things, language, understanding, society and
ourselves, are govemed by this power. Today everything is technological, administrated, and controlled. Yet, in the
midst of our historical destiny in within which nothing remains strange, we are increasingly finding the whole of this
destiny strange. If we persist within this uncanniness and seek to truly have ears for it, we may be lead into the uncanny,
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into being, itself. This nncaınıiness will remain strange, for “we men of knowledge” as Nietzsche wrote, will continue
to misunderstand it and ourselves. But a first remembrance into this
may become possible.
uncannineslf. Clarion
University, Pennsylvania
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